Palkon v. Maffei

• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware
• Decided: February 20, 2024
• Docket: C.A. No. 2023-0449-JTL
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DENNIS PALKON AND HERBERT ) WILLIAMSON, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 2023-0449-JTL ) GREGORY B. MAFFEI, ALBERT E. ) ROSENTHALER, MATT GOLDBERG, JAY ) C. HOAG, BETSY MORGAN, GREG ) O’HARA, JEREMY PHILIPS, TRYNKA ) SHINEMAN BLAKE, JANE JIE SUN, ) ROBERT S. WIESENTHAL, LARRY E. ) ROMRELL, J. DAVID WARGO, MICHAEL ) J. MALONE, CHRIS MUELLER, and ) CHRISTY HAUBEGGER, ) ) Defendants, ) ) and ) ) TRIPADVISOR, INC. AND LIBERTY ) TRIPADVISOR HOLDINGS, INC., ) ) Nominal Defendants. )

OPINION DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Date Submitted: November 8, 2023 Date Decided: February 20, 2024

Gregory V. Varallo, Andrew E. Blumberg, Mae Oberste, Daniel E. Meyer, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Kimberly A. Evans, Robert Erickson, BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Sara D. Swartzwelder, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, New York, New York; Jeremy Friedman, David Tejtel, Christopher Windover, FRIEDMAN OSTER & TEJTEL PLLC, Bedford Hills, New York; Jason Leviton, Joel Fleming, Amanda Crawford, BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; D. Seamus Kaskela, Adrienne Bell, KASKELA LAW LLC, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania; Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dennis Palkon and Herbert Williamson.

Kevin R. Shannon, J. Matthew Belger, Jaclyn C. Levy, Justin T. Hymes, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Matthew W. Close, Jonathan B. Waxman, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Los Angeles, California; Abby F. Rudzin, Asher Rivner, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Defendants Gregory B. Maffei, Albert E. Rosenthaler, Larry E. Romrell, J. David Wargo, Michael J. Malone, Chris Mueller, Christy Haubegger, and Nominal Defendant Liberty TripAdvisor Holdings, Inc.

Bradley R. Aronstam, S. Michael Sirkin, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; John A. Neuwirth, Evert J. Christensen, Jr., Stefania D. Venezia, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Defendants Matt Goldberg, Jay C. Hoag, Betsy Morgan, Greg O’Hara, Jeremy Philips, Trynka Shineman Blake, Jane Jie Sun, and Robert S. Wiesenthal, and Nominal Defendant TripAdvisor, Inc.

LASTER, V.C. A Delaware corporation has two classes of stock. The CEO/Chair owns high-

vote shares carrying a majority of the outstanding voting power, giving him hard

majority control. The board decides to convert the Delaware corporation into a

Nevada corporation, and the CEO/Chair delivers the necessary stockholder vote. The

board does not establish any protections to simulate arm’s length bargaining. The

conversion is not conditioned on either special committee approval or a majority-of-

the-minority vote.

A stockholder plaintiff challenges the conversion.1 The plaintiff argues that

Nevada law offers fewer litigation rights to stockholders and provides greater

litigation protections to fiduciaries like the directors and the CEO/Chair. The plaintiff

alleges that the directors and the CEO/Chair approved the conversion to secure the

litigation protections for themselves. In support of those assertions, the plaintiff cites

the materials the board considered, disclosures in the company’s proxy statement,

the work of distinguished legal scholars about the content of Nevada law, and public

statements by Nevada policy makers about the direction Nevada law has taken.

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it fails to state a

claim on which relief can be granted. The outcome depends in the first instance on

the standard of review.

1 There are really two corporations and two conversions. They are substantively identical for purposes of the Delaware law analysis. For now, we are keeping it simple by speaking about only one. As depicted, the conversion constitutes a self-interested transaction

effectuated by a stockholder controller. The reduction in the unaffiliated stockholders’

litigation rights inures to the benefit of the stockholder controller and the directors.

That means the conversion confers a non-ratable benefit on the stockholder controller

and the directors, triggering entire fairness. There are no protective devices that

could lower the standard of review. Entire fairness governs.

With entire fairness as the operative standard of review, the plaintiff has

stated a claim on which relief can be granted. The entire fairness standard has two

dimensions: substantive fairness (fair price) and procedural fairness (fair dealing).

The floor for substantive fairness is whether stockholders receive at least the

substantial equivalent in value of what they had before. Before the conversion, the

stockholders held shares carrying the bundle of rights afforded by Delaware law,

including a set of litigation rights. After the conversion, the stockholders owned

shares carrying a different bundle of rights afforded by Nevada law, including a lesser

set of litigation rights. That makes it reasonably conceivable that the stockholders do

not possess at least the substantial equivalent of what they possessed before,

supporting an inference that the conversion was not substantively fair.

The test for procedural fairness is whether the process leading to the

conversion adequately simulated arm’s length bargaining. As depicted, the

stockholder controller and the board did not implement any procedural protections.

The board recommended the conversion, and the stockholder controller delivered the

2 vote. Those allegations support an inference that the conversion was not procedurally

fair.

The plaintiff therefore has stated a claim on which relief can be granted. That

holding does not require finding that Nevada provides greater protection against

fiduciary liability than Delaware law. The question at this stage is whether it is

reasonably conceivable that Nevada law offers greater protection. The complaint

alleges facts suggesting that it does, that the defendants think so too, and that the

defendants sought to capture those benefits for themselves through the conversion.

This decision must credit the complaint’s allegations.

Holding that the plaintiffs have stated a claim on which relief can be granted

does not discriminate against Nevada entities. The same reasoning would apply if a

Delaware corporation converted into another Delaware entity in a transaction with

comparable implications. Using the contractual freedom conferred by the Delaware

Limited Liability Company Act, entity planners can implement a wide array of

governance schemes that provide fewer rights to investors than what stockholders in

a Delaware corporation enjoy. If a Delaware corporation converted into a Delaware

LLC where the governing agreement had eliminated all fiduciary duties, then the

same reasoning would hold. Entity planners could even design a Delaware LLC that

mirrors the internal governance structure of a Nevada corporation. If a Delaware

corporation converted into that LLC, the outcome would be the same.

Holding that these plaintiffs have stated a claim on which relief can be granted

does not mean that corporations cannot leave Delaware. The plaintiffs have asked for

3 an injunction to block the company’s departure, but even on the facts alleged, it is not

reasonably conceivable that the court would enjoin the company from leaving.

Nor does this decision mean that a corporation can never leave Delaware

without litigation risk. If a board proposed a similar conversion for a corporation

without a stockholder controller, and if the fiduciaries fully disclosed the

consequences of the change in legal regimes, including the effect on stockholder

litigation rights, then the stockholders’ approval of the conversion would be

dispositive, triggering an irrebuttable version of the business judgment rule.2 If

directors proposed a similar conversion for a corporation with a stockholder

controller, and if they properly conditioned the transaction on the twin MFW

protections, then the dual approvals would be dispositive, again triggering an

irrebuttable version of the business judgment rule.3

The plaintiffs can only state a claim on which relief can be granted because (1)

the corporation has a stockholder controller, and (2) the board did not implement any

protective provisions. The defendants also did not make any effort to compensate the

stockholders for the reduction in their litigation rights. Change any of those variables

and the outcome could be different.

2 See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Hldgs. LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).

3 See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (MFW), 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), as modified by Flood v. Synutra, Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018).

4 Instead, the outcome reflects that fiduciary duties operate unremittingly, as

the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly held.4 That includes when fiduciaries

effectuate a transaction that will eliminate the protection of Delaware law.

The outcome rests on a sound policy foundation. Delaware strives to maintain

a balanced corporation law that protects the interests of both managers and

investors. Delaware law gives managers broad discretion to build businesses, take

risks, and create value. At the same time, Delaware law protects investors through a

combination of statutory provisions and common law fiduciary duties. Because of

those protections, investors willingly entrust their capital to Delaware corporations.

4 See Dohmen v. Goodman, 234 A.3d 1161, 1168 (Del. 2020) (“Directors of Delaware corporations owe duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders. These duties do not operate intermittently, but are the constant compass by which all director actions for the corporation and interactions with its shareholders must be guided.” (cleaned up)); City of Fort Myers Gen. Empls.’ Pension Fund v. Haley, 235 A.3d 702, 718 (Del. 2019) (“It is elementary that under Delaware law the duty of candor imposes an unremitting duty on fiduciaries, including directors and officers, to not use superior information or knowledge to mislead others in the performance of their own fiduciary obligations.” (cleaned up)); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (“The stockholders of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon the board to discharge its fiduciary duties at all times. The fiduciary duties of a director are unremitting and must be effectively discharged in the specific context of the actions that are required with regard to the corporation or its stockholders as circumstances change.” (footnotes omitted)); Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillian, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“It is basic to our law that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation. In discharging this function, the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. This unremitting obligation extends equally to board conduct in a sale of corporate control.” (citations omitted)).

5 If the business judgment rule applied in this setting, then a stockholder

controller could reduce the rights investors enjoy by changing the corporation’s

domicile. That would create a gap in the protections offered by Delaware law. The

gap would have knock on effects, and investors would demand greater returns ex ante

to compensate for the increased risk. The cost of capital for Delaware corporations

would go up.

By applying fiduciary duties consistently across all controller transactions,

Delaware prevents gaps from forming in its law. A stockholder controller can exit

Delaware on fair terms. If the controller does not establish the MFW protections up

front, then the controller must prove entire fairness. Stockholders receive

compensation for their lost rights, and the controlled company can carry on in a new

jurisdiction.

Here, the defendants did not establish the MFW protections up front, and they

will bear the burden of proving entire fairness. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is

therefore denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the plaintiffs’ complaint and the documents that it

incorporates by reference.5

5 Citation in the form “DX __” refer to exhibits attached to the Transmittal

Affidavit of Justin T. Hymes, dated July 11, 2023.

6 A. The Defendants

TripAdvisor, Inc. (“TripAdvisor” or the “Company”) is a Delaware corporation

that operates the world’s largest travel guidance platform. It has a dual-class capital

structure. The Class A common stock carries one vote per share and trades publicly

under the symbol “TRIP.” The Class B common stock carries ten votes per share and

is owned exclusively by Liberty TripAdvisor Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”). In addition

to owning all of the Company’s Class B shares, Holdings owns approximately 21% of

the Class A shares. Through that stake, Holdings exercises 56% of the Company

outstanding voting power while owning barely one fifth of the economic interest.

Holdings has a dual-class capital structure of its own. Its Series A common

stock carries one vote per share, and its Series B common stock carries ten votes per

share. Both series trade publicly.

Gregory B. Maffei is the CEO and Chairman of Holdings. When the plaintiffs

filed this action, Maffei beneficially owned Series B shares carrying 43% of Holdings’

voting power. For purposes of their motion to dismiss, the defendants concede that

Maffei controls both Holdings and TripAdvisor.

The other defendants are members of either the Company’s board of directors

(the “Company Board”) or Holdings’ board of directors (the “Holdings Board”). The

members of the Company Board are Maffei, Matt Goldberg, Jay C. Hoag, Betsy

Morgan, Greg O’Hara, Jeremy Philips, Albert E. Rosenthaler, Trynka Shineman

Blake, Jane Jie Sun, and Robert S. Wiesenthal. The members of the Holdings Board

7 are Maffei, Rosenthaler, Larry E. Romrell, J. David Wargo, Michael J. Malone, Chris

Mueller, and Christy Haubegger.

B. The Company Board Resolves To Convert TripAdvisor Into A Nevada Corporation.

At a meeting in November 2022, TripAdvisor management first presented to

the Company Board about the possibility of converting TripAdvisor into a Nevada

corporation. They benefits included greater protections against litigation for directors

and officers, plus lower franchise taxes and fees.

In February 2023, the Company Board revisited the potential conversion. A

management presentation noted that the “laws of Nevada would generally permit the

Company to offer greater protection to its directors and officers” and reduce the “risk

of expensive and time consuming litigation against the Company and its directors

and officers.” DX 2 at ‘059. The presentation included a comparison of Delaware and

Nevada law and explained that under Nevada law, a director or officer can be liable

“only when the plaintiff affirmatively rebuts the business judgment presumption and

demonstrates that the fiduciary breach involved intentional misconduct, fraud, or a

knowing violation of law.” Id. at ‘063. The presentation explained that Delaware law

applied the entire fairness test to interested transactions with a controlling

stockholder, but Nevada law did not unless the plaintiff could rebut the business

judgment rule. Id. The directors also considered other potential factors associated

with the conversion.

In March 2023, the Company Board again considered whether TripAdvisor

should become a Nevada entity. A management presentation again noted that 8 Nevada law generally offered greater protection against liability to officers and

directors. DX 3 at ‘090.

At the end of the March meeting, the Company Board unanimously resolved to

approve the conversion of the Company into a Nevada corporation. At a meeting in

April 2023, the Company Board approved final resolutions authorizing the

conversion.

C. The Holdings Board Resolves To Convert Holdings Into A Nevada Corporation.

During March 2023, Holdings management presented to its directors on

potentially converting into a Nevada corporation. The presentation identified the

following advantages:

• “Recent case law developments in Delaware, in particular with respect to conflicted controller and ‘change of control’ transactions, have increasingly emboldened plaintiffs’ law firms to bring claims against directors and officers, significant stockholders and the company and have increased potential exposure for these parties[.]”

• “Under Delaware law director liability cannot be eliminated if the court finds a breach of duty of loyalty and D&O carriers often argue duty of loyalty claims are not insured[.]”

• “Cases that are subject to ‘entire fairness’ review in Delaware (which requires the defendants to demonstrate that the price and process in a transaction were entirely fair) present a high bar and, because of the factual issues involved, it is often difficult for defendants to prevail in the preliminary stages of litigation[.]”

• “Liberty Media [an affiliated public company for which Maffei serves as CEO], its service companies and certain of their portfolio companies have experienced these developments, having been involved in at least 8 stockholder lawsuits in Delaware since 2012 (5 of which were brought in the last 5 years) which have resulted in substantial time and expense to defend and resolve[.]”

9 • “Management believes Nevada law generally provides greater protection from liability to the Company and its D&Os than Delaware law[.]”

• “Nevada law eliminates the individual liability of both officers and directors to the company, its stockholders or its creditors for damages as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty unless the breach involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law and unless a company’s articles of incorporation provide for greater liability[.]”

• “Nevada does not follow Revlon duties (duty to get the best price reasonably available in a sale), and instead permits consideration of ‘other constituencies’ by statute[.]”

DX 5 at ‘013, ‘016. Management undertook to explore the idea further and report back

to the directors at a later date.

In April 2023, management circulated additional information about the

conversion process. The members of the Holdings Board approved the conversion by

unanimous written consent.

D. The Company and Holdings Seek Stockholder Approval.

The Company and Holdings sought stockholder approval for the conversions.

They prepared and distributed proxy statements asking stockholders to vote in favor.

The Company’s proxy statement called the conversion a “Redomestication.”

Under the heading “Reasons for the Redomestication,” the proxy statement disclosed

the following:

• “[T]he Redomestication will provide potentially greater protection for unmeritorious litigation for directors and officers of the Company.”

• “The Redomestication will result in the elimination of any liability of an officer or director for a breach of the duty of loyalty unless arising from intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing violation of law.”

• “[W]e believe that, in general, Nevada law provides greater protection to our directors, officers, and the Company than Delaware law.”

10 DX 10 at 29.

The Holdings proxy statement offered similar rationales. Under the heading

“Reasons for the Conversion,” the Holdings proxy statement disclosed the following:

• “We believe that . . . Nevada law generally provides greater protection against liability for our directors, officers and the company than Delaware law.”

• “The conversion will therefore result in the elimination of liability of an officer or director for breaches of fiduciary duties to the company, including its stockholders unless, [sic] involving intentional misconduct, fraud or knowing violation of law.”

DX 9 at 40.

At stockholder meetings in June 2023, holders of a majority of the voting power

at each company approved each conversion. Assuming Holdings cast all of its votes

in favor the Company conversion, only 5.4% of the unaffiliated Company stockholders

voted in favor. Assuming Maffei cast all of his votes in favor of the Holdings

conversion, only 30.4% of the unaffiliated Holdings stockholders voted in favor.

Holdings and Maffei thus provided the decisive votes.

E. This Litigation

In April 2023, the plaintiffs filed this action. Herbert Williamson alleges that

he is a stockholder of Holdings. Dennis Palkon alleges that he is a stockholder of

TripAdvisor. They contend that the conversions were self-interested transactions

that are not entirely fair.

The complaint sought an injunction to prevent the conversions from closing.

The defendants agreed not to effectuate the conversions unless the parties otherwise

agree or the court enters an order dismissing the case that has become final.

11 F. Late-Breaking News

On February 9, 2024, the Company announced that it had entered into

discussions with Holdings about a going-private transaction and had formed a special

committee to oversee those discussions. The announcement stated that any

transaction would be subject to the twin MFW protections. There was no assurance

as to whether an agreement might be reached or when a going-private transaction

might happen.

The court asked the parties whether the announcement had implications for

the motion to dismiss. The parties agreed that the potential for a transaction at some

point in the future did not have any effect on the pending motion, and both sides

asked the court to render a decision.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). When

considering such a motion, the court (i) accepts as true all well-pled factual

allegations in the complaint, (ii) credits vague allegations if they give the opposing

party notice of the claim, and (iii) draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiffs. Dismissal is inappropriate “unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to

recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.” 6

6 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535

(Del. 2011).

12 A. Statutory Compliance And The Twice-Tested Framework

The defendants launch their argument for dismissal by explaining that the

conversions complied with Section 266 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the

“DGCL”), which authorizes “[a] corporation of this State [to] . . . convert to . . . a

foreign corporation.”7 A conversion historically required both a board

recommendation and unanimous stockholder approval. In 2022, the General

Assembly amended the statute to require a board recommendation and approval from

holders of a majority of the corporation’s outstanding voting power.8

Assuming the defendants are right about statutory compliance, that does not

end the inquiry. “[I]nequitable action does not become permissible simply because it

is legally possible.”9 Instead, according to Professor Berle’s famous formulation,

in every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in

7 8 Del. C. § 266(a).

8 83 Del. Laws ch. 377, § 11 (2022).

9 Bäcker v. Palisades Growth Cap. II, L.P., 246 A.3d 81, 96 (Del. 2021) (quoting

Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)); see Marino v. Patriot Rail Co., 131 A.3d 325, 336 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Post–1967 decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court . . . rendered untenable the strong-form contention that a statutory grant of authority necessarily foreclosed fiduciary review.”); In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 434 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“Nothing about [the doctrine of independent legal significance] alters the fundamental rule that inequitable actions in technical conformity with statutory law can be restrained by equity.”).

13 favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary.10

“A reviewing court’s role is to ensure that the corporation complied with the statute

and [that its fiduciaries] acted in accordance with [their] fiduciary duties.”11

The plaintiffs do not contend that the conversions violated the technical

requirements of Section 266, so the defendants’ arguments about statutory

compliance are beside the point. The plaintiffs argue that it is reasonably conceivable

that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties when approving the conversions.

That claim invokes Professor Berle’s second test, not the first.

B. The Claim For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty

The real question is whether the complaint states a claim for breach of

fiduciary duty. Analyzing that claim requires determining the appropriate standard

of review, then evaluating the allegations through that lens. That analysis reveals

that the plaintiffs have stated a claim on which relief can be granted.

10 A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049,

1049 (1931); see Bäcker, 246 A.3d at 96 (quoting In re Invs. Bancorp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1222 (Del. 2017)); accord Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Hldg. Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) (“Delaware follows the ‘twice tested’ framework when evaluating challenges to corporate acts.”); Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 2014 WL 5465535, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2014) (“Delaware law adheres to the twice-testing principle.”). 11Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011) (emphasis added). 14 1. The Standard Of Review

“Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director decision-making:

the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness.”12

Delaware’s default standard of review is the business judgment rule. When

applying that standard, a court presumes that the defendant fiduciaries “acted on an

informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the

best interests of the company.”13 Unless a plaintiff rebuts one of the elements of the

rule, “the court merely looks to see whether the business decision made was rational

in the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s objectives.”14

Only when a decision lacks any rationally conceivable basis will a court infer bad

faith and a breach of duty.15

12 Reis, 28 A.3d at 457.

13 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds

by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000).

14 In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010).

15 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Irrationality is the outer limit of the business

judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.” (footnote omitted)); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Allen, C.) (“A court may, however, review the substance of a business decision made by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”).

15 Enhanced scrutiny is “Delaware’s intermediate standard of review.”16

Enhanced scrutiny synthesizes the lessons from a series of 1980s decisions, when

standards of review seemed to proliferate.17 Each of the 1980s precedents bore two

hallmarks. First, there was a specific, recurring, and identifiable context where the

realities of the situation could subtly undermine the decisions of even independent

and disinterested directors. Second, the action the directors took intruded into a space

where stockholders possess rights of their own.18 The directors’ exercise of corporate

16 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013).

17 In re Columbia Pipeline Grp., Merger Litig., 299 A.3d 393, 456–60 (Del. Ch.

2023) (describing proliferation and subsequent unification); Pell v. Kill, 135 A.3d 764, 784–85 (Del. Ch. 2016) (explaining how “[p]articularly during the 1980s, standards of review seemed to proliferate,” but that Delaware courts have subsequently consolidated the various intermediate standards within the framework of enhanced scrutiny); Reis, 28 A.3d at 457–58 (discussing variants of enhanced scrutiny).

18 E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–56 (Del. 1985)

(creating intermediate standard of review to address resistance to a tender offer where the situational conflict resulted from the “omnipresent specter” that the directors could have been acting to further their own interests or those of incumbent management, “rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders” and the encroachment on stockholder rights involved the stockholders’ ability to tender their shares); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (applying intermediate scrutiny where situational conflict resulted from the final-period problem in an M&A setting and the encroachment on stockholder rights implicated the stockholders’ right to vote on (and potentially reject) the board’s preferred transaction, free of unreasonable interference from their fiduciaries); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787–88 (Del. 1981) (introducing intermediate standard of review of a decision by a special litigation committee where the situational conflict involved the difficult dynamic of directors deciding whether to cause the corporation to sue their fellow directors and the encroachment on stockholder rights involved a stockholder plaintiff’s ability to pursue a derivative claim when demand was excused); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658–59 (Del. Ch. 1988) (introducing intermediate standard of review where directors 16 power therefore raised questions about the allocation of authority within the entity

and, from a theoretical perspective, implicated the principal-agent problem.19 Those

situations “do not rise to a level sufficient to trigger entire fairness review, but also

do not comfortably permit expansive judicial deference [under the business judgment

rule].”20

Each time a decision addressed one of those situations, the court applied an

intermediate standard of review that examined “the reasonableness of the end that

the directors chose to pursue, the path that they took to get there, and the fit between

the means and the end.”21 Under this standard, the directors must establish that they

(i) sought to pursue a legitimate end and (ii) selected an appropriate means of

achieving it. It is not enough for the directors to have a good faith belief that a

took action in response to an election contest that implicated corporate control and the encroachment on stockholder rights involved the stockholders’ right to vote).

19 To be clear, directors and officers are not agents of the stockholders, nor are

the stockholders their principals. “A board of directors, in fulfilling its fiduciary duty, controls the corporation, not vice versa. It would be an analytical anomaly, therefore, to treat corporate directors as agents of the corporation when they are acting as fiduciaries of the stockholders in managing the business and affairs of the corporation.” Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 1996) (footnote omitted); see also Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City, Missouri Tr. v. Presidio, 251 A.3d 212, 286 (“Rather than treating directors as agents of the stockholders, Delaware law has long treated directors as analogous to trustees for the stockholders.”). The principal-agent problem uses the language of economic theory, not the language of legal relationships.

20 In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 82 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d

sub nom. RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).

21 Obeid v. Hogan, 2016 WL 3356851, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016).

17 particular outcome is desirable; they must have a reasonable basis for their belief. It

is also not permissible for the directors to pursue the desired outcome by any means

necessary. They must select a means that falls within a range of reasonableness.

Delaware’s most onerous standard is entire fairness. Under that standard, the

fiduciary defendants must establish “to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction

was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.”22 “Not even an honest belief that

the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to establish entire fairness. Rather,

the transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.”23

The defendants contend that the business judgment rule protects the

conversions. But since 1994 (if not before), Delaware law has deemed the business

judgment rule rebutted and applied the entire fairness test ab initio to any

transaction between the corporation and a controlling stockholder in which the

controller receives a non-ratable benefit.24 Unless the transaction incorporates one or

more protective mechanisms, “the standard of review for that decision is entire

fairness, with the burden of proof resting on the defendants.”25

22 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary IV), 663 A.2d 1156,

1163 (Del. 1995) (citation omitted).

23 Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006).

24 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994);

accord Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont II), 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997).

25 Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. Oak Hill Cap. P’rs III, L.P., 2020 WL 2111476,

at *33 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2020). 18 Plaintiffs allege—and for purposes of this motion, defendants concede—that

Maffei controls both Holdings and the Company. No one suggests that the conversions

were cleansed in any way. Determining the correct standard of review therefore

depends on whether the conversions conferred a non-ratable benefit on the fiduciary

defendants.

2. Non-Ratable Benefits

Under Delaware law, a controller or other fiduciary obtains a non-ratable

benefit when a transaction materially reduces or eliminates the fiduciary’s risk of

liability. Delaware decisions have applied that principle repeatedly to mergers.26 The

parties posit that no Delaware decision has applied those principles to a

reincorporation merger, but that is not so. In Harris v. Harris, the court explained

that Mary Ellen Harris, the sole director of a privately held, family-run corporation

was interested in a reincorporation merger that moved the corporation’s domicile

from Delaware to New Jersey and, in the process, extinguished the minority

26 E.g., In re AmTrust Fin. Servs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2020 WL 914563, at *11–

12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2020) (holding that plaintiff pled that merger conferred a non- ratable benefit on the defendants by extinguishing stockholder standing to bring a derivative claim that threated the defendants with damages that would be material to them personally); In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 2018 WL 3120804, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2018) (crediting that stockholder plaintiffs had stated a direct claim against defendants who extracted non-ratable benefits through a settlement agreement); In re Riverstone Nat’l, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2016 WL 4045411, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2016) (finding that a complaint adequately alleged that by extinguishing stockholder standing to bring a threatened but not yet pending lawsuit, “a majority of the Defendant directors received a material benefit from the merger not shared by the common stockholders.”); In re Primedia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 455, 487 (Del. Ch. 2013) (same); see also Morris v. Spectra Energy P’rs (DE) GP, LP, 246 A.3d 121, 134–35 (Del. 2021) (adopting Primedia framework). 19 stockholders’ standing to pursue derivative claims.27 Those claims sought “to recover

compensation and benefits paid to Mary Ellen and the Advisors, making them

interested in the litigation.”28 Because the merger extinguished the plaintiffs’

standing to pursue those claims, the defendants received a non-ratable benefit from

the reincorporation merger.29 There is no reason why similar principles of law would

not apply to a conversion.

In response, the defendants contend that a fiduciary can only receive a

material benefit from a reduction in liability exposure if the transaction addresses

“existing potential liability.”30 By using that oxymoronic phrase, they mean a

situation where the events giving rise to the claim have already occurred, making the

liability “existing,” even if a judgment has not yet been entered, making the liability

“potential.” The alternative to “existing potential liability” is “future potential

liability,” where the events that could give rise to liability have not happened yet. 31.

27 Harris v. Harris, 2023 WL 115541, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2023).

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Defs’ Op. Br. at 22.

31 At times, the defendants seem to suggest that a claim asserting an existing-

potential liability must have been filed, but Delaware precedent has treated fiduciaries as interested in transactions that materially reduced their liability exposure even without a pending lawsuit. See New Enter. Assocs. 14, L.P. v. Rich, 292 A.3d 112, 172 (Del. Ch. 2023) (finding that directors were interested in third-party merger that extinguished sell-side stockholder standing to assert derivative claims, rendering entire fairness the governing standard of review, despite the absence of any filed claim); In re Orbit/FR, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2023 WL 128530, at *4 (Del. 20 The defendants’ arbitrary distinction between existing potential liability and

future potential liability would make Delaware law piteously naive. Real-world actors

have no difficulty understanding that litigation risk can exist even though the specific

events have not happened yet. Delaware law can too.

Insurance premiums present a multi-trillion dollar problem for the defendants’

distinction. When a policy issues, none of the events that could give rise to a claim

have happened yet. In the defendants’ parlance, all of the insured’s potential losses

are future potential liabilities, not existing potential liabilities. But that does not

undermine the policy’s value. The market for insurance exists because humans

understand the importance of mitigating risk for future potential liabilities.

Obtaining coverage for future potential liabilities is a benefit, and insureds pay

premiums to get it.

Think about whether a change in coverage for future potential liabilities might

matter to an insured. For any given level of coverage, its real value to the insured

depends on the conditions that the insured must meet to make a successful claim. All

Ch. Jan. 9, 2023) (explaining that a controlling stockholder and the director defendants were interested in a merger that extinguished the stockholders’ standing to assert derivative claims for corporate looting, even though a stand-alone breach of fiduciary duty claim concerning those matters had not been filed); Riverstone, 2016 WL 4045411, at *14–15 (holding that director defendants were interested in a merger that extinguished the stockholders’ standing to assert a corporate opportunity claim where lawsuit was threatened but not yet filed). It would easy to fixate on the defendants’ references to an existing lawsuit and use those precedents to defeat that strawman. The steelman version of the defendants’ argument does not fixate on whether a lawsuit has been filed but rather contends that the conduct giving rise to a potential claim must have occurred.

21 else equal, a policy with greater conditionality has less value, because it will be more

difficult for the insured to recover. An insured does not get as much benefit from the

same dollar value of coverage if onerous conditions make recovery less likely.

Conversely, an insurer gets greater benefit from the same dollar value of premium if

onerous conditions mean the insurer is less likely to pay.

Now imagine an insurer that can ratchet up the conditions for coverage at will

(either through express changes or by applying them differently). With more onerous

conditions, the coverage has less value to the insured, and the premium paid has

more value to the insurer. It does not matter that all of the situations where coverage

could apply continue to involve future potential liabilities rather than existing

potential liabilities. The change in the likelihood of coverage imposes a detriment on

the insured and confers a benefit on the insurer.

The insurance example maps onto this case. Corporate law gives stockholders

the right to recover from their fiduciaries for certain types of wrongdoing.

Stockholders do not pay insurance premiums to secure that right; it exists because of

the principles of equity that govern fiduciary behavior.32 If the law changes such that

recovery becomes more difficult, then the right to pursue the recovery has less value.

32 As a matter of economic theory, the right to sue is part of the governance

package that public stockholders price when they purchase shares in the IPO. Considerable doubt exists about whether IPO investors can price governance regimes accurately. See Albert H. Choi, Pricing Corporate Governance, 75 U.C. L.J. 67, 72 n.14 & 74–78 (2023) (collecting scholarship casting doubt on whether IPO market is informationally efficient).

22 In insurance terms, the fiduciaries are less likely to pay. As with the insurance policy,

the change imposes a detriment on stockholders and confers a benefit on the

fiduciaries. It does not matter that the events that could give rise to a claim have not

happened yet.33

The arbitrary nature of the existing-potential versus future-potential

distinction shines through for other stockholder rights as well. Assume that a

transaction alters an economic right, such as the right to receive dividends when and

if declared by the board. Envision that before the transaction, each share of stock

carries the right to receive a pro rata portion of any dividend declared by the board,

but that after the transaction, each share only carries the right to receive a pro rata

portion of any dividend declared by the board if that share is held by a director. Under

the defendants’ approach, that change could confer a benefit on the insiders only if

the transaction took place after the board declared a dividend and before it was

distributed, because only then would there be an existing-potential opportunity to

receive the dividend. Yet it is easy to see that the change reallocates economic value

regardless of whether an existing dividend has been declared. The reallocation might

33 Other real-world settings offer similar lessons. The Delaware Supreme Court

authorized the use of the MFW framework to enable controllers to mitigate litigation risk. But if the defendants are right, no one would use it: The structure guards against future potential liabilities, not existing potential liabilities, and according to the defendants, the latter are always immaterial. M&A agreements illustrate the same point. Corporate lawyers charge thousands of dollars per hour to haggle over the precise language of material adverse effect clauses and other conditions. Under the defendants view of the world, that’s irrational. Those provisions address future potential issues, not existing potential issues, so no one should care.

23 only affect future-potential dividends, but that provides little comfort to the

unaffiliated stockholders. Their share of any future dividend will go to the insiders.

That is a non-ratable benefit to the insiders, even though the benefit will manifest

itself tangibly from future-potential dividends rather than an existing-potential

dividend.

Moving from litigation claims to economic rights points to another multi-

trillion-dollar problem for the defendants’ theory: the options market. Envision a

standard American call option to purchase a share of common stock with the strike

price set at the market price on the grant date. The intrinsic value of the call option

on the grant date is zero. But the call option has value because there are future states

of the world in which the stock price exceeds the strike price. The Black-Scholes

method is one way of measuring that value.

Using defendant’s concepts, the call option has no value. As they see it, only

existing-potential value matters, and the call option has none of that because none of

the states of the world in which the call option has intrinsic value have occurred. Yet

we know people value that type of option. Just ask executives and employees who

demand them as part of their compensation packages. Deeply out-of-the-money

options and futures reveal the concept even more clearly. Derivatives covering

trillions of dollars in notional value exist because parties care about future-potential

events.

The defendants’ distinction is therefore hard to follow. It also lacks persuasive

support in case law. To justify their fixation on existing potential liability, the

24 defendants rely primarily on four cases: Bamford,34 Orloff,35 Coates,36 and Sylebra.37

They cite Chevron38 and Underbrink39 in passing.

Read together, those cases do not support a temporal distinction. They support

a materiality rule. To be fair, some of the cases use temporal language, but the real

pivot is materiality. That should not be surprising. A fiduciary is interested in a

transaction when it confers a material benefit on the fiduciary.40 The cases treat

litigation protection as a benefit and ask whether the reduction in litigation risk is

material.

Bamford v. Penfold, L.P., 2022 WL 2278867 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2022), 34

reargument granted in part, 2022 WL 3283869 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2022).

35 Orloff v. Shulman, 2005 WL 3272355 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005).

36 Coates v. Netro Corp., 2002 WL 31112340 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2002).

37 Sylebra Cap. P’rs Master Fund, Ltd. v. Perelman, 2020 WL 5989473 (Del. Ch.

Oct. 9, 2020).

38 Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch.

2013).

39 Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., 2008 WL 2262316 (Del. Ch. May

30, 2008).

40 In re Pattern Energy Gp. Inc. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 1812674, at *66 (Del.

Ch. May 6, 2021) (“To plead interestedness, a plaintiff can plead the fiduciary received ‘a personal financial benefit from the transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders[.]”) (quoting In re Saba Software S’holder Litig., 2017 WL 1201108, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017)); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (explaining that a benefit conferred on a director is material when “the alleged benefit was significant enough ‘in the context of the director’s economic circumstances, as to have made it improbable that the director could perform her fiduciary duties to the . . . shareholders without being influenced by her overriding personal interest.’”) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch. 1999)).

25 The Bamford litigation involved a closely held LLC with three members. One

of the members—Joseph Manheim—held a majority of the member interests.

Manheim and a second member worked for the LLC; the third was a passive investor.

After Manheim fired the other working member, souring that relationship, the

passive member became suspicious about Manheim’s actions. Anticipating litigation,

Manheim adopted a new LLC agreement that contained an “impressively broad

exculpatory provision.”41 Manheim sought to make the exculpatory provision “not just

prospective, but retrospective as well.”42

When the other members filed suit, Manheim invoked the exculpation

provision. The court held that adopting the provision was “a self-interested decision

that can be reviewed in equity.”43 Entire fairness applied because the provision

reduced Manheim’s litigation exposure, and he had not attempted to show that the

provision was entirely fair. The court therefore held that the provision was

ineffective. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that “[i]t was not equitable

for Manheim to implement the [provision] unilaterally in an effort to eliminate all

liability, prospectively and retrospectively, for any fiduciary breach.”44

41 Bamford, 2022 WL 2278867, at *33.

42 Id. at *34.

43 Id.

44 Id.

26 Bamford did not distinguish between existing-potential and future-potential

liability. That adoption of the exculpatory provision was plainly material, rendering

Mannheim interested. The Bamford decision does not support a temporal rule. It

supports a materiality rule.

The same is true with Orloff. There, the individuals who controlled a

corporation adopted a Section 102(b)(7) provision after minority stockholders had

filed a books-and-records action. In subsequent plenary litigation, the plaintiffs

alleged that the defendants approved the provision “under the threat of imminent

litigation, and breached their fiduciary duties by self-interestedly protecting

themselves against litigation that they knew would soon name them as defendants.”45

The court dismissed the claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege

“facts creating a reasonable doubt that the directors were disinterested or

independent when they made their decision to approve the certificate amendment.”46

45 Orloff, 2005 WL 3272355, at *6.

46 Id. at *13. The Orloff court seems to have viewed the question of whether a

director is interested in the adoption of a Section 102(b)(7) provision as settled, noting that “[t]he court has at least twice before rejected claims of this kind, noting that they are ‘but variations on the ‘directors suing themselves’ and ‘participating in the wrongs’ refrain.” Id. at *13 (quoting Decker v. Clausen, 1989 WL 133617, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 1989), and Caruana v. Saligman, 1990 WL 212304, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990)). Those internal quotations do not seem relevant to whether the adoption of a Section 102(b)(7) provision is a self-interested act; they seem tied to demand futility. And that turns out to be what the Decker and Caruana decisions addressed.

In Decker, the plaintiff asserted what today would be recognized as a Caremark claim, and the defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 23.1. The plaintiff argued that the directors faced a substantial risk of personal liability that prevented them from considering a demand disinterestedly because “insurance would not cover an 27 A director is interested in a transaction when it confers a material benefit on

the director. The Section 102(b)(7) provision in Orloff only protected against monetary

damages for a breach of the duty of care, and by statute, it could only apply

action brought by the company against its own directors” and alleged that the directors necessarily feared the lawsuit because they had recommended the adoption of a Section 102(b)(7) provision. 1989 WL 133617 at *2. The Decker court dismissed the Caremark claim because demand was not futile. The case did not involve a challenge to the exculpatory provision itself.

Likewise in Caruana, the plaintiffs asserted a derivative claim challenging the sale of a subsidiary to certain insiders. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 23.1. As in Decker, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants faced a substantial risk of personal liability that prevented them from considering a demand disinterestedly because “liability insurance would not cover an action brought by the company against its own directors,” and they alleged that the directors were concerned about the lawsuit because “the directors recommended a charter amendment limiting their liability.” 1990 WL 212304, at *3. The court cited Decker to hold that those allegations were insufficient to establish interestedness and did not analyze the issue further. Id. at *4.

There is a difference between (i) arguing that directors are interested in the adoption of a Section 102(b)(7) provision because they will benefit from the reduction in liability exposure that the provision confers and (ii) arguing that the directors must inferably face a substantial risk of liability on an otherwise unrelated derivative claim because they proposed the adoption of a Section 102(b)(7) provision. The Decker and Caruana cases addressed the latter scenario. The Orloff decision treated those rulings as if they also applied to the former issue. The Orloff decision did not explain why. That makes Orloff a weak precedent in its own right.

In the vast majority of cases, there is no valid fiduciary challenge to the adoption of a Section 102(b)(7) provision because stockholders approve it. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996). The fiduciary duty issue arises when the directors who recommend the provision also deliver the vote. That was the case in Orloff, but the court did not focus on that question. In a later decision involving the same issue—the adoption of an exculpatory provision by a controller—the court treated the challenge to the provision as settled by Caruana, Decker, and Orloff. Sutherland v. Sutherland, 2010 WL 1838968, at *14–15 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2010). In reality, no Delaware decision has directly confronted the question.

28 prospectively.47 The Orloff court thus could readily conclude that the Section 102(b)(7)

provision did not confer a material benefit on the fiduciaries who adopted it. The

Orloff decision also rejected a complaint that was generalized and conclusory. 48 Read

properly, the Orloff supports a materiality rule as well.

The Coates case likewise points to a materiality rule. A stockholder plaintiff

challenged a reincorporation merger, but with the corporation moving from California

to Delaware. In the proxy statement, the board acknowledged that “Delaware law

provided more protections for the board” and cautioned that stockholders should take

that conflict of interest into account when considering their recommendations.49 After

the merger closed, a stockholder filed suit in Delaware. The plaintiff primarily raised

disclosure violations, but also argued that the directors were interested in the merger

due to Delaware’s more favorable law. After rejecting the alleged disclosure

violations, Chancellor Chandler held that the complaint did not sufficiently plead any

facts suggesting interestedness. He did not reject the idea that directors could be

interested in a transaction that conferred greater legal protections.50 He instead held

47 See 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (“No such provision shall eliminate or limit the

liability of a director or officer for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective.”).

48 Orloff, 2005 WL 3272355, at *14 (“Nor do the plaintiffs’ allegations in this

complaint allege particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that the directors were disinterested or independent when they made their decision to approve the certificate amendment.”).

49 Coates, 2002 WL 31112340, at *1.

50 Id. at *5.

29 that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pled self-interested conduct based solely on the

directors’ acknowledgment that “a possible conflict of interest may arise from the

greater protections afforded directors under Delaware law.”51 The Chancellor

declined to credit what he regarded as a “mere conclusory statement” with no

supporting factual predicate.52 The plaintiff thus failed to allege facts supporting an

inference that the merger conferred a material benefit on the directors.

The fourth case—Sylebra—at first seems close to this one because it too

involved a corporation moving from Delaware to Nevada.53 But the plaintiffs in

Sylebra sued in Delaware nearly two years after the merger closed, in violation of a

forum-selection bylaw specifying the Nevada courts, and only after the Nevada

corporation implemented a forced redemption transaction that they sought to

challenge. The court refused to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and

dismissed the case based on the forum-selection bylaw.54 The Sylebra decision has

nothing to do with the point the defendants are trying to make.

In passing, the defendants cite Chevron and Underbrink. They suggest that

the Chevron court considered whether a forum-selection bylaw created a

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 Sylebra, 2020 WL 5989473, at *6.

54 Id. at *7 (“I will not address the merits of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6).”);

id. at *14 (dismissing based on forum selection bylaw).

30 disqualifying interest, but that is not accurate. The case involved a facial challenge

to the validity of a forum-selection bylaw, and in the section the defendants cite, the

court declined to consider as-applied challenges based on whether the bylaw might

operate unreasonably in future cases.55 The defendants have taken language out of

context. Regardless, for a Delaware corporation to use a forum-selection bylaw to

concentrate internal affairs litigation in Delaware court would not confer a material

benefit on its fiduciaries. The bylaw only changes the forum, not the law or the

fiduciaries’ litigation exposure. To the extent that plaintiffs might be able to secure

greater recoveries in other forums, that is not due to differences in substantive law,

but rather the increased volatility that results when courts apply law with which they

are less familiar.56 Concentrating cases in Delaware thus does not reduce litigation

exposure relative to what outcomes should be, meaning that the forum-selection

bylaw does not confer any benefit, much less a material one.

The last decision—Underbrink—held after trial that entire fairness would not

apply to a board’s decision to adopt a mandatory advancement bylaw where the

55 Chevron, 73 A.3d at 961–62,

56 That is not a knock on other courts; it is a function of the comparative advantages that come from specialization. Delaware judges regularly decide cases under Delaware law. Judges in other jurisdictions do so far less often. Delaware judges therefore have a comparative advantage in deciding cases under Delaware law. That is true for every jurisdiction and subject-matter. For example, I rarely decide cases under California law. I am confident that California judges have a comparative advantage in deciding cases under California law. A party who litigates a case involving California law in front of me should therefore expect greater volatility in the potential result than if a California judge were deciding the case.

31 benefit conferred was not material.57 The Underbrink decision interpreted Orloff as

supporting a temporal distinction and put heavy emphasis on that concept when

assessing materiality. But the ultimate question for purposes of rebutting the

business judgment rule was materiality, not temporal orientation.

The real question for determining the standard of review is whether a decision

confers a material benefit on the fiduciaries who made it. Here, it is reasonable to

infer at the pleading stage that the conversions will confer a material benefit on the

fiduciary defendants who approved them. The defendant directors focused on the

ability of the conversions to reduce or eliminate litigation risk. The board materials

discussed those issues and called out past cases. And the proxy statements told the

stockholders that the directors were recommending the conversions to reduce or

eliminate litigation risk.

During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the defendants seemed to

acknowledge that materiality is what matters, because their counsel sought to argue

that Nevada law—properly understood—is not more protective than Delaware law.

This decision does not rule on that issue. At the pleading stage, it is reasonable to

infer from the complaint’s allegations that Nevada law provides greater protection to

fiduciaries and confers a material benefit on the defendants. To the extent the

defendants wish to show that Delaware law and Nevada law are equivalent, they can

attempt to make that showing at a later phase of the case.

57 Underbrink, 2008 WL 2262316, at *13.

32 The plaintiffs have alleged particularized facts demonstrating that the

defendants were interested in the conversions. Entire fairness therefore applies.

3. The Feasibility Of Applying The Entire Fairness Standard

The defendants separately argue that entire fairness cannot supply the

standard of review because the court cannot feasibly apply that standard outside of

a transaction in which stockholders received cash for their shares. They ask

rhetorically, “how would the Court even conduct an entire fairness review, where

there is no ‘price’ to be assessed for fairness?” 58 That objection misunderstands the

entire fairness test.

Entire fairness is a unitary standard that has both substantive and procedural

dimensions. Although the two aspects may be examined separately, they are not

separate elements of a two-part test. “All aspects of the issue must be examined as a

whole since the question is one of entire fairness.”59

The substantive dimension of the fairness inquiry examines the transactional

result. The cases that developed the entire fairness test historically involved freeze-

outs or squeeze-outs. The earliest freeze-outs involved corporations selling all of their

assets for a package of consideration, typically cash, then dissolving and distributing

58 See Reply Br. at 12.

59 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.

33 the net cash to stockholders.60 After mergers became the preferred transactional

vehicle, the leading cases involved squeeze-outs in which the minority shares were

converted into the right to receive a specific amount of cash.61 The substantive

fairness of the transaction therefore largely turned on the price that the minority

stockholders received, and “fair price” became the dominant nomenclature for the

substantive dimension. In that setting, the fair price inquiry generally involved

comparing what the stockholders received with their proportionate share of the

corporation’s value as a going concern. Thus, in the canonical framing, fair price

“relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,

including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and

any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.” 62

But the substantive dimension of the entire fairness inquiry has never been narrowly

focused on evaluating a price. The true “test of fairness” is whether the minority

stockholder receives at least “the substantial equivalent in value of what he had

before.”63

60 See Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 250 A.3d 1016, 1033–34 (Del.

Ch. 2020) (describing history of asset sales and mergers).

61 Id.

62 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.

63 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 114 (Del. 1952); accord Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he correct test of fairness is ‘that upon a merger the minority stockholder shall receive the substantial equivalent in value of what he had before.’” (quoting Sterling, 93 A.2d at 114)); see Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in 34 The procedural dimension of the entire fairness inquiry examines the process

that generated the result. Known as “fair dealing,” it “focuses upon the conduct of the

corporate fiduciaries in effectuating the transaction.”64 The procedural dimension

“embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,

structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the

directors and the stockholders were obtained.”65

The procedural dimension matters because the substantive dimension is often

contestable. “The concept of fairness is of course not a technical concept. No litmus

paper can be found or [G]eiger-counter invented that will make determinations of

fairness objective.”66 Instead, a judgment concerning fairness “will inevitably

constitute a judicial judgment that in some respects is reflective of subjective

reactions to the facts of a case.”67 Thus, if fiduciaries successful replicate arm’s length

Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119, 139 (2005) (arguing for a remedial standard that “provides the minority shareholders with the value of what was taken from them . . . .”).

64 Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 430.

65 Weinberger v. UP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).

66 Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont I), 1996 WL 145452, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar.

21, 1996) (Allen, C.) (“A fair price is a price that is within a range that reasonable men and women with access to relevant information might accept.”), rev’d on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997).

67 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary III), 663 A.2d 1134,

1140 (Del. Ch. 1994) (Allen, C.), aff’d, Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).

35 bargaining, then that that evidence of fair dealing can validate a debatable outcome.

But the opposite is also true: a dubious process can call into question a low but

nominally fair price.68 “Factors such as coercion, the misuse of confidential

information, secret conflicts, or fraud could lead a court to hold that a transaction

that fell within the range of fairness was nevertheless unfair compared to what

faithful fiduciaries could have achieved.”69 Where those factors are present, a court

68 See Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 432 (“[H]ere, the process is so intertwined with

price that under Weinberger’s unitary standard a finding that the price negotiated by the Special Committee might have been fair does not save the result.”); Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Invs., LLC, 2018 WL 3326693, at *37 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018) (“Just as a fair process can support the price, an unfair process can taint the price.”), aff’d sub nom. Davenport v. Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC, 221 A.3d 100 (Del. 2019); Bomarko, Inc. v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1183 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 1999) (“[T]he unfairness of the process also infects the fairness of the price.”), aff’d, 776 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000) (per curium).

69 ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 2017 WL 3421142, at *19 (Del. Ch. July

21, 2017), aff’d, 184 A.3d 1291 (Del. 2018) (TABLE).

36 may conclude that the transaction is not entirely fair. As a remedy, the court could

award a “fairer price”70 or rescissory damages.71

Numerous decisions have applied the entire fairness test to transactions other

than freeze-outs or squeeze-outs in which stockholders received a specific amount of

cash per share.72 Here are a few examples:

• In Nixon v. Blackwell, the controlling stockholders of E.C. Barton & Co. generated liquidity for themselves and select company employees by using an employee stock option plan and key man life insurance policies to repurchase

70 Id.; accord Reis, 28 A.3d at 467 (“Depending on the facts and the nature of

the loyalty breach, the answer can be a ‘fairer’ price.”); see, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *2 (finding that controller and his associate had engaged in fraud; holding that “[u]nder these circumstances, assuming for the sake of argument that the $13.50 price still fell within a range of fairness, the stockholders are not limited to a fair price. They are entitled to a fairer price designed to eliminate the ability of the defendants to profit from their breaches of the duty of loyalty.”); HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 116–17 (Del. Ch. 1999) (finding that although price fell within lower range of fairness, “[t]he defendants have failed to persuade me that HMG would not have gotten a materially higher value for Wallingford and the Grossman’s Portfolio had Gray and Fieber come clean about Gray’s interest. That is, they have not convinced me that their misconduct did not taint the price to HMG’s disadvantage.”); Bomarko,, 794 A.2d at 1184–85 (holding that although the “uncertainty [about] whether or not ITI could secure financing and restructure” lowered the value of the plaintiffs’ shares, the plaintiffs were entitled to a damages award that reflected the possibility that the company might have succeeded absent the fiduciary’s disloyal acts).

71 See, e.g., Duncan v. TheraTx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1023–24 (Del. 2001); Lynch

v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501–03 (Del. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703–04.

72 See generally In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Deriv. Litig., 2016

WL 301245, at *11–16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (collecting authorities).

37 shares. The minority stockholders were not eliminated for a specific price per share, yet the Delaware Supreme Court applied the entire fairness test.73

• In Trans World Airlines, a corporation purchased or leased aircraft from its controlling stockholder. Those transactions were not freeze-outs or squeeze- outs and there was no cash price per share, yet the Delaware Supreme Court applied the entire fairness test.74

• In Tremont I, Tremont Corporation purchased 15% of the stock of NL Industries, Inc. from Valhi, Inc. When the transaction took place, Harold Simmons controlled all three corporations. The transaction did not have an obvious per-share price, but both Chancellor Allen and the Delaware Supreme Court applied the entire fairness test.75

• In T. Rowe Price, Seaman Furniture Company entered into a services agreement with another company owned by Seaman’s controlling stockholder. Seaman agreed to manage stores and provide operational expertise to the company in return for a multi-million dollar annual fee. The transaction did not involve stockholders receiving a specific price per share, but Vice Chancellor Lamb applied the entire fairness test.76

• In Harbor Finance Partners, a company repurchased a block of its notes from its controlling stockholder. The transaction was not a freeze-out or squeeze-out involving a specific price per share, but Justice Jacobs, then a Vice Chancellor, applied the entire fairness test.77

Many more examples exist.78

73 Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375 (Del. 1993).

74 Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1988).

75 Tremont I, 1996 WL 145452, at *7, rev’d on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del.

1997).

76 T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536, 551 (Del. Ch.

2000).

77 Harbor Finance P’rs v. Sugarman, 1997 WL 162175, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3,

78 E.g., Tornetta v. Musk, — A.3d —, —, 2024 WL 343699, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan.

30, 2024); Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 183–85 (Del. 38 Taken to its logical extreme, the defendants’ argument would mean that a

court could not apply entire fairness in a stock-for-stock merger, because there is no

dollars-and-cents price. Yet the Delaware courts have applied the entire fairness test

to parent-subsidiary mergers in which the minority shares were converted into the

right to receive stock.79 Not only that, but the defendants’ argument logically means

that a Delaware court cannot conduct an appraisal after a stock-for-stock merger. The

fair price analysis and the fair value analysis involve parallel inquiries,80 so if a court

cannot analyze the entire fairness of stock-for-stock merger due to the lack of a per-

share price, then a court cannot conduct an appraisal either. Yet the DGCL

contemplates appraisal following stock-for-stock mergers (unless the market-out

exception applies).81

Ch. 2014); Dweck v. Nasser, 2012 WL 161590, at *22 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2012); Shandler v. DLJ Merch. Banking, Inc., 2010 WL 2929654, at *12 n.108 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2010); Monroe Cnty. Empls.’ Retirement Sys. v. Carlson, 2010 WL 2376890, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2010); In re Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc., 2008 WL 4293781, at *20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008); Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 529–30 (Del. Ch. 2006); Flight Options Int’l, Inc. v. Flight Options, LLC, 2005 WL 5756537, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2005); In re New Valley Corp., 2001 WL 50212, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2001); Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 570–71 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 1999 WL 350473, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 24, 1999); In re MAXXAM, Inc., 659 A.2d 760, 771 (Del. Ch. 1995).

79 In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. S’holders Litig., 1991 WL 70028, at

*7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1991); Steiner v. Sizzler Rests. Int’l, Inc., 1991 WL 40872, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1991) (Allen, C.); Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 505 (Del. Ch. 1990).

80 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711; Reis, 28 A.3d at 462.

81 8 Del. C. § 262(b); see Krieger v. Wesco Fin. Corp., 30 A.3d 54, 57–58 (Del.

Ch. 2011) (explaining the “market-out exception” and the “exception to the exception” 39 In substance, the two conversions in this case operate like stock-for-stock

mergers in which stockholders in the Delaware corporations have their shares

converted into the right to receive shares of Nevada corporations. If the Company’s

and Holdings’ shares did not trade publicly, bringing them within the market-out

exception, then the stockholders would have appraisal rights.82 The court could not

shirk an appraisal inquiry, which the DGCL would require.83 The court likewise can

conduct an entire fairness inquiry and consider, under the substantive dimension,

whether stockholders received the substantial equivalent of what they had before.

4. Evidence Of Unfairness

When entire fairness is the standard of review, and when a plaintiff “alleges

facts making it reasonably conceivable that the transaction was not entirely fair to

stockholders, the granting of a motion to dismiss is inappropriate, because the burden

is on the defendants to develop facts demonstrating entire fairness.”84 The plaintiffs

have pled facts supporting an inference that the conversions were not entirely fair.

The plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient to call into question the substantive

dimension of fairness, because the stockholders will not receive the substantial

in the context of merger with stock election); see also Dofflemyer v. W. F. Hall Printing Co., 432 A.2d 1198, 1201–02 (Del. 1981) (holding that statutory procedures for withdrawing appraisal rights apply equally to cash-for-stock and stock-for-stock mergers).

82 8 Del. C. §§ 262(b) & 266(c)(5).

83 8 Del. C. § 262(b).

84 Salladay v. Lev, 2020 WL 954032, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020).

40 equivalent of what they had before. When the Company and Holdings were Delaware

corporations, the unaffiliated stockholders enjoyed all of the litigation rights provided

by Delaware law. After the conversion, the unaffiliated stockholders will possess only

the litigation rights provided by Nevada law. For the reasons already discussed, those

litigation rights are inferably less than what Delaware provides.

The plaintiffs also have pled facts sufficient to call into question the procedural

dimension of fairness. The goal of procedural fairness is to replicate arm’s length

bargaining. The defendants did not make any effort to replicate arm’s length

bargaining. Management proposed the conversions, the Board recommended them,

and Holdings and Maffei approved them.

The unaffiliated stockholders’ voting pattern supports an inference of

unfairness. Just as an informed vote by unaffiliated stockholders in favor of a

conflicted transaction is evidence of fairness,85 an informed vote by unaffiliated

stockholders against a conflicted transaction suggests unfairness. Here, the

unaffiliated stockholders resoundingly rejected the conversions.

The defendants observe that in Williams v. Geier,86 a majority of the Delaware

Supreme Court considered a challenge to a charter amendment that adopted a

tenured voting structure. A family group that held a majority of the shares approved

85 In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., 298 A.3d 667, 715 (Del 2023) (“We

find no error with the Vice Chancellor’s determination to give the vote some weight.”). 86 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).

41 the amendment without a majority of the minority vote. Three-quarters of the

minority shares were present at the meeting, and two-thirds of those shares voted in

favor, but enough of the minority shares did not participate that the amendment

failed to secure support from a majority of the minority.87 The plaintiffs pointed to

that fact as evidence of unfairness, but the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed:

Where, as here, there is a controlling stockholder or a controlling bloc, there is no requirement under the Delaware General Corporation Law that the transaction be structured or conditioned so as to require an affirmative vote of a majority of the minority group of outstanding shares. In those parent-subsidiary situations where the circumstances call for an entire fairness analysis, the burden is normally on the defendants to show entire fairness, but if a majority of the minority votes in favor under certain circumstances, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show unfairness. The converse does not apply, however—namely, the failure to obtain a majority of the minority does not give rise to any adverse inference of invalidity.88

The Williams decision predated by almost two decades the decisions in MFW, Corwin,

and C&J Energy that stressed the importance of informed stockholder voting and de-

emphasized the role of fiduciary duty litigation.89 The assertion in Williams that the

87 Id. at 1374.

88 Id. at 1382 (citations omitted).

89 MFW, 88 A.3d at 644 (“The simultaneous deployment of the procedural protections employed here create a countervailing, offsetting influence of equal—if not greater—force. That is, where the controller irrevocably and publicly disables itself from using its control to dictate the outcome of the negotiations and the shareholder vote, the controlled merger then acquires the shareholder-protective characteristics of third-party, arm’s-length mergers, which are reviewed under the business judgment standard.”); Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312–13 (“[W]hen a transaction is not subject to the entire fairness standard, the long-standing policy of our law has been to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the 42 minority stockholders’ rejection of a transaction should not carry any weight in the

fairness analysis is no longer persuasive in light of the increased emphasis that

Delaware law places on stockholder votes.90

The defendants contend that other benefits of Nevada incorporation render the

conversion fair, such as lower franchise taxes and a greater ability to recruit

management personnel. The reduction in franchise taxes appears immaterial given

the size of the Company and Holdings. The greater ability to recruit management

economic merits of a transaction for themselves.”); C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Empls.’, 107 A.3d 1049, 1070 (Del. 2014) (“When a board exercises its judgment in good faith, tests the transaction through a viable passive market check, and gives its stockholders a fully informed, uncoerced opportunity to vote to accept the deal, we cannot conclude that the board likely violated its Revlon duties.”).

90 Another aspect of Williams reflects formalistic thinking that is no longer

persuasive. The Delaware Supreme Court held under a summary judgment standard that a tenured voting system did not confer any non-ratable benefit on the controlling stockholder group. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1378. In practice, because the controlling group was more likely to hold its shares rather than sell them, and because the controlling group pushed through the tenured voting scheme to minimize the influence of dissident factions, it seems plain that the controlling group sought and obtained a benefit. More recent decisions take a more realistic approach by recognizing that measures which nominally treat all stockholders equally can in fact confer a disproportionate, non-ratable benefit on a controller. See IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *8–9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017); In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7469–CS, at 95–96 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2013) (TRANSCRIPT).

The norm of equal treatment resonates deeply in American culture, but we should not ignore the fact that nominally equal treatment can have disproportionate effects. That generally will not be the case when recipients are similarly situated. It often will be the case when recipients are differently situated. In a controlled company, the stockholder controller and the unaffiliated stockholders are differently situated. Nominally equal treatment in a controlled company can therefore lead to disproportionate and inequitable results.

43 personnel seems to be a function of reduced litigation exposure, so it is not really a

separate benefit. Regardless, those allegedly countervailing benefits cannot be

assessed at this stage.

The plaintiffs have alleged facts supporting a reasonable inference that the

conversions are not entirely fair. The complaint therefore states a claim on which

relief can be granted.

C. Preventing Litigation Rights From Becoming Second-Class Rights.

Holding that the plaintiffs have stated a claim in this action fulfills important

public policies related to Delaware’s effort to maintain a balanced legal regime. As

discussed previously, Delaware strives to gives substantial discretion to managers to

build businesses and create value while at the same time offering protections to

investors so that they willingly contribute their capital to Delaware corporations. For

investor protections to be meaningful, litigation rights cannot become second-class

rights.

Stockholders are widely regarded as possessing three fundamental rights: to

sell, vote, and sue.91 Each fundamental right represents a category of entitlements

that stockholders possess: economic rights, governance rights, and litigation rights.92

91 Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 595 n.21 (Del. Ch. 2015).

92 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Single-Owner Standard and The

Public-Private Choice,47 J. Corp. L. 675, 684 (2022) (“Stockholders are commonly said to have three basic entitlements: (1) the right to pro rata residual distributions from the corporation, (2) the right to vote to elect directors and to pass on certain other 44 It seems readily apparent that under current Delaware law, a transaction that

cuts back on either economic rights or governance rights would trigger entire fairness

review. Envision a scenario in which the Company merges with another Delaware

corporation, the high-vote shares are converted into identical high-vote shares of the

resulting corporation, and the low-vote shares are converted into nearly identical low-

vote shares of the resulting corporation—the sole difference being that the new shares

are subject to a redemption right. Assume the resulting corporation can exercise the

redemption right at any time and from time to time to buy in low-vote shares at a

20% premium to the pro rata value of the Company at the effective time. Because

Maffei, through Holdings, controls the resulting corporation, he can decide whether

and when to redeem the low-vote shares. If the value of the corporation appreciates

by more than 20%, he can exercise the redemption right. The corporation would

capture the incremental value, but because Holdings’ ownership percentage would

increase, Maffei benefits. It seems obvious that the merger would be an interested

transaction, implemented by a stockholder controller, in which the stockholder

controller receives a non-ratable benefit. Entire fairness would govern.

Now forget the redemption right. Assume the merger converts the Company’s

low-vote shares into no-vote shares. The answer still seems obvious. The loss of voting

power inures to Holdings’ benefit. Before the merger, only a long-form squeeze-out

matters like mergers; and (3) the right to enforce the directors’ obligations of fidelity.”).

45 was possible. After the merger, a short-form squeeze-out is on the table, which

changes the game for the unaffiliated holders.93 The merger is therefore a self-

interested one, and entire fairness again would govern.

The same should be true for litigation rights. They are not second-class rights.

They enable parties to access the courts, which is foundational to a civil society and

necessary to protect all other rights.

Without the ability to obtain a judgment from a court, backed by the power of the state, other rights become meaningless. Unless the holder of the right has some other source of leverage, like influence, economic power, or a willingness to deploy extra-legal force, then the counterparty can ignore the right. Without courts to enforce them, even voting rights can become nullities. In a civil society, what renders a right meaningful is access to the courts and, with a judgment in hand, the power of the state.94

Value ultimately depends on legal rights, because “the market will only value rights

that the law would protect, and, thus, the price of an asset is inescapably dependent

on the legal entitlements of the holder of that asset.”95 Economic rights and

93 See Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001) (establishing

narrower fiduciary duty regime for short-form mergers in which only the duty of disclosure applies and a stockholder’s exclusive remedy is generally an appraisal; accepting the same arguments for not applying entire fairness that were rejected in Roland Int’l Corp. v. Najjar, 408 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), overruled in part by Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (overruling Roland as to business-purpose test but not as to application of entire fairness to short-form mergers)).

94 New Enter. Assocs. 14, L.P. v. Rich, 295 A.3d 520, 591 (Del. Ch. 2023). The

vast literature on access to justice both undergirds and develops these concepts. For one convenient entry point, consider volume 86 of the Fordham Law Review, a symposium issue on access to justice from 2018.

95 Korsmo & Myers, supra, at 704 (citing Thomas Merrill, Property and the

Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 731–32 (1998) (“[N]early everyone agrees that 46 governance rights remain meaningful only to the extent that litigation rights back

them up. Without legal protection, an investor’s capital becomes a gift.

From the perspective of equity, Delaware law should be just as concerned about

transactions that reduce stockholders’ litigation rights as it is about transactions that

reduce their economic rights or governance rights.96 This decision treats litigation

rights as first-class rights.

D. The Availability Of Injunctive Relief

The defendants finally argue that even if the plaintiffs have stated a claim on

which relief can be granted, they cannot obtain an injunction blocking the Company

and Holdings from leaving Delaware. They seem to think that as a matter of policy,

the institution of property is not concerned with scarce resources themselves (‘things’), but rather with the rights of persons with respect to such resources.”).

96 The role of equity in protecting litigation rights has become more important,

because the Delaware Supreme Court recently confirmed that Section 242(b)(2) does not provide protection against modifications to litigation rights. In re Fox Corp./Snap Inc., — A.3d —, 2024 WL 176575 (Del. Jan. 17, 2024). Under the reasoning of that case, Section 242(b) of the DGCL provides statutory protection both for rights that appear expressly in the certificate of incorporation and for rights which the DGCL establishes and incorporates by default into every certificate of incorporation. See id. at *10 (“Class-based powers or rights incorporated through the DGCL’s default provisions are also expressed in the charter for purposes of Section 242(b)(2).”). But the Delaware Supreme Court held that the right to sue is not one that the DGCL recognizes expressly or implicitly. Id. It follows that a charter amendment can impose qualifications, restrictions, or limitations on that right without a statutory class vote. Mergers have long been able to modify all types of stockholder rights, including litigation rights. See Fed. United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 339–40 (Del. 1940) (permitting use of merger to convert preferred stock carrying right to accumulated dividends into new preferred stock and Class A common stock, thereby eliminating the dividend overhang). As a practical matter, only equitable review protects litigation rights.

47 a Delaware court cannot enjoin an entity from leaving the state. That assertion goes

too far. In extreme scenarios, courts have the power to prevent persons and assets

from leaving their jurisdiction when doing so is necessary to preserve their ability to

award final relief.97 In theory, therefore, this court could enjoin the Company or

Holdings from departing Delaware if the equities warranted it. But the circumstances

in which the equities might warrant that extreme result are limited. They are not

present here.

Before addressing the availability of an injunction, a cautionary note is in order

about pleading-stage efforts to rule out remedies. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges

whether a plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief could be granted. The motion

does not target the types of relief that a plaintiff might obtain. A court determines

remedies after trial, so a pleading-stage assessment is usually premature.98 In some

97 See 6 Del. C. § 1307(a) (authorizing injunctive relief to block fraudulent

transfer); Destra Targeted Income Unit Inv. Tr. v. Parmar, 2017 WL 373207, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2017) (granting preliminary injunction to prevent “defendants and parties acting in concert with them from distributing cash and other securities that they will receive in connection with the transactions governed by” a merger agreement alleged to be a fraudulent conveyance where there was “[a] meaningful threat that a defendant may render relief meaningless by dissipating assets or removing them from the court's jurisdiction.”); Mitsubishi Power Sys. Americas, Inc. v. Babcock & Brown Infrastructure Grp. US, LLC, 2009 WL 1199588, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2009) (issuing a temporary restraining order preventing the defendant from transferring assets other than in the ordinary course of business where there was a risk that the defendant could defeat the court’s ability to adjudicate the case by transferring its assets out of the jurisdiction).

98 E.g., Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney, 199 A.3d 109, 178 (Del.

Ch. 2018) (declining to rule on remedies at the pleading stage, writing that “[w]hether and what kind of remedy issues should be addressed at a future date.”); Bear Stearns Mortg. Funding Tr. 2006-SL1 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, 2015 WL 139731, at *17 (Del. Ch. 48 situations, however, ruling at the pleading stage on whether a remedy will be

available can assist in the simplification of the case and the formulating of issues for

trial, which are important parts of the trial court’s case-management function.99

The plaintiffs have asked the court to enjoin the conversions. To obtain a

permanent injunction, the plaintiffs will have to prevail on the merits and prove that

“other remedies are inadequate.”100 To meet that test, a plaintiff need not show

irreparable harm. “A showing of irreparable harm can satisfy that requirement. But

establishing irreparable harm is not strictly necessary.”101 Conversely, if legal

remedies are adequate, then a plaintiff cannot make the showing necessary for

injunctive relief.102

Jan. 12, 2015) (“At the pleadings stage, the court will not rule out the possibility of other remedies, such as rescissory damages.”); see Ambac Assur. Corp. v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 2009 WL 734073, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009) (denying defendant’s request to strike rescissory damages on the basis that it was premature); Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. UBS Real Est. Secs., Inc., 2012 WL 3525613, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (“It would be premature to strike a remedy at the pleadings stage.”).

99 See Goldstein v. Denner, — A.3d —, —, 2024 WL 303638, at *13 (Del. Ch.

Jan. 26, 2024) (discussing trial court’s case management authority); Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson, 2023 WL 8868407, at *16 n.39 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2023) (same); Harris v. Harris, 289 A.3d 310, 342–43 (Del. Ch. 2023) (same).

100 In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Servs., 285 A.3d 1205, 1228

(Del. Ch. 2022).

101 Id.

102 Id. at 1228–30.

49 The standard legal remedy is money damages. It seems quite likely that the

court can craft a monetary remedy in this case that would be adequate. The remedial

challenge will be to quantify the extent of the harm, if any, that moving from

Delaware to Nevada imposes on the unaffiliated stockholders.

One way to determine the quantum of harm would be to value the Company

pre-conversion as a Delaware corporation, then value the Company post-conversion

as Nevada corporation, subtract the Nevada value from the Delaware value, and

calculate a per share amount. That would be hard.

But there is another way to get at the delta. The Company’s stock has a trading

price. In the conversion, nothing will change except the Company’s corporate

domicile. Maffei’s control will remain constant. The Company’s business will remain

constant. The only independent variable is the law governing its internal affairs.

Given that set-up, the change in the Company’s trading price should help

quantify the harm, if any, caused by the conversion. As long as the market for the

Company’s common stock is semi-strong-form efficient, then the price reaction should

be indicative. Note that the stock price need not fairly approximate a pro rata share

of the Company’s intrinsic value for the price reaction to matter. As long as any

pricing disconnects remains consistent across variables other than the governing law,

the price impact should provide insight.

Not only that, but the announcement of the conversion should have a relatively

clean price impact. The Company’s conversion was not conditioned on a majority-of-

the-minority vote, so nothing could prevent Holdings from implementing it. There is,

50 of course, always some uncertainty about whether a transaction will close, but here,

the likelihood of closure would have been high. The price reactions to other events,

such as the announcement of the vote or the filing of this litigation, may provide

additional datapoints.

That does not make the price reaction the be all and end all. Considerable

scholarly literature calls into question the ability of investors to price governance

structures at the IPO phase.103 Similar uncertainty could exist about the ability of

investors to price changes in governance structures. Intuitively, however, a change

in governance structure should present a cleaner question. At the IPO stage, a firm’s

economic prospects dominate, and the way a stockholder controller, the board, or

management may use the governance rights they possess is relatively unknown. For

the conversion, the only question is a change in the governing law, and the Company’s

fiduciaries have a track record.

Because of the narrow issue that this case presents, it seems likely that the

court will have a sufficiently reliable basis to craft a monetary award for any harm

that the Company’s stockholders suffer. A judgment against the defendants in that

amount should provide the plaintiff with a fully adequate remedy. The court will

103 See generally Choi, supra, at 74–78 (collecting scholarship casting doubt on

whether IPO market is informationally efficient); id. at 83–91 (using game theory to demonstrate that even if the IPO market is informationally efficient, governance structures are likely to be mispriced so long as different firms have different optimal governance structures and outside investors are informationally disadvantaged relative to insiders); id. at 91–94 (calling into question ability of private ordering and liability regimes to correct for IPO mispricing).

51 retain jurisdiction over the individual defendants even after the conversion is

complete. The court can enter a judgment against any of them who are held liable.

The plaintiffs can use standard collection procedures to enforce the judgment. If that

requires domesticating judgments in other jurisdictions and enforcing them there,

then the plaintiffs can do that.

The closing of the conversion will not alter anything else about the case. By

statute,

[t]he conversion of a corporation out of the State of Delaware in accordance with this section and the resulting cessation of its existence as a corporation of this State pursuant to a certificate of conversion to non-Delaware entity shall not be deemed to affect … the personal liability of any person incurred prior to such conversion, nor shall it be deemed to affect the choice of law applicable to the corporation with respect to matters arising prior to such conversion.104

Any liability for the conversion necessarily arises prior to the mystical singularity of

the effective time. This case will go forward, governed by Delaware law, regardless of

whether the Company’s conversion closes. The same is true for the conversion

involving Holdings.

Injunctive relief is therefore off the table. The pendency of this litigation should

not delay the conversions from closing.

III. CONCLUSION

The defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the plaintiffs’ request for

injunctive relief. Otherwise, the motion is denied.

104 8 Del. C. § 266(e).