Opinion
FOTI, J.
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) to suspend his license pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b1 and dismissing his administrative appeal. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that (1) the police report was properly admitted into evidence, (2) sufficient evidence was presented to support the finding that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff, and (3) sufficient evidence was presented to support the finding that the plaintiff refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary for a proper resolution of this appeal. On July 8, 1995, at approximately 10 p.m., the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Groton. The plaintiff, who had been operating the vehicle, exchanged seats with a woman passenger before the arresting police officer arrived.2 [579]*579The officer observed that the plaintiffs speech was slurred and that he had an odor of alcohol on his breath. The officer conducted a number of field sobriety tests that the plaintiff either failed or refused to perform.3 The plaintiff was arrested at the scene and transported to police headquarters. He was afforded an opportunity to contact an attorney. He was also advised of the mandatory alcohol testing requirements of the implied consent law.4 The officer completed a police report, including an A-44 report form,5 indicating that the plaintiff refused to be tested for his blood alcohol content.
The plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. After the hearing, the hearing officer determined affirmatively, pursuant to § 14-227b (f),6 that the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, that the plaintiff was placed under arrest, that the plaintiff was operating the vehicle and that the plaintiff refused to submit to a test of the alcohol content of his blood. The plaintiffs operator’s license was suspended for two years.
[580]*580The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. After considering the plaintiffs claims, essentially the same three claims raised in this appeal, the trial court dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the police report, prepared and filed by the arresting officer, should not have been admitted into evidence because it relied on hearsay. He specifically argues that because the arresting officer did not personally observe the accident or the plaintiff operating the vehicle, and relied on the statements of two eyewitness bystanders, his A-44 report form and the narrative supplement to it, which included an admission by the plaintiff that he was operating the motor vehicle at the time of the accident, should not have been admitted as evidence. We disagree.
“The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling is arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion. Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 183 Conn. 128, 139, 439 A.2d 282 (1981).” O’Sullivan v. DelPonte, 27 Conn. App. 377, 382, 606 A.2d 43 (1992). The plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden.
The provisions of General Statutes § 14-227b (c)7 and § 14-227b-198 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies permit the admission of the police report on [581]*581a form approved by the defendant, as the A-44 form has been, together with additional sheets or materials necessary to explain the report, which are considered part of the report.
Moreover, we have previously determined that a police report containing the hearsay statements of witnesses may be properly admitted at such an administrative hearing without requiring the witnesses’ presence at the hearing. See O’Sullivan v. DelPonte, supra, 27 Conn. App. 381. While police reports are normally admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, statements of witnesses repeated in the report do not fall within this exception. Hutchinson v. Plante, 175 Conn. 1, 4-5, 392 A.2d 488 (1978). The plaintiffs statement, however, contained in that report is admissible as an admission. See Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 151, 575 A.2d 206 (1990). Furthermore, hearsay evidence itself is not prohibited in administrative proceedings by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., which permits the introduction of oral or documentary evidence.9 Tomlin v. Personnel Appeal Board, 177 Conn. 344, 348, 416 A.2d 1205 (1979). We, therefore, conclude that the introduction of the police report into evidence was not improper.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that probable cause existed to arrest him. We do not agree.
[582]*582“Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . .The determination of whether substantial evidence exists is subject to de novo review by this court. . . . Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record demonstrates a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Labenski v. Goldberg, 33 Conn. App. 727, 732-33, 638 A.2d 614 (1994). If the commissioner’s determination to suspend the plaintiffs license is supported by substantial evidence in the record, that determination must be sustained. O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 507, 636 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994).
The arresting officer, on the basis of current information from an eyewitness bystander that a motor vehicle had been involved in an accident and that the driver was attempting to evade responsibility, detained the plaintiffs vehicle, which had fresh damage to the left rear bumper. The officer asked the plaintiff, who was identified by two witnesses as the driver and who eventually admitted to being the operator, to exit the automobile.
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Opinion
FOTI, J.
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) to suspend his license pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b1 and dismissing his administrative appeal. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that (1) the police report was properly admitted into evidence, (2) sufficient evidence was presented to support the finding that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff, and (3) sufficient evidence was presented to support the finding that the plaintiff refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary for a proper resolution of this appeal. On July 8, 1995, at approximately 10 p.m., the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Groton. The plaintiff, who had been operating the vehicle, exchanged seats with a woman passenger before the arresting police officer arrived.2 [579]*579The officer observed that the plaintiffs speech was slurred and that he had an odor of alcohol on his breath. The officer conducted a number of field sobriety tests that the plaintiff either failed or refused to perform.3 The plaintiff was arrested at the scene and transported to police headquarters. He was afforded an opportunity to contact an attorney. He was also advised of the mandatory alcohol testing requirements of the implied consent law.4 The officer completed a police report, including an A-44 report form,5 indicating that the plaintiff refused to be tested for his blood alcohol content.
The plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. After the hearing, the hearing officer determined affirmatively, pursuant to § 14-227b (f),6 that the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, that the plaintiff was placed under arrest, that the plaintiff was operating the vehicle and that the plaintiff refused to submit to a test of the alcohol content of his blood. The plaintiffs operator’s license was suspended for two years.
[580]*580The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. After considering the plaintiffs claims, essentially the same three claims raised in this appeal, the trial court dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the police report, prepared and filed by the arresting officer, should not have been admitted into evidence because it relied on hearsay. He specifically argues that because the arresting officer did not personally observe the accident or the plaintiff operating the vehicle, and relied on the statements of two eyewitness bystanders, his A-44 report form and the narrative supplement to it, which included an admission by the plaintiff that he was operating the motor vehicle at the time of the accident, should not have been admitted as evidence. We disagree.
“The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling is arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion. Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 183 Conn. 128, 139, 439 A.2d 282 (1981).” O’Sullivan v. DelPonte, 27 Conn. App. 377, 382, 606 A.2d 43 (1992). The plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden.
The provisions of General Statutes § 14-227b (c)7 and § 14-227b-198 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies permit the admission of the police report on [581]*581a form approved by the defendant, as the A-44 form has been, together with additional sheets or materials necessary to explain the report, which are considered part of the report.
Moreover, we have previously determined that a police report containing the hearsay statements of witnesses may be properly admitted at such an administrative hearing without requiring the witnesses’ presence at the hearing. See O’Sullivan v. DelPonte, supra, 27 Conn. App. 381. While police reports are normally admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, statements of witnesses repeated in the report do not fall within this exception. Hutchinson v. Plante, 175 Conn. 1, 4-5, 392 A.2d 488 (1978). The plaintiffs statement, however, contained in that report is admissible as an admission. See Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 151, 575 A.2d 206 (1990). Furthermore, hearsay evidence itself is not prohibited in administrative proceedings by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., which permits the introduction of oral or documentary evidence.9 Tomlin v. Personnel Appeal Board, 177 Conn. 344, 348, 416 A.2d 1205 (1979). We, therefore, conclude that the introduction of the police report into evidence was not improper.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that probable cause existed to arrest him. We do not agree.
[582]*582“Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . .The determination of whether substantial evidence exists is subject to de novo review by this court. . . . Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record demonstrates a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Labenski v. Goldberg, 33 Conn. App. 727, 732-33, 638 A.2d 614 (1994). If the commissioner’s determination to suspend the plaintiffs license is supported by substantial evidence in the record, that determination must be sustained. O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 507, 636 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994).
The arresting officer, on the basis of current information from an eyewitness bystander that a motor vehicle had been involved in an accident and that the driver was attempting to evade responsibility, detained the plaintiffs vehicle, which had fresh damage to the left rear bumper. The officer asked the plaintiff, who was identified by two witnesses as the driver and who eventually admitted to being the operator, to exit the automobile. On the bases of the information supplied and his own observation of the plaintiff, including the plaintiffs performance of a field sobriety test, the officer arrested him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Clark v. Muzio, 14 Conn. App. 212, 213, 540 A.2d 1063, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 809, 545 A.2d 1105 (1988). “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of [583]*583the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that [an offense] had been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 182 Conn. 176, 189, 438 A.2d 46 (1980). We conclude, on the basis of the facts presented, that probable cause existed for the arrest of the plaintiff.
Ill
The plaintiff argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a determination that he refused to submit to the blood alcohol test. He argues that, although the A-44 report form contained a statement that he refused to submit to such a test, along with the name and signature of a witness to the refusal, there is no “factual explanation, description or basis for that conclusion” and the hearing officer could not make that a separate finding of fact. We do not agree.
The record before the hearing officer supports the determination that the police officer fully explained the testing procedure to the plaintiff and the consequences of a refusal to take the test, and that the plaintiff refused to take the test. The trial court noted “that there was no other evidence for the hearing officer to consider in this case. In particular, there was no evidence to contradict any of the evidence that was contained in the police report.” The evidence presented, therefore, would clearly support a finding that the plaintiff failed to take the test because he refused to do so. Any claim that the plaintiff failed to take the test because he was incapable is not supported by the record.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.