Paszkowski v. Chapman, No. Cv01 0072786s (Aug. 30, 2001)

2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12006
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedAugust 30, 2001
DocketNo. CV01 0072786S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12006 (Paszkowski v. Chapman, No. Cv01 0072786s (Aug. 30, 2001)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paszkowski v. Chapman, No. Cv01 0072786s (Aug. 30, 2001), 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12006 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE:
MOTION TO DISMISS
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-31, the defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiff alleges in her complaint dated November 27, 2000 that on December 3, 1998, she was on the premises of the Mohegan Sun Casino when she slipped and fell. She claims that she sustained personal injuries and monetary losses and that her injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on the grounds that they are being sued for actions undertaken in their official capacities as representatives of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, CT Page 12007 hereinafter referred to as the MTGA, and the Mohegan Tribe, respectively, both of which are sovereign entities entitled to immunity from suit. It is the defendants' claim that unless the Mohegan Tribe has expressly waived its sovereign immunity to a legal action by this plaintiff, she cannot recover against it or against its officials or employees for actions taken in their respective official capacities.

The plaintiff, in opposing the motion to dismiss, argues that the defendants are non-official tribal employees acting in a non-governmental capacity and, therefore, the defendants cannot invoke the Mohegan Tribe's immunity from suit.

At the time of the alleged incident, defendant Chapman was the Director of Facilities Operations of the Mohegan Sun Casino. The plaintiff alleges that he was negligent in failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition in that he knew or should have known of the "wet, slippery and defective condition of the floor"; that he failed to remove or clean up the "wet, slippery substance off of the floor where the plaintiff fell"; in that he failed to inspect the floor; and that he failed to warn the plaintiff of the condition.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant Ida was responsible for her injuries in his capacity as "a building official at the Mohegan Sun Casino." The theory of liability as to defendant Ida is identical to those claims asserted against defendant Chapman as set forth herein.

Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 10-31 a motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person and (3) improper venue. "A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court."Richardello v. Butka, 45 Conn. Sup. 336, (1997), Gurliacci v. Mayer,218 Conn. 531, 544 (1991). "A motion to dismiss is used to assert jurisdictional flaws that appear on the record or are alleged by the defendant in a supporting affidavit as to facts not apparent on the record." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Darien, 54 Conn. App. 178, 182 (1999), Bradley's Appeal from Probate, 19 Conn. App. 456, 461-62 (1989). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Darien, supra at 183, Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 567 (1990).

"The doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." CT Page 12008 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "The issue of tribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature." McClendon v.United States, 885 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Puyallup Tribe,Inc. v. Washington Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977). "A ruling on a motion to dismiss is neither a ruling on the merits of the action . . . nor a test of whether the complaint states a cause of action . . . rather, motions to dismiss are granted solely on jurisdictional grounds." (Citations omitted.) Discover Leasing, Inc. v. Murphy,33 Conn. App. 303, 306-307, 635 A.2d 843, 1993.

The Mohegan Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe whose sovereignty renders it immune from suit, absent authorization from Congress, unless the Mohegan Tribe explicitly waives its sovereign immunity. World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Management, LLC,117 F. Sup.2d 271, 275 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), citing Kiowa Tribe of Oklahomav. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700,140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998). "It is well established that Indian tribes possess the common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potowatomi IndianTribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); United States v. United States Fidelityand Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Bassett v. MashantucketPequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 356 (2d. Cir. 2000). This sovereign immunity extends to tribal agencies and commercial enterprises, as well. Garciav. Akwesasne Housing Authority, 105 F. Sup.2d 12, 15 (N.D.N.Y. 2000);Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch HousingAuthority, 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2000); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.

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Richardello v. Butka
717 A.2d 298 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1997)
Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson
47 F.3d 1061 (Tenth Circuit, 1995)
Mahoney v. Lensink
569 A.2d 518 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990)
Gurliacci v. Mayer
590 A.2d 914 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1991)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Peabody, N.E., Inc.
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Discover Leasing, Inc. v. Murphy
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2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paszkowski-v-chapman-no-cv01-0072786s-aug-30-2001-connsuperct-2001.