Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.

Supreme Court

Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.

343 U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 96 L. Ed. 1022, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2098, 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 876

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedMay 12, 1952

DocketNO. 301

StatusPublished

Cited by24 cases

This text of 343 U.S. 390 (Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 96 L. Ed. 1022, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2098, 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 876 (1952).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

These two appeals challenge the constitutionality of Okla. Stat., 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Tit. 52, §§ 286.1-286.17, providing for unitized management of common sources of supply of oil and gas in Oklahoma. This statute was repealed by the Oklahoma Legislature on May 26, 1951, Okla. Laws 1951, c. 3a, § 16, p. 142, and we ordered the causes continued in order to determine the effect of this repeal on the matters raised in these appeals. 342 U. S. 35 (1951). After being advised by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes, we noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument.

Appellants contend that this statute and an order issued thereunder by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission impair their contractual rights in violation of U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, and amount to a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, appellants argue that the statute is an unreasonable exercise of the State’s police power and an unreasonable delegation of legislative and judicial power to private groups. In addition, appellants maintain that the statute is too vague and indefinite to furnish the Commission with any reasonable guide for the issuance of orders approving unitization plans, and that the evidence does not support the Commission’s findings of fact.

In the light of our previous decisions, appellants have failed to raise any substantial federal questions and the appeals are therefore dismissed. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 *392 U. S. 570 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939); Home Building & Loan Assoc iation v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 435, 436, 437 (1934); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).

Dismissed.

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Per Curiam.

These two appeals challenge the constitutionality of Okla. Stat., 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Tit. 52, §§ 286.1-286.17, providing for unitized management of common sources of supply of oil and gas in Oklahoma. This statute was repealed by the Oklahoma Legislature on May 26, 1951, Okla. Laws 1951, c. 3a, § 16, p. 142, and we ordered the causes continued in order to determine the effect of this repeal on the matters raised in these appeals. 342 U. S. 35 (1951). After being advised by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes, we noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument.

Appellants contend that this statute and an order issued thereunder by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission impair their contractual rights in violation of U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, and amount to a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, appellants argue that the statute is an unreasonable exercise of the State’s police power and an unreasonable delegation of legislative and judicial power to private groups. In addition, appellants maintain that the statute is too vague and indefinite to furnish the Commission with any reasonable guide for the issuance of orders approving unitization plans, and that the evidence does not support the Commission’s findings of fact.

In the light of our previous decisions, appellants have failed to raise any substantial federal questions and the appeals are therefore dismissed. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 *392 U. S. 570 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939); Home Building & Loan Assoc iation v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 435, 436, 437 (1934); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).

Dismissed.

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343 U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 96 L. Ed. 1022, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2098, 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palmer-oil-corp-v-amerada-petroleum-corp-scotus-1952.

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