Patterson v. Williams Sr

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided July 21, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-01267·Unknown

Opinion

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL PATTERSON, Case No. 2:20-cv-01267-GMN-NJK

Petitioner, v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE BRIAN WILLIAMS, SR., et al., Respondents. Pro se Petitioner Christopher Michael Patterson, a Nevada state prisoner, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This habeas matter is before the Court on for initial review under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.1 For the reasons discussed below, Patterson is ordered to show cause in writing why his federal petition should not be dismissed as time-barred. He must also resolve the filing fee.2 Patterson challenges a conviction and sentence imposed by the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada (“state court”). State of Nevada v. Patterson, Case No. C-11- 277884-1.3 Following a seven-day trial, a jury found Patterson guilty of kidnapping, sexual assault, battery, open or gross lewdness, and child abuse or neglect. On September 29, 2015, the state court entered a judgment of conviction. Patterson filed a direct appeal. On March 31, 2017, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed Patterson’s conviction. Patterson v. State of Nevada, Case No. 68917. His conviction became final under federal law on June 29, 2017, when the time expired 1 All references to a “Habeas Rule” or the “Habeas Rules” in this order identify the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 2 Patterson also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 1-2). The Court defers consideration of the motion until after he has responded to the order to show cause and resolved the filing fee. 3 The Court takes judicial notice of the online docket records of the Eighth Judicial District Court and Nevada appellate courts. Those docket records may be accessed by the public online at: https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/default.aspx and http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseSearch.do. for him to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. On December 19, 2018, Patterson filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus (“state petition”) seeking post-conviction relief. The state petition was denied as untimely, and Patterson appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, and a remittitur issued in April 2020. Patterson v. State of Nevada, Case No. 78687-COA. Patterson represents that he mailed, or handed to a correctional officer for the purpose of mailing, his federal petition on July 3, 2020, initiating this case. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 11.) Pursuant to Habeas Rule 4, the assigned judge must examine the habeas petition and order a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019). This rule allows courts to screen and dismiss petitions that are patently frivolous, vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, false, or plagued by procedural defects. Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one-year limitation period for state prisoners to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The one-year limitation period, i.e., 365 days, begins to run from the latest of four possible triggering dates, with the most common being the date on which the petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final by either the conclusion of direct appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For a Nevada prisoner pursuing a direct appeal, a conviction becomes final when the 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expires after a Nevada appellate court has entered judgment or the Nevada Supreme Court has denied discretionary review. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005); Sup. Ct. R. 13. The AEDPA limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed” state post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, an untimely state petition is not “properly filed” and thus does not toll the federal statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). Patterson’s conviction became final under AEDPA on June 29, 2017, after the Nevada Court of Appeals decided his direct appeal and the time expired for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.4 The AEDPA statute of limitations began running the following day. Absent another basis for tolling or delayed accrual, the AEDPA deadline expired 365 days later on June 29, 2018. Although Patterson filed the state petition on December 19, 2018, it was filed nearly six months after the expiration of the AEDPA limitations period and thus could not have tolled an already expired deadline. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if the state petition had been filed before the AEDPA statute of limitations expired, however, it would not have tolled the federal deadline because the state petition was untimely and the state court and denied as such. Because the state petition was not timely under Nevada law, it was not “properly filed” for the purposes of tolling the AEDPA deadline. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. Therefore, without another basis for tolling or delayed accrual, the AEDPA deadline expired on June 29, 2018, and Patterson’s federal petition, filed over two years later, is untimely on its face. Accordingly, Patterson must show cause why his petition should not be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred under § 2244(d). Patterson is informed that the one-year limitation period may be equitably tolled. Equitable tolling is appropriate only if the petitioner can show that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule,” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted)). The petitioner ultimately has the burden of proof on this “extraordinary exclusion.” Id. at 1065. He accordingly must demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstance and the lateness of his filing. E.g., Spitsyn v.

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