Ollnova Technologies Limited v. Ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a/ Ecobee

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedApril 10, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00072
StatusUnknown

This text of Ollnova Technologies Limited v. Ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a/ Ecobee (Ollnova Technologies Limited v. Ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a/ Ecobee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ollnova Technologies Limited v. Ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a/ Ecobee, (E.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD., § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Civil Action No. 2:22-CV-00072-JRG § ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES, ULC d/b/a § ECOBEE, § § Defendant. § CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this patent case, Plaintiff Ollnova Technologies Ltd. (“Ollnova”) alleges infringement by Defendant ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a ecobee (“ecobee”), of certain claims from U.S. Patent Nos. 7,746,887 (the “’887 Patent”), 7,860,495 (the “’495 Patent”), 8,224,282 (the “’282 Patent”), and 8,264,371 (the “’371 Patent”). Each patent relates to automation systems for build- ings. See, e.g., ’887 Patent at 1:53–56 (“The described embodiments include methods, processes, apparatuses, and systems for reporting information over a wireless automation system, and partic- ularly to a wireless building automation system.”); ’495 Patent at 1:7–8 (“[A] wireless building control architecture implements automation of building systems.”); ’282 Patent at 1:16–19 (“[T]he present disclosure relates to methods and devices for communicating change-of-value information within a building automation system.”); ’371 Patent at 1:9–12 (same). The parties dispute the scope of nine terms or phrases, with ecobee asserting several terms are indefinite. Having considered the parties’ briefing and arguments of counsel during a March 8, 2023 hearing, the Court resolves the disputes as follows. I. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Generally “[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). As such, if the parties dispute the scope of the claims, the court must determine their meaning. See, e.g., Verizon

Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff’g, 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Claim construction, however, “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, “[c]laim construction is a matter of [resolving] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims . . . .” Id. A court need not “repeat or restate every claim term in order to comply with the ruling that claim construction is for the court.” Id. When construing claims, “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given

their ordinary and customary meaning.” Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). Courts must therefore “look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the patented invention.” Id. (citations omitted). The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. This “person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specifica- tion.” Id. Intrinsic evidence is the primary resource for claim construction. See Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312). For certain claim terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.”). But for claim terms with less-apparent meanings, courts consider “those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean . . . [including] the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id. B. Indefiniteness

“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification de- lineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014). The claims “must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed,” but that consideration must be made while accounting for the inherent limitations of language. Id. at 908. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). II. THE LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART The level of ordinary skill in the art is the skill level of a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In resolving the appropriate level of ordinary skill, courts consider the types of and solutions to problems encountered in the art, the speed of innovation, the sophistication of the technology, and the education of workers active in the field. Id. Importantly, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v.

Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). Here, the parties proffer similar levels of ordinary skill in the art by way of their respective experts. Ollnova’s expert opines a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor’s Degree in com- puter science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field (or its equivalent), and had at least two years of experience in the design or development of automation components.” Madisetti Decl., Dkt. No. 89-7 ¶ 39. ecobee’s expert opines similarly. See Martens Decl., Dkt. No. 89-8 ¶ 28 (concluding a skilled artisan at the time of invention would have had “at least a bache- lor’s degree, or equivalent professional experience, in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a related discipline, and at least 2 years of experience with automation,

sensors, or controls systems”).

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Related

Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Technologies, Inc.
599 F.3d 1343 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
550 U.S. 398 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.
503 F.3d 1295 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Medrad, Inc. v. Mri Devices Corp.
401 F.3d 1313 (Federal Circuit, 2005)
CBT FLINT PARTNERS, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.
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Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC
669 F.3d 1362 (Federal Circuit, 2012)
In Re GPAC Inc.
57 F.3d 1573 (Federal Circuit, 1995)
Group One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., Defendant-Cross
407 F.3d 1297 (Federal Circuit, 2005)
Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Amino Chemicals Ltd.
715 F.3d 1363 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.
134 S. Ct. 2120 (Supreme Court, 2014)
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Bluebook (online)
Ollnova Technologies Limited v. Ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a/ Ecobee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ollnova-technologies-limited-v-ecobee-technologies-ulc-dba-ecobee-txed-2023.