The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY July 23, 2020
2020COA115
No. 19CA1375 Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G. —
Family Law — Marriage and Rights of Married Persons —
Putative Spouse
A division of the court of appeals considers whether a party
may attain putative spouse status under section 14-2-111, C.R.S.
2019, after a magistrate determined that no common law marriage
existed. The division concludes that the putative spouse statute
does not apply because the absence of a common law marriage is
not an impediment to the existence of a legal marriage. Thus, the
division affirms the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s
order denying the motion to amend a pleading to add the putative
spouse claim. The division also concludes that the magistrate and the
district court abused their discretion in awarding attorney fees and
costs pursuant to sections 13-17-101 and 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2019,
because the appellant, although unsuccessful, presented an
arguably meritorious legal theory on an issue of first impression in
Colorado. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA115
Court of Appeals No. 19CA1375 Mesa County District Court No. 18DR30130 Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G., a Child,
and Concerning Patrick Goldsworthy,
Appellee,
and
Tammy Tatarcuk,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Richman and Dunn, JJ., concur
Announced July 23, 2020
Catherine C. Burkey P.C., Catherine C. Burkey, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Feather Legal Services P.C., Gerald B. Feather, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Tammy Tatarcuk believed that she and Patrick Goldsworthy
were common law married. A magistrate, however, determined that
no common law marriage existed. In response, Ms. Tatarcuk
attempted to attain putative spouse status under section 14-2-111,
C.R.S. 2019, which allows a party, under certain circumstances, to
obtain spousal rights even though no legal marriage existed. The
magistrate denied her request, and the district court adopted the
magistrate’s order.
¶2 This appeal raises a novel issue: May a party attain putative
spouse status after a court determines that no common law
marriage existed? We say no. The putative spouse statute affords
spousal rights when a marriage is invalid due to some impediment
to the existence of a legal marriage, and the absence of a common
law marriage is not such an impediment. We therefore affirm the
district court’s judgment with respect to the magistrate’s denial of
Ms. Tatarcuk’s motion to amend her petition.
¶3 Ms. Tatarcuk also appeals the magistrate’s and district court’s
rulings awarding attorney fees and costs to Mr. Goldsworthy.
Because Ms. Tatarcuk’s claim presented an arguably meritorious
legal theory on an issue of first impression in Colorado, the
1 magistrate and the district court abused their discretion in
awarding attorney fees and costs under sections 13-17-101 and
13-17-102, C.R.S. 2019. We reverse those portions of the
judgment.
I. Background
¶4 Ms. Tatarcuk and Mr. Goldsworthy lived together for over ten
years and had a son, D.P.G.
¶5 After the relationship soured, Mr. Goldsworthy petitioned for
an allocation of parental responsibilities. A month later,
Ms. Tatarcuk initiated a dissolution of marriage proceeding, alleging
that the two were common law married. Mr. Goldsworthy denied
the existence of a marriage. The two cases were consolidated.
¶6 The magistrate held a hearing to determine whether a common
law marriage existed. The magistrate acknowledged that some
evidence showed that the parties cohabited and held themselves out
as husband and wife, but he concluded that this evidence was
insufficient to establish the existence of a common law marriage.
¶7 Ms. Tatarcuk did not challenge this determination. Instead,
she moved to amend her petition, requesting maintenance and a
division of the property and debt as a putative spouse under section
2 14-2-111. In her amended petition, Ms. Tatarcuk alleged that she
had resided with Mr. Goldsworthy “for over 10 years under
circumstances that at least caused [her] to believe in good faith that
they were married.”
¶8 The magistrate denied Ms. Tatarcuk’s request. He explained
that the right to claim putative spouse status under section
14-2-111 must be read in conjunction with section 14-2-110,
C.R.S. 2019, which prohibits certain marriages, including (1) a
marriage or civil union entered into before the dissolution of an
earlier marriage or civil union; (2) a marriage between an ancestor
and a descendant or between a brother and a sister; and (3) a
marriage between an uncle and a niece or between an aunt and a
nephew. The magistrate concluded that because Ms. Tatarcuk did
not allege any facts showing she was an innocent spouse who had
entered into a prohibited marriage, she had “no legal basis” to
assert a claim as a putative spouse. The magistrate also granted
Mr. Goldsworthy’s request for attorney fees and costs under section
“13-17-101” and later entered an award of $567.50.
¶9 Ms. Tatarcuk petitioned the district court to review the
magistrate’s orders. The district court determined that, while
3 putative spouse status is not limited to the prohibited marriages
listed in section 14-2-110, that statute must be read in conjunction
with the putative spouse statute. It then concluded that the
putative spouse statute “was not designed to provide a party that
has received an adverse ruling on the existence of a common law
marriage, to have a second bite of the proverbial apple.” And it
adopted the magistrate’s determination denying the motion to
amend.
¶ 10 The district court also considered Ms. Tatarcuk’s claim that
“no basis” existed for the magistrate’s award of attorney fees and
costs. The court noted that Ms. Tatarcuk filed her petition for
review before the magistrate entered a final order determining the
amount of the attorney fees and costs and that she did not seek
review of the final order. The court recognized, however, that
Ms. Tatarcuk did not object to the amount requested by
Mr. Goldsworthy, and it concluded that, given the record support
for the magistrate’s order, the decision to award attorney fees and
costs was appropriate.
¶ 11 Last, the court granted Mr. Goldsworthy’s request for attorney
fees and costs incurred in connection with Ms. Tatarcuk’s petition
4 for review of the magistrate’s order. It found that the petition
lacked substantial justification because Ms. Tatarcuk’s putative
spouse claim had “no legal or factual basis in this case, particularly
after the unchallenged finding that the parties did not have a valid
common law marriage.” The court ordered Ms. Tatarcuk to pay
Mr. Goldsworthy an additional $385.50 in attorney fees and costs.
¶ 12 Ms. Tatarcuk now appeals.
II. Adequacy of Opening Brief
¶ 13 As an initial matter, Mr. Goldsworthy argues that we should
strike Ms. Tatarcuk’s opening brief because it does not comply with
the appellate rules. Specifically, he asserts that her brief does not
state, under a separate heading before each issue, (1) the applicable
standard of review with citation to supporting legal authority and
(2) whether the issue was preserved and the precise location where
the issue was raised and ruled on in the record. See C.A.R.
28(a)(7)(A).
¶ 14 While Ms. Tatarcuk did not fully comply with this requirement,
the deficiencies in her brief do not hamper our ability to conduct a
meaningful appellate review. See Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d 857,
861 (Colo. App. 2011) (stating that an appellate court will consider
5 the level of noncompliance with the appellate rules in deciding
whether to impose sanctions); Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs,
252 P.3d 30, 32 (Colo. App. 2010) (considering the merits despite a
party’s noncompliant brief). In the interest of judicial economy, we
decline to strike Ms. Tatarcuk’s brief. See People v. Durapau,
280 P.3d 42, 50 (Colo. App. 2011).
III. Standard of Review
¶ 15 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s
decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re
Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 8. We review de novo the district
court’s and magistrate’s conclusions of law but accept the factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1132 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 16 Our review of a court’s denial of a motion to amend, in turn, is
generally limited to determining whether the court abused its
discretion. Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 14. But when the
court denies the motion because the requested amendment is futile,
the issue is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
6 IV. Putative Spouse
¶ 17 Ms. Tatarcuk contends that the facts and circumstances of
this case fit squarely within the provisions of section 14-2-111 and,
thus, that the district court and magistrate erred in denying her
motion to add her putative spouse claim. We disagree.
¶ 18 A putative spouse is a “person who has cohabited with another
to whom he or she is not legally married in the good faith belief that
he or she was married to that person.” § 14-2-111. A person’s
putative spouse status terminates when the person obtains
“knowledge of the fact that he or she is not legally married.” Id. A
putative spouse has the same rights as a legal spouse, including
the right to maintenance, “whether or not the marriage is prohibited
under section 14-2-110, declared invalid, or otherwise terminated
by court action.” Id.
¶ 19 At first glance, the language of section 14-2-111 appears to
support Ms. Tatarcuk’s claim. She alleged that she cohabited with
Mr. Goldsworthy and held a good faith belief that they were
common law married until the magistrate found that no such
marriage existed. But, as the district court noted, we cannot read
section 14-2-111 in isolation. See In re Marriage of Joel, 2012 COA
7 128, ¶ 19 (recognizing that the marriage statutes must be read
together and harmonized when possible).
¶ 20 Section 14-2-111 recognizes that putative spouse status may
be invoked when a marriage is prohibited under section 14-2-110.
See, e.g., Combs v. Tibbitts, 148 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo. App. 2006).
These situations include marriages or civil unions entered into
before the dissolution of a prior marriage or civil union and
marriages between certain family members. See
§ 14-2-110(1)(a)-(c).
¶ 21 Section 14-2-111 also recognizes that a putative spouse claim
may exist when a court invalidates a marriage. A court shall
invalidate a marriage when a party (1) lacked capacity to consent to
the marriage; (2) lacked the physical capacity to consummate the
marriage; (3) was under age and did not have consent or judicial
approval; (4) entered the marriage based on fraud; (5) entered the
marriage under duress; or (6) entered the marriage as a jest or a
dare. § 14-10-111(1)(a)-(f), C.R.S. 2019. A court shall also declare
a marriage invalid when it is prohibited by law for the reasons
provided in section 14-2-110. See § 14-10-111(1)(g).
8 ¶ 22 While putative spouse status is not limited to the instances of
a prohibited marriage or an invalid marriage, we look to these
statutes to guide us in determining the scope of section 14-2-111.
See Joel, ¶ 19. In doing so, and considering that “[s]ection
14-2-111 was enacted to protect innocent participants in
meretricious relationships and the children of those relationships,”
People v. McGuire, 751 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Colo. App. 1987), we
cannot agree with Ms. Tatarcuk that section 14-2-111 allows a
person to attain putative spouse status when she fails to establish
the existence of a common law marriage. Rather, the putative
spouse statute seeks to afford spousal rights to an individual who
held a good faith belief that he or she was validly married to
another but, in fact, was not married due to some impediment that
prevented the existence of a legal marriage. See Williams v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 670 P.2d 453, 455 (Colo. App. 1983); see
also Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1128 (Nev. 2004)
(explaining that a majority of states recognize the putative spouse
doctrine either through case law or statute and that it requires one
or both parties to have had a good faith belief that no impediment
to the marriage existed and that the marriage was valid and proper);
9 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage § 92, Westlaw (database updated May
2020) (“[A] ‘putative marriage’ is a matrimonial union which is
contracted in good faith by at least one of the parties, but which is
in fact invalid because of some legal infirmity or some impediment
on the part of one or both parties.”) (footnotes omitted).
¶ 23 Ms. Tatarcuk alleged no impediment to the existence of a valid
marriage with Mr. Goldsworthy. Rather, the parties did not engage
in a marriage of any type. Both statutory and common law
marriages require the mutual consent or agreement of both parties
to the creation of a marital relationship. See § 14-2-104(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2019 (providing that a valid marriage exists if, among other
requirements, it is solemnized); § 14-2-109, C.R.S. 2019 (describing
solemnization and registration of marriages); see also People v.
Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 663 (Colo. 1987) (“A common law marriage is
established by the mutual consent or agreement of the parties to be
[married] . . . .”). A marriage cannot be created through the
unilateral belief of one party, even if that party held a good faith
belief that he or she was married. See Lucero, 747 P.2d at 663; see
also In re Marriage of Hogsett, 2018 COA 176, ¶ 20 (“[I]f one party to
a purported common law marriage believes she is married, but the
10 other party does not, a marriage cannot be established.”) (cert.
granted in part Sept. 30, 2019).
¶ 24 Ms. Tatarcuk and Mr. Goldsworthy did not have a ceremonial
marriage, and the magistrate determined that no common law
marriage existed. Ms. Tatarcuk did not challenge the common law
marriage determination or dispute the lack of a ceremonial
marriage. See C.R.M. 7(a)(12) (stating that if timely district court
review is not requested, a magistrate’s determination becomes the
district court’s order and further appeal of the order is barred). The
magistrate therefore did not “terminate[]” a marriage, “declare[ a
marriage] invalid,” or determine that a marriage was “prohibited
under section 14-2-110.” § 14-2-111. And there was no other
impediment to the existence of a marriage. It just never existed.
Thus, we conclude that the lack of a marital relationship, in any
form, prevents Ms. Tatarcuk from obtaining spousal rights as a
putative spouse under section 14-2-111.
¶ 25 And we are not persuaded that In re Estate of Yudkin, 2019
COA 25 (cert. granted in part Sept. 30, 2019), on which
Ms. Tatarcuk relies, suggests that a party may attain putative
spouse status following a court’s determination that no common
11 law marriage existed. Although the division in that case referred to
the parties as “putative spouses,” id. at ¶ 1, Yudkin did not
consider, let alone mention, section 14-2-111 or the rights of a
putative spouse. It instead reviewed and ultimately reversed a
magistrate’s decision that no common law marriage existed.
Yudkin, ¶¶ 13-18. Yudkin thus has no relevance to the issue
presented here.
¶ 26 We therefore perceive no error in the district court’s adoption
of the magistrate’s order denying Ms. Tatarcuk’s motion to amend
her petition.
V. Attorney Fees and Costs Orders
¶ 27 Ms. Tatarcuk next contends that the district court erred in
upholding the magistrate’s award of attorney fees and costs and in
imposing its own award of attorney fees and costs against her. We
agree.
A. Jurisdiction
¶ 28 To start, Mr. Goldsworthy argues that Ms. Tatarcuk’s appeal of
the magistrate’s attorney fees and costs order is untimely and thus
should be dismissed.
12 ¶ 29 The district court may review only a final magistrate order.
C.R.M. 7(a)(3); see In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 8. An
order is final when it “fully resolves an issue or claim.” C.R.M.
7(a)(3); see also Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Guarantee Co. of
N. Am. USA, 2019 COA 44, ¶ 24 (recognizing that an attorney fees
award is separately appealable from a judgment on the merits).
¶ 30 We may not review a magistrate’s order unless a timely
petition for review has been filed and decided by the district court.
C.R.M. 7(a)(11); see People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 2. Seeking
review prematurely, however, does not prevent a court’s review
when a final order on the issue is subsequently entered and cures
the jurisdictional defect. See Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244,
246-47 (Colo. 2006); 1405 Hotel, LLC v. Colo. Econ. Dev. Comm’n,
2015 COA 127, ¶¶ 33-34.
¶ 31 Ms. Tatarcuk filed her petition for district court review of the
magistrate’s denial of her motion to amend and decision to award
attorney fees and costs before the magistrate entered a final order
on attorney fees and costs, and she did not later petition for review
of that final order. But the magistrate entered his final order on
attorney fees and costs before the district court ruled on
13 Ms. Tatarcuk’s petition for review, which cured the jurisdictional
defect. See Musick, 136 P.3d at 246-47. The district court then
reviewed the final order and adopted it. See C.R.M. 7(a)(10). We
thus do not agree with Mr. Goldsworthy that Ms. Tatarcuk’s appeal
of the attorney fees and costs order is untimely.
B. Discussion
¶ 32 We review a court’s determination of whether to award
attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Tognoni,
313 P.3d 655, 660-61 (Colo. App. 2011). A court abuses its
discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. Whiting-Turner Contracting
Co., ¶ 56. “But we review de novo the legal analysis employed by
a . . . court in reaching its decision on attorney fees.” Colo. Citizens
for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207, 1220
(Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 33 A court may award attorney fees against a party who has
brought a claim that lacked substantial justification — meaning, as
relevant here, that it was substantially frivolous. See
§§ 13-17-101, -102(4). A claim is frivolous when the proponent can
present no rational argument based on the evidence or the law to
14 support the claim. W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063,
1069 (Colo. 1984).
¶ 34 “Meritorious actions that prove unsuccessful and good faith
attempts to extend, modify, or reverse existing law are not
frivolous.” City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 620
(Colo. 2005). A court may not award attorney fees when a party
“makes a good faith presentation of an arguably meritorious legal
theory upon which no determinative authority in Colorado exists.”
McCormick v. Bradley, 870 P.2d 599, 608 (Colo. App. 1993); accord
Cruz v. Benine, 984 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Colo. 1999).
¶ 35 No prior Colorado case directly addresses the issue presented
by Ms. Tatarcuk — whether a party may seek putative spouse
status following a court’s determination that a common law
marriage did not exist. In the absence of case law preventing such
a claim, Ms. Tatarcuk argued that, under the plain language of
section 14-2-111, she was entitled to amend her petition to seek
relief as a putative spouse because she had cohabited with
Mr. Goldsworthy and held a good faith belief that she was married
to him. Given the circumstances and that no case specifically held
15 that relief was not appropriate under section 14-2-111, such an
argument was not without merit.
¶ 36 Indeed, the merit of Ms. Tatarcuk’s argument is evidenced by
the fact that the magistrate and the district court disagreed on the
reason for rejecting it. The magistrate relied on the lack of any
factual allegation that Ms. Tatarcuk was an innocent spouse who
had entered into a prohibited marriage under section 14-2-110.
The district court, however, noted that the putative spouse statute
was not limited to the specific instances listed in section 14-2-110
and, instead, concluded that a person could not attain putative
spouse status after a determination that a common law marriage
did not exist. And, as explained above, we resolve Ms. Tatarcuk’s
putative spouse claim on a slightly different rationale than either
the district court or magistrate.
¶ 37 Ms. Tatarcuk thus presented a rational argument in support
of her claim based on an arguably meritorious legal theory for
which no determinative authority in Colorado existed. Although the
magistrate, the district court, and we have rejected her argument,
that does not mean it was frivolous. Accordingly, the record does
not support the magistrate’s and the district court’s determinations
16 that Ms. Tatarcuk’s attempt to amend her petition to add a putative
spouse claim was frivolous, and we reverse their awards of attorney
fees and costs.1
VI. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 38 Last, Mr. Goldsworthy requests an award of attorney fees and
costs incurred on appeal under C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-101
because, he argues, the appeal lacked substantial justification.
Given our reversals of the magistrate’s and the district court’s
awards of attorney fees and costs, we deny his request. In re
Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 41; see also Mission Denver
Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984) (“Because a lawyer
may present a supportable argument which is extremely unlikely to
prevail on appeal, it cannot be said that an unsuccessful appeal is
necessarily frivolous.”).
1In addition, while the magistrate and the district court allowed Mr. Goldsworthy to recover costs under sections 13-17-101 and 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2019, those statutes provide only for an award of attorney fees, not costs.
17 VII. Conclusion
¶ 39 We affirm the portion of the district court’s judgment denying
Ms. Tatarcuk’s motion to amend and reverse the portions of the
judgment awarding Mr. Goldsworthy attorney fees and costs.
JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE DUNN concur.