ACCEPTED 07-14-00444-CV SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 8/3/2015 3:21:54 PM Vivian Long, Clerk
No. 07-14-00444-CV
IN THE FILED IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 7th COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO, TEXAS AMARILLO, TEXAS 8/3/2015 3:21:54 PM VIVIAN LONG CLERK ________________________________________________________________________
PAUL EDWARD HUDSON Appellant
VS.
DALLAS COUNTY, CITY OF DALLAS, DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, PARKLAND HOSPITAL DISTRICT, AND DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND Appellees
________________________________________________________________________
Appealed from the rd 193 District Court of Dallas County, Texas
DALLAS COUNTY, CITY OF DALLAS, DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, PARKLAND HOSPITAL DISTRICT, AND DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND’S BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Edward Lopez, Jr. Bar No. 12563520 LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP 2777 N. Stemmons Freeway Suite 1000 Dallas, Texas 75207 (214) 880-0089 telephone (214) 754-7167 fax edwardl@lgbs.com dallas.litigation@lgbs.com Attorneys for Appellees TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. i LIST OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................................ ii - iii IDENTITY OF PARTIES................................................................................................ ii STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................ 1 ISSUES PRESENTED..................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................... 2 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. 2
ISSUE NO. 1: Based upon the briefing standards which all litigants must follow, whether any of Appellant’s “issues” represent a sustainable basis for appeal? ..................................................................................... 2
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the evidence presented by the Taxing Units was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s rulings and entry of judgment? .................................................................................................................. 4
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether this court should disturb the judgment entered by the trial court based upon arguments which were not affirmatively pled and raised for the first time on appeal? .............................................................. 6
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 6 PRAYER .......................................................................................................................... 7 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................... 8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ 8
-i- LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Case Law:
Adams v. First National Bank, 154 S.W.3d 859, 871 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2005, no pet.) ... 6 Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston, 453 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1970)........................... 5
Anheuser Busch v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d 928, 942 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1993, pet. denied) ................................................................................................................... 3 Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d 162, 163 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, no pet.) ..................... 4 In Re Becerra, 100 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no writ) ........................ 5 Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).................................................................... 4 Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982).................................................... 5 Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex. 1988) .......................................... 4 E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 34 (Tex. 1987) .................................... 6 Escamilla v. City of Laredo, 9 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) ............................................................................................................................. 6 Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Company, 881 S.W.2d 279, 284, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 843 (Tex. 1994) ............................................................................... 4 Greenstreet v. Heiskell, 940 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1997, no writ) .......... 2 Hall v. Timmons, 987 S.W.2d 248, 256 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1999, no pet.) ..................... 3 Hays Consolidated Independent School District v. Valero Transmission Company, 645 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. App. –Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ......................................... 5 Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. 1982) ........................................... 5 Labrador Oil Co. V. Norton Drilling Co., 1 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1999, no pet.) ...................................................................................... 3 Larsen v. FDIC/Manager Fund, 835 S.W.2d 66, 75 (Tex. 1992) ......................................... 6 Leyva v. Leyva, 960 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. App. –El Paso 1997, no writ) .......................... 3 Most Worshipful Prince Hall v. Jackson, 732 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............................................................................. 3 Phifer v. Nacogdoches County Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) ................................................................................................ 5 Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).................................................. 4
- ii - Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2004, pet denied), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1076, 125 S. Ct. 928, 160 L.Ed 2d 816 (2005) .............. 2, 4 Webb v. Johns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 1972) ................................................................ 5
Rules of Procedure/Statutes:
Tex. R. App. P.1.1.................................................................................................................. 2 Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) .......................................................................................................... 6 Tex. R. App. P. 38, 38.1(e) .................................................................................................... 3 Tex. R. App. P 38.1(g) and (h) .............................................................................................. 3 Tex. Prop. Tax Code § 33.47(a) ............................................................................................ 2, 5
- iii - STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of an action filed by Dallas County, City of Dallas, Dallas Independent
School District, Dallas County School Equalization Fund, Parkland Hospital District and Dallas
County Community College District in their capacity as taxing units situated in Dallas County,
Texas (the “Taxing Units”) seeking to recover unpaid and delinquent ad valorem business personal
property taxes on property within their jurisdictional boundaries.
The defendants in the underlying trial case were Gloria J. Roque, a/k/a Gloria J. Lee, d/b/a
Old School Night Club, a/k/a Old School Club and Paul Edward Hudson d/b/a Old School Night
Club a/k/a Old School Club. Both parties appeared in court on the trial date of November 10, 2014
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue No. 1: Based upon the briefing standards which all litigants must follow, whether any of
Appellants “issues” represent a sustainable basis for appeal?
Issue No. 2: Whether the evidence presented by the Taxing Units was legally sufficient to
support the trial court’s rulings and entry of judgment?
Issue No. 3: Whether this court should disturb the judgment entered by the trial court based
upon arguments which were not affirmatively pled and raised for the first time on appeal?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action filed by Dallas County, City of Dallas, Dallas Independent School
District, Dallas County School Equalization Fund, Parkland Hospital District and Dallas County
Community College District in their capacity as taxing units situated in Dallas County, Texas (the
“Taxing Units”) seeking to recover unpaid and delinquent ad valorem business personal property
Appellees’ Brief Page 1 07-14-00444-CV taxes on property located at 2910 S. Lamar Street, Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.
Following a bench trial at which both defendants appeared, the trial court considered the
evidence, records and testimony presented by the parties and entered judgment in favor of the
Taxing Units. On November 10, 2014, the Honorable Judge M. Kent Sims signed a judgment
awarding the liquidated claims for delinquent ad valorem business personal property taxes.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The procedures in a suit to collect delinquent ad valorem business personal property taxes
are fairly simple and straight-forward. The taxing units are permitted to establish their prima facie
case by introducing portions of the tax roll by certified record. Once introduced, the records
establish each and every element necessary for the trial court to grant judgment in favor of the
Taxing Units. Tex. Prop. Tax Code § 33.47. That process was followed by the Taxing Units in
this case. There was no error by the court and the judgment was supported by the evidence. In
the absence of fundamental error, an appellate court has no discretion to reverse an otherwise
error-free judgment. For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Issue No. 1: Based upon the briefing standards which all litigants must follow, whether any
of Appellants “issues” represent a sustainable basis for appeal?
All parties appearing in the appellate courts of Texas must conform to the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.–Dallas
2004, pet denied), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1076, 125 S.Ct. 928, 160 L.Ed 2d 816 (2005). Tex. R.
App. Pro. 1.1. A pro se litigant is required to properly present his case on appeal, just as he is
required to do at the trial court. Strange, 126 S.W.2d at 678. If this were not the rule, pro se
Appellees’ Brief Page 2 07-14-00444-CV litigants would be given an unfair advantage over those parties represented by counsel.
Greenstreet v. Heiskell, 940 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1997, no writ).
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth the required contents and organization
for an appellant’s brief. See, Tex. R. App. P. 38. One such requirement is that appellant’s brief
must concisely state all issues or points presented for review. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e). An issue
presented in an appellants brief is considered sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate
court to the particular error from which the complaint is made. Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d
162, 163 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, no pet.). This guideline is not met when an appellant merely
utters brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations. Moreover, the complete
absence of legal authority or the complete failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue
waives the complaint on appeal. See, Leyva v. Leyva, 960 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. App. –El Paso
1997, no writ).
To avoid the possibility of waiver due to inadequate or deficient briefing, a party must
ensure that arguments raised in support of a position are adequately supported by authority and any
necessary record references. Labrador Oil Co. V. Norton Drilling Co., 1 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.–
Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Hall v. Timmons, 987 S.W.2d 248, 256 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1999, no
pet.). Moreover, if the brief fails to refer to pertinent portions of the record, the court may decline
to make an independent search of the record. Anheuser Busch v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d
928, 942 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1993, pet. denied); Most Worshipful Prince Hall v. Jackson, 732
S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). If the factual recitation lacks the
necessary references to the record that are required by Appellate Rule 38.1(g) and (h), it cannot
provide a basis for the reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
Appellees’ Brief Page 3 07-14-00444-CV On appeal, an appellant bears the burden of discussing his assertions of error. An appellate
court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine
whether there was error. Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 678. When reviewing a civil matter, an appeals
court cannot consider an issue not raised in appellant’s brief, even if the ends of justice would so
require. Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d at 163-64. Nor can an appeals court speculate as to
the substance of the specific issues an appellant urges the court to consider. Strange, 126 S.W.3d
at 678.
Appellant’s Brief is wholly deficient and inadequate to preserve any error on appeal. The
Brief is a disjointed, incoherent and random collection of arguments without any reference to the
record or authority to support the position taken. Because the Brief is wholly inadequate, and
unsupported by the evidence and record, Appellant has waived all prospective issues on appeal.
See, Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Company, 881 S.W.2d 279, 284, 37
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 843 (Tex. 1994). Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Issue No. 2: Whether the evidence presented by the Taxing Units was legally sufficient to
When considering a “no evidence” or “legal sufficiency” point on appeal, the courts of
appeal can consider only the evidence favorable to the decision of the trier of fact and must
disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d
518, 522 (Tex. 1988). In considering a factual sufficiency point, the appellate court should assess
all the evidence and reverse for a new trial only if the challenged finding is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715
S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). In a bench trial,
the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses/evidence and the weight to be
Appellees’ Brief Page 4 07-14-00444-CV given to their testimony. Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. 1982). It may
resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of any one witness as well as in the
testimony of different witnesses. Webb v. Johns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 1972). The trial
judge can reject or accept any witnesses’ testimony/evidence, in whole or in part. In Re Becerra,
100 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no writ).
In this case, the evidence was presented by way of certified governmental records (with
accompanying affidavits) and no live witnesses were called. As such, the court weighed the only
admissible and uncontroverted evidence which was presented. The evidence presented by the
Taxing Units relative to their taxes was consistent with state law. Section 33.47(a) of the Texas
Property Tax Code provides in relevant part:
(a) In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit’s current tax roll and delinquent tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the property and the amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest accrued constitute prima facie evidence that each person charged with a duty relating to the imposition of the tax has complied with all requirements of law and that the amount of tax alleged to be delinquent against the property and the amount of penalties and interest due on that tax as listed are the correct amount. (emphasis added)
The Texas Supreme Court has broadly interpreted and applied this section of the Tax Code.
See Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982). Once introduced, certified tax
records create a prima facie case "as to every material fact necessary to establish [their] cause of
action, including that defendants owned the subject property and owed the amounts claimed.
Phifer v. Nacogdoches County Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000,
pet. denied); see also Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982); Hays
Consolidated Independent School District v. Valero Transmission Company, 645 S.W.2d 542, 545
(Tex. App. –Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston, 453
Appellees’ Brief Page 5 07-14-00444-CV S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1970). Once the presumption is created, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to
introduce evidence in support of its claim that it did not own the subject property or owe the
amounts alleged. Escamilla v. City of Laredo, 9 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
pet. denied). For this reason, the evidence supported the entry of the court’s judgment and
should not be disturbed.
Issue No. 3: Whether this court should disturb the judgment entered by the trial court based
upon arguments which were not affirmatively pled and raised for the first time on appeal?
It is an established rule of Texas procedure, that absent fundamental error, an appellate
court has no discretion to reverse an otherwise error-free judgment based upon a new argument
raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Larsen v. FDIC/Manager Fund, 835
S.W.2d 66, 75 (Tex. 1992); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 34 (Tex.
1987)(per curiam). A party cannot complain on appeal about a trial court’s failure to award relief
when the party never pled for the relief in the trial court. Adams v. First National Bank, 154
S.W.3d 859, 871 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2005, no pet.)
Additionally, Appellant’s Brief raises issues which were not perfected at trial or in any post
judgment pleading. For this reason, this court should affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CONCLUSION
Appellant’s appeal should be denied and the judgment of the trial court affirmed for the
reason that Appellant has failed to provide this Court with any basis for reversal. His brief fails to
meet the requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and it is devoid of any cohesive,
coherent and reasoned analysis. For these reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Appellees’ Brief Page 6 07-14-00444-CV PRAYER
Appellees, the Taxing Units, pray that the Court affirm the Judgment of the trial court,
deny all relief requested by Appellant and award the Taxing Units their respective costs on appeal.
Respectfully Submitted,
LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP
Edward Lopez, Jr. State Bar No. 12563520 2777 N. Stemmons Freeway, Suite 1000 Dallas, Texas 75207 Tel. (214) 880-0089 Fax (214) 754-7167 Dallas.litigation@lgbs.com
Attorney for Appellees Dallas County, et al
Appellees’ Brief Page 7 07-14-00444-CV CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word and
contains 2,666 words, as determined by the computer software’s word-count function, excluding
the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
Edward Lopez, Jr.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This will certify that on this the 3rd day of August, 2015 the undersigned attorney served a
copy of Appellees’ Brief upon the following parties:
Paul Edward Hudson Via CM/RRR #7014 1820 0000 2078 8389 2935 Sundial Dr. Dallas, TX 75229
Appellees’ Brief Page 8 07-14-00444-CV