Parekh v. Avalara Inc

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided October 6, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-01580·Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 MARTIN SOHOVICH, CASE NO. C22-1580 MJP 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 12 v. DISMISS 13 AVALARA, INC., et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 45.) 17 Having reviewed the Motion, the Response (Dkt. No. 49), the Reply (Dkt. No. 52), and all 18 supporting materials, and having held oral arguments on September 28, 2023, the Court 19 GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES the Amended Complaint. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Martin Sohovich, an investor in Avalara, Inc., alleges that Avalara and its Board of 22 Directors (which includes Avalara’s CEO) misled investors as to the fairness of Avalara’s $8.4 23 billion sale in August 2022 to a private investor—Vista Equity Partners Management, LLC. 24 1 Sohovich alleges the Proxy distributed to the investors to vote on the sale to Vista contained 2 misleading and false statements that misrepresented the fair value of Avalara and violated 3 Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The Court 4 reviews the Amended Complaint’s (Dkt. No. 37 (“AC”)) allegations about Avalara, the Proxy,

5 and the sale to assess the merits of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 6 A. Avalara’s business 7 “Avalara is a leading provider of cloud-based tax compliance software that automates the 8 routine transactional tax work traditionally performed by a company’s tax or legal department.” 9 (AC ¶ 2.) A successful business, Avalara has grown substantially, particularly from 2015 10 through 2021 where its total annual revenues grew at a compound annual growth rate of 33.6%. 11 (Id. ¶ 43.) Avalara has grown by increasing its customer base and by acquiring other companies. 12 From Q1 2018 through Q2 2022, Avalara added an average of 750 customers per quarter. (Id. ¶ 13 44.) And through its acquisition strategy, Avalara acquired twenty-eight companies from 2007 to 14 2021, including twelve between 2018 to 2021. (Id. ¶ 46.) Avalara’s management, included

15 Defendant Scott McFarlane, the CEO and Board Chair, often told investors that “M&A is part of 16 Avalara’s DNA.” (Id. ¶ 48) 17 Leading up to its August 2022 sale, Sohovich alleges that Avalara’s management 18 maintained a positive outlook and touted the Company’s strong sales, competitive advantages, 19 acquisition strategy, and low volatility even in the face of a cooling economy. (AC ¶¶ 48- 53.) 20 Sohovich supports these allegations with statements Avalara’s management made on earnings 21 calls for Q4 2021 and Q1 2022 (February and May 2022, respectively) and at an “Analyst Day” 22 event in late June 2022. (Id. ¶ 4.) During the earnings calls, Avalara’s management described its 23 ongoing acquisition strategy, its belief in the Company’s strong long-term business outlook, and

24 1 the Company’s strength in the face of economic downturn. (Id. ¶¶ 48-53.) Although Avalara 2 faced uncertainty about continued business with a European customer/partner (“Partner A”), 3 Avalara’s management downplayed its significance on earnings calls for Q4 2021 and Q1 2022, 4 stating that Partner A contributed “less than 4% of revenue.” (Id. ¶ 54.) And at the Analyst Day

5 event, Avalara’s management touted the Company’s resilience, its desire to engage in 6 acquisitions, and its targets for increased revenues and margins. (Id. ¶¶ 56-62.) 7 B. Avalara Considers a Sale 8 In response to interest from four private equity firms, Avalara’s Board commenced a sale 9 process in April 2022. (AC ¶ 63.) Sohovich alleges that the private equity interest stemmed from 10 Avalara’s stock drop, which was “driven by macroeconomic trends rather than a decline in the 11 Company’s performance.” (Id.) The stock drop was significant, with shares falling from $165 per 12 share on December 31, 2020 to $71 per share on June 30, 2022. But Sohovich notes that over the 13 same time period, Avalara maintained its high margins and “its total revenues skyrocketed 14 108%.” (Id. ¶ 64.)

15 As part of the sale process, Avalara’s management prepared projections for 2022-2025, 16 which Sohovich refers to as the “May Projections.” (AC ¶ 68.) Sohovich alleges that the May 17 Projections were inaccurate because they project lower revenues due to challenges and risks that 18 the Company publicly downplayed on the Q4 2021 and Q1 2022 earnings calls. (Id.) And “there 19 [was] no indication that the May Projections contemplated future M&A activity, though the 20 Company has always made clear that acquisitions are a ‘part of its DNA.’” (Id.) The Board 21 approved the projections in late May, and provided them to Avalara’s financial advisor, 22 Goldman Sachs, and the interested private equity firms. (Id. ¶¶ 70-71.) 23

24 1 Of the potential acquirers, only two—Vista and “Party A”—submitted indications of 2 interest. On June 23, 2022, Vista expressed an interest in acquiring Avalara at a range between 3 $97-$101 per share, while Party A valued Avalara between $90-$95 per share. (AC ¶ 71; Proxy 4 at 39 (attached as Ex. 10 to the Declaration of Mike Rusie (Dkt. No. 46)).) According to the

5 Proxy, between July 6 and 10, Avalara’s management privately provided Vista and Party A with 6 “a summary of Avalara’s performance in the second quarter of 2022, which was below 7 management’s expectations for revenue, representing the first quarter since Avalara’s initial 8 public offering where Avalara would not beat public market analysts’ expectations on revenue, 9 except for its earnings guidance released in May 2020 as a result of uncertainty around the 10 COVID-19 pandemic, and increase its revenue guidance for the year, and the effect of such 11 performance on Avalara’s expected performance for the remainder of the 2022 fiscal year.” 12 (Proxy at 40.) But, as Sohovich points out, the Q2 2022 revenues were $208.6 million, which fell 13 within management’s public guidance of $208 to $210 million for the same quarter. (AC ¶ 73.) 14 Avalara received no definitive proposals by the July 14th deadline it had set. (AC ¶ 71.)

15 Party A withdrew from the sales process on July 12, 2022 because: (1) “Avalara’s second quarter 16 results were below management’s expectations for revenue,” (2) Party A believed “that 17 Avalara’s results for the remainder of the 2022 fiscal year would also be below expectations,” 18 and (3) “general macroeconomic conditions were uncertain and unfavorable.” (Proxy at 41; see 19 AC ¶ 71.) Vista did not meet the July 14th deadline, citing its need for more time to formulate a 20 bid given “Avalara’s second quarter results being below management’s expectations for revenue, 21 [its] belief that Avalara’s results for the remainder of the 2022 fiscal year would also be below 22 expectations, the deterioration in the financial markets and [its] need to contact additional 23 financing sources and continue discussions with existing financing sources to obtain the

24 1 financing that would be necessary to acquire Avalara.” (Proxy at 41; AC ¶ 71.) The Board then 2 terminated the sales process on July 16, 2022, even though Goldman Sachs told it that several 3 other private equity firms had expressed interest in bidding. (Id.) 4 On July 18, 2022, Vista contacted Goldman Sachs to express its continued interest in

5 acquiring Avalara. (Id. at ¶ 72.) That same day, Avalara’s management presented, and the Board 6 approved, a revised set of projections (the “July Projections”) that lowered estimated annual 7 revenues by 4% as compared to the May Projections.

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