Parsons, Inc. v. Youngblood

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Parsons, Inc. v. Youngblood

125 S.E.2d 518, 105 Ga. App. 583, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 986

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 21, 1962

Docket39181

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 125 S.E.2d 518 (Parsons, Inc. v. Youngblood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Parsons, Inc. v. Youngblood, 125 S.E.2d 518, 105 Ga. App. 583, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 986 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962).

Pincite

Opinions

Jordan, Judge.

It is contended that the allegations of paragraphs 8 and 9 are conclusions of the pleader in that they are contradicted by the allegations of fact contained in paragraph 10. To. sustain the demurrer, the court would necessarily have to' take judicial notice of a physical law. to the effect that because a mass placed precariously on end for a period of time remains upright; the fact that it eventually topples shows some other reason than the precarious balance to be the sole cause of the loss of equilibrium. We agree that such a situation suggests some additional force applied to the article than that of gravity, but do not agree that as a matter of law it can be said, where such situation exists, that imperfect balánce is eliminated as an element of proximate cause. The simple game of building a [585]*585“house of cards” amply demonstrates that an article may fall because of an imperfect foundation though the fall be not immediate. These special demurrers were properly overruled.

Where a person maintains a place of business at which he sells goods or dispenses services, such person owes a duty to those coming to the premises to trade with him of using ordinary care and caution to keep the premises in a safe condition (Lake v. Cameron, 64 Ga. App. 501, 505, 13 SE2d 856; Code § 105-401); and in the exercise of this duty, the merchandise and fixtures with which such person conducts his business, must not be so placed as to threaten injury to those visiting the store who are in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety. Tinley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 70 Ga. App. 390, 393 (28 SE2d 322).

The instant petition alleges that this twelve foot high roll of linoleum fell because it was negligently placed on a seven-inch base, with no further support provided; that this was an unsafe manner of. placing the merchandise which rendered its position dangerous; that it eventually fell on the plaintiff and injured him; that the defendant, who by its employee so placed the merchandise, knew it was unsupported and dangerous, and the plaintiff did not; and that this constituted a lack of ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for an invitee.

These allegations were sufficient to show a failure on the part of the defendant to comply with his duty of furnishing a safe place for his invitees, and that the breach of such duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Counsel for plaintiff in error argues in effect that since the roll did not fall immediately, and since the plaintiff’s pleadings cannot be aided by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it becomes apparent that the injury was due to some intervening force sufficient of itself to stand as the proximate cause of the injury. This does not follow. The mere fact that the injury would not and could not have resulted by reason of the defendant’s acts alone will not of itself be taken to limit and define the intervening agency as constituting the proximate cause. Rollestone v. Cassirer & Co., 3 Ga. App. 161, 173 (59 SE 442). “Where a defendant’s negligence sets in operation other causal forces; [586]*586which are the direct, natural, and probable consequences of that negligence, he may be held liable for injuries caused by the other forces; and where two concurrent causes naturally operate in causing an injury, there may be a recovery against both or either of the actors. . Reid v. Modern Roofing &c. Works, 89 Ga. App. 285, 286 (79 SE2d 31). The chain of causation is not broken by an intervening act which is a normal reaction to the stimulus of a situation created by negligence. Bass v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 205 Ga. 458, 474 (53 SE2d 895). A mass, such as this rug, precariously balanced may be caused to fall even by a slight gust of wind, yet wind, unless it be extraordinarily violent, is not such an intervening proximate cause as will insulate a defendant against his original negligence. Pollard v. Walton, 55 Ga. App. 353 (190 SE 396). Further, one who balances a mass in a precarious manner should anticipate that slight force, not sufficient ordinarily to suggest to the actor who does not know of the peril that injury will result, will be sufficient to cause damage. A negligent defendant is not relieved of the consequences of his negligence by an intervening act which in the normal course of events he should have anticipated might occur. Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (1) (42 SE 395, 59 LRA 109).

The plaintiff here alleged that the placing of the rug on an inadequate seven-inch base without further support constituted negligence on the part of the proprietor as to its invitee, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. He alleged no intervening cause, but if it be conceded that, under the facts alleged, construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, something else concurred with the placing of the rug to cause the loss of balance, this is a matter of defense, and it must be shown not only that such fact exists but that it was a force sufficient of itself to cause the injury regardless of the negligence of the defendant.

The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrers to the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Felton, C. J., Carlisle, P. J., Bell, Frankum, Hall and Russell, JJ., concur. Nichols, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., dissent.

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Jordan, Judge.

It is contended that the allegations of paragraphs 8 and 9 are conclusions of the pleader in that they are contradicted by the allegations of fact contained in paragraph 10. To. sustain the demurrer, the court would necessarily have to' take judicial notice of a physical law. to the effect that because a mass placed precariously on end for a period of time remains upright; the fact that it eventually topples shows some other reason than the precarious balance to be the sole cause of the loss of equilibrium. We agree that such a situation suggests some additional force applied to the article than that of gravity, but do not agree that as a matter of law it can be said, where such situation exists, that imperfect balánce is eliminated as an element of proximate cause. The simple game of building a [585]*585“house of cards” amply demonstrates that an article may fall because of an imperfect foundation though the fall be not immediate. These special demurrers were properly overruled.

Where a person maintains a place of business at which he sells goods or dispenses services, such person owes a duty to those coming to the premises to trade with him of using ordinary care and caution to keep the premises in a safe condition (Lake v. Cameron, 64 Ga. App. 501, 505, 13 SE2d 856; Code § 105-401); and in the exercise of this duty, the merchandise and fixtures with which such person conducts his business, must not be so placed as to threaten injury to those visiting the store who are in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety. Tinley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 70 Ga. App. 390, 393 (28 SE2d 322).

The instant petition alleges that this twelve foot high roll of linoleum fell because it was negligently placed on a seven-inch base, with no further support provided; that this was an unsafe manner of. placing the merchandise which rendered its position dangerous; that it eventually fell on the plaintiff and injured him; that the defendant, who by its employee so placed the merchandise, knew it was unsupported and dangerous, and the plaintiff did not; and that this constituted a lack of ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for an invitee.

These allegations were sufficient to show a failure on the part of the defendant to comply with his duty of furnishing a safe place for his invitees, and that the breach of such duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Counsel for plaintiff in error argues in effect that since the roll did not fall immediately, and since the plaintiff’s pleadings cannot be aided by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it becomes apparent that the injury was due to some intervening force sufficient of itself to stand as the proximate cause of the injury. This does not follow. The mere fact that the injury would not and could not have resulted by reason of the defendant’s acts alone will not of itself be taken to limit and define the intervening agency as constituting the proximate cause. Rollestone v. Cassirer & Co., 3 Ga. App. 161, 173 (59 SE 442). “Where a defendant’s negligence sets in operation other causal forces; [586]*586which are the direct, natural, and probable consequences of that negligence, he may be held liable for injuries caused by the other forces; and where two concurrent causes naturally operate in causing an injury, there may be a recovery against both or either of the actors. . Reid v. Modern Roofing &c. Works, 89 Ga. App. 285, 286 (79 SE2d 31). The chain of causation is not broken by an intervening act which is a normal reaction to the stimulus of a situation created by negligence. Bass v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 205 Ga. 458, 474 (53 SE2d 895). A mass, such as this rug, precariously balanced may be caused to fall even by a slight gust of wind, yet wind, unless it be extraordinarily violent, is not such an intervening proximate cause as will insulate a defendant against his original negligence. Pollard v. Walton, 55 Ga. App. 353 (190 SE 396). Further, one who balances a mass in a precarious manner should anticipate that slight force, not sufficient ordinarily to suggest to the actor who does not know of the peril that injury will result, will be sufficient to cause damage. A negligent defendant is not relieved of the consequences of his negligence by an intervening act which in the normal course of events he should have anticipated might occur. Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (1) (42 SE 395, 59 LRA 109).

The plaintiff here alleged that the placing of the rug on an inadequate seven-inch base without further support constituted negligence on the part of the proprietor as to its invitee, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. He alleged no intervening cause, but if it be conceded that, under the facts alleged, construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, something else concurred with the placing of the rug to cause the loss of balance, this is a matter of defense, and it must be shown not only that such fact exists but that it was a force sufficient of itself to cause the injury regardless of the negligence of the defendant.

The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrers to the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Felton, C. J., Carlisle, P. J., Bell, Frankum, Hall and Russell, JJ., concur. Nichols, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., dissent.

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125 S.E.2d 518, 105 Ga. App. 583, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 986, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parsons-inc-v-youngblood-gactapp-1962.

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