Parra v. Administrative Office of the United States Courts

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-0206
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RAVEL FERRERA PARRA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:26-cv-00206 (TNM)

DAVID J. BRADLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

For Ravel Ferrera Parra lawsuits beget lawsuits. Here, he complains about how the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of Texas handled another case. Because the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Parra’s claims, it will sua sponte dismiss the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3).

I.

A few years ago, Parra sued United Airlines in Texas state court. See Notice of Removal,

Ferrera-Parra v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-01053-DHP (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2019). The

airline removed the case to the Southern District of Texas, where it won dismissal. See Final J.,

Ferrera-Parra v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-01053 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021).

Unhappy with that outcome, Parra now looks to this Court. Proceeding pro se, he sues

the former Chief Judge (Lee H. Rosenthal) and the Clerk of Court (David J. Bradley) for the

Southern District of Texas. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18, ECF No. 13. He is suspicious of

how these defendants handled his filings in the prior case. See id. ¶ 14. That concern manifests

in claims for “Declaratory Relief Concerning Administrative Handling and Procedural

1 Traceability,” id. ¶¶ 48–52, and “Prospective Injunctive Relief and Limited Procedural

Discovery,” id. ¶¶ 53–57. Defendants have not yet appeared.

II.

Courts hold complaints filed by pro se litigants to “less stringent standards” than

pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, pro se litigants

must comply with the Federal Rules. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).

That includes Rule 8, which demands that the plaintiff plead facts that bring the suit within the

court’s jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). “If the [district] court determines at any time that it

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see

Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 102, 106 (D.D.C. 2014). Because the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Parra’s claims, it will dismiss the Complaint.

The first clue that Parra has not satisfied Rule 8 is his failure to cite the federal law under

which his claims arise. That matters because he invokes the Court’s federal question

jurisdiction. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 11 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). And a plaintiff properly

invokes federal question jurisdiction “only when a federal question is presented on the face of

the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987). Neither of Parra’s claims invoke any federal law (or indeed, any law at all). See Second

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48–57. Besides 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the only law Parra cites is the Declaratory

Judgment Act. Id. ¶ 11. But that Act “is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.”

Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Sols. & Servs. Inc., 774 F.3d 18, 25 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Without a

federal question, the Complaint flunks Rule 8.

Even putting that flaw aside, the Court would have to dismiss the Complaint because it

“lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of other federal courts.” Klayman v. Rao, 49 F.4th 550,

2 552 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (cleaned up). At bottom, Parra criticizes how another court

handled his case. He admits that he already raised his concerns about his filings with the judge

handling the prior case. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Unsatisfied with how that judge

handled his objections, Parra now asks this Court to comb through his old filings. See, e.g., id.

¶ 29 (directing the Court to “SDTX docket chronology”); id. ¶ 51(a) (requesting “a declaration

clarifying” the “procedural handling” of the filings). The Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct

such a task. See, e.g., Doe v. Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., 2025 WL 1134961, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 15,

2025) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claims arising out of court proceedings

in another district); Azaryev v. Wolff, 2025 WL 3771300, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2025)

(explaining that a plaintiff cannot “circumvent” “the determinations of” one court by filing a

second lawsuit).

Unsuccessfully attempting to skirt this jurisdictional bar, Parra emphasizes that he “does

not request reversal of adjudicative determinations entered in [the prior case].” Second Am.

Compl. ¶ 13; see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 2, 52, 57. That disclaimer offers no help. This Court lacks

jurisdiction over a sister court’s ultimate decision, as well as its intermediate decisions. See Doe,

2025 WL 1134961, at *5 (reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction over complaints about

“legal filings” and “public docketing” in a case pending in another judicial district).

Nor does it help that Parra targets “administrative” action. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 2, 14, 49. This Court lacks supervisory power over “a clerk in a different federal district.”

Doe, 2025 WL 1134961, at *5 (cleaned up). Parra’s requested relief—an injunction ordering the

Southern District of Texas Clerk to take actions—runs headlong into that limit. See Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 58–60. So this is yet another indication that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Parra’s

claims. See, e.g., In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (affirming

3 dismissal of a complaint asking this court to compel the Supreme Court Clerk of Court to act);

Doe, 2025 WL 1134961, at *5 (reasoning that a district court cannot order other “clerks to file

and docket [plaintiff’s] petitions and other filings” (cleaned up)).

All of these problems confirm that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Parra’s Complaint.

The appropriate avenue for raising Parra’s concerns was a timely appeal from the Texas

decision—not a new lawsuit. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Obama, 6 F. Supp. 3d 31, 44 (D.D.C. 2013).

III.

Having concluded that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Parra’s Complaint, the Court

must dismiss it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). That dismissal is without prejudice. See N. Am.

Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2020). A separate Order will issue 2026.07.09 today. 11:51:14 -04'00'

Dated: July 9, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.