Olivier v. Baldwin

48 So. 2d 806, 1950 La. App. LEXIS 741
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 22, 1950
DocketNo. 3299
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 48 So. 2d 806 (Olivier v. Baldwin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olivier v. Baldwin, 48 So. 2d 806, 1950 La. App. LEXIS 741 (La. Ct. App. 1950).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge.

The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Ernest J. Olivier, were invited to take a trip during the latter part of July, 1948 as guests of the defendants, Roy Stanley Baldwin and his wife, in the latter’s automobile, which invitation was accepted and the two couiples, after a two weeks trip, were returning to their homes in Lake Charles on July 31, 1948 when, at approximately 4:30 P.M., the automobile in which they were riding became involved in a collision with an automobile owned and driven by a Mr. Capps and traveling in the opposite or easterly direction toward the city of Baton Rouge, and as a result, the plaintiff, Ernest J. Olivier, was painfully and seriously injured and his wife, Mrs. Myrtle Fisher Olivier, suffered minor injuries, for which injuries they have sued their host, Roy Stanley Baldwin, driver of the car, and his insurer.

Plaintiffs alleged that the accident was caused by the negligence of Baldwin in the operation of his car in that he was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and that he lost control of his car so that it went off on the north shoulder of the United States Highway #190 when Baldwin suddenly caused it to proceed in a southwesterly direction across the north lane of traffic and into the south lane of said highway which at that time was being traveled and occu[807]*807pied by a Pontiac automobile belonging to said Capps.

Defendant denied any negligence and alleged that the Capps automobile pulled into his lane of traffic a short distance in front of defendant’s automobile thereby creating an emergency, and he was, therefore, free from any negligence and not liable to the plaintiffs for their injuries.

The District Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs from which the defendants have appealed, and the plaintiffs have answered the appeal asking that the award be increased.

The main question to be decided is one of fact as to whether an emergency confronted the defendant Baldwin which he did not create nor assist in creating. It is Baldwin’s contention that the Capps automobile suddenly pulled into his, the north, lane of traffic in order to pass an automobile, while the plaintiffs contend that Baldwin was driving too fast on a wet road and lost control of his car so that at least the right rear wheel went off the edge of the pavement onto the shoulder, and that Baldwin, in attempting to get the car back upon the pavement, negligently pulled across the north lane of traffic into the south lane of traffic and struck the Capps automobile.

The doctrine of emergency is well recognized and settled in our law and needs no citation of authorities. It is stated substantively in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, Sec. 171, Pg. 600, and in Vol. 60, Corpus Juris Secundum, Motor Vehicles, § 257, page 624 as follows: “Where the operator of a motor vehicle is by a sudden emergency, not caused in whole or in part by him, placed in a position of imminent peril to himself or to another, without sufficient time in which to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, he is not held to the same coolness, accuracy of judgment, or degree of care as is required of him under ordinary circumstances, or of one having ample opportunity for the full exercise of judgment, and is not liable for injuries caused by his vehicle if an accident occurs, provided he exercises ordinary or reasonable care or prudence, considering the stress of the circumstances, to avoid an accident, * * * »

Also, in Vol. 60 of Corpus Juris Secun-dum, Motor Vehicles, § 257-B, page 628, dealing with what constitutes emergency, we find the following:

“In order for the emergency doctrine, as set forth supra subdivision a of this section, to apply, it must be clear that an emergency existed. If the driver has an opportunity to exercise his deliberate judgment between alternate courses to pursue, no emergency arises in legal contemplation, and the emergency doctrine ordinarily applies only when the evidence discloses that alternative action is possible and that quick judgment is required; likewise, there must be an unforeseen circumstance or an unexpected happening or a hazard which could not reasonably be anticipated. On the other hand, if the driver is suddenly confronted ¡by the unexpected operation of some natural force, or by the innocent or wrongful act of a third person, the emergency doctrine applies; and, without express reference to emergency, drivers have been held not liable where their only proved fault is inability to avoid a collision under circumstances which are unusual and not likely to be anticipated.”
“Where there is ample time and space to avoid an accident, the sudden emergency rule does not apply.”

The District Court held that Baldwin was not confronted with an emergency and that the accident and resulting injuries to the plaintiffs were caused by his “excessive speed and the too forceful application of the brakes by Baldwin when he first saw the Capps automobile which caused his automobile to swerve and the rear wheel to' leave the pavement. It was Baldwin’s continued attempt to drive the rear wheel back upon the pavement that caused his automobile to enter the south lane of traffic and hit the Capps car as it did.”

There is no conflict in the testimony of the eye witnesses, that is, Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin and Mrs. Olivier, Mr. Olivier being asleep at the time, that the Capps’ Pontiac automobile which was traveling toward Baton Rouge and thus meeting defendant’s car, pulled out of its south lane well into' the north lane of traffic and traveled therein in an apparent attempt to oass the car in front of it. The ■distance Detween the Capps car [808]*808and the defendant’s car at the time the former left its south lane of traffic and entered the defendant's north lane of traffic.is somewhat in conflict. Mr. Baldwin, in a statement which he gave the day-after the-accident, placed the distance at 150 feet, but on the trial of the case pointed out an object in the court room which the Judge estimated to be approximately eighty feet. Mrs. Olivier estimated the distance on the trial of the case at 250 feet, however, this estimate is in direct conflict with statements which she made prior to the trial and which will be discussed more in detail.

The testimony of Baldwin, the defendant and driver of the automobile, consisted of that given- on the trial and also of a statement dated August 1, 1948 made to Steve Alford, Jr.,. an attorney-at-law of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, who at that time was employed as an -adjuster by an independent adjusting company and which he reduced to writing and Baldwin apparently signed. This statement is substantially in accord with Baldwin’s testimony, and the pertinent portion thereof is as follows:

“At the time of the -accident we were en-route from Baton Rouge to Lake Charles. We were proceeding at about 45 to 50 M.P.H. on the right hand side of the highway. There was a rather heavy line of eastbound traffic approaching us -and the driver of the Pontiac pulled out of this line directly in front of tne in my lane of traffic. The other car was about 150 feet away from me coming so fast that there was absolutely nothing I could do to avoid the collision. I couldn’t say how fast the other car was going at the time of the accident meeting it head on as I was.”
“It was not raining at the time of the collision but had stopped only a short time before and the highway was still wet.

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Bluebook (online)
48 So. 2d 806, 1950 La. App. LEXIS 741, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/olivier-v-baldwin-lactapp-1950.