THOMAS H. NEWTON, Judge.
Ms. Brenda D. Owsley appeals from the circuit court’s modification judgment, challenging its rulings on child support, child-support arrearages and abatement, the attorney’s fee award, and certain evidentiary issues. Finding error on one issue, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties (Ms. Owsley and Mr. Clayton J. Brittain) were married and had one child, John, who was born in 1984. They divorced in 1993 and were awarded joint legal and physical custody.1 Mr. Brittain was also ordered to pay child support. In 1997 the judgment was modified by awarding sole legal and physical custody of the child to Mr. Brittain; Ms. Owsley was ordered to pay $249 per month in child support during the school year, and Mr. Brittain was obligated to pay $196 per month during the summer months when John visits with his mother. In 2002, his senior year in high school, John moved in with his mother; and neither party paid child support. In September 2002, Ms. Owsley filed a motion to modify child custody and amended the motion in February 2003. Ms. Owsley sought sole physical custody2 and joint legal custody. She also sought to terminate her child-support obli[814]*814gation and impose a support obligation on Mr. Brittain.
While the motion was pending, John graduated from high school and enrolled in college. To prepare for trial and calculate Mr. Brittain’s support obligation, his attorney made numerous attempts in 2003 to obtain information from Ms. Owsley regarding her finances and John’s college enrollment, financial aid, and employment. The parties stipulated that neither Ms. Owsley nor John provided written notification to Mr. Brittain regarding college enrollment, the courses, or his grades for semesters beginning in fall 2003 and ending in summer 2004. On August 24, 2004, one day after the new semester began, Mr. Brittain did receive the documentation necessary to continue his support obligation under section 452.340.5.3
Following a bench trial in September 2004, the circuit court determined that John’s earnings justified a deviation from the presumed child-support amount and ordered Mr. Brittain to pay child support to Ms. Owsley of $137 per month from October 1, 2002, through August 31, 2003, and, thereafter, commencing in January 2005. The court further determined that child support should abate from September 1, 2003, through December 31, 2004, for John’s failure to comply with section 452.340.5. Ms. Owsley’s child-support ar-rearages of $5,027.10 and Mr. Brittain’s child-support arrearages of $831.10, both determined as of September 1, 2004, were set aside. Finally, legal fees of $4,000 were awarded to Mr. Brittain due to the “extraordinary amount” of time and legal services required to defend the action.
Ms. Owsley raises six points on appeal and asserts that the circuit court erred in: (i) abating child support from September 1, 2003, through December 31, 2004; (ii) assessing attorney’s fees against her; (iii) incorrectly calculating Mr. Brittain’s child-support obligation; (iv) making an inconsistent, vague, and unenforceable order regarding child-support arrearages; (v) failing to consider Ms. Owsley’s request for attorney’s fees; and (vi) failing to allow Ms. Owsley to question the parties’ child concerning notice to Mr. Brittain about his college enrollment.
In a bench-tried case, we affirm the circuit court’s decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Meyer v. Block, 123 S.W.3d 316, 321-22 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). We defer to the court’s credibility determinations and view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment. Id. at 321. We disregard all contrary evidence. Id. Regarding the exclusion or admission of evidence, trial courts have considerable discretion, and we will not reverse an evidentiary ruling unless that discretion has been abused. Campbell v. Campbell, 929 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Mo.App. W.D.1996).
As to attorney’s fees in child-support cases, the circuit court’s decision is presumed correct, and we defer to its determination. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 159 S.W.3d 529, 542 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). The complaining party bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the circuit court has considered all of the factors under section 452.355.1. Id. And we will not reverse a circuit court’s award or denial of attorney’s fees in such cases, unless the complaining party shows that its decision was “against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Bauer v. Bauer, 38 S.W.3d 449, 457 (Mo.App. W.D.[815]*8152001) (citation omitted). We consider the circuit court to be an expert on attorney’s fee issues, and it may consider a spouse’s unreasonable conduct during the proceedings that may have increased the other spouse’s fees. Id.
With respect to continuing eligibility for child support after the child reaches age eighteen, section 452.340.5 provides in relevant part:
If the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than October first following graduation from a secondary school or completion of a graduation equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and completes at least twelve hours of credit each semester, not including the summer semester, at an institution of vocational or higher education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-two, whichever first occurs. To remain eligible for such continued parental support, at the beginning of each semester the child shall submit to each parent a transcript or similar official document provided by the institution of vocational or higher education which includes the courses the child is enrolled in and has completed for each term, the grades and credits received for each such course, and an official document from the institution listing the courses which the child is enrolled in for the upcoming term and the number of credits for each such course.
(emphasis added).
Our rules of statutory construction require this court to determine the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. banc 1992). Furthermore, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. Id.
According to Ms. Owsley, she was the obligated parent for child support until the circuit court modified the parties’ support obligations in 2004. Hence, she was not required to provide proof of John’s enrollment or other documentation under this section. She argues, “Since Mr. Brittain was not the obligating parent under Section 452.340.5, whether he received such documentation from the child is immaterial and the provisions of Section 452.340.5 would not apply as it pertains to the father in this case.” To the contrary, Mr. Brit-tain was obligated under the 1997 court order to pay child support to Ms. Owsley during the summer months. Regardless, the statute does not distinguish between obligated and non-obligated parents. To remain eligible for support, the child is simply required to provide the documentation to “each parent,” and we see no reason to interpret the statute otherwise. See Mayes v. Fisher, 854 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Mo.App. W.D.1993) (where statutory language is unambiguous, resorting to statutory construction is unnecessary).
Ms. Owsley further contends that even if the section does apply, the child was not required to provide proof of enrollment with respect to his first semester, and the summer semester is also exempt from the reporting requirements. While the Missouri Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]here appear to be no reporting requirements for the first semester” under this section, eligibility for support during that semester may be established “simply by proof of enrollment.” In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo. banc 1999). There is no indication in Kohring about how the child complied with this [816]*816requirement, and we will not address that issue now.4 Regarding the summer semester, the only exception noted in the statute relates to the 12-credit hour requirement and not to the notification requirements, which are set forth in a separate sentence and relate without exception or qualification to “each semester.”
According to the stipulation filed by the parties and the evidence introduced at trial, before 2004 John did not provide any information to his father, either oral or written, official or unofficial, that he was enrolled in college for the fall 2003 semester. The parties have also stipulated that, except for documents provided on August 24, 2004, John did not provide any written documentation to Mr. Brittain regarding “the courses in which he was enrolled, the number of credit hours, and his grades for the Fall 2003 semester, Winter 2004 semester and Summer 2004 semester.”5 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding Mr. Brittain’s support obligation abated between September 2003 and August 2004.
The court did err, however, in finding that, because the specified documentation was not provided to Mr. Brit-tain until the day after the fall 2004 semester started, John was not eligible for support for that semester either. We do not find that the statute requires the child to submit the documentation to each parent before or on the exact day the semester commences. The statute simply states that such information shall be submitted to the parents “at the beginning of each semester.” § 452.340.5. When we interpret statutes, we attempt to ascertain the legislature’s intent and generally start by giving the language used its plain and ordinary meaning. Lake Ozark Constr. Indus., Inc. v. Osage Land Co., L.L.C., 168 S.W.3d 471, 477 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). When the legislative intent cannot be discerned from the statute’s language, the statute is considered ambiguous and only then can we apply the rules of statutory construction. Id. In this case, the phrase “at the beginning,” which sets forth the time that documentation relating to college or vocational school enrollment must be submitted to the parents to continue a parental support obligation, does not have a plain and ordinary meaning.
As Judge Howard wisely observes, there is no precise dictionary definition for the word “beginning.” The definitions range from “the point at which something begins to exist,” to “the first part,” “the first third,” and “a rudimentary stage” or an “early period.” WebsteR’s ThiRD New InTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 198 (1993). Nor does some of the world’s great literature appear to have a fixed definition or usage for the term. For example, Marcel Proust once wrote, “Not only does one not retain all at once the truly rare works, but even within such works it is the least precious parts that one perceives first. Less deceptive than life, these great masterpieces do not give us their best at the beginning.” John BaRtlett, Familiar Quotations 6 (16th ed.1992). One can reasonably surmise that Mr. Proust intended to convey a message of “on first reading” in his observation. Or not. Similarly, Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, lauded as a master of the written and spoken word, once said in [817]*817a 1942 speech, “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” Id. at 621. Any reasonable interpretation of the former British prime minister’s intent would likely indicate a broad use of the word, not marking any particular day or time.
This court, attempting to interpret the phrase “commencing at the beginning of the school year in 2000,” which appeared in a child custody order, noted that the child’s mother could be correct in stating that the phrase meant a time after summer vacation had concluded. Love v. Love, 75 S.WM 747, 761 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). The comet determined, however, that construing this phrase in conjunction with another paragraph appearing in the order made it clear that the child’s father was entitled to primary physical custody after the last day of the 2000 school year, or before summer vacation had begun. Id.
Thus, we can see how elastic this phrase can be, whether used by writers, speakers, judges, or the legislature. In his dissent, Judge Howard looks to the legislative history of the statute to ascertain legislative intent, having found no other way to properly interpret “beginning.” We are not convinced that the legislature intended to impose a rigid requirement by its selection and use of the phrase “at the beginning.” Rather, we believe that the legislature, recognizing the utility of requiring a continuing child-support obligation for the parents of those children not yet in the workforce but enrolled in an institution of higher learning, intended to impose a flexible requirement that could be applied consistent with the circumstances of each case.6 We think that imposing the interpretation, “on the first day of class,” goes beyond legislative intent and writes into the statute a requirement that the legislature could easily have imposed by selecting a more precise phrase. Its decision not to do so evinces an intent different from that envisioned by the dissenting opinion. Also, the dissent’s interpretation could make the statute more unclear, because what first day of class are we talking about? The first day of class for one student may not be the first day of class for another student.
We believe that the legislature intended this requirement to be applied with flexibility; otherwise, it would have more clearly stated that the documentation must be in the parents’ possession on the first day of the semester.7 A flexible requirement gives a court the ability to address individual circumstances, such as where a child takes advantage of the late enrollment offered by some schools or places the documentation in the mail, i.e., submits it, before the semester begins, but it is not received until some time thereafter. While a bright-line requirement could forestall further litigation over exactly what constitutes “the beginning of each semester,” in this case we cannot conclude that Mr. Brittain’s receipt of the required documentation one day after the semester started is beyond a reasonable interpretation and application of the phrase.8 Had [818]*818the legislature intended otherwise, it would have so specified.9 Thus, Mr. Brittain’s support obligation was not abated for the fall 2004 semester, and the court erred in finding that his obligation would not commence until January 2005.
Ms. Owsley challenges the $4,000 award of attorney’s fees on two grounds: (i) the circuit court did not make sufficient findings under Rule 73.0110 to support the award, and (ii) she was not obligated to provide the information that Mr. Brittain sought regarding John’s income, college expenses, scholarships, and the documentation required under section 452.340.5.
Statutory authority for the award of attorney’s fees is governed by section 452.355.1 which states in part:
[T]he court from time to time after considering all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties, the merits of the case and the actions of the parties during the pendency of the action, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding pursuant to sections 452.300 to 452.415 and for attorney’s fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding and after entry of a final judgment.
As for the sufficiency of the circuit court’s findings, we find no deficiency. In its findings of fact, the court stated, among other matters:
4. [Mr. Brittain’s] counsel had to expend time and legal services of an extraordinary amount concerning the pleadings in this ease as two hearings were required with respect to the Motion to Modify and the Amended Motion to Modify. An additional hearing was required as [Ms. Owsley’s] counsel filed certain allegations in pleadings that were later withdrawn. Two discovery hearings were held for [Mr. Brittain] to obtain proper court orders to obtain proper discovery.
a. [Mr. Brittain’s] counsel wrote seven (7) letters to [Ms. Owsley’s] counsel requesting documents and information on John’s (age 20) grades, college status, college expenses and other items which correspondence was never answered and [Mr. Brittain] had to take John’s deposition on September 23, 2003, to obtain school records, college loan records, and other information necessary to properly compute child support in this case.
b. [Mr. Brittain’s] legal fees per [Mr. Brittain’s] Exhibit No. 7 were a total of $7,274.80 not counting four hours of trial and two hours to prepare the Proposed Findings of Fact for a total of six hours times $150.00 per hour for a total of $900.00 added to the fees of $7,274.80 totaling $8,174.00.
c. [Ms. Owsley] requested legal fees of $6,000.00 in her trial testimony which request for said fees was not pleaded in any of [Ms. Ows-ley’s] pleadings in this cause.
[819]*819d. [Mr. Brittain’s] counsel wrote [Ms. Owsley’s] counsel on February 24, 2003, June 18, 2003, June 23, 2003, June 21, 2003, July 25, 2003, August 13, 2003, and August 28, 2003, which correspondence requested various items: [Ms. Owsley’s] W2 for 2002, John’s W2 for 2002, John’s tax returns, pay records and financial status, John’s scholarship information, housing information, personal income information, and actual cost of school, books, tuition and fees. Said records were never voluntarily provided to [Mr. Brittain] causing the necessity of depositions, interrogatories, and motions to produce in this cause.
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8. Child support calculations pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 88 are as follows:
a. [Mr. Brittain’s] Exhibit 3A (Second Amended Form 14) lists [Ms. Owsley’s] gross income of $1,446.00 and Respondent’s gross income of $3,894.00 per the TRIAL STIPULATION.
In its conclusions of law, the circuit court states, in relevant part:
[Ms. Owsley] should pay [Mr. Brittain’s] legal fees in the amount of $4,000, suit monies and court costs due to [Ms. Ows-ley’s] failure to provide discoverable information on an informal basis or even to respond to requests for information during the litigation of the issues in this case.
Given that section 452.355, in allowing an attorney’s fee award, requires the court to consider factors such as the financial resources of the parties and their actions during the pendency of the litigation, and that specific findings were made as to these matters, we cannot say that the court’s findings were insufficient.
Among the factors the circuit court considers in making an award of legal fees are the actions of the parties while the matter is pending.11 § 452.355.1; Bauer, 38 S.W.3d at 457 (court may consider unreasonable conduct of a spouse during proceeding that may have increased the other spouse’s attorney’s fees). While it is true that the law does not require Ms. Owsley to provide the information required under section 452.340.5, the correspondence and other evidence introduced at trial confirms that Mr. Brittain’s counsel made numerous attempts, beginning in February 2003, to obtain information that Ms. Owsley’s counsel had said he would provide12 In addition, some of the information requested involved Ms. Owsley’s finances, which she did have an obligation to provide and had full access to under the law.13 It was not until late August that a written response was provided to Mr. Brittain, indicating that Ms. Owsley did not have the informa[820]*820tion and that a subpoena directed to John would be the best alternative. Had affirmative representations about the documents’ availability not been made over a period of months to Mr. Brittain’s lawyer, he could have stopped wasting his time seeking the information from Ms. Owsley. It is more desirable to resolve discovery disputes informally, because it saves time and money for the parties. On this record, the circuit court properly determined that a $4,000 award (from a request of over $8,000) for Mr. Brittain’s attorney’s fees was justified on the basis of actions attributable to Ms. Owsley, and for Mr. Brittain’s time and effort over the two-year period of this litigation.14 Hence, the circuit court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to Mr. Brittain.
In her challenge to the child-support calculation, Ms. Owsley claims that the circuit court (i) ordered payment of support retroactive to October 2002 without any evidence regarding John’s income in 2002, (ii) failed to account for John’s college expenses, while offsetting Mr. Brit-tain’s obligation by the child’s income, (iii) failed to list the factors that made the presumed child-support obligation unjust and inappropriate, and (iv) failed to accurately recite Ms. Owsley’s gross monthly income in its judgment. The parties stipulated that John’s monthly income was $500. In her motion to modify, Ms. Ows-ley specifically sought child support retroactive to the date she filed the motion. If John did not earn any income in 2002, it was incumbent upon Ms. Owsley to present such evidence to the circuit court or to incorporate this information in the stipulation. She did not do so; thus, the circuit court did not err on this basis in making its child-support award.
There is nothing in Rule 88 or Form 14 that requires a circuit court to include post-secondary school expenses in its calculations. Indeed, the Form 14 comments note that “[p]ost-secondary educational expenses ... are not included in the schedule of basic child support obligations. These expenses may be included in Form No. 14 as an ‘other extraordinary child-rearing cost’ if the parents agree or the court orders that the parents contribute to payment of these expenses.” Because the evidence in this case was that some of the child’s college expenses were being paid with government grants and assistance from grandparents, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to include these expenses in its Form 14 calculation.
Regarding the circuit court’s determination that the presumed child support of $468 was unjust and inappropriate, Ms. Owsley relies on Timmons v. Timmons, 132 S.W.3d 906 (Mo.App. W.D.2004), to assert that the circuit court must also list the factors that make the presumed amount unjust and inappropriate.15 The circuit court did state that it was deviating from the presumed child-support [821]*821amount because of the child’s $500 monthly income, properly noting that a child’s resources are a factor for it to consider in calculating child support under section 452.340.1(1). Because the circuit court made a specific finding that the presumed child support amount was unjust and inappropriate and set forth the basis for its child-support calculations in its judgment, its ruling will not be disturbed on this basis either.
Additionally, while the circuit court incorrectly recited Ms. Owsley’s gross monthly income in its findings of fact, it is clear from its discussion of the issue that the court used the correct amount, as set forth in the parties’ Form 14 calculations and the trial stipulation, in making its support award. See Foraker v. Foraker, 133 S.W.3d 84, 94 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) (where there are inconsistencies between the findings of fact and the judgment, the judgment prevails over the findings of fact). This point is denied.
Regarding child-support arrearages, Ms. Owsley complains that the circuit court’s judgment is vague and uncertain. In its judgment, the circuit court orders Mr. Brittain to pay child support of $137 per month beginning October 1, 2002, with a period of abatement from September 1, 2003, through December 31, 2004, and recommencing in January 2005. The circuit court then addresses child-support arrear-ages, and states that neither party shall pay any to the other. Earlier in its findings, the circuit court discusses the parties’ arrearages as shown by the Boone County Circuit Clerk’s records. It is clear that the child-support award, which was made retroactive and abated in part, is not the same thing as the unpaid arrearages. Accordingly, the difference between the child-support award and the arrearages stated in the order can be clearly ascertained. In re Marriage of Melton, 816 S.W.2d 232, 238 (Mo.App. S.D.1991). This point is denied.
Ms. Owsley argues that because the parties’ trial stipulation provides, among other matter's, that the parties are in dispute about “legal fees and costs,” the circuit court erred in refusing to receive evidence regarding the amount of her legal fees. She did not, however, include a request for legal fees in her pleadings, and Mr. Brittain timely objected to the introduction of any evidence regarding her legal fees as being outside the scope of the pleadings. In Higgins v. Higgins, 918 S.W.2d 383, 384-85 (Mo.App. E.D.1996), the court affirmed a denial of attorney’s fees because they had not been pled, and a timely objection had been made during trial to the introduction of evidence on the issue. See also Norman v. Wright, 100 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2003) (court states, “The relief awarded in a judgment is limited to that sought by the pleadings.”).
While issues tried by consent of the parties can be treated as if they had been raised in the pleadings, Rule 55.33(b), the stipulation herein does not support Ms. Owsley’s contention that the parties agreed to try any issue that had not been properly pleaded, i.e., the issue of Ms. Owsley’s legal fees. A stipulation is not a pleading, but it is “an agreement between counsel with respect to business before the court.” Smith v. Smith, 985 S.W.2d 836, 841-42 (Mo.App. W.D.1998). We give stipulations “a reasonable construction with a view to effecting the intent of the parties; but in seeking the intention of the parties, the language used will not be so construed as to give it the effect of ... the waiver of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished.” Huegel v. Huegel, 329 Mo. 571, 46 S.W.2d 157, 158 (1932). The stipulation herein reflects the parties’ intention simply to seek the circuit court’s determination as [822]*822to “legal fees and costs.” Had Mr. Brit-tain intended to waive his right to challenge Ms. Owsley’s effort to insert her attorney’s fees into the case without having pled the issue, at the very least the statement would have indicated that the parties were disputing Ms. Owsley’s legal fees and costs. Because the stipulation does not clearly do so, this point is denied.
In her final point, regarding the court’s failure to allow her to question their son about notice to his father of his college enrollment, Ms. Owsley contends that section 452.340.5 does not require when proof of enrollment for a first college semester is to be provided so that the child can remain eligible for continued parental support. She argues that Mr. Brittain admits in the trial stipulation that John entered college in August 2003, and that their son’s testimony on the matter, barred by the court as irrelevant, would have shown that notice had been provided. According to the evidence presented at trial and the parties’ stipulation, the child did not provide any notice to his father about his college enrollment at any time before or during his first semester. Official documentation was not provided until the child had already been in college for a full year.
"While the statute does not specify when or how notification of enrollment in the first semester is to be provided, common sense dictates that some form of contemporaneous or prior notification is required to impose a continued parental support obligation under section 452.340.5. Because Ms. Owsley stipulated that John had not provided documentation about his college enrollment and John testified that before August 2004 he had not told his father anything other than that he was considering going to college, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the testimony. Campbell, 929 S.W.2d at 762.
We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
THOMAS H. NEWTON, Judge, writes for the majority.
Judges PATRICIA A. BRECKENRIDGE, JAMES M. SMART, RONALD R. HOLLIGER, LISA WHITE HARDWICK, and Sr. Judge FRANK D. CONNETT concur.
VICTOR C. HOWARD, Judge, dissents in separate opinion filed.
EDWIN H. SMITH, Chief Judge, HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, ROBERT G. ULRICH, and JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judges, concur.