Panyko v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

888 A.2d 724, 585 Pa. 310, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3102

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 28, 2005
• Docket: 37 WAP 2004
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

Justice NIGRO.

Appellant Russell T. Panyko (“Claimant”) appeals from the Commonwealth Court’s order which affirmed the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (the “Board”) denying Claimant’s claim petition. We now reverse.

On November 17, 1997, Claimant filed a claim petition seeking various benefits for a heart attack he suffered on February 5, 1997, during a meeting with one of his supervisors.¹ Claimant’s employer, U.S. Airways, filed an answer to the petition, in which it denied that Claimant’s heart attack was “work-related.”

During a hearing before a workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) on January 13, 1998, Claimant testified that he had been employed by U.S. Airways as a baggage handler for fifteen years. He explained that in July 1995, he suffered a heart attack and underwent a triple bypass. Shortly after the surgery, he returned to work and he did not miss any additional work days until May of 1996, when he was out for two days due to chest pains. Over six months later, in January of 1997, Claimant missed another two days because of chest pains. According to Claimant, other than the above four absences, he had a good attendance record.

With respect to the events of February 5, 1997, Claimant testified that on that date, his supervisor told him that Gene Egan, his attendance manager, wanted to speak with him. He was upset about having to attend the meeting because he felt that he had a good attendance record. Later that afternoon, Claimant and his union steward met with Egan and Egan told them that Claimant had incurred four “occurrences,” meaning that he had missed four days of work when he was scheduled to be at work.² Egan informed Claimant that if he incurred another “occurrence,” he would be placed on level one, which was a type of disciplinary status.

Claimant stated that he questioned Egan about why one of his May 1996 absences had been deemed an “occurrence,” and Egan replied that it had been designated as such, because he said so.³ Egan then apparently told Claimant that he was going to “write him up” for his attitude. At that point, Claimant felt chest pains. Egan suggested that Claimant take a walk and come back once he had calmed down, but Claimant refused. Egan then offered Claimant a Family Leave Plan, pursuant to which Claimant could incur “occurrences” due to his heart problems without disciplinary repercussions. Claimant completed the paperwork for the plan and thanked Egan. As he left the meeting, Claimant felt pain in his back, neck, and shoulder, and asked his union steward to take him to the hospital, where it was determined that he was suffering from a heart attack.

Claimant testified that a few days after his heart attack, he told one of his administrators about the attack and asked her if it was covered by workers’ compensation, to which she replied that it was not. Claimant stated that he later informed this same administrator that he needed to take off thirty days due to his heart attack, and at that time, she again told him that his attack was not covered by workers’ compensation. In July or August 1997, one of Claimant’s co-workers gave him a book about workers’ compensation. After reading the section on heart attacks, Claimant realized that his heart attack may have been related to his meeting with Egan and thereby covered by workers’ compensation. Therefore, in August 1997, Claimant went to see Egan to file a work injury report.

In support of his petition for benefits, Claimant also offered a letter from his doctor, Stephen Osmanski, M.D., in which Dr. Osmanski opined that “the confrontation [between Egan and Claimant on February 5th] directly did contribute to [Claimant’s] heart attack, causing him to be disabled from work for the thirty day recovery period.” 10/10/1997 Letter from Dr. Osmanski to James Burn, Jr.

U.S. Airways subsequently offered testimony from Egan in its defense. According to Egan, as manager of attendance control, he routinely had “initial discussions” with employees when they incurred four “occurrences.”⁴ WCJ Hearing, 4/28/1998, at 7-10. He recalled that during his February 5th meeting with Claimant, Claimant “appeared to be extremely upset and angry and irritated at the fact that he had to come to my office and discuss his attendance,” because he “was angrily speaking .. . with his teeth clinched, and his hands were shaking.” Id. at 14. Egan testified that he let Claimant “vent” for a few minutes and then told him that he was acting disrespectfully and would be disciplined if his conduct continued. Id. at 15. Egan also suggested that Claimant leave and calm down.

Egan stated that Claimant decided to remain in his office and the two went over Claimant’s occurrences, with Claimant disputing the designation of his initial May absence as an “occurrence.” Egan then offered Claimant the Family Medical Leave Plan and after completing some paperwork, Claimant left Egan’s office. Egan testified that he did not know that Claimant was having physical difficulties during the meeting. While he later learned of Claimant’s heart attack, he testified that he did not know that it was related to his meeting with Claimant until Claimant approached him in August 1997 to file a work injury report.

On February 10, 1999, the WCJ entered an order granting Claimant’s claim petition and request for counsel fees.⁵ In response to U.S. Airways’ claim that Claimant had failed to notify it of his injury within 120 days of his heart attack, as required by 77 P.S. § 631, the WCJ pointed out that the statutory notification period does not begin to run until a claimant either “knows or by reasonable diligence should know of the possible connection between an injury and work.” Panyko v. U.S. Airways, WCJ Decision, 2/10/1999, at 6 (citing to 77 P.S. § 631). The WCJ then found that the notification period for Claimant’s heart attack did not begin to run until July 1997 because “[Claimant] clearly and unequivocally testified that he was not aware of such a possible connection until he read the workers’ compensation handbook in July of 1997.” Id. Moreover, given that start date, the WCJ concluded that Claimant properly notified U.S. Airways of his injury in August 1997.

The WCJ further found that Claimant credibly testified that his February 5th heart attack occurred during his meeting with Egan.⁶ In addition, the WCJ accepted Dr. Osmanski’s opinion that the meeting directly contributed to Claimant’s heart attack and therefore awarded Claimant benefits, stating that Claimant had met his burden of proving that “he suffered an injury which arose in the course of his employment and that it was related thereto.” Id. at 7. The WCJ then awarded Claimant counsel fees, finding that U.S. Airways did not have a reasonable basis for contesting Claimant’s petition as it had not produced any evidence to rebut Claimant’s assertions that his heart attack was related to the attendance meeting.

On appeal, the Board affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant’s notification was timely as well as the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant was entitled to benefits, finding that both conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. However, the Board reversed the WCJ’s award of counsel fees to Claimant, finding that U.S. Airways reasonably contested Claimant’s petition based on his failure to notify it of his claim within 120 days of his heart attack because “the legal question of notice needed to be resolved.” Panyko v. U.S. Airways, Board Decision, 10/11/2000, at 9.

U.S. Airways subsequently appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Board’s conclusion that Claimant provided U.S. Airways with timely notice, but vacated the Board’s conclusion that Claimant was entitled to benefits. See U.S. Airways v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Panyko), 779 A.2d 1238 (Pa.Commw.2001). The Commonwealth Court explained that in Davis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Swarthmore Borough), 561 Pa.462, 751 A.2d 168 (2000), this Court held that where a claimant seeks benefits for a physical injury, such as a heart attack, caused by a psychic reaction to a working condition, such as stress, the claimant must prove not only that the psychic reaction caused the injury, but also that the working condition that caused the psychic reaction was abnormal. See U.S. Airways, 779 A.2d at 1239. Accordingly, relying on Davis, the court held that Claimant was required to prove that the psychic reaction that caused his heart attack on February 5th was the result of abnormal working conditions. However, the court pointed out that “because this prong of Claimant’s burden was not addressed by the WCJ, there are no specific findings in this regard.” Id. Therefore, the court vacated the Board’s order granting Claimant benefits and remanded the matter to the Board “for further remand to the WCJ for findings in accordance with Claimant’s burden of proof as set forth by ... Davis.” Id.

On remand, the WCJ held additional hearings during which both Claimant and Egan testified on the issue of whether the February 5th meeting was an abnormal working condition. Claimant testified that during the meeting, Egan was loud, harassing, and unprofessional. See WCJ Hearing, 12/4/2001, at 7-9. Moreover, he stated that he felt that his life was in danger when Egan threatened to “write him up” for his attitude. See id. at 24. As in his previous testimony, Egan testified that his February 5th meeting with Claimant was a routine procedure. See WCJ Hearing, 1/29/2002, at 18-19. Indeed, he stated it was one of six he had scheduled for that day. See id. at 26, 751 A.2d 168. Egan also denied Claimant’s assertions that he was loud, harassing, and unprofessional at the meeting, stating that instead, it was Claimant who was angry and disrespectful. See id. at 19-28.

On May 28, 2002, the WCJ entered a decision denying and dismissing Claimant’s claim petition. The WCJ initially determined that the February 5th meeting was a standard meeting required by U.S. Airways’ corporate policy. The WCJ further found “[Cjlaimant’s representation that Mr. Egan placed his life in danger to be unpersuasive.” WCJ Decision, 5/28/2002, at 9. Although the WCJ accepted Claimant’s testimony that Egan was unprofessional and disrespectful during the meeting, he determined that such conduct did not make the meeting an abnormal working condition. Accordingly, the WCJ denied Claimant’s petition, stating that Claimant had “failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was subjected to abnormal working conditions on February 5, 1997.”⁷ Id. at 8. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision and the Commonwealth Court subsequently affirmed.

In his appeal to this Court, Claimant essentially argues that the Commonwealth Court erroneously interpreted this Court’s decision in Davis to require a claimant who suffered a purely physical injury, such as a heart attack, as a result of a psychic reaction to a working condition to prove that the working condition was abnormal. According to Claimant, the Davis court only held that a claimant must satisfy the abnormal working conditions test where the claimant suffered from a “psychic ” injury with related physical symptoms. Moreover, Claimant asserts that the Commonwealth Court’s application of the abnormal working conditions test to cases where a claimant suffers a purely physical injury is an unfair expansion of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.1 (the “Act”),⁸ as it defeats the humanitarian purposes of the Act. We agree with Claimant that this Court’s decision in Davis should be read narrowly, so as not to require a claimant to meet the restrictive abnormal working conditions test in situations where he suffers a purely physical injury such as a heart attack.

“In workers’ compensation appeals, this Court must affirm the adjudication below unless we find that an error of law was committed, that constitutional rights were violated, that a practice or procedure of a Commonwealth agency was not followed or that any necessary finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence of record.” Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transport), 574 Pa.61, 828 A.2d 1043, 1046 (2003); see also 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. The primary issue that we are asked to decide here, i.e., whether the Commonwealth Court erroneously required Claimant to establish that his heart attack was due to an abnormal working question, is solely a legal question. Thus, our review is de novo and we may consider the entire record. See Fine v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253, 870 A.2d 850, 857 n. 3 (2005).

Prior to 1972, the Act required employers to compensate employees “only if the employee was injured or killed by an ‘accident’ occurring in the course of employment.” Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659, 661 (1978). It also “defined ‘injury’ to require ‘violence to the physical structure of the body.’ ” Id. (citing 77 P.S. § 411 (amended 1979)). Based on this limited definition, our courts found that only physical injuries qualified as compensable injuries under the Act. See, e.g., University of Pittsburgh v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 347, 405 A.2d 1048, 1051 (1979).

In 1972, however, the General Assembly amended the Act to make employers “liable for compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of each employe, by an injury in the course of his employment.” 77 P.S. § 431. Moreover, the General Assembly changed the definition of the term “injury” to define that term as “an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of his employment and related thereto.” Id. § 411. The Commonwealth Court subsequently determined that the General Assembly intended mental or psychic injuries to be included as compensable injuries under the newly amended Act because it eliminated the requirement that an injury include “violence to the physical structure of the body.” See University of Pittsburgh, 405 A.2d at 1050.

However, shortly after it issued the above decision, the Commonwealth Court determined that due to the “highly subjective nature of psychiatric injuries, the occurrence of the injury and its cause must be adequately pinpointed.” Thomas v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 55 Pa.Cmwlth. 449, 423 A.2d 784, 787 (1980). The court explained that an injury could not be compensable under the Act if it was simply the result of “an employee’s subjective reaction to being at work and being exposed to normal working conditions.” Id. at 788. Accordingly, the court held that a claimant could only obtain benefits for a psychic injury if he showed that his injury was either more than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions or caused by abnormal working conditions, i.e., the abnormal working conditions test. See id. at 787; see also Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509, 568 A.2d 159, 164-65 (1990). This Court subsequently agreed with the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning and thereby upheld the abnormal working conditions test for psychic injuries, stating:

Abandoning the distinction between normal and abnormal working conditions, as the Appellant urges us to do, would eliminate the element of causation. It would destroy the fundamental principle underlying the scheme of the Workmen’s Compensation Act — that, in order to be compensable, an injury must be work-related. Under the Appellant’s theory, a claimant would have to establish only that the employee suffered from a mental illness while employed and that the illness was a condition created or aggravated by that employee’s perception of the conditions of his employment. That would reduce workmen’s compensation benefits to nothing more than a disability or death benefit payable only because of the employee status of the claimant — and not because the injury was caused by his employment.

Davis, 751 A.2d at 174.

Therefore, based on Martin, a claimant seeking benefits for psychic injuries caused by a psychic stimulus was required to prove that: (1) he suffered from a psychic injury; and (2) his psychic injury was either more than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions or caused by abnormal working conditions. See Ryan v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Community Health Services), 550 Pa.550, 707 A.2d 1130, 1135 (1998); Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Commonwealth, 546 Pa. 27, 682 A.2d 1257, 1260 (1996). In contrast, a claimant seeking benefits for any other type of injury only had to show that: (1) he suffered from such an injury; and (2) “the injury arose in the course of employment and was related thereto.” ⁹ Krawchuk v. Phila. Electric Co., 497 Pa. 115, 439 A.2d 627, 630 (1981); see also 77 P.S. § 411; Whiteside v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Unisys Corp.), 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 488, 650 A.2d 1202, 1205-07 (1994).

Some time after Martin, this Court granted allocatur in Davis to address the issue of whether the abnormal working conditions test applied to a claimant who allegedly suffered from a psychic injury with related physical symptoms. See 751 A.2d at 174. There, the claimant, James Davis, filed a claim petition seeking benefits for certain psychic injuries, namely, post-traumatic stress disorder and specific work inhibition, which he claimed were caused by “repeated stressful and life-threatening experiences during the course of his duties as a police officer.” Id. at 169. Davis also alleged that his psychic injuries included physical symptoms, such as shortness of breath, uncontrollable hand shaking, and general muscle twitching with aches and pains. See id. at 172. The WCJ awarded Davis benefits, finding that he had sufficiently established that he suffered from a “bona-fide psychiatric illness,” which was caused by abnormal working conditions. Id. at 173. The Board, however, reversed, explaining that Davis’ “working conditions were not unusually stressful for police work.” Id,.

On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed the Board, holding that because Davis showed that he suffered from physical symptoms along with his psychic injury, he was not required to prove that his injuries were the result of abnormal working conditions. Instead, the court held that Davis “was required to prove only that the psychological stress of normal working conditions caused a physical injury.” Id. at 174. This Court, however, reversed the Commonwealth Court, essentially finding that a psychic injury did not become a physical injury simply because it included physical symptoms. See id. at 177 (“[I]t is the nature of the injury asserted, not the presence or absence of physical symptoms that is controlling.”). Accordingly, this Court held that because Davis’ injuries were unquestionably psychic in nature, with simply related physical symptoms, Davis had to meet the abnormal working conditions test and the Board correctly determined that the evidence submitted by Davis did not satisfy that test. See id.

As explained above, the Commonwealth Court in the instant case relied on Davis in finding that Claimant was required to meet the abnormal working conditions test to obtain benefits for his heart attack. According to the Commonwealth Court, the Davis court held that whenever a claimant suffers an injury, whether it be psychic or physical, as a result of a psychic reaction to a working condition, the claimant must show that the working condition was abnormal. However, contrary to the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion, we now hold that, given the facts of Davis, that case only stands for the proposition that where a claimant suffers a psychic injury with attendant physical symptoms, the claimant must meet the abnormal working relations test. See Davis, 751 A.2d at 170 (“We hold that where a psychic injury is claimed, regardless of whether it is manifested through psychic symptoms alone or physical symptoms as well, the claimant must establish that the injury arose from abnormal working conditions in order to recover benefits.”) (emphasis added); id. at 174; id. at 176; id. at 177. Indeed, given the facts before it, the Davis court simply did not resolve the completely separate question of whether a claimant must satisfy the abnormal working conditions test when seeking benefits for a purely physical injury, such as a heart attack, caused by a psychic reaction to a working condition.

Moreover, this Court refuses to take this case as an opportunity to expand the abnormal working conditions test to situations where a claimant suffers a purely physical injury due to a psychic reaction to a working condition.¹⁰ In the first instance, we note that the concerns that caused this Court to adopt the abnormal working conditions test in cases where a claimant suffers a psychic injury are not present in cases where a claimant suffers a purely physical injury, such as a heart attack, angina, or colitis. Indeed, unlike psychic injuries, purely physical injuries are usually objectively verifiable and can ordinarily be traced to an identifiable source. Thus, a physical injury’s relationship to the workplace is easier to discern than that of a psychic injury, which, by its nature, is inherently subjective. Compare Krawchuk, 439 A.2d at 628-29 (evidence showed that decedent was working and under heavy stress at time he suffered his heart attack), with Thomas, 423 A.2d at 787 (evidence was unclear as to whether claimant’s psychic injury in 1975 was related to work-related events years earlier). Further, given the objective nature of physical injuries, they are less likely than psychic injuries to be either subject to manipulation or simply the result of a “subjective reaction to normal working conditions.” Davis, 751 A.2d at 177.

Accordingly, we do not believe that it is necessary to require claimants allegedly suffering from physical injuries to show that their injuries are the result of abnormal working conditions. Rather, such claimants need only show that (1) they are suffering from an objectively verifiable physical injury; and (2) “the injury arose in the course of employment and was related thereto.” Krawchuk, 439 A.2d at 630. Moreover, as we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the WCJ’s initial determination that Claimant met the above burden, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order denying Claimant’s claim petition.

Chief Justice CAPPY and Justice EAKIN and BAER join the opinion. Justice CASTILLE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion. Justice NEWMAN files a dissenting opinion.

1 . Claimant sought: (1) payment for the wages he lost while he was out of work due to the heart attack; (2) payment for his medical bills; and (3) counsel fees.

2 . Claimant explained that pursuant to U.S. Airways’ policy, an employee was required to attend an “initial meeting” with Egan if he incurred four “occurrences.” WCJ Hearing, 1/13/98, at 16.

3 . Claimanl contended that the initial May absence should not have been treated as an "occurrence” because he had gone to work on that day, but had to leave because of sharp chest pains.

4 . Egan explained that the initial discussion was not a disciplinary meeting, but simply "a discussion that’s documented in writing to make the employee aware that he or she has four occurrences^] to cover what the Attendance Control Policy is all about, and to discuss [the] Family and Medical Leave.” WCJ Hearing, 4/28/1998, at 8.

5 . The WCJ had previously entered an order granting Claimant's claim petition and request for counsel fees on October 13, 1998. However, on November 4, 1998, the WCJ vacated that decision and relisted the case to consider U.S. Airways’ brief.

6 . The WCJ also found that Egan’s testimony corroborated Claimant's testimony in this respect.

7 . In spite of his ruling, the WCJ noted that he agreed with Claimant “that the restrictive abnormal working conditions rule has been unfairly extended to mental-physical cases” such as Claimant's. WCJ Decision, 5/28/2002, at 11. Indeed, the WCJ respectfully requested the appellate courts to reconsider the application of this rule to mental-physical cases.

8 . Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736.

9 . The other types of injuries include: (1) physical/physical injuries, where a physical stimulus causes a physical injury; (2) psychic/physical injuries, where a psychic stimulus causes a physical injury; and (3) physical/psychic, where a physical stimulus causes a psychic injury. See Katz v. Evening Bulletin, 485 Pa. 536, 403 A.2d 518, 519 (1979) (example of physical/physical injury); Ryan, 707 A.2d at 1133-34 (identifying and giving examples of other two types of injuries).

10 . The Commonwealth Court found that this Court expanded the abnormal working conditions test to cases in which a claimant allegedly suffers from a psychic/physical injury by means of our per curiam order in Erie Bolt Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Elderkin), 562 Pa. 175, 753 A.2d 1289 (2000), which reversed the order of the Superior Court based on Davis. However, our current recognition that Davis did not address psychic/physical injuries makes plain that our mere citation to Davis in Erie Bolt could not have expanded the abnormal working conditions test to cover such injuries. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 575 Pa. 203, 836 A.2d 5, 17 (2003) (although an unexplained per curiam reversal establishes the law of the case, "by definition it establishes no precedent beyond the authority cited in the order.”)