BOYD, Justice.
This is a consolidation of two suits, one by Ellis L. Parson and the other by J. E. Turner against the City of Texas City, for damages growing out of a collision of an automobile occupied by the wives of the plaintiffs with another automobile driven by one Raines, at a-crossing of two streets in the city of Texas City, in which collision both ladies were injured, it being alleged that the collision resulted from the “simultaneous display * * * of green or go-ahead lights to traffic moving in intersecting * * * directions at the intersection,” by a lighting signal suspended approximately thirty-five feet above the intersection, and that this condition of the lights had existed for several days, and created such an essentially dangerous traffic hazard as to constitute a nuisance. It was admitted that (1) the maintenance of a traffic control-signal device at the intersection involved was not an unreasonable means of direct[334]*334ing and controlling traffic at that intersection; (2) there was no appreciable risk of harm or damage to persons or property-resulting from the installation of the traffic control signal device so long as it was properly maintained; and (3) neither automobile involved in the collision came into physical contact with' the traffic signal, and neither changed its course either prior to or at the time of the collision in order to avoid physical contact with the traffic signal.
The City filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the pleadings of the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action, in that the erection and maintenance of traffic signal lights involved a governmental function and that the negligent operation of such traffic signal lights cannot be the basis of recovery against the City. The motion for summary judgment was sustained and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appellants urge for reversal a single point to the effect that it was error to sustain the motion for summary judgment because the continued maintenance of the defective traffic light created an essentially dangerous hazard and was a nuisance, and that the City is liable for maintaining a nuisance even though it be in connection with the exercise of governmental power.
It is well settled that a city, in the exercise of a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary or corporate function, is exempt from liability for damages oc-. casioned by its negligence in carrying out such function. City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118; City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 141 Tex. 201, 171 S.W.2d 480; City of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57; Barnes v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 1081, writ refused; Whitfield v. City of Paris, 84 Tex. 431, 19 S.W. 566, 15 L.R.A. 783; City of Houston v. Shilling, Tex.Sup., 240 S.W.2d 1010, 26 A.L.R.2d 935. Although there has been strong dissent from the holding that the maintenance and operation of an electric traffic control signal is a governmental function as being an incident to policing activities, Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 91 N.E.2d 401, we think such holding is sustained by the great weight of authority. Baker v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 499; Auslander v. City of St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778; Powell v. City of Nashville, 167 Tenn. 334, 69 S.W.2d 894, 92 A.L.R. 1493; Vickers v. City of Camden, 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.2d 613; Parsons v. City of New York, 273 N.Y. 547, 7 N.E.2d 685; Sandmann v. Sheehan, 279 Ky. 614, 131 S.W.2d 484; Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689; Cleveland v. Town of Lancaster, 239 App.Div. 263, 267 N.Y.S. 673; Martin v. City of Canton, 41 Ohio App. 420, 180 N.E. 78; Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okl. 536, 83 P.2d 594; Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357, 161 A.L.R., p. 1404; Avey v. City of West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So.2d 881; Hodges v. City of Charlotte, 214 N.C. 737, 200 S.E. 889. Appellants' concede that such is. the law. However, it has long been established that an exception to such immunity exists when a city creates or maintains a nuisance in connection with a governmental function. City of Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404, 12 S.W. 52; Wiggins v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 468, affirmed, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 761. Therefore, if the appellants have in fact alleged that the City created or maintained a nuisance, they have alleged a cause of action, and the summary judgment should not have been granted.
It appears that the case may be disposed of with the answer to this question: Is the continued maintenance of an automatic traffic control signal light which does not itself encroach upon a public street, but which is out of repair so as simultaneously to display green lights to traffic moving in intersecting directions, causing injury to a motorist, a “nuisance” within the principle making a municipality liable for the maintenance of a nuisance while the City is engaged in a governmental function? We believe that under the authorities the question must be answered “no.”
“Nuisance” covers many varied situations and is difficult to define. Kincaid v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 119 S.W.2d 1084; McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391, 57 A.L.R. 1.
[335]*335It has been held that for a city to be liable for creating or maintaining a nuisance, the nuisance must constitute an unlawful invasion of the rights of the complaining party. In Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565, 566, it was shown that the City maintained, a sew-age disposal cesspool on land where young children customarily played. The top of the cesspool resembled a sand pile and there wa9 no guard rail around the pit. The plaintiff’s seven year old child stepped onto the surface of the cesspool, sank into the pit and was drowned. It was alleged that the cesspool, with its misleading appearance and unguarded as it was, constituted a nuisance for which the City ought to be held liable, even though it was engaged in a governmental function in maintaining the cesspool. The City’s demurrer to the petition was sustained and Chief Justice Alexander, writing for the Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s judgment, said: “Plaintiffs’ second contention is that the cesspool constituted a nuisance, and that by reason thereof the City is liable for damages caused by the maintenance thereof. There are authorities which hold that a municipality is liable for damages caused by the maintenance of a nuisance, even though the municipality in maintaining the same is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function. 43 C.J. 956; 30 Tex.Jur. 537. However, in order to create liability for the maintenance of a nuisance, the nuisance must in some way constitute an unlawful invasion of the rights of others. 46 C.J. p. 653, sec. 18. For example, in the case of City of Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404, 12 S.W. 52, 15 Am.St.Rep.
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BOYD, Justice.
This is a consolidation of two suits, one by Ellis L. Parson and the other by J. E. Turner against the City of Texas City, for damages growing out of a collision of an automobile occupied by the wives of the plaintiffs with another automobile driven by one Raines, at a-crossing of two streets in the city of Texas City, in which collision both ladies were injured, it being alleged that the collision resulted from the “simultaneous display * * * of green or go-ahead lights to traffic moving in intersecting * * * directions at the intersection,” by a lighting signal suspended approximately thirty-five feet above the intersection, and that this condition of the lights had existed for several days, and created such an essentially dangerous traffic hazard as to constitute a nuisance. It was admitted that (1) the maintenance of a traffic control-signal device at the intersection involved was not an unreasonable means of direct[334]*334ing and controlling traffic at that intersection; (2) there was no appreciable risk of harm or damage to persons or property-resulting from the installation of the traffic control signal device so long as it was properly maintained; and (3) neither automobile involved in the collision came into physical contact with' the traffic signal, and neither changed its course either prior to or at the time of the collision in order to avoid physical contact with the traffic signal.
The City filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the pleadings of the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action, in that the erection and maintenance of traffic signal lights involved a governmental function and that the negligent operation of such traffic signal lights cannot be the basis of recovery against the City. The motion for summary judgment was sustained and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appellants urge for reversal a single point to the effect that it was error to sustain the motion for summary judgment because the continued maintenance of the defective traffic light created an essentially dangerous hazard and was a nuisance, and that the City is liable for maintaining a nuisance even though it be in connection with the exercise of governmental power.
It is well settled that a city, in the exercise of a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary or corporate function, is exempt from liability for damages oc-. casioned by its negligence in carrying out such function. City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118; City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 141 Tex. 201, 171 S.W.2d 480; City of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57; Barnes v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 1081, writ refused; Whitfield v. City of Paris, 84 Tex. 431, 19 S.W. 566, 15 L.R.A. 783; City of Houston v. Shilling, Tex.Sup., 240 S.W.2d 1010, 26 A.L.R.2d 935. Although there has been strong dissent from the holding that the maintenance and operation of an electric traffic control signal is a governmental function as being an incident to policing activities, Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 91 N.E.2d 401, we think such holding is sustained by the great weight of authority. Baker v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 499; Auslander v. City of St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778; Powell v. City of Nashville, 167 Tenn. 334, 69 S.W.2d 894, 92 A.L.R. 1493; Vickers v. City of Camden, 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.2d 613; Parsons v. City of New York, 273 N.Y. 547, 7 N.E.2d 685; Sandmann v. Sheehan, 279 Ky. 614, 131 S.W.2d 484; Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689; Cleveland v. Town of Lancaster, 239 App.Div. 263, 267 N.Y.S. 673; Martin v. City of Canton, 41 Ohio App. 420, 180 N.E. 78; Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okl. 536, 83 P.2d 594; Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357, 161 A.L.R., p. 1404; Avey v. City of West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So.2d 881; Hodges v. City of Charlotte, 214 N.C. 737, 200 S.E. 889. Appellants' concede that such is. the law. However, it has long been established that an exception to such immunity exists when a city creates or maintains a nuisance in connection with a governmental function. City of Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404, 12 S.W. 52; Wiggins v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 468, affirmed, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 761. Therefore, if the appellants have in fact alleged that the City created or maintained a nuisance, they have alleged a cause of action, and the summary judgment should not have been granted.
It appears that the case may be disposed of with the answer to this question: Is the continued maintenance of an automatic traffic control signal light which does not itself encroach upon a public street, but which is out of repair so as simultaneously to display green lights to traffic moving in intersecting directions, causing injury to a motorist, a “nuisance” within the principle making a municipality liable for the maintenance of a nuisance while the City is engaged in a governmental function? We believe that under the authorities the question must be answered “no.”
“Nuisance” covers many varied situations and is difficult to define. Kincaid v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 119 S.W.2d 1084; McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391, 57 A.L.R. 1.
[335]*335It has been held that for a city to be liable for creating or maintaining a nuisance, the nuisance must constitute an unlawful invasion of the rights of the complaining party. In Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565, 566, it was shown that the City maintained, a sew-age disposal cesspool on land where young children customarily played. The top of the cesspool resembled a sand pile and there wa9 no guard rail around the pit. The plaintiff’s seven year old child stepped onto the surface of the cesspool, sank into the pit and was drowned. It was alleged that the cesspool, with its misleading appearance and unguarded as it was, constituted a nuisance for which the City ought to be held liable, even though it was engaged in a governmental function in maintaining the cesspool. The City’s demurrer to the petition was sustained and Chief Justice Alexander, writing for the Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s judgment, said: “Plaintiffs’ second contention is that the cesspool constituted a nuisance, and that by reason thereof the City is liable for damages caused by the maintenance thereof. There are authorities which hold that a municipality is liable for damages caused by the maintenance of a nuisance, even though the municipality in maintaining the same is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function. 43 C.J. 956; 30 Tex.Jur. 537. However, in order to create liability for the maintenance of a nuisance, the nuisance must in some way constitute an unlawful invasion of the rights of others. 46 C.J. p. 653, sec. 18. For example, in the case of City of Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404, 12 S.W. 52, 15 Am.St.Rep. 840, a municipality operated a dump yard in such manner as to cause noxious and offensive odors to invade the premises of an adjoining landowner and injure his health. No such facts are here alleged as are necessary to bring the cesspool in question within the class of the nuisance there referred. to. * *
In Braun v. Trustees of Victoria Independent School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 947, 948, writ refused, it was alleged that the trustees of the School District had caused or allowed a ligustrum tree near the buttress of the front steps of the school building to be pruned so that the branches were sharp pointed, “resembling spears and daggers,” which condition was-known to the trustees. The plaintiff’s minor daughter fell off of the'buttress, where it-was customary for children to stand, and was severely injured upon coming in contact with the sharp limbs of the tree, and the contention was that the tree, with its sharp branches in such close proximity to the buttress, created a hazardous, and dangerous condition and constituted a nuisance erected or permitted by the trustees. A general demurrer was sustained to the petition, and in affirming, the Court of Civil Appeals said: “What is the difference in alleging that the agents' of the school district were negligent in maintaining the lig-ustrum tree under all the circumstances and in alleging that under all the circumstances the ligustrum tree was a nuisance and that the agents of the school were negligent in maintaining and not abating the nuisance? The question of a nuisance becomes relevant when, by the maintenance of a nuisance, private property or property rights have been involved. * * * In addition to what we have above decided, we are, of the opinion that the ligustrum tree under all the circumstances was not of such inherent danger as to be regarded in law as a nuisance, and this case presents nothing more than a negligence case. Galling the freshly pruned ligustrum tree a nuisance does not make this a different suit than if appellant had simply alleged negligence’ in the maintenance of the ligustrum tree.”
In Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 168 S.W.2d 1080, 1082, the plaintiff’s-husband lost his life in a fire that destroyed the city jail, in which he was confined on a charge of - drunkenness. It was alleged that the jail was located a long distance from other houses where people lived; ■ there .were no means of communication with persons outside; there were no fire extinguishers, no fire protection, and no watchman; the building was of sound-proof and airtight construction with no openings for ventilation; was so constructed that an inmate could not reach an outer door; trash, papers, grease,, oil, cigarette stubs, and other combustible' material had accumulated [336]*336in the jail for a long period of time “to the knowledge of said City of Craig and the officers and mayor thereof,” and that such construction and negligent maintenance of the jail in such condition for a long period of time constituted a nuisance. In affirming a judgment sustaining a general demurrer, the court held that the -real basis of plaintiff’s claim was negligence and not nuisance, and the city therefore was not liable, citing 41 Am.Jur., p. 899; 43 C.J., p. 1168, 63- C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 903; 46 A.L.R., p. 103; Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485; Brown’s Adm’r v. Town of Guyandotte, 34 W.Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707, 11 L.R.A. 121. See also McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo.App. 337, 62 P. 231; Nichols v. Town of Fountain, 165 N.C. 166, 80 S.E. 1059, 52 L.R.A., N.S. 942; Lahner v. Incorporated Town of Williams, 112 Iowa 428, 84 N.W. 507.
In Baker v. City of Waco, supra, it was held that damages occasioned by the failure of the employees of the City to flash a yellow light and to ring a warning bell to warn persons using the street that an emergency vehicle was about to pass the intersection were not recoverable, even though the City customarily gave such warning, and that the allegation that such situation constituted a nuisance was a conclusion not sustained by the fact allegations of the petition. A demurrer was sustained to plaintiff’s petition and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment.
When a city, in the exercise of its governmental function of controlling traffic, uses means that constitute a dangerous physical obstruction of the street, it commits an affirmative wrong for which recovery will be allowed. Baker v. City of Waco, supra; Murphy v. Incorporated Village of Farmingdale, 252 App.Div. 327, 299 N.Y.S. 586; Mayor and Aldermen of City of Vicksburg v. Harralson, 136 Miss. 872, 101 So. 713, 39 A.L.R. 777; Town of Hobart v. Casbon, 81 Ind.App. 24, 142 N.E. 138. But in.many jurisdictions it has been held that a municipality -owes no. legal duty to the public to erect, maintain, or repair traffic signal lights. Vickers v. City of Camden,. supra; Parsons v. City of New York, supra; Sandmann v. Sheehan, supra; Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, supra; Cleveland v. Town of Lancaster, supra; Martin v. City of Canton, supra; Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okl. 536, 83 P.2d 594.
If a city owes no legal duty to the public to repair and maintain in good working order a traffic signal light it has installed, it would seem that its failure to do so would not constitute an unlawful invasion of the rights of a complaining party, under the rule laid down in Gotcher v. City of Farm-ersville, supra.
We believe that the weight of authority in this state and other jurisdictions is to the effect that to constitute a nuisance the danger must be inherent in the thing itself, beyond that arising from negligence in its use,' and are constrained to hold that the maintenance of the signal light in the condition described in appellants’ pleadings did not constitute a nuisance making the City liable, and that the court did not err in sustaining appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
We are not unmindful of the rule that the doctrine of nonliability is strictly construed against the municipality. City of Houston v. Shilling, supra. Nor do we extend this opinion to explore the possibility that the doctrine should be reconsidered in the light of the suggestion, often repeated, that it is unsound in theory and wrong in practice. We are bound by the authorities. Moreover, if there be need for such reconsideration, we think it is .a legislative, rather than a judicial, prerogative. City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, supra; Brown V. City of Craig, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.
MASSEY, C. J., dissents.