Paul Boynton Co. v. Morris Chute Co.

87 F. 225, 30 C.C.A. 617, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 1788
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1898
DocketNo. 4
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 87 F. 225 (Paul Boynton Co. v. Morris Chute Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paul Boynton Co. v. Morris Chute Co., 87 F. 225, 30 C.C.A. 617, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 1788 (3d Cir. 1898).

Opinion

DALLAS, Circuit Judge.

The patent for consideration in this case was issued to John P. Newburg on September 17, 1889, and is numbered 411,255. Although five of its six claims are alleged to have been infringed, but three of them have been urgéd upon the attention of this court, and these are as follows:

(1) “In an inclined pleasure railway, in combination with an inclined way and track which is located or erected near a body of water, a boat-shaped car or toboggan, adapted, when it reaches the foot of the incline, to enter and float forwardly on the water, substantially as described.”
(4) “In combination with the boat-shaped car or toboggan, the spray deflectors fixed to its sides, substantially as described.”'
(6) “In combination with an inclined railway, which may be located near a body of water, a boat-shaped car or toboggan, having runners, J, guard plates, K, and spray deflectors, I, substantially as described.”

1. It is not necessary to add anything to the opinion of the learned judge of the circuit court in support of his conclusion that the first claim, if its terms should be regarded as controlling, is void for lack of novelty. This has not been conceded by the appellant, but it has not been very strenuously denied, and we have no doubt about it. It is, however, contended that this claim, though expressly inclusive of any “boat-shaped car or toboggan adapted * * * to enter and float forwardly on the water,” should be construed to be exclusive of any such device which is not also “adapted to prevent the shipping of water and splashing of occupants.” It is insisted that this limitation may be found in the specification and drawings, and that from them it may be imported into the claim. But we cannot accept either branch of this proposition. We are not at liberty to add to or vary the claim by reference to other parts of the patent, nor is there anything contained in it upon which the amendment desired (if allowable) could reasonably be founded. If interpretation of the claim were requisite, the specification might, of course, be resorted to for the purpose of arriving at a better understanding of its meaning, but this may not be done “for the purpose of changing it and making it different from what it is.” White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47, 7 Sup. Ct. 72. We are asked, not to construe an ambiguous claim, but to ingraft upon a perfectly plain one a restrictive qualification, which the patentee wholly omitted to “particularly point out” when he applied for his patent, and which it is proposed shall now be inserted only because the exigency of the appellant’s case demands it. Authority to do this has not been vested in the courts. “The claim is a statutory requirement prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is, and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.” White v. Dunbar, supra. The words, [227]*227“substantially as described,” do not warrant the insertion of an additional element in the claim. The combination, as there defined, does not include any provision against splashing, and by no reference to the context can the requirement that an applicant shall “particularly point out and distinctly claim” his invention be evaded. The words ••'substantially as described” must, therefore, be related to the matter designated (Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. National Car Brake-Shoe Co., 110 U. S. 229, 4 Sup. Ct. 33); and a patentee who has claimed either more or less than was necessary cannot, in a suit for infringement, be relieved from the consequences (McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419-425, 12 Sup. Ct. 76; Durand v. Schulze, 10 C. C. A. 97, 61 Fed. 819).

It would be as futile as it is inadmissible to explore the other parts of the patent for discovery of anything to justify the interpolation of a spray-deflecting device into this claim. If it were possible to sustain it as broadly as it is stated, the appellant might well insist that the sjjeciflcation and drawings supply no pretext for narrowing it by construction, and the question presented is, of course, the same where a constrictive interpretation is invoked by the owner of a patent as where it is sought to impose it upon him against his will. At the outset the specification informs us that:

“This invention relates to improvements in coasters or inclined pleasure railways; and the main feature of the invention consists in an inclined track or way erected near a lake, river, or any other suitable body of water, and a car or toboggan in the form of a boat, adapted to move or slide downwardly over said incline, mainly by the force of gravity, and at the foot of the incline to enter and float upon the body of water as it is propelled by the momentum acquired in its descent over the inclined railway. Besides this main feature, certain novel means are employed in carrying out my invention, as hereinafter described.”

Not one word, it will be observed, is here said about spray deflect ors. On the contrary, comparison of this general description with the first claim shows them to be, so far as the toboggan is concerned, substantially identical. All that is material in either is that it is said in the one that the toboggan is to be “in the form of a boat adapted to * i:‘ * enter and float upon the body of water,” and in the other that it is to be “a boat-shaped car or toboggan, adapted * * (0 enter and float forwardly on the water.” Manifestly, the meaning of the language here quoted is, in each instance, precisely the same; and nothing further is anywhere said about the toboggan, except as follows:

“X have sliown in the drawings a preferred form of construction for the boat-shaped car or toboggan, G, similar in the outlines to an ordinary flatboat, with its flat bottom curved or sloped upwardly at its forward end, g, so that it will enter the water without any shock or concussion, its rear end, gi, partly sloped upwardly and partly vertical, and with vertical or approximately vertical sides, g2, and with seats, ii, for the passengers. On each side of the toboggan it is preferable, also, to have a spray-deeilcting board, I, which is broad at its rear end, runs to a point at its forward end, and which is fixed in position on the car or toboggan, as shown, with its upper edge or side in about same horizontal plane as the top of the boat. These boards will deflect tlie spray or water outwardly, which is thrown upwardly by the rapid movement of the car or toboggan, and prevent it striking ihe occupants thereof. The spray deflected by each board, I, may be utilized to produce a pleasant effect on the eye by means [228]*228of a scroll-shaped or'convoluted plate, i, placed at the upper edge or side of each board, X, as shown at Fig. 7, which will concentrate the spray and discharge it from the rear end of the scroll in an ornamental stream.”

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Bluebook (online)
87 F. 225, 30 C.C.A. 617, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 1788, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-boynton-co-v-morris-chute-co-ca3-1898.