Opinion No. (2007)

Nebraska Attorney General Reports·Decided February 27, 2007·Published

Opinion

REQUESTED BY: Gerry Oligmueller, acting DAS Director, Claims Board Member on behalf of the Board. You have requested an opinion of the Attorney General concerning issues relating to the statute of limitations for filing claims governed by the Miscellaneous Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,294 to 81-8,301 (2003). More specifically you have posed the following three questions:

1. Does the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218 (1995), apply to claims filed against the State under the Miscellaneous Claims Act?

2. Does the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218 (1995), apply to Miscellaneous Claims filed against the State under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 66-1531 (2003)?

3. Is there any exception to the application of Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-218 (1995) to Miscellaneous Claims filed against the State?

1. Does the two-year statute of limitations set forth in § 25-218 apply to claims filed against the State under the Miscellaneous Claims Act?

Yes. We believe that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218 (1995) applies to miscellaneous claims filed pursuant to the Nebraska State Miscellaneous Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,294 to 81-8,301 (2003) ("Miscellaneous Claims Act"). The Miscellaneous Claims Act does not contain a specific statute of limitations section or provision proscribing the time period for filing a miscellaneous claim against the State. However, § 25-218 states:

Every claim and demand against the State shall be forever barred unless action is brought thereon within two years after the claim arose. Every claim and demand on behalf of the State, except for revenue, or upon official bonds, or for loans or money belonging to the school funds, or loans of school or other trust funds, or to lands or interest in lands thereto belonging, shall be barred by the same lapse of time as is provided by the law in case of like demands between private parties. This section shall not apply to any claim or demand against the State regarding property taxes.

The opening sentence of § 25-218 says that "[e]very claim and demand against the State" is barred unless "action is brought thereon within two years after the claim arose." The plain language of this sentence demonstrates that the limitation applies to all "claims and demands;" this would include a miscellaneous claim filed under the Miscellaneous Claims Act. It is presumed the Legislature meant what it said when it classified "every claim and demand" as being subject to the two year limitation:

Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Aquila, Inc., 271 Neb. 454, 712 N.W.2d 280 (2006). In the absence of ambiguity, courts must give effect to the statutes as they are written. If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning.

Turco v. Schuning, 271 Neb. 770, 773, 716 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (2006).

In other State claim statutory schemes, the Legislature enacted a specific statute of limitation that applies to a specific claim procedure. See, the State Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,227 (2003), and the Contract Claims Act Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,306 (2003). However, as stated above, no specific statute of limitations was provided when the Miscellaneous Claims Act was enacted. Because §§81-8,227 81-8,306 are specific statutes of limitation, they would apply over the general statute of limitation found in § 25-218:

In determining which statute of limitations applies to any given cause of action, we bear in mind that a special statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative will concerning a particular subject. Wendeln v. The Beatrice Manor, Inc.,271 Neb. 373, 380, 712 N.W.2d 226, 235 (2006).

Therefore, the plain, ordinary meaning of § 25-218 is that every claim or demand against the State is barred if action is not brought thereon within two years from the time the claim arose. This would apply to miscellaneous claims.

We have had occasion to discuss this issue in a prior opinion request. In 1981, in Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81074 (April 14, 1981), we stated:

Second, you inquire whether there are any statutes of limitation which apply to the payment of "miscellaneous claims." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218 (Reissue 1979) is a general statute which applies to all claims against the state for which there is no more specific limitation. Consequently, it appears that statute would apply to the payment of claims under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,236 (Reissue 1976).

The relevant language of §§ 25-218 81-8,236 has not changed since our 1981 opinion, and thus, our opinion that § 25-218 sets forth the applicable statute of limitations remains.

The fact that § 25-218 is contained in Article 2 of the Civil Procedure section of the Nebraska Statutes, does not restrict its application to the Miscellaneous Claims Act. In Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Medical Center v. Haworth, 260 Neb. 63, 615 N.W.2d 460 (2000), the Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to determine between competing statutes of limitation found in the Nebraska Hospital Medical Liability Act and the Nebraska Probate Code. The Court found that it was required to harmonize the two statutes to determine the intent of the Legislature, and ascertain which statute applied:

In determining which of these statutes applies in the present case, we are guided by the fundamental rule that statutes shall be construed in pari materia and from their language as a whole to determine the intent of the Legislature. All subordinate rules are mere aids in reaching this fundamental determination. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 254 Neb. 64,574 N.W.2d 498 (1998).

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Armour v. L.H.
608 N.W.2d 599 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 2000)
Metropolitan Utilities District v. Aquila, Inc.
712 N.W.2d 280 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 2006)
Wendeln v. the Beatrice Manor, Inc.
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Ferguson v. Union Pacific Railroad
601 N.W.2d 907 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1999)
Hoiengs v. County of Adams
574 N.W.2d 498 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1998)
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