JONES, Circuit Judge.
The Panama Railroad Company was incorporated in New York in 1849. From 1905 until 1949, when it was dissolved, all of its stock was owned by the United States. The appellant corporation, Panama Canal Company, herein generally referred to as the Company, was created by the Panama Canal Company Act which the Congress enacted in 1948 and which is now Sections 245 to 258 of the Canal Zone Code. The Company is the successor to the Panama Railroad Company. Its stock, like that of its predecessor, is wholly owned by the United States. The appellees, 171 in number, are or have been employees of the Company, working at hourly rates of pay aboard the dredges, tugs, launches and perhaps other floating equipment of the Company. These employees, for the most part, travel from some pick-up point in the neighborhood of their residence to a dock or landing. All of the appellee-em-ployees are transported by the Company on its launches to the equipment where they are employed. The time of waterborne travel of the employees depends, of course, upon the distance from dock or landing to dredge or other equipment, and ranges from ten minutes to two hours. The employees are compensated at an hourly pay rate for weekly pay periods of forty hours with time and a half for overtime. The time for which wages are paid includes only that spent in the performance of the duties of the employees on the equipment to which they have been assigned. It does not include any time spent in traveling to or from the equipment over either water or land. The appellees brought suit in the District Court of the Canal Zone claiming that they were entitled to recover additional compensation for their travel time. The court held that the time spent in water-borne travel was compensable but the time spent in overland travel was not. The court, being anxious to avoid computing the additional wages of the multitude of plaintiffs in the event of error in its determination that waterborne travel time was work time for which wages were payable, certified the question to this Court under the statutory provision for interlocutory appeals. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).
The district court made a determination that the employee-appellees are subject to the so-called Thomas Amendment1 and to Section 248 of Title 2, Canal Zone Code, as amended.2 It was held that the [100] appellees are not subject to sections 102 (d),3 205 4 or 606 5 of the Federal Employees Pay Act as amended.
The questions, as presented by the interlocutory appeal and as framed by the district court, are:
(a) Are the plaintiffs as a group, or are any of them individually, subject to section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 522, 5 U.S.C.A. § 673c?
(b) Does the time spent by plaintiffs in traveling by means of defendant’s water-borne conveyances over the Panama Canal and contiguous waters (under the state of facts found by the district court in its opinion of April 26, 1961) constitute regular hours of labor within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 522, 5 U.S.C.A. § 673c?
More briefly stated, the question which this Court has undertaken to answer is whether the Thomas Amendment requires that the appellees be paid for their over-water travel time as constituting regular hours of labor.
The question presented is one of statutory construction. Where there are two or more statutes dealing with the same subject they are to be read in pari materia and harmonized, if possible. If there is any repugnancy between them the specific or particular statute will control over and supersede a general statute even though the general measure be more recently enacted. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd Ed. 541, § 5204, 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 369, p. 839; Bulova Watch Company v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 81 S.Ct. 864, 6 L.Ed.2d 72; Enzor v. United States, 5th Cir. 1959, 262 F.2d 172, cert. den. 359 U.S. 953, 79 S.Ct. 740, 3 L.Ed.2d 761; Price v. United States, 5th Cir. 1934, 74 F.2d 120, cert. den. 294 U.S. 720, 55 S.Ct. 549, 79 L.Ed. 1252, reh. den. 295 U.S. 767, 55 S.Ct. 643, 79 L.Ed. 1708. Section 606, 5 U.S.C.A. § 946, supra, is a specific statutory provision dealing with particular employee groups including vessel employees of the Panama Canal Company. If, as seems to be established, the appellees are vessel employees of the Panama Canal Company, and if, as seems also to have been established, it is not the wage practice in the maritime industry to compensate vessel employees for the time spent in over-water travel to and from the vessel on which they are employed, there is, in our opinion, a repugnancy between the specific terms of Section 606 and the gen[101] eral provisions of the Thomas Amendment and the canons of construction give the precedence to the specific statute.
The district court rejected the view that the specific legislation governed and, in its opinion, said:
“Prior to June 30, 1951 [when much of the functions and many of the employees of the Canal Zone government were taken over by the Panama Canal Company] plaintiffs were as has been stated, employees not of the ‘Company’ but of the unincorporated entity, the Panama Canal, and Congress in passing specific legislation [in 1945] for ‘vessel employees’ of the Company could not have had them in mind.” 194 F. Supp. 765, 786.
To us it would appear that Congress, in enacting the specific provisions relating to vessel employees, would not have intended to require different wage treatment for employees doing identical work under the same circumstances and conditions dependent upon whether the particular workman had been hired before or after the vessel employee statute was enacted. The adherence to this view requires us to reject the construction placed upon the enactments by the district court.
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JONES, Circuit Judge.
The Panama Railroad Company was incorporated in New York in 1849. From 1905 until 1949, when it was dissolved, all of its stock was owned by the United States. The appellant corporation, Panama Canal Company, herein generally referred to as the Company, was created by the Panama Canal Company Act which the Congress enacted in 1948 and which is now Sections 245 to 258 of the Canal Zone Code. The Company is the successor to the Panama Railroad Company. Its stock, like that of its predecessor, is wholly owned by the United States. The appellees, 171 in number, are or have been employees of the Company, working at hourly rates of pay aboard the dredges, tugs, launches and perhaps other floating equipment of the Company. These employees, for the most part, travel from some pick-up point in the neighborhood of their residence to a dock or landing. All of the appellee-em-ployees are transported by the Company on its launches to the equipment where they are employed. The time of waterborne travel of the employees depends, of course, upon the distance from dock or landing to dredge or other equipment, and ranges from ten minutes to two hours. The employees are compensated at an hourly pay rate for weekly pay periods of forty hours with time and a half for overtime. The time for which wages are paid includes only that spent in the performance of the duties of the employees on the equipment to which they have been assigned. It does not include any time spent in traveling to or from the equipment over either water or land. The appellees brought suit in the District Court of the Canal Zone claiming that they were entitled to recover additional compensation for their travel time. The court held that the time spent in water-borne travel was compensable but the time spent in overland travel was not. The court, being anxious to avoid computing the additional wages of the multitude of plaintiffs in the event of error in its determination that waterborne travel time was work time for which wages were payable, certified the question to this Court under the statutory provision for interlocutory appeals. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).
The district court made a determination that the employee-appellees are subject to the so-called Thomas Amendment1 and to Section 248 of Title 2, Canal Zone Code, as amended.2 It was held that the [100] appellees are not subject to sections 102 (d),3 205 4 or 606 5 of the Federal Employees Pay Act as amended.
The questions, as presented by the interlocutory appeal and as framed by the district court, are:
(a) Are the plaintiffs as a group, or are any of them individually, subject to section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 522, 5 U.S.C.A. § 673c?
(b) Does the time spent by plaintiffs in traveling by means of defendant’s water-borne conveyances over the Panama Canal and contiguous waters (under the state of facts found by the district court in its opinion of April 26, 1961) constitute regular hours of labor within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 522, 5 U.S.C.A. § 673c?
More briefly stated, the question which this Court has undertaken to answer is whether the Thomas Amendment requires that the appellees be paid for their over-water travel time as constituting regular hours of labor.
The question presented is one of statutory construction. Where there are two or more statutes dealing with the same subject they are to be read in pari materia and harmonized, if possible. If there is any repugnancy between them the specific or particular statute will control over and supersede a general statute even though the general measure be more recently enacted. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd Ed. 541, § 5204, 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 369, p. 839; Bulova Watch Company v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 81 S.Ct. 864, 6 L.Ed.2d 72; Enzor v. United States, 5th Cir. 1959, 262 F.2d 172, cert. den. 359 U.S. 953, 79 S.Ct. 740, 3 L.Ed.2d 761; Price v. United States, 5th Cir. 1934, 74 F.2d 120, cert. den. 294 U.S. 720, 55 S.Ct. 549, 79 L.Ed. 1252, reh. den. 295 U.S. 767, 55 S.Ct. 643, 79 L.Ed. 1708. Section 606, 5 U.S.C.A. § 946, supra, is a specific statutory provision dealing with particular employee groups including vessel employees of the Panama Canal Company. If, as seems to be established, the appellees are vessel employees of the Panama Canal Company, and if, as seems also to have been established, it is not the wage practice in the maritime industry to compensate vessel employees for the time spent in over-water travel to and from the vessel on which they are employed, there is, in our opinion, a repugnancy between the specific terms of Section 606 and the gen[101] eral provisions of the Thomas Amendment and the canons of construction give the precedence to the specific statute.
The district court rejected the view that the specific legislation governed and, in its opinion, said:
“Prior to June 30, 1951 [when much of the functions and many of the employees of the Canal Zone government were taken over by the Panama Canal Company] plaintiffs were as has been stated, employees not of the ‘Company’ but of the unincorporated entity, the Panama Canal, and Congress in passing specific legislation [in 1945] for ‘vessel employees’ of the Company could not have had them in mind.” 194 F. Supp. 765, 786.
To us it would appear that Congress, in enacting the specific provisions relating to vessel employees, would not have intended to require different wage treatment for employees doing identical work under the same circumstances and conditions dependent upon whether the particular workman had been hired before or after the vessel employee statute was enacted. The adherence to this view requires us to reject the construction placed upon the enactments by the district court.
The appellant urges that the appellees are not wage-board employees under the Thomas Amendment and hence are not entitled to its benefits. It contends that the Thomas Amendment is applicable only to employees of corporate agencies of the United States whose compensation is fixed on an annual or monthly basis and does not apply to such employees as the appellees who are paid by the hour. Even if the Thomas Amendment applies to the appellees, it is said by the appellant that we must reverse the district court and sustain the administrative finding of the appellant that over-water travel time does not constitute hours of labor within the meaning of the Amendment. This, it says, follows because the administrative finding cannot be overturned in the absence of a finding of an abuse of discretion; and because, in any event, the travel to the job site is not contemplated or included within “hours of labor”. Since we have decided that the district court’s determination must be reversed upon a more basic and fundamental principle of statutory construction, these questions do not require our consideration.
The judgment of the district court is Reversed.