Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc.

356 S.E.2d 578, 319 N.C. 534, 1987 N.C. LEXIS 2087

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: June 2, 1987
• Docket: 418PA86
• Status: Published

Opinions

MEYER, Justice.

In April 1978, defendant Ames Business Systems, Inc. (hereinafter “Ames”), was incorporated by James H. Nicholson, formerly a salesman of accounting machines for Olivetti Corporation, and Wade M. Perry, previously an owner and operator of a small company that sold business forms and supplies. Ames was initially capitalized by Nicholson and four other investors, including Perry’s wife and mother-in-law, for $45,000; Perry did not contribute any capital to Ames. Ames was formed to sell word processors for plaintiff Olivetti Corporation (hereinafter “Olivetti”). Ames and Olivetti entered into an agreement to that effect on 3 March 1978, including a provision for Olivetti to provide long-term maintenance and service through its Charlotte office. Olivetti signed a service contract with Ames on 1 May 1978, and Ames executed an initial order of $85,000 worth of equipment on the same date. Olivetti closed its Charlotte office the following month, giving Ames the option of taking over the Olivetti sales operation. Ames agreed and began distributing word processors out of Charlotte. Olivetti assigned its service contract with Ames to Piedmont Business Systems, Inc. Until Ames opened up its own service department, service was performed by an employee of Piedmont, Rex Jones. Ames lost $13,400 during that first year.

In April 1979, Olivetti began preparing to market a new word processor, the Olivetti TES-701. This machine was to be manufactured by NBI, Inc. (hereinafter “NBI”), and was essentially identical to the NBI-3000. The TES-701 was to be sold for about thirty percent less than the NBI-3000 and was apparently to compete for the same market. On 10 April 1979, Olivetti entered into a contract with NBI (hereinafter the “NBI agreement”), which was renewable on an annual basis and provided that, in the event of nonrenewal, NBI would continue to provide parts to Olivetti for five years thereafter. There was no provision in the agreement for long-term software updates.¹ In the summer of 1979, Olivetti discussed with Ames the benefits of the TES-701. As a way of encouraging Ames to carry the TES-701, one of Olivetti’s employees, Tom Gallagher, told Ames that the NBI agreement did in fact contain a long-term software update provision. In July 1979, Ames ordered one TES-701 as a demonstrator. Ames showed another loss that year of $24,400, leaving it with a net worth of about $7,000.

As early as February 1980, Olivetti began trying to get out of the NBI agreement. During the spring, Olivetti and NBI held talks to arrange an amicable separation. At the same time, Ames, unaware of these talks, continued to buy TES-701s from Olivetti and sell them. In July 1980, Olivetti breached the agreement with NBI. A termination agreement with NBI provided Olivetti with maintenance and software updates only through 31 December 1982. As part of the termination agreement, Olivetti and NBI agreed that the breakup would be kept secret. In the fall of 1980, Ames began to hear rumors, through Mr. J. S. Epley, a potential customer, that Olivetti and NBI might be breaking up. Olivetti’s employee Gallagher reassured Ames that the agreement was still intact and that Geoffrey A. Kohart, also of Olivetti, would write to reassure Epley. Kohart wrote the letter on 26 November 1980. This letter alluded to the industry rumors, but tended to downplay the possibility of trouble between NBI and Olivetti. Apparently reassured by the letter, Ames bought several TES-701s from Olivetti and sold two to Epley. Olivetti sold these to Ames at a very low price, saying that it wanted to reduce its inventory. According to Ames, Olivetti represented that it wanted to reduce its inventory to make room for additional TES-701s from NBI. At the end of the year, Ames had a net worth of negative $31,800.

Early in 1981, Olivetti changed its credit terms with Ames. Before Olivetti would honor new orders for parts or equipment, Olivetti required Ames to sign trade acceptances for the amount that Olivetti claimed Ames still owed it, some $108,379.11. Ames did so under protest. In March 1981, Ames met with an NBI representative to discuss becoming a dealership. Audley W. Downs, a regional manager responsible for dealer operations for NBI, met with Perry; Julius M. “Jay” Ozment, Ames’ sales manager; David Harrison, Ames’ service representative; and another Ames employee for a full day. When Downs left, Perry decided that it would not be feasible to market the NBI-3000, since it was the same machine as the TES-701 and he would essentially be competing with himself. Downs apparently also decided that Ames was not ready to become an NBI dealership and did not recommend that such a dealership be offered at that time. According to Olivetti, Ames did not meet NBI’s financial requirements for becoming a dealership — some $250,000. According to Ames, it decided not to pursue a dealership with NBI because it had been assured that Olivetti would continue to support the TES-701. Furthermore, Ames presented evidence that it needed only about $26,000 to become a dealership and that that amount was available to it.

In June 1981, NBI contracted with Information Processing Consultants (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) to become its dealership in North Carolina. In August or September, during a training session in Georgia for the TES-351 (Olivetti’s then-newest word processing system), Kohart, an employee of Olivetti, told Ozment that Olivetti was phasing out the TES-701. According to Ames, Olivetti told Ames in the summer of 1981 that it would be buying more TES-701s from NBI. Olivetti offered to sell Ames ten TES-701s at a considerable discount, claiming that it wanted to clear its inventory to make room for more TES-701s. At the time of the trial, Ames had been unable to sell seven of the machines. In the fall of 1981, Ozment left Ames and set up an office for IPC in Charlotte. At the end of the year, Ames had a net worth, according to Olivetti, of negative $78,000.

The trial court found that Olivetti had defrauded Ames and had committed unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1. It calculated Ames’ damages for lost future profits to be $401,000 and for lost past profits to be $5,200 and trebled those amounts pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, awarding Ames $1,218,600. The court also found that Ames would have been entitled to substantial punitive damages from Olivetti if N.C.G.S. § 75-1 did not apply to this case. The trial court also found that Ames owed Olivetti $57,000 based upon a pre-existing debt. Finally, the trial court ordered Ames to return its unsold Olivetti word processors to Olivetti, the contract price of which was deducted from Ames’ debt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in all respects.

Olivetti first argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s finding that Olivetti made material misrepresentations upon which Ames reasonably relied. We disagree and affirm the Court of Appeals in this respect.

The trial court made extensive findings on this issue, including the following:

12. Based upon the false statements of Olivetti that it had a five year agreement with NBI for the 701, and the fact that the product was a good product, Ames purchased a demonstration 701 and proceeded to spend at least two-thirds of its time from August, 1979 through October, 1981 preparing to sell and attempting to sell the 701. In so doing, Ames concentrated its efforts on the 701 and slackened its efforts on other products in its line. Ames did so in reliance upon the false representations of Olivetti.

15. On or about July 17, 1980, Olivetti breached the NBI Agreement and refused to accept any further shipments of 701’s from NBI. At that time Olivetti had over 400 of the 701’s in inventory, at a purchase price of approximately $5,000 each, and was committed to purchase another 400 or more during the remainder of 1980. This breach was committed by Olivetti despite its representations to Ames that it had a five year supply agreement for the 701, and that it would support the 701 during that period of time.

17. On or about September 23, 1980, Olivetti’s president confirmed a termination arrangement reached September 15, 1980 with NBI’s president. In this arrangement Olivetti would accept from NBI 47 additional 701 systems already completed, but no more; Olivetti would pay a $300 premium per unit on each of the 379 units purchased in 1980 ($113,700); NBI would make no additional software options available to Olivetti except records processing, stat/math, tailorable communications and a diablo wide track printer. The parties specifically agreed, at Olivetti’s request, that no public announcement would be made about these matters. Olivetti never made a public announcement of the NBI termination.

18. In October or November, 1980, Ames heard, through a potential customer, a rumor that Olivetti had breached the NBI Agreement and that the Agreement had been terminated. The customer, Mr. J. S. Epley of Charlotte, was considering the purchase of a 701 from Ames, and had heard about these matters. Mr. Epley was disturbed, because he liked Ames and the 701 but did not want to purchase a 701 unless he could be assured of continued service, and support, including hardware and software updates. He conveyed the information and his concern to Ames; and Mr. Jay Ozment, Ames’ salesman, telephoned Olivetti from Charlotte to check on the rumors.

19. Mr. Ozment first talked about the matter with Mr. Gallagher, at Olivetti, the former product manager for the 701. Mr. Gallagher told Mr. Ozment there was no truth to the rumor and that everything was fine between NBI and Olivetti. Mr. Gallagher again stated that the Agreement with NBI was for five years, and said Olivetti was merely negotiating with NBI over price and systems updates. He then referred Mr. Ozment to Mr. Geoffrey Kohart, the then-current Olivetti product manager for the 701. Mr. Kohart confirmed to Mr. Ozment that the rumors were false, and that Olivetti and NBI were merely negotiating over quantities to be shipped. Mr. Kohart agreed to write Mr. Epley a letter confirming these matters.

20. On or about November 26, 1980, Mr. Kohart, on behalf of Olivetti, wrote a letter to Mr. Epley in which he failed to acknowledge that the parties had agreed not to renew the NBI Agreement for 1981, and falsely stated that the Agreement provided for software disks, supplies and technical support for five years. Mr. Kohart wrote a similar letter to another dealer, in Minneapolis, in which he also falsely stated that the NBI Agreement provided for systems software updates for five years after its termination.

25. In the summer of 1981 Olivetti offered to sell Ames 10 of the 701’s on credit, at a substantially discounted price of $5,600.00 each. Ames asked Olivetti why it was selling the products at such a low price, and Olivetti falsely told Ames it was trying to reduce its inventory so it could purchase more 701’s from NBI pursuant to its contract with NBI. Olivetti never told Ames that the NBI Agreement had been breached by Olivetti or that it had been terminated by NBI. Based upon Olivetti’s misrepresentations, Ames purchased, on credit, 10 of the 701’s from Olivetti in the early fall of 1981, plus two Olivetti 351’s, a new word processing machine. Ames would not have purchased any of these machines if it had been told the truth by Olivetti. The total purchase price for the machines was $62,348. Ames signed notes or trade acceptances for the two 351’s in the amount of $6,348 on August 28, 1981 and for the ten 701’s in the amount of $56,000 on November 11, 1981.

(Document numbers and exhibit numbers omitted.)

In a non-jury trial, the trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence. Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E. 2d 784 (1970). Our task, therefore, is limited to determining whether there was competent evidence before the judge from which he could find that Olivetti made material misrepresentations to Ames and from which he could find that Ames reasonably relied on those misrepresentations.

The trial judge heard testimony from Perry and Ozment regarding statements made by Gallagher that the NBI agreement contained a five-year software support provision, that the agreement between NBI and Olivetti was not in trouble, and that Olivetti would continue to support the TES-701 for five years. Moreover, the court had before it the 26 November 1980 letter from Kohart to Epley and the testimony of Perry that he understood the letter to be an assurance that the NBI-Olivetti agreement was not about to be breached. Finally, there was the testimony of Perry that he was further reassured in 1981 by officers of Olivetti that the agreement was intact.

There was also evidence that the representations made to Ames regarding the NBI agreement were false. The NBI agreement did not contain a provision for five years of software support. Olivetti concedes that the letter from Kohart was “technically incorrect” in that it represented that the NBI agreement included such support. Moreover, at the time this letter was written, NBI and Olivetti were trying to arrange a termination agreement. There was evidence from Ozment and Perry that Olivetti later withheld information from Ames regarding the actual breach of the NBI agreement. In fact, Olivetti’s representations to Ames in 1981 came over a year after the NBI agreement had been breached. It appears, then, that there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Olivetti made misrepresentations to Ames regarding the nature and status of the agreement between Olivetti and NBI.

The trial court also found that the misrepresentations were material. Perry and Ozment testified to the significance of the agreement between NBI and Olivetti. Of paramount concern was the long-term support feature of the agreement. According to both witnesses, it was imperative that Ames be able to offer such support to potential customers in order to sell the Olivetti equipment. Moreover, Perry testified that he would not have bought more TES-701s if he had known of the true status of the NBI agreement. There was therefore evidence to support the judge’s finding that the misrepresentations about the NBI agreement were material. This finding was also supported by evidence of Olivetti’s attempts to keep the information about the breach secret. We hold, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s findings that Olivetti’s misrepresentations were material.

Olivetti argues, however, that even if there were material misrepresentations, Ames was not reasonable in relying upon them. Olivetti cites Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 97 S.E. 2d 881 (1957), for the proposition that Ames had a duty of diligence to look beyond assurances made to it.

Calloway concerned a land transaction. The plaintiff-buyer knew that there were water shortages in the area and was concerned that the well on the property might not provide enough water to supply the house. The defendant-seller said that there was “plenty of’ water in the well. The buyer did not turn on the water spigot until after the sale was closed. In holding that the plaintiff had not reasonably relied on the sellers’ representations, we said:

“ ‘It is generally held that one has no right to rely on representations as to the condition, quality or character of property, or its adaptability to certain uses, where the parties stand on an equal footing and have equal means of knowing the truth. The contrary is true, however, where the parties have not equal knowledge and he to whom the representation is made has no opportunity to examine the property or by fraud is prevented from making an examination.’ 12 R.C.L., 384 [23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 169 (1939) ]. When the parties deal at arms length and the purchaser has full opportunity to make inquiry but neglects to do so and the seller resorted to no artifice which was reasonably calculated to induce the purchaser to forego investigation action in deceit will not lie. Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N.C. 652; May v. Loomis, 140 N.C. 350; Frey v. Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 759; Tarault v. Seip, 158 N.C. 359, 23 A.J., 981.”

Calloway, 246 N.C. at 134, 97 S.E. 2d at 885-86 (quoting Harding v. Insurance Co., 218 N.C. 129, 134, 10 S.E. 2d 599, 602 (1940)).

Our decision, then, rested on three factors which are not present in the case at bar. First, in Calloway the plaintiff could have found out simply by turning on the faucet whether there was water in the house. We specifically held that the case would have been different if the buyer and seller had not had equal access to the information concerning presence or absence of adequate water for the house. Second, we noted that there was no allegation or proof by the plaintiff that the defendant had intended to deceive the plaintiff or even that the defendant was aware that there was insufficient available water. Third, Calloway rested on the established principle that representations about the quality or usability of real property are not ordinarily the subject of fraud. Under the unique facts of that case, we held that the plaintiff was under a duty to make the minimal inquiry needed to find out the truth.

Olivetti nonetheless relies on Calloway and argues that Ames should not have relied on the assurances of Gallagher and Kohart. Specifically, Olivetti contends that Perry should have made further inquiries of Kohart after reading the letter to Epley. Olivetti argues that Ames was put on notice, by rumors in the trade, that trouble was brewing between Olivetti and NBI and that Ames’ reliance upon Kohart’s letter was unreasonable as a matter of law. Moreover, Olivetti points to testimony of Rex Jones, an employee of Piedmont Business Equipment and previously Olivetti’s service manager. Jones testified that he and Ozment had discussed, in the summer of 1981, the rumored breach of the NBI agreement. Thus, according to Olivetti, Ames was not reasonable in relying on any contrary representations from Olivetti after the summer of 1981. We disagree.

Ordinarily, the question of whether an actor is reasonable in relying on the representations of another is a matter for the finder of fact. Whitaker v. Wood, 258 N.C. 524, 128 S.E. 2d 753 (1963). While there are some extreme circumstances in which conduct may be considered unreasonable as a matter of law, this is not such a case. Calloway, a case where the two parties had equal access to the truth and where there was no evidence of intentional misrepresentation, does not apply. There was competent evidence here that Ames did not have access to the nature of the NBI-Olivetti relationship except as fraudulently represented to it by Olivetti. Olivetti’s reliance upon some evidence that Ames was informed from other sources of the NBI-Olivetti breakup is misplaced. Such conflicts and contradictions in the evidence are for the trier of fact to resolve. Garrett v. Garrett, 229 N.C. 290, 49 S.E. 2d 643 (1948). In light of the evidence that Olivetti intentionally misled Ames for the purpose of inducing Ames to continue to deal with Olivetti and in light of the evidence that Olivetti intentionally withheld information regarding the breach of the NBI agreement, Olivetti will not now be heard to complain that Ames believed its false representations. We hold, therefore, that there was competent evidence from which the trial judge could find that Olivetti made material misrepresentations to Ames, upon which Ames reasonably relied.

Olivetti next argues that the trial court erred in finding that Ames was damaged by Olivetti’s misrepresentations. We agree and reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s award of damages.

The trial court found as facts that had it not been for Olivetti’s fraud, Ames could have become an NBI dealer; that if Ames had become an NBI dealer, Ozment would not have left Ames to join IPC; and that if Ozment had stayed with Ames, he would have made the same sales for Ames as he did for IPC. The court concluded that the proper measure of damages was the sales Ozment made for IPC during the three years after Ozment left Ames.² Olivetti argues that Ames should be precluded from recovering any damages for lost profits because Ames had not previously made any profits. Alternatively, Olivetti argues that even if Ames is not barred as a matter of law from showing lost future profit damages, it has not done so here with the reasonable certainty our law requires.

We first consider Olivetti’s argument that the “new business” rule should be applied to this case. This rule would preclude an award of damages for lost profits where the allegedly damaged party has no recent record of profitability. See Comment, Remedies — Lost Profits as Contract Damages for an Unestablished Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 693 (1978).³ Jurisdictions applying this rule seem to have decided, as a matter of law, that a showing of lost future profit damages by such a business will be too speculative. Moreover, the new business rule is founded in part on the contract law principle that only those damages within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting are recoverable. See E. Hightower, North Carolina Law of Damages § 2-8 (1981). Where the action is in tort rather than contract, the principle is stated somewhat differently, to the effect that the damages must be the natural and probable result of the tort-feasor’s misconduct. Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N.C. 154, 25 S.E. 2d 626 (1943). Olivetti argues that where a new business is involved, the parties would not contemplate lost profits as an element of either contract or tort damages.

Olivetti has directed our attention to several cases from other jurisdictions applying the new business rule. See, e.g., E.F.K. Collins Corp. v. S.M.M.G., Inc., 464 So. 2d 214 (Fla. App. 1985); Radlo of Georgia, Inc. v. Little, 129 Ga. App. 530, 199 S.E. 2d 835 (1973); Buddy’s Tastee #1, Inc. v. Tastee Donuts, Inc., 483 So. 2d 1321 (La. App.), writ denied, 486 So. 2d 738 (La. 1986); Kenford Co., Inc. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y. 2d 257, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 131 (1986); First Texas Savings Association of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W. 2d 179 (Tex. App. 1982). It appears, however, that this Court has never addressed the question of whether the new business rule is the law in North Carolina. Olivetti urges us to adopt this rule, arguing that it guards against windfall recoveries to aggrieved parties based upon speculative forecasts of hypothetical losses. Olivetti cites Lawrence v. Stroupe, 263 N.C. 618, 139 S.E. 2d 885 (1965), for the proposition that we have always viewed future damages claims with strict scrutiny and concludes that the new business rule is in keeping with our rejection of speculative damage awards and our close review of awards of future damages.

While we agree with Olivetti that lost future profits are difficult for a new business to calculate and prove, we are persuaded that there should be no per se rule against the award of such damages where they may be shown with the requisite degree of certainty. Accordingly, we hold, along with what appears to be a majority of jurisdictions reaching the issue, that the new business rule is not the law of our state.

It is a well-established principle of law that proof of damages must be made with reasonable certainty. Weyerhaeuser v. Supply Co., Inc., 292 N.C. 557, 234 S.E. 2d 605 (1977). Olivetti argues that Ames has not proven with reasonable certainty either that it lost the opportunity to become an NBI dealership or what, if any, profits it would have made as an NBI dealership. We agree.

In order for Ames to show that it was deprived of an opportunity to make profits, it must first show that there was in fact such an opportunity. The trial judge found as a fact that Ames, in reliance on Olivetti’s misrepresentations, passed up the opportunity to become an NBI dealer. We hold, however, that there was no competent evidence to support this finding. There was no evidence that NBI ever offered a dealership to Ames. On the contrary, the testimony from Downs, the NBI representative, was that no such offer was made. Although a firm offer is not a prerequisite for recovery under a lost opportunity theory, Rannbury-Kobee Corp. v. Miller Machine Co., Inc., 49 N.C. App. 413, 271 S.E. 2d 554 (1980), Downs also testified that Ames did not appear to qualify financially for such an undertaking. Perry, Ozment, and Harrison, all employees or former employees of Ames, testified that after the meeting with Downs, Ames decided not to pursue becoming an NBI dealership. While these witnesses were competent to testify to their own intentions, they were not competent to testify that NBI would ever have made a dealership offer to Ames. There was, therefore, no competent evidence before the judge to support his finding that Ames could have become an NBI dealership.

Ames’ proof was insufficient in another respect. Ames contends that it passed up the opportunity to become an NBI dealership in order to remain an Olivetti dealer. However, there was no evidence at trial that Ames could not have been both an NBI dealer and an Olivetti dealer. In fact, Ames did take on other lines of equipment while remaining a dealer for Olivetti. Moreover, Jay Ozment was able to sell both NBI and Olivetti equipment for IPC. Thus, even if Ames was defrauded into retaining the Olivetti line of equipment, it was not precluded from taking on the NBI line. We hold that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Ames could have become an NBI dealership in 1981 or that, if it could have become an NBI dealership, it was precluded from doing so by Olivetti. We hold, therefore, that Ames has failed to show with reasonable certainty that it lost an opportunity to make profits as an NBI dealer.

Even if Ames had shown that it could have become an NBI dealer, it has not shown with reasonable certainty that it would have made profits in that event. The trial court used as a measure of Ames’ lost profits the sales of Jay Ozment for IPC, the company that became the NBI dealership in North Carolina. The court concluded that Ozment would not have left Ames if Ames had become an NBI dealer and that Ozment would have made the same sales for Ames as he did for IPC.

The burden of proving damages is on the party seeking them. Brown v. Moore, 286 N.C. 664, 213 S.E. 2d 342 (1975). As part of its burden, the party seeking damages must show that the amount of damages is based upon a standard that will allow the finder of fact to calculate the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. Midgett v. Highway Commission, 265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E. 2d 121 (1965).

In finding of fact 27, the trial court recited:

27. If Ames had become an NBI dealer in late 1980 or early 1981, it is reasonable that Jay Ozment would not have left Ames and also David Harrison, and that Ames would have had the sales which Jay Ozment produced for IPC, and also the service business which Ames lost to IPC. Also, it is reasonable that Ames would have gotten the normal amount of service business from the additional sales.

We note first that while the trial judge denoted this as a finding of fact, we are not bound by this designation. Brown v. Board of Education, 269 N.C. 667, 153 S.E. 2d 335 (1967). It appears to us that this finding includes a mixed question of fact and law. While the amount of damages is ordinarily a question of fact, the proper standard with which to measure those damages is a question of law. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Supply Co., 292 N.C. 557, 234 S.E. 2d 605 (jury award of damages for breach of contract vacated because measure of damages incorrect). Such questions are, therefore, fully reviewable by this Court. Taylor v. Cone Mills, 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E. 2d 189 (1982).

We have previously held that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Ames would have become an NBI dealer had it not been for the misrepresentations of Olivetti. The trial court’s conclusion in finding 27 that Ozment would have made the same sales for Ames as he did for IPC was based upon the false premise that Ames did not become an NBI dealer because of Olivetti’s misconduct and is erroneous as a matter of law. Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was not precluded from using Ozment’s sales for IPC as a measure of Ames’ damages, there was insufficient evidence before the trial court to measure such damages with reasonable certainty. There is little evidence in the record on the question of whether Ozment would have made the same sales with Ames that he did with IPC. The evidence that is in the record suggests that IPC was able to market its products more widely and sell those products more cheaply than could Ames, regardless of any misconduct by Olivetti. Ames’ only evidence on this question was that Ozment used similar sales techniques for IPC that he had for Ames and, though later his sales territory was considerably larger, that for some time he sold only in the Charlotte area. The judge’s conclusion from this evidence that Ozment would have made any sales for Ames over the next three years, much less that he would have made more than $800,000 worth of sales, was manifestly unsupported and the result of speculation. We hold that the trial court erred in using Ozment’s sales as a proper measure of damages. Accordingly, the trial court’s award of damages to Ames must be vacated.

Olivetti next argues that the trial court erred in trebling the damage award pursuant to Chapter 75 of our General Statutes. Because we have held that Ames did not prove its damages with reasonable certainty, we need not address this question. Nor do we reach Ames’ contention that it is entitled to punitive damages if we were to determine that Chapter 75 does not apply to this case. Punitive damages may only be awarded where some compensatory damages have been shown with reasonable certainty. Oestreicher v. American National Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E. 2d 797 (1976).

The final issue raised by Olivetti concerns the amount due it from Ames from past purchases of equipment. Olivetti argues that the trial court improperly reduced its claim of $148,990.68. As evidence of Ames’ debt, Olivetti introduced certain trade acceptances signed by Ames. The trial court found that these trade acceptances were signed under protest and recalculated the actual amount owed Olivetti. He then ordered unsold Olivetti equipment to be returned by Ames and reduced the amount of the debt accordingly. We find no error in the judge’s determination of the amount owed Olivetti by Ames and therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in this regard.

In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that Olivetti made material misrepresentations to Ames, upon which Ames reasonably relied. However, Ames has not borne its burden of showing that it was damaged by these material misrepresentations. We conclude further that Ames is not entitled to punitive damages, as it has not shown any compensatory damage. We find no error in the trial court’s calculation of the amount due Olivetti by Ames. We need not reach the question of whether Chapter 75 applies to this transaction.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

1 . There was considerable testimony at trial regarding the significance of long-term software updates. It was Ames’ position, not disputed by Olivetti, that software updates are a critical feature in the salability of word processing equipment.

2 . The trial court also found that Ames was damaged by having, subsequent to the filing of this action, sold two TES-701s at a loss of $5,200. The proper measure of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation in the sales context is the difference between the goods as represented and their actual value at the time and place of acceptance. N.C.G.S. §§ 25-2-721, 25-2-714 (1986). Because Ames did not present the trial court with evidence of the difference in value between the TES-701s as represented and their actual value at the time of their acceptance, however, it appears that there was nothing before the court upon which to base its finding in this regard. We therefore vacate that part of the trial court’s finding that awards Ames $5,200 for lost past profits from the sale of two TES-701s.

3 . We note in passing that the term “new business” for the purposes of this doctrine is not restricted to those businesses that have recently been instituted, but rather applies to any business without a recent history of profitability. Thus Ames’ argument that the new business rule does not apply to it because it is not “new” need not be considered. Since the record is clear that Ames never had a profitable year, the new business rule would apply to Ames should this Court adopt that rule.