Olympia Industrial, Inc. v. United States

7 F. Supp. 2d 997, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 387, 22 C.I.T. 387, 20 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1469, 1998 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 37
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedApril 17, 1998
DocketSlip Op. 98-49. Court No. 95-10-01339
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 7 F. Supp. 2d 997 (Olympia Industrial, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olympia Industrial, Inc. v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 2d 997, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 387, 22 C.I.T. 387, 20 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1469, 1998 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 37 (cit 1998).

Opinion

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Judge.

In this action, the Court reviews the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) Remand Determination of the Notice of Final Results of Administrative Review: Heavy Forged Hand Tools, Finished or Unfinished, With or Without Handles, from the People’s Republic of China, 60 Fed.Reg. 49,251 (Sept. 22, 1995) (“Final Results”). Plaintiff, Olympia Industrial Inc. (“Olympia”), a respondent in the underlying administrative review, contests one aspect of the Remand Determination. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994). The Court sustains the Remand Determination in part, and remands in part.

I.

BACKGROUND

Olympia, a . U.S. importer of heavy forged hand tools (“HFHTs”) from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), and defendant-in-tervenor, Woodings-Verona Tool Works, Inc. (“Woodings”), a U.S. producer of HFHTs and petitioner in the underlying agency action, commenced this consolidated case under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and 28 U.S.C. § 2631(c) (1994) seeking judicial review of certain por *999 tions of the Final Results of Commerce’s second administrative review. See Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 CIT-, 1997 WL 181529 (Apr. 10, 1997) (“Olympia I ”). In Olympia I, both parties disputed the dumping margin results in the Final Results, focusing on certain values eiflployed by Commerce when it calculated the foreign market value (“FMV”) of the HFHTs imports using a factors of production (“FOP”) analysis. 1 More specifically, Woodings challenged Commerce’s Final ■ Results on the grounds that Commerce erred when it (1) rejected certain Indian surrogate data based on a comparison of data from other market economy countries, and (2) valued shipping pallets that were assembled by the importer’s suppliers based on surrogate data for the value of a finished pallet. On the other hand, Olympia alleged that Commerce erred when it (1) used surrogate country data to value the steel input when viable PRC import data was available, and (2) calculated inland freight expenses based on the longest distance between input suppliers to factory.

For the reasons discussed in Olympia I, the Court rejected Woodings arguments but accepted Olympia’s challenges to the Final Results, and thus remanded two issues to Commerce. First, the Court agreed with Olympia that Commerce erred when it relied on surrogate country data to value the steel inputs. Accordingly, the Court instructed Commerce to solicit information bearing on whether the import data submitted by PRC trading companies is reliable. The Court then directed Commerce to use this information “to either change its methodology [for valuing steel inputs in its FOP analysis] or provide a clearly articulated rationale” explaining why the PRC import data from the trading companies should not be used. Olympia /, 21 CIT at-, 1997 WL 181529 at *3. Second, the Court also agreed that Commerce erred in calculating inland freight; therefore, the Court instructed Commerce to reopen the record so parties could submit information on the percentage of steel purchased from suppliers and on the distances between suppliers and manufacturers. The Court further directed Commerce to adjust its inland freight calculation using the supplemented data.

In its Remand Determination, Commerce complied with the latter remand instruction, but not the former. On remand, Commerce did not seek additional information from the parties as to the reliability of the PRC steel import data. Rather, Commerce rejected the data in its entirety without review. In doing so, Commerce stated that its policy was only to evaluate inputs sourced from market-economy suppliers when those inputs are actually purchased by the NME manufacturer. Remand Determination, at 8-9. Because the import data at issue related to inputs purchased by NME trading- companies, not by NME manufacturers, Commerce declined to solicit new information or to use the existing PRC import data. Commerce then concluded that “because there are no actual market-based prices for steel purchases by the manufacturer, we continue to use surrogate country data to value the steel input used in the production of HFHTs.” Remand Determination, at 9-10.

Olympia objects to this aspect of the Remand Determination. Specifically, Olympia contends that Commerce’s Remand Determination fails to use data that is the best information available to value one of the factors of production. The question thus posed is whether under the governing statute, is it reasonable for Commerce to ignore what is purportedly the best information available and instead resort to surrogate data when it employs a NME factors of production analysis?

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Commerce’s remand determination will be sustained if it is supported by substantial *1000 evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1994).

Although well told, to determine whether Commerce’s interpretation of the ■ statute is in accordance with law, the court applies the two-step test set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Chevron first directs the court “to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the statute is unambiguous as to the issue at hand, then the court must give effect to the intent of Congress. Id. However, “[i]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on. a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104' S.Ct. 2778 (footnote omitted). Thus, the second element of the Chevron test directs the court to consider the reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation.

If asked to review Commerce’s factual findings, the court will uphold the agency if its findings are supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is something more than a ‘mere scintilla,’ and must be enough reasonably to support a conclusion.” Cer amica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 405, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986) (citations omitted), aff'd., 5 Fed. Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987).

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7 F. Supp. 2d 997, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 387, 22 C.I.T. 387, 20 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1469, 1998 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/olympia-industrial-inc-v-united-states-cit-1998.