Parekh v. Avalara Inc

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMarch 1, 2024
Docket2:22-cv-01580
StatusUnknown

This text of Parekh v. Avalara Inc (Parekh v. Avalara Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parekh v. Avalara Inc, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 MARTIN SOHOVICH, CASE NO. C22-1580 MJP 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 12 v. 13 AVALARA, INC., et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second 17 Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 61.) Having reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff’s Opposition (Dkt. 18 No. 63), the Reply (Dkt. No. 64), and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion 19 and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE. The Court finds this matter suitable for 20 decision without the requested oral argument. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Martin Sohovich, an investor in Avalara, Inc., alleges that Avalara and its Board 23 of Directors (which includes Avalara’s CEO) misled investors as to the fairness of Avalara’s 24 1 $8.4 billion sale in August 2022 to a private investor—Vista Equity Partners Management, LLC. 2 Sohovich alleges the Proxy distributed to the investors to vote on the sale to Vista contained 3 misleading and false statements that misrepresented the fair value of Avalara and violated 4 Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The Court

5 previously dismissed Sohovich’s Amended Complaint, but granted leave to amend. (MTD Order 6 (Dkt. No. 54).) Sohovich has filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Dkt. No. 57)), and 7 Defendants again seek dismissal. The Court reviews the SAC’s allegations about Avalara, the 8 Proxy, and the sale to assess the merits of Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss. 9 A. Avalara’s business 10 “Avalara is a leading provider of cloud-based tax compliance software that automates the 11 routine transactional tax work traditionally performed by a company’s tax or legal department.” 12 (SAC ¶ 2.) A successful business, Avalara has grown substantially, particularly from 2015 13 through 2021 where its total annual revenues grew at a compound annual growth rate of 33.6%. 14 (Id. ¶ 43.) Avalara has grown by increasing its customer base and by acquiring other companies.

15 From Q1 2018 through Q2 2022, Avalara added an average of 750 customers per quarter. (Id. ¶ 16 45.) And through its acquisition strategy, Avalara acquired twenty-eight companies from 2007 to 17 2021, including twelve between 2018 to 2021. (Id. ¶ 46.) Avalara’s management, included 18 Defendant Scott McFarlane, the CEO and Board Chair, often told investors that “M&A is part of 19 Avalara’s DNA.” (Id. ¶ 48) 20 Leading up to Avalara’s August 2022 sale, Sohovich alleges that Avalara’s management 21 maintained a positive outlook and touted the Company’s strong sales, competitive advantages, 22 acquisition strategy, and low volatility even in the face of a cooling economy. (SAC ¶¶ 48-53.) 23 Sohovich supports these allegations with statements Avalara’s management made on earnings

24 1 calls for Q4 2021 and Q1 2022 (February and May 2022, respectively) and at an “Analyst Day” 2 event in late June 2022. (Id. ¶ 4.) During the earnings calls, Avalara’s management described its 3 ongoing acquisition strategy, its belief in the Company’s strong long-term business outlook, and 4 the Company’s strength in the face of economic downturn. (Id. ¶¶ 48-53.) Although Avalara

5 faced uncertainty about continued business with a European customer/partner (“Partner A”), 6 Avalara’s management downplayed its significance on earnings calls for Q4 2021 and Q1 2022, 7 stating that Partner A contributed “less than 4% of revenue.” (Id. ¶ 54.) And at the Analyst Day 8 event, Avalara’s management touted the Company’s resilience, its desire to engage in 9 acquisitions, and its targets for increased revenues and margins. (Id. ¶¶ 56-64.) 10 B. Avalara Considers a Sale 11 In response to interest from four private equity firms, Avalara’s Board commenced a sale 12 process in April 2022. (SAC ¶ 65.) Sohovich alleges that the private equity interest stemmed 13 from Avalara’s stock drop, which was “driven by macroeconomic trends rather than a decline in 14 the Company’s performance.” (Id.) The stock drop was significant, with shares falling from $165

15 per share on December 31, 2020 to $71 per share on June 30, 2022. But Sohovich notes that over 16 the same time period, Avalara maintained its high margins and “its total revenues skyrocketed 17 108%.” (Id. ¶ 66.) 18 As part of the sale process, Avalara’s management prepared projections for 2022-2025, 19 which Sohovich refers to as the “May Projections.” (SAC ¶ 70.) Sohovich alleges that the May 20 Projections were inaccurate because they project lower revenues due to challenges and risks that 21 the Company publicly downplayed on the Q4 2021 and Q1 2022 earnings calls. (Id.) And “the 22 Proxy statement did not reveal that the May Projections did not include any projected inorganic 23 revenue growth from M&A activity though the Company had previously included inorganic

24 1 growth in its guidance, always made clear that acquisitions are a ‘part of its DNA,’ and would 2 continue to be a significant part of Avalara’s growth story going forward.’” (Id. ¶ 71.) The Board 3 approved the projections in late May, and provided them to Avalara’s financial advisor, 4 Goldman Sachs, and the interested private equity firms. (Id. ¶ 73.)

5 Of the potential acquirers, only two—Vista and “Party A”—submitted indications of 6 interest. On June 23, 2022, Vista expressed an interest in acquiring Avalara at a range between 7 $97-$101 per share, while Party A valued Avalara between $90-$95 per share. (SAC ¶ 74; Proxy 8 Statement at 39 (attached as Ex. 10 to the Declaration of Mike Rusie (Dkt. No. 46)).) According 9 to the Proxy, between July 6 and 10, Avalara’s management privately provided Vista and Party 10 A with “a summary of Avalara’s performance in the second quarter of 2022, which was below 11 management’s expectations for revenue, representing the first quarter since Avalara’s initial 12 public offering where Avalara would not beat public market analysts’ expectations on revenue, 13 except for its earnings guidance released in May 2020 as a result of uncertainty around the 14 COVID-19 pandemic, and increase its revenue guidance for the year, and the effect of such

15 performance on Avalara’s expected performance for the remainder of the 2022 fiscal year.” 16 (Proxy at 40.) But, as Sohovich points out, the Q2 2022 revenues were $208.6 million, which fell 17 within management’s public guidance of $208 to $210 million for the same quarter. (SAC ¶ 76.) 18 Avalara received no definitive proposals by the July 14th deadline it had set. (SAC ¶¶ 74- 19 75.) Party A withdrew from the sales process on July 12, 2022 because: (1) “Avalara’s second 20 quarter results were below management’s expectations for revenue,” (2) Party A believed “that 21 Avalara’s results for the remainder of the 2022 fiscal year would also be below expectations,” 22 and (3) “general macroeconomic conditions were uncertain and unfavorable.” (Proxy at 41; see 23 SAC ¶ 74.) Vista did not meet the July 14th deadline, citing its need for more time to formulate a

24 1 bid given “Avalara’s second quarter results being below management’s expectations for revenue, 2 [its] belief that Avalara’s results for the remainder of the 2022 fiscal year would also be below 3 expectations, the deterioration in the financial markets and [its] need to contact additional 4 financing sources and continue discussions with existing financing sources to obtain the

5 financing that would be necessary to acquire Avalara.” (Proxy at 41; SAC ¶ 74.) The Board then 6 terminated the sales process on July 16, 2022, even though Goldman Sachs told it that several 7 other private equity firms had expressed interest in bidding. (Id.) 8 On July 18, 2022, Vista contacted Goldman Sachs to express its continued interest in 9 acquiring Avalara.

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