Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States

30 Ct. Int'l Trade 782, 2006 CIT 94
United States Court of International Trade·Decided June 21, 2006·No. Consol. Ct. 04-00319·Published

Opinion

OPINION

BARZILAY, Judge:

This consolidated case concerns a challenge by the plaintiffs to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) determination in the antidumping investigation Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the People’s Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,125 (June 18, 2004), amended, 69 Fed. Reg. 42,419 (July 15, 2004). The court remanded Commerce’s determination on one issue concerning the electricity used by one of the companies under review. Commerce has now issued its remand determination.

The Remand Results

The court remanded Commerce’s calculation of electricity usage for Hang Lung Plastic Manufactury Ltd. (“Hang Lung”), a Chinese manufacturer and exporter to the United States of polyethylene retail carrier bags (“PRCBs”) and a mandatory respondent in the underlying investigation, because the court found that Commerce’s explanation of its calculation was unclear. See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Comm. v. United States, 29 CIT_, Slip Op. 05-157 at 8-10 (Dec. 13, 2005) (hereinafter “PRCB F). 1 Commerce was instructed to explain its calculation and reconcile seeming inconsistencies between its Analysis for the Final Determination of PRCBs from the People’s Republic of China: Hang Lung, June 9, 2004, (“Final Analysis Memorandum”) and the information contained in Commerce’s September 13, 2005, Motion for Leave to Clarify Commerce’s Electricity Calculation for Hang Lung (“Motion to Clarify”). On February 13, 2006, Commerce issued its Results of Redetermination on Remand (“Remand Determination”). Plaintiffs Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee and its individual members, Vanguard Plastics, Inc., Hilex Poly Co., LLC, and Superbag Corp. (collectively “PRCB Committee Plaintiffs”), filed Comments Regarding Commerce’s Determination on Remand (“Pis.’ Comments”). Commerce then asked that the court allow it to respond to those comments, and the court granted that request.

In its Remand Determination, Commerce addressed two questions: 1) how it allocated electricity and 2) the seeming inconsistency between the Final Analysis Memorandum and the Motion to Clarify. Commerce explained that it chose the total electricity used by Hang Lung in production of all plastic bags, regardless of destination, as *784 the amount of electricity in kilowatt-hours (kwh) used during the period of investigation. See Remand Determination at 4. Commerce then “applied that total electricity to only Hang Lung’s U.S. sales by allocating the total kwh electricity used over the total extruded resin by the weight and concentrate Hang Lung used to produce the bags it sold to the United States.” Id. Because it did not know the total weight of extruded resin and concentrate used in Hang Lung’s U.S. sales, Commerce merged Hang Lung’s factors-of-production database with its U.S. sales database. As stated in its Final Analysis Memorandum, Commerce allocated total printing electricity usage only to printed bags sold in the United States because only those bags would incur electricity usage for printing. Id. at 5.

Regarding the court’s query that Commerce appeared to have presented two inconsistent positions between the Motion to Clarify and the Final Analysis Memorandum, Commerce responded that “[the] Motion to Clarify explains how [it] arrived at the total kwh of electricity to he allocated . . . rather than the general methodology [it] used to allocate that figure to Hang Lung’s U.S. sales.” Remand Determination at 6. The Final Analysis Memorandum describes how Commerce applied the total kwh of electricity to individual U.S. sales using the U.S. factors-of-production database, which Commerce “created by merging Hang Lung’s U.S. sales database with its factors of production database.” Remand Determination at 6. Therefore, Commerce explained, the two positions are not inconsistent.

In their comments on the Remand Determination, PRCB Committee Plaintiffs present three key arguments: 1) that Commerce’s electricity calculation is not supported by record evidence; 2) that “even assuming, arguendo, that Commerce’s interpretation is supported by the record, the electricity calculation is still not adverse to Hang Lung because it simply reallocates the same amount of electricity that Hang Lung would have allocated had it cooperated with the investigation”; and 3) that Commerce should not have used Hang Lung’s Verification Exhibit 11 (C.R. 164) as it is unreliable. For these reasons, they desire that the court again remand the case as not supported by substantial evidence and otherwise contrary to law. Pis.’ Comments at 3, 9.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

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Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 782, 2006 CIT 94 (cit 2006).

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