Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Federal Power Commission

352 F.2d 241, 23 Oil & Gas Rep. 1021, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 4273
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedOctober 18, 1965
Docket7303
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 352 F.2d 241 (Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Federal Power Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Federal Power Commission, 352 F.2d 241, 23 Oil & Gas Rep. 1021, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 4273 (10th Cir. 1965).

Opinion

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

In Texaco, Inc., v. Federal Power Commission, 10 Cir., 317 F.2d 796, we held that the Federal Power Commission, acting under its general rule-making powers, could not proscribe certain pricing provisions in the contracts of independent producers of natural gas; and we set aside Commission orders rejecting two applications for certificates of convenience and necessity, one by Texaco and one by Pan American. On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed, 1 holding that the Texaco petition should be dismissed for lack of venue and that the Commission acted within its statutory authority in adopting the challenged regulations under its rule-making powers. The Supreme Court remanded the case to this court “for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court.” On motion of the Commission we dismissed the Texaco petition. See Texaco, Inc., v. Federal Power Commission, 10 Cir., 337 F.2d 253. The remaining issue is the Pan American contention that, insofar as the contract here presented is concerned, the regulations are invalid because they are not rationally related to the regulatory purposes of the Natural Gas Act. 2

The Regulations under the Natural Gas Act require independent producers subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction to file their sale contracts as rate schedules. 3 Section 154.93, as amended by Commission Orders Numbers 232, 232A, and 242, 4 permits certain price-changing provisions in such contracts, prohibits all others, and provides that contracts which are executed after April 2, 1962, and which contain impermissible price-changing provisions shall be rejected.

The Pan American certificate application is based on a contract for the sale by Pan American to Colorado Interstate Gas Company of gas produced in the Beaver Creek Field, Fremont County, Wyoming. The contract calls for a 17.5 cent per MCF rate for the first five years with increases of one cent per MCF at the end of each of three subsequent five-year periods. The contract also contains what Pan American calls a price renegotiation clause which provides that for each five-year period after 1983 the price “shall be the fair market price established as of the beginning of each such period but in no event shall be less than 20.5 cents.” The parties are required to meet to establish such fair market price. In establishing that price “the parties shall consider along with other relevant factors, quality, quantity, delivery pressure and delivery point, and the prices other major pipeline companies are paying for gas in the general area under agreements which at that time have been recently negotiated or renegotiated.” The price renegotiation provisions are impermissible under § 154.93 and caused the summary rejection of the Pan American contract.

The Commission insists that all issues of the validity of the challenged regulations, including reasonableness, were determined by the Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 84 S.Ct. 1105, 12 L.Ed.2d 112. We do not so read that decision. *243 It did not discuss the reasonableness of those regulations, probably because the posture of the case presented did not require it to do so. A decision upholding the propriety of the procedures followed does not necessarily mean that the result of the procedures is valid.

The Commission also points out that the decision in Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 9 Cir., 322 F.2d 601, upheld the reasonableness of the regulations and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 377 U.S. 922, 84 S.Ct. 1219, 12 L.Ed.2d 215. We do not consider the action of the Supreme Court in the Superior case as determinative of the issue here presented. Denial of certiorari “imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.” 5 6Ad-ditionally the Superior case concerned a contract containing a favored-nation type of escalation clause. 6 We have here a different type of escalation provision.

Certain it is that neither the Supreme Court in Texaco nor the Ninth Circuit in Superior considered whether the proscription of an escalation clause such as presented here is a reasonable exercise by the Commission of its regulatory powers under the Act. We believed that under the remand it was incumbent on us to resolve this narrow issue and we required the Commission to file the records compiled in the rule-making procedures which resulted in Orders Numbers 232, 232A, and 242. 7 This has been done and the parties have reproduced a joint appendix containing material portions of those records.

In its Order No. 232 the Commission recognized the propriety and desirability of long-term contracts for the sale of natural gas by producers to pipeline companies and held that such contracts containing “indefinite escalation clauses” contributed to instability and uncertainty of price and were contrary to the public interest. Escalation clauses are common in long-term contracts for the sale of gas because (1) a natural gas company is bound by its contract and may not unilaterally file for increased rates 8 and (2) a producer should have a contractual right to protect against the unforeseeable economic conditions of the future. These clauses take many forms such as two-party favored nation, three-party favored nation, spiral escalation, periodic escalation, redetermination, and renegotiation. 9 We need concern ourselves only with the distinctions between the last two. Redetermination clauses generally provide for an upward adjustment in price at specified times to reflect the average of the highest prices then paid by buyers to other suppliers for gas delivered under substantially similar terms and conditions. Renegotiation clauses generally provide for agreement by the buyer and seller on a price to be effective at a certain time and generally set forth the factors to be considered by the parties in agreeing on the renegotiated price.

In the rule-making proceedings before Order No. 232 was entered some of the participants urged the approval of renegotiation clauses. One of the commissioners dissented from that order “insofar as it renders void and inoperative provisions in producer contracts permitting price changes arrived at through negotiation or arbitration after a period of five years from the date of the contract.” 10

Objections to Order No. 232 resulted in its amendment by Order No. 232A. Therein the Commission found that eer *244

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352 F.2d 241, 23 Oil & Gas Rep. 1021, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 4273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pan-american-petroleum-corporation-v-federal-power-commission-ca10-1965.