In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 24–0700
Submitted February 19, 2025—Filed May 9, 2025
Parent Father Doe and Parent Mother Doe, individually and as parents and next friends of Minor Doe,
Appellants,
vs.
Western Dubuque Community School District and Jessica Pape, Dan Butler, and Scott Firzlaff, in their official capacities,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica Zrinyi
Ackley, judge.
Plaintiffs appeal an order dismissing their petition due to the plaintiffs’ use
of pseudonyms in their petition and the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the
heightened pleading standards in the qualified immunity provision in Iowa Code
section 670.4A(3). Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Case Remanded.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Richard A. Pundt (argued) and Vincent Pundt of Pundt Law Office, Cedar
Rapids, for appellants.
Dustin T. Zeschke (argued) of Swisher & Cohrt, PLC, Waterloo, for
appellees. 2
McDonald, Justice.
Minor Doe, Father Doe, and Mother Doe filed suit against a school district
and several school district officials and employees after Minor Doe was attacked
by another student during school. The Does asserted claims for negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, and loss of consortium. On the defendants’ motion, the
district court dismissed the Does’ suit on four grounds: first, the Does failed to
comply with the heightened pleading requirements in the qualified immunity
provision of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA); second, the rules of
civil procedure disallow pseudonymous petitions; third, the breach of fiduciary
duty claim failed as a matter of law; and fourth, the consortium claim failed as
a matter of law without the underlying causes of action. We conclude the district
court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the first, second,
and fourth grounds, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We
affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty
claim.
I.
On January 12, 2023, Minor Doe was an eighth-grade student attending
Drexler Middle School in the Western Dubuque Community School District. She
was participating in an industrial arts technology class when another student
assaulted her over the head with a board. Minor Doe never had any prior issues
with her assailant, but school personnel were aware of past disciplinary matters
involving the assailant.
After the assault, Minor Doe was taken from the classroom to the
principal’s office and left unattended. She was semiconscious. She had blurred
vision and a headache. After some time passed, a school nurse came to the 3
principal’s office. The nurse brought Minor Doe two ibuprofen tablets. Minor Doe
returned to class approximately one hour after the assault.
According to the petition, the school did not contact proper medical
personnel or Minor Doe’s parents after the assault. Minor Doe, however, did
contact Father Doe. Minor Doe told her father about the assault and asked for
help. Father Doe notified Mother Doe of the assault. Mother Doe came to the
school office, removed Minor Doe from class, and took Minor Doe to the hospital.
Minor Doe was diagnosed with a concussion and other injuries.
The Does sued the Western Dubuque Community School District, Jessica
Pape (the school board president), Dan Butler (the school district
superintendent), and Scott Firzlaff (the Drexler Middle School principal), each in
their official capacities. The petition was filed using fictitious names: “PARENT
FATHER DOE and PARENT MOTHER DOE parents and next friend for: MINOR
DOE, and INDIVIDUALLY, on their own behalf, as parents.” The Does asserted
three causes of action against the defendants: (1) negligence, (2) breach of
fiduciary duty, and (3) loss of consortium.
At the time the Does filed their petition, they also filed a motion to increase
the security level of the entire case. The security level designation in the court’s
electronic filing system controls access to case information, case events, and
case documents. For example, case information in a case assigned security
level 0 is available to the public, but case information in a case assigned security
level 9 is restricted to judges and clerks of court. The Does claimed that a
heightened security level was required in this case due to the “sensitive
circumstances relating to this matter.” The district court denied the motion to
elevate the security level of the entire case. However, the court did order “that
the identity of the minor child, the identity of the parent[s] of the minor child and 4
the social security numbers of each, along with birth dates and other personal
information shall be maintained in this matter as a Level One security measure
and shall not be publicly disclosed pursuant to Chapter 16 of the Code of Iowa
and Rule 16.602 and Rule 16.604, Iowa Rules of Electronic Procedure,
Division VI, Personal Privacy Protection.”
The plaintiffs served original notices on each of the defendants. The
original notices did not include the real names of the plaintiffs. Instead, they
contained the pseudonyms Minor Doe, Mother Doe, and Father Doe.
After the defendants were served with original notices, the defendants filed
a pre-answer motion to dismiss. They asserted three grounds for dismissal. First,
the defendants contended the petition failed to meet the heightened pleading
requirements set forth in the IMTCA’s qualified immunity provision. See Iowa
Code § 670.4A(3) (2023). In particular, the defendants contended the petition
failed to state the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.
Second, the defendants maintained the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
case. According to the defendants, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.201 requires
that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302 provides that original notices must
contain the real name of the parties. The plaintiffs’ use of fictitious names in the
petition and original notices instead of their real names thus failed to confer the
district court with jurisdiction over the defendants. Third, the defendants
asserted the Does’ breach of fiduciary duty claim failed as a matter of law.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The district court held
that the petition failed to satisfy the qualified immunity pleading requirements
in Iowa Code section 670.4A and that dismissal with prejudice was required.
With respect to the jurisdictional argument, the district court did not reject 5
out-of-hand that the Does could proceed anonymously, but it found that there
was no “credible support asserted by the [Does] to proceed anonymously.”
Because there was no need for the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously, the district
court reasoned the original notices were defective and did not confer jurisdiction
over the defendants. The district court held the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of
fiduciary duty failed as a matter of law because the petition failed to allege any
facts sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship between the defendants and
Minor Doe. Finally, the district court concluded the plaintiffs’ consortium claim
failed as a matter of law because it was merely derivative of the now-dismissed
underlying claims.
II.
We first address the district court’s ruling on the municipal qualified
immunity provision, Iowa Code section 670.4A. We conclude the district court
erred in holding that section 670.4A required dismissal of this petition. The
history of the IMTCA, the circumstances surrounding the passage of the qualified
immunity provision, and the text of the qualified immunity provision, when read
in conjunction with federal qualified immunity law from which it borrowed,
demonstrate the municipal qualified immunity provision is inapplicable to the
plaintiffs’ common law claims.
A.
The IMTCA was enacted in 1967. See Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518,
521 (Iowa 2013); 1967 Iowa Acts ch. 405 (originally codified at Iowa Code
ch. 613A (1971), now codified as amended at Iowa Code ch. 670 (2023)). It
provides that “every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of
its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties,
whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.” Iowa Code 6
§ 670.2(1). The IMTCA exempts certain claims from the act. See id. § 670.4(1).
For example, the Act exempts “[a]ny claim by an employee of the municipality
which is covered by the Iowa workers’ compensation law.” Id. § 670.4(1)(a). As to
exempted claims, a “municipality shall be liable only to the extent liability may
be imposed by the express statute dealing with such claims and, in the absence
of such express statute, the municipality shall be immune from liability.” Id.
§ 670.4(1).
Fifty years after the passage of the IMTCA, in Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d
844 (Iowa 2017), this “court held for the first time that state officials could be
sued directly under the Bill of Rights of the Iowa Constitution for money
damages.” Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Iowa 2023). The Godfrey court
created a state constitutional tort claim where none had before existed. See 898
N.W.2d at 870–72. Although Godfrey involved a state official, its rationale was
not limited to state officials. See id. at 845. Soon enough, plaintiffs began to
assert state constitutional tort claims against municipal government officials as
well. See, e.g., White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2023); Baldwin v.
City of Estherville, 929 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2019); Venckus v. City of Iowa
City, 930 N.W.2d 792, 799 (Iowa 2019). After Godfrey, this court labored “to fill
in the details of this court-devised remedy.” Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 293. This
court attempted to resolve a host of new questions that the state constitutional
tort created: whether qualified immunity was available as a defense, and if so,
what was the standard; whether the judicial process immunity was available as
a defense; whether punitive damages could be recovered; whether attorney fees
could be recovered; what was the controlling statute of limitations; and other
ancillary questions. Id. at 297. “On almost all of these issues, our court was
divided.” Id. 7
While we were navigating this new constitutional terrain, the legislature
passed the municipal qualified immunity provision at issue in this case. See
2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022)). The
municipal qualified immunity statute did three things. First, section 670.4A(1)
provided a substantive qualified immunity defense to officers and employees of
municipalities. See Nahas v. Polk County, 991 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Iowa 2023);
Victoriano v. City of Waterloo, 984 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2023). Second,
section 670.4A(3) established a heightened pleading requirement distinct from
Iowa’s notice pleading requirement. See Nahas, 991 N.W.2d at 776–77;
Victoriano, 984 N.W.2d at 181. Third, section 670.4A(4) provided a statutory
right of interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity.
The legislature did not blaze new ground in enacting the municipal
qualified immunity provision. Instead, the legislature followed the well-trodden
path of federal qualified immunity law. Under federal law, a party can sue any
person acting under color of state law for any “deprivation” of “rights, privileges,
or immunities” secured by the Federal Constitution or federal statutes. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Like Godfrey, section 1983 “creates ‘a species of tort liability.’ ” Memphis
Cmty Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (quoting Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)). The Supreme Court holds that government
officials are qualifiedly immune from these tort claims and cannot be liable for
damages unless their conduct “violate[s] clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The substantive municipal qualified
immunity defense is lifted directly from this body of federal law. Iowa Code
section 670.4A(1)(a) provides that an employee or officer shall not be liable
unless the “right, privilege, or immunity” was “clearly established at the time of 8
the alleged deprivation” or “the state of the law was . . . sufficiently clear that
every reasonable employee would have understood that the conduct alleged
constituted a violation of law.”
Like the substantive defense, the municipal qualified immunity pleading
standard draws on federal law. It has three components. First, a plaintiff
“alleging a violation of the law must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting the violation.” Id. § 670.4A(3). Second, the statute requires the
plaintiff to “plead a plausible violation” of law. Id. Third, the plaintiff must plead
“that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id.
These qualified immunity pleading standards are borrowed partly from federal
law, which requires pleading facts sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity
defense. See Nahas, 991 N.W.2d at 781–82.
The substantive qualified immunity defense and the qualified immunity
pleading standards contained in section 670.4A must be read together as a
whole. See City & County of San Francisco v. EPA, 145 S. Ct. 704, 717 (2025)
(“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.’ ” (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 320
(2014))). After all, the Code section is titled “Qualified immunity,” from which we
can infer that all subsections within section 670.4A apply only when qualified
immunity is at issue. See State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201–02 (Iowa 2004)
(stating that the title of a statute can be considered in determining the
application of a statute). In addition, the statute treats the substantive defense
and pleading requirement as one unified qualified immunity defense. It provides
that any decision “denying qualified immunity,” which includes denial of the
substantive defense and denial of a pleadings challenge, “shall be immediately 9
appealable.” Iowa Code § 670.4A(5). When section 670.4A is viewed as a whole,
it is clear the substantive defense and heightened pleading requirement are a
couplet.
As a couplet, when the substantive qualified immunity defense is
inapplicable, then the heightened qualified immunity pleading standard is also
inapplicable. For example, in Dickey v. Mahaska Health Partnership, 705 F.
Supp. 3d 883 (S.D. Iowa 2023), the plaintiff brought several claims under the
Iowa Civil Rights Act against the Mahaska Health Partnership and several of its
employees in federal district court. Id. at 887–88. The defendants attempted to
invoke section 670.4A as a defense. Id. at 890. The court held that the
defendants were “not entitled to raise qualified immunity or other IMTCA
defenses to Dickey’s ICRA claims except insofar as those defenses also would be
available under the ICRA itself.” Id. at 894. The court did apply heightened
pleading standards to the complaint because the heightened pleading
requirements were “the applicable pleading standards under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure” and not because of section 670.4A. Id.
In 1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, ___ N.W.3d
___, 2025 WL 1007321 (Iowa Apr. 4, 2025), we held that the qualified immunity
defense and qualified immunity pleading standard must be read and applied
together as a whole. Id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *4. There, the plaintiffs
brought a statutory cause of action against a municipality seeking nonmonetary
relief. Id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *2. The district court dismissed the suit
on the ground the plaintiffs failed to meet the heightened pleading requirement
under section 670.4A(3). Id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *3. We reversed the
judgment of the district court. Id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *4. We explained
the substantive qualified immunity defense applied only to claims seeking 10
monetary damages. See id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *3–4. We then explained
that the substantive immunity defense and heightened pleading standard had to
be read together. See id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *3–4. The “two subsections
were added to the statute at the same time in the same enactment.” Id. at ___,
2025 WL 1007321, at *3. We found “no evidence of any textual attempt to create
some difference in scope between the types of claims that the subsections cover.”
Id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *4. We concluded that section “670.4A implies
a coordinated, rather than an independent, interpretation within its subsections
about the type of claim it covers.” Id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *4. Because
the plaintiffs’ claim did not seek monetary damages, we held that neither the
substantive qualified immunity defense nor the heightened qualified immunity
pleading standard applied. See id. at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at *4.
Prior to 1000 Friends of Iowa, in Nahas, we stated the substantive defense
and pleading standard were “inextricably intertwined,” 991 N.W.2d at 780, but
we did not apply them in that case as if they were. In that case, we concluded
that the substantive qualified immunity defense did not apply because it would
be an impermissible retroactive application of the statute, but we nonetheless
held that certain portions of the heightened pleading standard could be
applied—essentially treating the “particularity” and “plausible violation” pleading
requirement of section 670.4A(3) separate from the “clearly established” pleading
requirement. See id. at 778–80. On further reflection, we conclude the
application of any of the heightened pleading standard to claims not subject to
the qualified immunity defense was erroneous. The substantive defense and
heightened pleading are contained in one provision and are inextricably
intertwined. See 1000 Friends of Iowa, ___ N.W.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1007321, at
*4. The qualified immunity defense and the heightened pleading standard apply 11
en toto or not at all. See id. To the extent Nahas said something different, we
overrule it and follow the guidance of 1000 Friends of Iowa. Although we are
reluctant to overrule our precedents, we have a duty to correct course and turn
back before the passage of time cements the decision. See, e.g., TSB Holdings,
L.L.C. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 913 N.W.2d 1, 10–14 (Iowa 2018) (overruling Dakota,
Minnesota & Eastern Railroad v. Iowa District Court, 898 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017),
after a re-examination of its holding).
B.
Several signposts lead us to conclude that the municipal qualified
immunity couplet contained in section 670.4A is inapplicable to the claims at
issue in this case: the statute’s incorporation of federal law limits the
applicability of the statute; the statutory text is wholly inapt when applied to
common law claims; and the statute, as applied to common law claims, is not
capable of fair and consistent judicial administration.
The incorporation of federal qualified immunity law into section 670.4A is
legally significant. When law “is obviously transplanted from another legal
source . . . it brings the old soil with it.” Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., 975 N.W.2d 670,
682 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 73 (2012)). Under federal law, the qualified immunity
defense applies only to alleged violations of statutory or constitutional rights.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam); see also Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (discussing the two-step qualified immunity
analysis). Under federal law, qualified immunity is not a defense to common law
claims. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing
that “qualified immunity is a doctrine of federal common law” and does not apply
to state claims); Mawhirt v. Ahmed, 8 F. App’x 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) 12
(recognizing that “the federal law doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply
to state law claims”); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 816 F. Supp. 528, 545 (D. Minn.
1993) (holding federal qualified immunity does not apply to state common law
claims), rev’d in part on other grounds, 27 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1994); Gordon v.
District of Columbia, 309 A.3d 543, 559 (D.C. 2024) (“Qualified immunity does
not shield government officials from liability for common law torts, like a claim
of trespass.”). To keep step with federal law, we conclude that section 670.4A
applies only where the plaintiff has asserted a state constitutional tort claim or
statutory claim and not where the plaintiff has asserted only a state common
law claim. See Dickey, 705 F. Supp. 3d at 893 (“[T]he timing . . . of the most
recent amendments to the IMTCA make clear that the Iowa Legislature’s focus
was . . . constitutional tort claims under the Iowa Constitution.”); see also
Harmann v. Arganbright, No. 4:24-cv-00336-SHL-WPK, 2025 WL 481586, at *5
(S.D. Iowa Feb. 5, 2025) (stating that it appears the legislature adopted “a state
law version of qualified immunity that tracks the qualified immunity doctrine as
it exists under federal law” (quoting Stark v. Hamelton, No. 3:18-cv-00069-RGE-SHL,
2021 WL 4056716, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 2, 2021))).
Our conclusion that the qualified immunity defense was intended to mirror
federal law and that the qualified immunity defense does not apply to state
common law claims is further evidenced by the text of the statute. Section
670.4A(1)(a) provides that an employee or officer cannot be liable unless
“[t]he right, privilege, or immunity secured by law” was “clearly established at
the time of the alleged deprivation.” The statutory terminology is ill-fitted to
common law claims. For example, consider a personal injury negligence claim
arising out of a vehicle crash involving a municipal employee. A negligence claim
speaks in terms of duty and breach and not in terms of right, privilege, or 13
immunity. What is the right, privilege, or immunity at issue in a personal injury
case arising out of a vehicle crash? The statute also provides the right, privilege,
or immunity must be “secured by law.” Id. This language is inapt when applied
in a negligence case. The statute creates a qualified immunity defense in
response to a claimed “deprivation” of a right, privilege, or immunity. Id. Again,
the deprivation language is ill-suited when applied to a negligence claim. The
malapropos terminology evidences a doctrinal and conceptual mismatch
between the qualified immunity statute when applied to common law claims. We
cannot shoehorn the plain language of the statute to force a fit where none exists
and where none was intended.
Because there is no doctrinal or conceptual fit, section 670.4A would pose
insurmountable problems of judicial administration when applied to common
law claims. In particular, the qualified immunity defense, when applied to
common law claims, creates significant level-of-generality problems. See City of
Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42–44 (2019) (per curiam) (discussing the
level-of-generality problem in qualified immunity cases). Consider again the
personal injury negligence claim arising out of a vehicle crash with a municipal
employee. What is the right, privilege, or immunity at issue (to the extent those
terms make any sense in this context)? Is it the right, privilege, or immunity to
be free from physical injury? Or the right, privilege, or immunity to be free from
physical injury caused by unreasonable operation of a motor vehicle? Do the
specifications of alleged negligence matter? Perhaps the right, privilege, or
immunity is to be free from physical injury caused by excessive speeding? What
about the failure to yield? Do the people have a clearly established right,
privilege, or immunity to be free from being rear-ended? T-boned? Side-swiped?
These types of “arbitrary distinctions render[] constitutional tort law functionally 14
unintelligible.” Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 654 (7th
Cir. 2021) (quoting John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts,
99 Va. L. Rev. 207, 208 (2013)). That unintelligibility would only be amplified
when applied to common law claims. We cannot conclude the legislature, in
responding to Godfrey, meant to send litigants and the courts down this trail of
illusory and immaterial distinctions.
C.
Section 670.4A was intended to serve as shelter from the Godfrey storm.
This is evidenced by the timing of its passage. See Dickey, 705 F. Supp. 3d at
893–94. This is evidenced by the text of the statute when read in accord with the
federal law it mapped. This is evidenced by practical considerations in the
administration of the statute. When we interpret statutes, we must presume the
legislature intended a “just and reasonable result.” Iowa Code § 4.4(3). We
cannot conclude that the legislature intended, in enacting section 670.4A, to
effectively repeal the common law system of municipal officer and employee
liability that has been in place since 1967. The district court erred in concluding
that section 670.4A required dismissal here.
III.
Moving on, we advance to the issue of whether pseudonymous petitions
are permissible. We conclude that pseudonymous petitions are generally
disfavored but that there may be some circumstances in which they are allowed.
Those circumstances were not met here, but dismissal was not the appropriate
remedy.
We begin with the defendants’ arguments first. The defendants insist the
rules of civil procedure disallow fictitious-name petitions. Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.201 states, “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the 15
real party in interest.” Further, “The original notice shall contain . . . [t]he name
of the court and the names of the parties.” Id. r. 1.302(1)(a). In Krebs v. Town of
Manson, 129 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1964), decided under a precursor to Iowa Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.302, we stated, “An original notice which does not contain
the matter required by [Rule 1.302] is [f]atally defective and does not confer
jurisdiction over the party served with such defective notice.” Id. at 745–46. The
defendants urge that these rules and Krebs preclude the filing of a petition using
a fictitious name.
We think the defendants overread the rules and our caselaw. The
defendants place too much emphasis on the word “name” in rules 1.201 and
1.302(1). Rule 1.201 requires that the real parties in interest are the ones
pursuing the litigation, and we know from the personal information form in this
file that the plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. This conclusion is bolstered
by the dismissal provision of rule 1.201, which provides that “[n]o action shall
be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for . . . substitution of[] the real party in interest.” The rule’s use of the word
“substitution” implies that a different party, i.e., the real party in interest, would
take the place of the named party. The rule really does not contemplate or
address merely disclosing the name of a real party in interest who chose to file
pseudonymously.
In any event, as rule 1.201 makes clear, dismissal was not the appropriate
remedy here. Even if the rule required the real parties in interest to identify
themselves in the petition using their legal names instead of fictitious names,
the Does should have been afforded an opportunity to amend their petition. See
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.201. “[M]ere irregularities which relate principally to the form 16
of the notice or to technical or clerical errors, and which do not deceive or mislead
the defendant, will not be found fatal to the jurisdiction of the court . . . .”
Parkhurst v. White, 118 N.W.2d 47, 49–50 (Iowa 1962). The conclusion that a
technical defect in the original notice defeats jurisdiction has been abandoned.
See Point Builders, L.L.C. v. Shi Zhong Zheng, No. 13–0119, 2013 WL 6405325,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013) (“It was hoped, with the amendment of our
process rules in 1975, that parties served with an original notice of actions then
on file would find no advantage in searching out technical defects or omissions
in the original notice.” (quoting Patten v. City of Waterloo, 260 N.W.2d 840, 842
(Iowa 1977))).
The plaintiffs take a different path than the defendants. They assert that
the Iowa Rules of Electronic Procedure trump the rules of civil procedure and
require anonymity to protect the identity of Minor Doe. The rules of electronic
procedure govern the filing of all documents in the court’s electronic document
management system and trump any other inconsistent Iowa court rule. See Iowa
R. Elec. P. 16.101(1) (stating that the rules govern electronic filing), r. 16.103
(“To the extent these rules are inconsistent with any other Iowa court rule, the
rules in this chapter govern electronically filed cases . . . .”); State v. Mendoza,
999 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023) (“[T]he rules of electronic procedure
control when they are inconsistent with other Iowa court rules.”). The Does argue
that rule 16.602 requires the identity of Minor Doe be concealed. See Iowa R.
Elec. P. 16.602 (“Protected information includes the following: . . . Names of
minor children.”). The plaintiffs extrapolate from there that Mother Doe and
Father Doe must be allowed to proceed under fictitious names to protect the
identity of Minor Doe. 17
Like the defendants, the plaintiffs overread the rules on which they rely.
Rule 16.602(4) provides that the “[n]ames of minor children” are protected
information. This means only that the “names” of minor children are not
included within filings. Under our practice, parties use the minor’s initials to
avoid disclosure of the name. See generally Tarbox ex rel. S.K. v. Obstetric &
Gynecologic Assocs. of Iowa City & Coralville, P.C., 13 N.W.3d 546 (Iowa 2024)
(referring to minor child as “S.K.”). While the rule treats the “names” of minor
children as protected information, the rule does not treat the “identity” of the
minor child as protected information. In other words, the rule does not require
the omission of any and all information in a filing that could be used to discern
the identity of the minor. Any such reading is impractical and inconsistent with
actual practice. For example, spouses in a dissolution proceeding typically use
their real names in filings and the initials of any children mentioned in the filings
even though the children are easily identifiable. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Frazier, 1 N.W.3d 775, 778 (Iowa 2024) (“Mary Streicher and Shannon Frazier
became parents to L.F. in 2011 and O.F. in 2013 before divorcing in 2014.”). We
thus reject the Does’ argument that the rules of electronic procedure require the
use of fictitious names to protect the identity of Minor Doe.
Having concluded that neither “never” nor “always” is the right answer to
the question presented, we address the question of when filing under a fictitious
name is allowed. Only two cases in Iowa have directly addressed the question
presented in this case. In Riniker v. Wilson, 623 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000),
the court of appeals stated, “Iowa law does not specifically provide for ‘Jane Doe’
plaintiff petitions,” but the court noted that “Iowa Courts have allowed, without
comment, the use of ‘Jane Doe’ pleadings.” Id. at 226. The court then noted,
“A few courts have taken the hard line approach that anonymity is never 18
allowed . . . . The majority of courts, however, have entered into a delicate
balancing of the plaintiffs’ privacy interests, the defendants’ right to exoneration,
and the public’s right of access to trials and court records.” Id. at 226–27 (quoting
Adam A. Miliani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity When a
Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41 Wayne L. Rev.
1659, 1677–78 (1995)). And, while the court found the enactment of a balancing
test “persuasive,” it declined to impose such a rule. Id. at 227. Instead, it wrote,
“No procedure exists for the filing of ‘Jane Doe’ petitions in Iowa, and we defer to
the legislature and/or our supreme court to make such rules.” Id.
In a recent unpublished decision, the court of appeals also permitted a
party to proceed under a pseudonym. See Doe v. Gill, No. 18–0504,
2019 WL 478518, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019). In Doe v. Gill, two plaintiffs
claimed their names were protected after they tested positive for HIV because the
Iowa Code statutorily protects the confidential nature of an HIV diagnosis. Id. at
*2. The district court allowed John and James Doe to proceed anonymously
because their HIV status was protected information that could not be disclosed
in court documents, and revelation of their name would be akin to doing so. See
id. at *3. This case is of little value here because, unlike in the present matter,
there was a statutory provision that permitted confidentiality. See id. at *2–3.
This issue has been addressed numerous times in federal precedents. In
federal courts, the use of fictitious names is disfavored. “The use of fictitious
names runs afoul of the public’s First Amendment interest in public proceedings
and their common law right of access thereto. Proceedings are only truly public
when the public knows the identities of the litigants.” Cajune v. Ind. Sch. Dist.
194, 105 F.4th 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2024); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d. Cir. 2008) (“Certainly, ‘[i]dentifying the 19
parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people
have a right to know who is using their courts.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting
Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir.
1997))).
Despite being disfavored, most circuits have nonetheless concluded that
the use of fictitious names is permissible and have adopted a balancing test to
determine when parties can proceed under a fictitious name. See, e.g., Cajune,
105 F.4th at 1077 (“[W]e join our sister circuits and hold that a party may
proceed under a fictitious name only in those limited circumstances where the
party’s need for anonymity outweighs countervailing interests in full
disclosure.”). Relevant factors to consider typically include whether the party
seeking anonymity is challenging government activity, whether identification of
the party would threaten revelation of sensitive and highly personal information,
the risk of prosecution, the risk of retaliation, fundamental unfairness to the
defendant, the public interest, and the existence of alternative options. Id. (citing
In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam); Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 188–90; Doe v. City of Chicago, 360
F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214
F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir.
1981)). These considerations are not exclusive. See Eugene Volokh, The Law of
Pseudonymous Litigation, 73 Hastings L.J. 1353, 1366 (2022).
Under federal law, even when no party objects to an anonymous pleading,
“the judge has an independent duty to determine whether exceptional
circumstances justify such a departure from the normal method of proceeding
in federal courts.” City of Chicago, 360 F.3d at 669–70 (quoting Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 112 F.3d at 872). “Because a district court must exercise discretion 20
in the course of weighing competing interests, . . . an abuse of discretion
standard of review is appropriate.” Cajune, 105 F.4th at 1078. “Under this
deferential standard of review, we must affirm the district court’s ruling unless
the district court failed to consider a factor that should have been given
significant weight, considered an improper factor, or committed a clear error of
judgment in the course of weighing proper factors.” Id.
We agree with these persuasive precedents and hold that there is a
presumption against allowing a party to proceed under a fictitious name and
that a party may proceed “under a fictitious name only in those limited
circumstances where the party’s need for anonymity outweighs countervailing
interests in full disclosure.” Id. at 1077. A party seeking to file under a
pseudonym should do so on motion and bears the burden of establishing that
the need for anonymity outweighs the countervailing interests. See id. We need
not identify all of the factors relevant to this determination at this point in time
because the plaintiffs have not even made a threshold showing that there is a
need for anonymity here. The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs and
defendants were in communication prior to the filing of this suit and that the
defendants already knew the identity of the plaintiffs, including the identity of
Minor Doe. In addition, the plaintiffs have not, on this record, identified any
serious threat or irregularity that would require anonymity. On remand, the
plaintiffs shall be afforded an opportunity to amend their pleadings and use their
real names in accordance with the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure and Iowa Rules
of Electronic Procedure. The plaintiffs shall use Minor Doe’s initials rather than
identifying her by name. 21
IV.
We end with the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of that claim. Generally, a fiduciary relation “arises
whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and influence result
on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely personal. Such
relationship exists when there is a reposing of faith, confidence and trust, and
the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of another.”
Weltzin v. Cobank, ACB, 633 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Kurth v. Van
Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695–96 (Iowa 1986)). Relevant factors in determining
whether a fiduciary relationship exists include “the acting of one person for
another; the having and the exercising of influence over one person by another;
the reposing of confidence by one person in another; the dominance of one
person by another; the inequality of the parties; and the dependence of one
person upon another.” Albaugh v. The Reserve, 930 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Iowa 2019)
(quoting Weltzin, 633 N.W.2d at 294).
The petition avers the defendants had a fiduciary duty “to care for [Minor
Doe’s] wellbeing while she was on school grounds,” “provid[e] a safe and secure
learning environment,” and “investigat[e] and ascertain[] any potential harm.”
The Does believe the fiduciary duty arises because of the existence of an in loco
parentis relationship between the defendants and Minor Doe while she attends
school. However, the in loco parentis relationship does not establish a fiduciary
duty; instead, it imposes a duty of ordinary care for the purposes of negligence.
In Franchi v. New Hampton School, 656 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.N.H. 2009), the court
emphasized this point after a plaintiff sued a private boarding school for breach
of fiduciary duty after it allegedly discharged the plaintiff’s daughter as a student
when she began to seriously suffer from an eating disorder. Id. at 255–56. The 22
school filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claim failed as a matter of law. Id.
at 261–62. In granting the school’s motion, the court applied the in loco parentis
doctrine. Id. at 263. It held that as a matter of law the nature of the duty the
school owed to the student “was a duty of care arising out of [the school’s] in loco
parentis status” rather than a “fiduciary duty arising from any
‘unique relationship.’ ” Id. As such, the court declined to find the school owed a
fiduciary duty to the student. Id. at 265.
Similarly, we conclude as a matter of law that there is no fiduciary
relationship between these defendants—the Western Dubuque Community
School District, Jessica Pape (the school board president), Dan Butler (the school
district superintendent), and Scott Firzlaff (the Drexler Middle School
principal)—and the plaintiffs. While schools, school officials, and teachers have
a duty to exercise reasonable care with respect to students, they do not generally
have fiduciary relationships with students. See Stotts v. Eveleth, 688 N.W.2d
803, 811 (Iowa 2004) (finding no fiduciary relationship existed as a matter of law
between a high school student and junior high teacher “based on a teacher’s
general duty to act in the best interest of a student”); Lindemulder v. Davis Cnty.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 15–0067, 2016 WL 1679835, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27,
2016) (affirming the grant of a motion for summary judgment for a school district
when “there was no evidence [the student] had a special relationship with any of
the administration in the School District”); see also Brummell v. Talbor Cnty. Bd.
of Ed., No. RDB-22-1601, 2023 WL 2537438, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2023)
(stating that no court in Maryland has extended a school’s in loco parentis status
“to encompass fiduciary responsibilities”); Doe v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 31,
No. 20-cv-226 (SRN/LIB), 2020 WL 4735503, at *5 n.2 (D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2020)
(“Plaintiffs fail to cite to any authority for the proposition that taxpayer-funded 23
public schools have a similar fiduciary relationship with their students.”);
K.R.S. v. Bedford Cmty. Sch. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1080 (S.D. Iowa 2015)
(holding that a school nurse did not have a fiduciary duty “to provide a safe and
nurturing educational environment” to a student); Thomas v. Bd. of Ed. of
Brandywine Sch. Sch. Dist., 759 F. Supp. 2d 477, 503 (D. Del. 2010) (“Plaintiff
provides no basis for predicting that the Delaware Supreme Court would accept
Plaintiff’s invitation to be the first state to recognize a fiduciary relationship
between a public school district and its students.”); Doe v. City of Belen Sch. Dist.,
No. CIV 00-163 BB/LFG, 2000 WL 36739615, at *7 (D.N.M. Aug. 10, 2000) (“The
courts, however, continue to reject the fiduciary label in the student–teacher
context.”); Chambers v. City of Middletown, No. MMXCV146011312,
2015 WL 544906, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2015) (“[T]here is nothing
pleaded in the operative complaint that would convince this court that the
relationship between the guidance counselor and the plaintiff should be elevated
beyond that of a general student–teacher relationship.”).
V.
For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
negligence and consortium claims, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Case Remanded.