Estate of Petri

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 17, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0430
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0430 Estate of Petri 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0430 Adams County District Court No. 23PR30553 Honorable Sara Price, Magistrate

In re the Estate of Dennis Garth Petri, deceased.

Donna Strickland,

Appellant,

v.

Dianna Lee Mayo and Christopher Turner Esq. in his capacity as Special Administrator for the Estate of Dennis Garth Petri,

Appellees.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDER AFFIRMED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Brown and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025

Donna Strickland, Pro Se

Francis Law L.L.C., Rory L. Francis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Dianna Lee Mayo

Gantenbein Law Firm LLC, Keith Gantenbein Jr., Christopher Turner, Christopher Pike, Wheat Ridge, Colorado, for Appellee Christpher Turner Esq. in his capacity as Special Administrator for the Estate of Dennis Garth Petri ¶1 In this probate case, Donna Strickland challenges two district

court magistrate orders — one granting Diana Lee Mayo’s putative

spouse claim for intestate distribution of decedent Dennis Garth

Petri’s estate and the other appointing Christopher Turner as

special administrator over the estate. She also challenges

payments made to Turner. We affirm as to the first order and

dismiss the appeal with prejudice as to the second order and any

challenge to the payments to the special administrator. We remand

the case to the district court for a determination of appellees’

reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

I. Background

¶2 After the decedent died without a will, Strickland, the

decedent’s spouse of twenty years, applied for an informal

appointment as personal representative. Mayo objected to the

appointment, claiming that she had a common law marriage with

the decedent, see § 14-2-109.5, C.R.S. 2024, or was, in the

alternative, his putative spouse, see § 14-2-111, C.R.S. 2024. Mayo

also alleged that, one day after the decedent’s death, several of the

decedent’s relatives forcibly entered the decedent and Mayo’s house,

1 took his personal property, changed the locks, and threw a Fourth

of July party at the house.

¶3 Given Mayo’s objection and trespass allegations, the

magistrate appointed Turner to manage the decedent’s estate until

the court ruled on Mayo’s marriage claims.

¶4 After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Mayo’s common

law marriage claim, granted her putative spouse claim, and ordered

that “Mayo shall be considered the decedent’s legal spouse for the

purposes of intestate distribution.” Turner remained the special

administrator because Mayo didn’t seek appointment as the estate’s

personal representative.

II. Discussion

¶5 Strickland contends that the magistrate erred by (1)

misapplying the putative spouse statute; (2) exceeding her authority

in ruling on Mayo’s putative spouse claim; and (3) prematurely

appointing Turner as special administrator. She also contends that

payments to Turner for his services as special administrator were

unauthorized because of the improper appointment. We address

these contentions in turn.

2 A. Putative Spouse Designation

¶6 Strickland first contends that the magistrate erred by finding

that Mayo was a putative spouse under section 14-2-111 for

purposes of intestate distribution. She argues that the putative

spouse statute doesn’t apply because Mayo and the decedent were

never legally married. We reject this argument.

1. Additional Facts

¶7 Strickland married the decedent in 2003, but they separated

in 2005 when Strickland moved away from Colorado, resettled in

another state, and eventually entered into a committed relationship

with another individual. Strickland testified that she and the

decedent knew about each other’s committed relationships.

¶8 Mayo testified that she and the decedent started dating and

cohabitating in 2018 and lived together in the same house most of

the time. She didn’t have concerns regarding the decedent’s marital

status because she believed that he had been married and divorced

twice. Mayo said the decedent proposed to her in 2020 with an

engagement ring, they both wore wedding bands, and they

celebrated an anniversary.

3 ¶9 Three disinterested witnesses testified to their belief that the

decedent and Mayo were married because the couple cohabitated,

referred to themselves as husband and wife, and wore wedding

bands. In her order, the magistrate found these witnesses’

testimony credible and persuasive but found the testimony of

Strickland’s daughter and the decedent’s stepdaughter, on which

Strickland relied, not credible.

2. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Strickland’s first argument raises an issue of statutory

construction. We review such questions de novo. State ex rel.

Weiser v. Ctr. for Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc., 2023 CO 23, ¶ 35.

3. Applicable Law

¶ 11 Colorado’s statute defining a putative spouse provides, “A

person who has cohabited with another to whom he or she is not

legally married in the good faith belief that he or she was married to

that person is a putative spouse . . . .” § 14-2-111. “A putative

spouse acquires the rights conferred upon a legal spouse, including

the right to maintenance following termination of his or her status,

whether or not the marriage is prohibited under section 14-2-

110 . . . .” Id. Section 14-2-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, prohibits, in

4 pertinent part, “[a] marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of

an earlier marriage of one of the parties.”

¶ 12 In interpreting these statutes, we seek to effectuate the

General Assembly’s intent and apply words and phrases according

to their plain and ordinary meanings. Ctr. for Excellence in Higher

Educ., ¶ 35. We also “read the statutory scheme as a whole, giving

consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” Id.

If we perceive no ambiguity in the statutory language, we apply it as

written. Id.

4. Analysis

¶ 13 By its plain terms, section 14-2-111 doesn’t require the

existence of a valid marriage between the putative spouse and the

person to whom she believes she is married (or the lack of a valid

marriage between that person and a third person) for one to qualify

as a putative spouse. Instead, the statute confers the rights

associated with a valid marriage on a putative spouse when (1) she

cohabitated with a person “to whom . . . she is not legally married”;

(2) she had “the good faith belief that . . . she was married to that

person”; and (3) there is some legal impediment to a legal marriage

between the putative spouse and the other person. § 14-2-111

5 (emphasis added); see In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

D.P.G., 2020 COA 115, ¶¶ 17-23; Williams v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 670 P.2d 453, 455 (Colo. App. 1983).

¶ 14 Strickland’s reliance on In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning D.P.G. is misplaced. In that case, a party asserted that

she had a common law marriage, which the other party — the

purported spouse — denied. 2020 COA 115, ¶¶ 5-6. A magistrate

concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish the

existence of a common law marriage. Id. at ¶ 6. In response, the

party asserting the common law marriage contended that the

putative spouse statute nevertheless entitled her to the rights

associated with marriage. Id. at ¶ 7. The district court rejected her

argument, ruling that the putative spouse statute didn’t give her “a

second bite of the proverbial apple.” Id. at ¶ 9. A division of this

court agreed, concluding that the absence of a common law

marriage, by itself, isn’t an impediment to marriage, as required by

the relevant statutes. Id. at ¶¶ 17-23.

¶ 15 But in this case, there was such an impediment — the

decedent’s existing legal marriage to Strickland. See

§ 14-2-110(1)(a). Indeed, it is that legal marriage that makes the

6 putative marriage statute applicable by its express terms. Thus, In

re Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G. is inapposite.

B. Magistrate’s Authority

¶ 16 Next, Strickland asserts — without supporting legal argument

— that the magistrate lacked authority to rule on Mayo’s putative

spouse claim because that issue is “traditionally reserved for

district court judges under Colorado law.” We disagree.

¶ 17 After Mayo objected to Strickland’s appointment as personal

representative, the magistrate provided the following notice to the

parties:

This matter may be assigned to a district court magistrate. Accordingly, all parties must consent to any decisions made in this matter being performed by a magistrate.

Any objection to proceeding before the magistrate must be made in open court within 14 days or in writing, filed with the Court, and served upon the other interested parties within 14 days. See C.R.M[.] 3(f)(1)(A)(i), (ii). If an interested party does not object in accordance with Rule 3 or Rule 5 of the Colorado Rules for Magistrates, or if a party fails to appear for a hearing after being provided this notice, the party will have consented to the magistrate. CRM 3(f)(1)(A).

7 Once given, a party’s consent to a magistrate in a proceeding may not be withdrawn. C.R.M[.] 3(f)(1)(B).

This notice is effective as of the date of this notice.

No party objected to the assignment.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 18 We review jurisdictional issues concerning a magistrate’s

authority de novo. In re Marriage of Vega, 2021 COA 99, ¶ 13.1 We

also interpret magistrate rules de novo. Andrews v. Miller, 2019

COA 185, ¶ 7. In doing so, we apply the same principles that we

apply when interpreting statutes. See id.

¶ 19 “A district court magistrate has only those powers provided by

statute or court rule.” Id. at ¶ 6 (first citing § 13-5-201(3), C.R.S.

2024; and then citing In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958, 960 (Colo. App.

2004) (a magistrate is a hearing officer who acts with limited

authority)). The Colorado Rules for Magistrates authorize

magistrates to perform functions in varying types of legal cases. Id.

(citing Heotis v. Colo. Dep’t of Educ., 2016 COA 6, ¶ 10).

1 We construe Strickland’s argument as one challenging the

magistrate’s jurisdiction. Such a challenge can be raised for the first time on appeal. Black v. Black, 2020 COA 64M, ¶ 90.

8 ¶ 20 C.R.M. 6(e)(2)(A) provides that a magistrate may “[h]ear and

rule upon all matters filed pursuant to” the probate statues with the

parties’ consent. A party consents by either affirmatively

consenting in writing or on the record, failing to object within

fourteen days of receiving notice, or failing to appear after receiving

notice. C.R.M. 3(f)(1)(A). With an exception not relevant in this

case, C.R.M. 6(b)(1)(A) provides that a magistrate “shall have the

power to preside over all proceedings arising under Title 14” —

which obviously includes section 14-2-111 — without the parties’

consent.

3. Analysis

¶ 21 Under the magistrate rules, the magistrate was expressly

authorized to decide Mayo’s putative spouse claim because that

matter was one “under Title 14.” And the magistrate didn’t need

any party’s consent to do so. Further, even if consent was required

because the issue arose in the context of a probate case, Strickland

consented to the magistrate’s authority over intestate distribution

under C.R.M. 3(f)(1)(A)(ii). Nothing in the record shows that

Strickland objected to the notice within two weeks — or indeed at

any point. On the contrary, her counsel filed several motions,

9 scheduled hearings, and filed a closing statement with the

magistrate. And Strickland appeared at the magistrate’s hearing on

Mayo’s putative spouse claim without objection.

¶ 22 In sum, the magistrate had jurisdiction to rule on the putative

spouse claim. And, as noted, Strickland doesn’t cite any legal

authority for the proposition that a magistrate can’t rule on such a

claim.

C. Strickland’s Other Contentions

1. Estate Apportionment

¶ 23 Strickland contends — for the first time in her reply brief —

that the magistrate abused her discretion by failing to apportion

any of the decedent’s estate to Strickland. We don’t consider

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Meadow Homes

Dev. Corp. v. Bowens, 211 P.3d 743, 748 (Colo. App. 2009).

2. Special Administrator’s Appointment and Payments to Turner

¶ 24 Strickland also contends that the magistrate erred by

appointing a special administrator to preserve the decedent’s estate

and secure its proper administration and that the appointment

violated her due process rights. And Strickland contends that

paying Turner was illegal.

10 ¶ 25 But Strickland didn’t appeal the order appointing the special

administrator or any order authorizing payments to Turner. Her

notice of appeal only identified the magistrate’s March 1, 2024,

order granting Mayo’s putative spouse claim as an order being

appealed. See C.A.R. 3(d)(2)(B). Moreover, because the court didn’t

limit the special administrator’s power, its order of August 22,

2023, appointing the special administrator was a final, appealable

order. In re Estate of Franchs, 722 P.2d 422, 423 (Colo. App. 1986).

Strickland didn’t timely appeal that order. Accordingly, we lack

jurisdiction to address these contentions and dismiss Strickland’s

appeal with prejudice to the extent she seeks to appeal these

rulings. See Amada Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Pomeroy, 2021 COA 73,

¶ 73.

III. Appellees’ Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 26 Under C.A.R. 38(b), we may award attorney fees and single or

double costs to an appellee if we determine that an appeal is

frivolous. Strickland’s appeal is frivolous as argued. See Castillo v.

Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006). Her briefs

fail to set forth a coherent assertion of error supported by legal

11 authority. See id. And her briefs challenge rulings relating to the

special administrator as to which she filed no notice of appeal.

¶ 27 We therefore award appellees, including the special

administrator,2 their reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal

and double costs incurred on appeal. We exercise our discretion

under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the case to the district court to

determine the reasonable amounts of those fees and costs.

IV. Disposition

¶ 28 The district court magistrate’s order finding that Mayo is a

putative spouse is affirmed. The appeal is otherwise dismissed with

prejudice. The case is remanded to the district court for it to

determine appellees’ reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on

appeal.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE YUN concur.

2 By order of this court, the special administrator was allowed to

participate in this appeal as an appellee.