Oliver Complot and Corina Tolamaa v. Credit Control, LLC and LVNV Funding LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 23, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00255
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Oliver Complot and Corina Tolamaa, No. CV-25-00255-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Credit Control, LLC and LVNV Funding LLC, 13 Defendants. 14

15 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s order 16 granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 58). Also pending are Defendants LVNV 17 Funding, LLC’s and Credit Control, LLC’s Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second 18 Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docs. 60, 62). The Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion and 19 grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motions for the following reasons. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This Court’s prior order dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ state claims against all 22 Defendants and Plaintiffs’ individual claims against U.S. Bank. (Doc. 57 at 22.) The Court 23 only granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) 24 claims against LVNV and Credit Control. (Id.) Plaintiffs have since filed a Motion for 25 Reconsideration and their SAC. (Docs. 58, 59.) The remaining Defendants again move to 26 dismiss. (Docs. 60, 62.) 27 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A. Motion for Reconsideration 3 “The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order.” Motorola, Inc. v. 4 J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003). However, 5 “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored,” id., and “are appropriate only in rare 6 circumstances.” 333 W. Thomas Med. Bldg. Enters. v. Soetantyo, 976 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 7 (D. Ariz. 1995). Accordingly, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask 8 the court to rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Id. 9 (citation modified). Instead, these motions are only appropriate where the Court: “(1) is 10 presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision 11 was manifestly unjust”; (3) is presented with “an intervening change in controlling law”; 12 or (4) is otherwise presented with “other, highly unusual, circumstances warranting 13 reconsideration.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 14 (9th Cir. 1993). 15 B. Motion to Dismiss 16 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 17 the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the 18 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice 19 of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 20 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 21 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court 22 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 24 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 25 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 26 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 27 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 28 cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual 1 matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” 2 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal 3 “probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 4 unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 5 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’” 6 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 7 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations 8 are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins 9 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 10 factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 11 of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 12 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence 13 outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States 14 v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider 15 materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in 16 the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into 17 a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908. 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 A. Motion for Reconsideration 20 The Court first addresses Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiffs argue 21 the Court committed clear error by dismissing their Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) 22 claims against U.S. Bank, and finding their accord and satisfaction argument insufficient. 23 (Doc. 58 at 1.) The Court finds it did not err in either respect. The Court reviewed its 24 Order and finds that it did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show that U.S. 25 Banks’ reporting was patently incorrect or misleading in violation of the FCRA. 26 The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ accord and satisfaction arguments because Plaintiffs 27 failed to allege any facts in support of this contention. Plaintiffs disagree and aver the 28 Court overlooked specific allegations in their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). To 1 evidence this, Plaintiffs’ Motion presents two alleged quotes from paragraphs 75 and 76 of 2 their FAC (Doc. 8). These “quotes,” however, do not exist. The Court compares Plaintiffs’ 3 fabricated quotes with what actually appears in paragraphs 75 and 76 of the FAC. 4 Fabricated Quotes Attributed to ¶¶ 75, 76 Actual Quotes from ¶¶ 75, 76 5 75: “USB cashed the January 15, 2024 75: “Credit and Moore did this in 6 settlement check of $100, manifesting furtherance of their business as acceptance of the accord and satisfaction terms abusive debt collectors who disregard 7 under controlling Minnesota law. Under T.B.M. consumer protection laws.” (Doc. 8 8 Props., 346 N.W.2d 203 (Minn.), ‘if a creditor at 49.) receives a check that was sent on the condition 9 that it will be accepted as full payment, he or she 10 either must decline the offer and return the check or accept it pursuant to the condition expressed 11 on it.’” (Doc. 58 at 9–10.) 12 76: “On June 8, 2024, plaintiff sent USB a 76: “The negligence was reasonably second settlement offer stating: ‘Cashing foreseeable. The defendants failed at 13 constitutes full satisfaction of all alleged communicating that information 14 amounts for all alleged accounts associated with (FDCPA). It was relied upon to chart the undersigned’s name at your a course of action as a least 15 organization/enterprise. It is a waiver of all sophisticated consumer and was 16 previously alleged and purported justified in relying on material contracts/agreements/judgements/fees/costs/any representations. The representations 17 liability against any interested parties.’ 1” (Doc. caused confusion, despair, and 18 58 at 10.) willfully humiliated as alleged throughout.” (Doc. 8 at 50.) 19

20 This is ostensibly the result of generative AI. The Court takes great concern with 21 Plaintiffs’ unscrutinized use of AI to fabricate non-existent quotes to refute this Court’s 22 prior order. Such abuse is particularly egregious where Plaintiffs’ Motion included a 23 verification page, wherein both Plaintiffs signed: “All the facts herein are true, correct, 24 complete and admissible as evidence, and the claimant will testify as to their veracity. All 25 stated herein is true and affirm under oath and penalty of perjury all herein.” (Doc. 58 26 1 Parts of this alleged settlement language are found in a photograph exhibit embedded in 27 the FAC, which is apparently a letter mailed to Citi Bank—not U.S. Bank—on June 1, 2024—not June 8, 2024. Importantly, the FAC does not include a paragraph quoting this 28 language. Rather, the pertinent language was only found after zooming in on Plaintiffs’ exhibits. (Doc. 8 at 34.) 1 at 17.) 2 Plaintiffs’ Motion hinged, in part, on the authenticity of these quotes. The 3 specificity of the quotes gave the Court pause as to its prior Order. The Court then wasted 4 time evaluating and cross-comparing Plaintiffs’ chimeric argument. Additionally, 5 Plaintiffs’ Response brief to LVNV’s Motion to Dismiss, discussed below, attributes a 6 quotation to Baker v. Emmerson, 734 P.2d 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) that does not exist. 7 (Doc. 61 at 5.) Plaintiffs’ Motion and Response contain classic indicia of AI use: fabricated 8 quotes and rapid turnaround. Both filings are eighteen pages, yet the first was filed three 9 days after the Court issued its Order and the second was filed one day after LVNV filed its 10 Motion to Dismiss. See Finch v. Block Inc., No. CV-25-04247-PHX-JJT, 2026 WL 11 295167, at *15 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2026) (finding that a plaintiff’s “breakneck speed in which 12 she files briefs and other documents” indicates the use of artificial intelligence). Such 13 negligent use of AI places Plaintiffs’ credibility in question—to say nothing of their ironic, 14 disconcerting “verification” statement. 15 Future misuses of AI will warrant sanctions. See Moore v. City of Del City, No. 25- 16 6002, 2025 WL 3471341, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) (“[W]e warn future litigants, pro 17 se and those represented by counsel alike, that outright dismissal—without a merits 18 ruling—may be an appropriate sanction in a given case, as may monetary or other 19 sanctions, such as an award of the opposing party’s attorney fees incurred in responding to 20 fabricated case citations or clear misrepresentations of law spawned by the unscrutinized 21 use of GenAI.”). 22 Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. 23 B. Motions to Dismiss 24 The Court only granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their FDCPA claims against Credit 25 Control and LVNV. (Doc. 57 at 22.) The SAC, however, includes a negligence per se 26 claim, FCRA claim, and breach of contract claim. (Doc. 59 at 13–17.) The Court strikes 27 these counts for exceeding the scope of the granted leave to amend. J.P. ex rel. Sok-Hang 28 v. City of Stockton, No. 2:21-CV-00788 WBS AC, 2022 WL 1409648, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 1 May 4, 2022). Thus, the Court will only consider the SAC’s nine counts of FDCPA 2 violations. 3 Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims primarily rely on two contentions. First, that Defendants 4 incorrectly represented the existence of, and wrongfully attempted to collect on, a debt that 5 was legally extinguished through an accord and satisfaction. Second, that Defendants 6 continued to communicate with Plaintiffs despite their notice of refusal to pay. The Court 7 addresses each in turn. 8 1. Accord and Satisfaction 9 a. Applicable Law 10 “An accord and satisfaction discharges a contractual obligation or cause of action 11 when the parties agree to exchange something of value in resolution of a claim or demand 12 and then perform on that agreement, the accord being the agreement, and the satisfaction 13 its execution or performance.” Abbott v. Banner Health Network, 372 P.3d 933, 937 (Ariz. 14 2016) (citation modified). “The four elements of an accord and satisfaction are (1) proper 15 subject matter, (2) competent parties, (3) assent or meeting of the minds of the parties, and 16 (4) consideration.” Id. “The general rule is that acceptance and use of a remittance by 17 check which purports to be payment ‘in full,’ or which implies words of similar meaning, 18 or is accompanied by a letter to that effect, constitutes an accord and satisfaction of the 19 larger claim of the creditor, assuming the claim is unliquidated or disputed.” Baker, 734 20 P.2d at 104. Accordingly, a “payment of less than the amount owed cannot serve as 21 consideration for an accord and satisfaction if the amount of money owed is liquidated and 22 undisputed.” Leavitt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-09-214-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 23 1178708, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 1, 2009). 24 An amount is liquidated “if the evidence makes it possible to calculate the amount 25 with exactness, without reliance on opinion or discretion.” Canal Ins. Co. v. Pizer, 901 26 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). Because an accord and satisfaction “is in the nature 27 of a compromise,” there must be an underlying bona fide dispute or controversy to which 28 the parties are impliedly resolving. Flagel v. Sw. Clinical Physiatrists, P.C., 755 P.2d 1 1184, 1188 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). Without such, “[p]ayment of a less amount than is due 2 operates only as a discharge of the amount paid, leaving the balance still due, and the 3 creditor may sue therefor notwishstanding [sic] the agreement” because “there is no 4 consideration for the release, as the debtor is obligated to pay the whole debt, and the 5 creditor entitled to receive it.” Phillips v. Graham County, 149 P. 755, 757 (Ariz. 1915) 6 (citation modified). In other words, where the amount due is certain and there is no honest 7 dispute that the creditor is entitled to that debt, an accord and satisfaction is nugatory. See 8 Abott, 372 P.3d at 937 (“[T]he surrender of a claim which is known to be entirely without 9 foundation either in law or at equity does not afford a sufficient consideration for a 10 compromise.” (citation modified)). But see Brecht v. Hammons, 278 P. 381, 383 (Ariz. 11 1929), overruled in part on other grounds by, Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Union Gas Co., 12 265 P.2d 435 (Ariz. 1954) (“[I]t is sufficient to support a compromise that there be an 13 actual controversy between the parties of which the issue fairly may be considered by both 14 parties as doubtful, and that at the time of the compromise they in good faith so considered 15 it.”). 16 b. Relevant Facts 17 The SAC states that Plaintiff Oliver Complot acquired the original, pertinent debt 18 through a US Bank credit card. (Doc. 59 at 2.) Using this card, Oliver amassed a debt 19 from purchases such as: “Amazon ($413.49, $97.27, $84.68, $60.10, $5.42);” “Autozone 20 ($16.38 purchase and return)”; “Medical and healthcare expenses (BHS Rehabilitation 21 $100.00, Wellness/Equine $33.50)”; and “Personal court fees (Maricopa County 22 $262.96).” (Id.) Plaintiffs never contest the legitimacy and accuracy of these purchases. 23 Rather, the FDCPA claims against Defendants rely on an alleged accord and satisfaction 24 of this debt with US Bank, to which LVNV and Credit Control later sought collection on. 25 The SAC states: “Around January 2024, a bona fide dispute existed between 26 Plaintiff and US Bank regarding the account, including issues related to the Fair Credit 27 Billing Act and other matters.” (Id.) That same month, Oliver allegedly “sent US Bank a 28 check intended as payment in full satisfaction of the disputed debt in response to the bona 1 fide dispute. US Bank cashed the settlement check with full knowledge of the settlement 2 conditions.” (Id. at 3.) Then, in June 2024, “Plaintiff and US Bank executed a second 3 accord and satisfaction. US Bank again cashed a check intended for full settlement of any 4 remaining dispute. The second offer was due to US Bank fraudulently continuing 5 collection activities.” (Id.) 6 Around October 2024, US Bank then assigned the “already-settled debt” to LVNV2 7 for collection. (Id.) LVNV then sought to collect on this debt, to which Plaintiffs replied 8 that the debt “has already been paid” and they were unwilling to pay. (Id.) After an alleged 9 follow up email from LVNV, Plaintiffs sent an “offer of settlement” stating: This must be some sort of mistake as the above account was previously 10 settled before your alleged acquisition and might be a FDCPA violation. 11 Therefore, in the interest of settlement and closure I have attached this payment. After this payment I am unwilling to pay. This tender is for the 12 purported and alleged debts asserted due. Cashing constitutes satisfaction of 13 all alleged amounts for all alleged accounts associated with the undersigned’s name at your organization/enterprise. It is a waiver/cancellation of all 14 previously alleged and purported contracts / agreements / judgements / 15 reservations / fees / costs / any liability against any interested parties. This is to prevent costly litigation. 16 (Id. at 4.) LVNV then cashed the check and continued to attempt to collect on the 17 remaining balance. (Id.) 18 Around December 2024, Credit Control sent Plaintiff an initial communication 19 seeking collection on the same debt. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff then sent an identically worded 20 “offer of settlement” to Credit Control for $150, to which Credit Control cashed and 21 continued to seek to collect on the account. (Id.) 22 In sum, due to the original accord and satisfaction allegedly settling Plaintiffs’ debt, 23 and subsequent settlement offers, Plaintiffs maintain that LVNV and Credit Control 24 violated the FDCPA by representing and seeking to collect on any ongoing debt. 25 2 Plaintiffs state that this transfer identified “Resurgent Acquisitions” as the new owner of 26 the debt, but then they received an email from Resurgent stating LVNV was the current owner. So, Plaintiffs argue LVNV violated the FDCPA by misleading them as to who was 27 the true owner of their debt. (Doc. 59 at 3, 11.) LVNV includes the email from Resurgent, which clearly states that LVNV purchased the account on 10/28/2024, and that LVNV 28 “outsources the management of its portfolio of accounts” to Resurgent. (Doc. 60-1 at 2.) Thus, there is no false representation or deception that LVNV owned Plaintiffs’ account. 1 c. Analysis 2 Plaintiffs fail to plead a sufficient accord and satisfaction defense for the following 3 reasons. 4 First, Plaintiffs only conclusory allege consideration. Again, for there to be 5 consideration for an accord and satisfaction the amount of the claim must be unliquidated 6 (i.e., uncertain) and subject to a bona fide dispute. See Baker, 734 P.2d at 104. Plaintiffs 7 do not contend that the amount owed is unascertainable. In fact, they readily plead many 8 of the exact transitions at issue. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ credit card debt is liquidated because 9 it is “possible to calculate the amount with exactness, without reliance on opinion or 10 discretion.” Canal Ins. Co., 901 P.2d at 1194. As such, Plaintiffs must adequately plead 11 a bona fide dispute of the debt to support their accord and satisfaction contention. Plaintiffs 12 fail to do so. 13 Plaintiffs merely recite the elements of accord and satisfaction. They state: “Around 14 January 2024, a bona fide dispute existed between Plaintiff and US Bank regarding the 15 account, including issues related to the Fair Credit Billing Act and other matters” and 16 “Plaintiff sent US Bank a check intended as payment in full satisfaction of the disputed 17 debt in response to the bona fide dispute” to which US Bank cashed. (Doc. 59 at 2.) 18 Plaintiffs do not describe the bona fide dispute; they simply allege its existence and tie it 19 to vague issues related to the Fair Credit Billing Act. The Court cannot accept such 20 conclusory, threadbare recitals. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, the SAC never contests 21 that US Bank was entitled to the whole debt. Therefore, the Court cannot reasonably infer 22 the existence of an accord and satisfaction of the original debt because Plaintiffs fail to 23 plausibly allege a bona fide dispute of US Banks’ claim. Removal of this piece necessarily 24 causes the remaining accords and satisfactions to topple; each dispute that a debt is owed 25 because of the original settlement. Consequently, “[b]ecause Plaintiff[s] inadequately 26 plead[] a factual predicate essential to all of [their] claims, the claims must be dismissed.” 27 See Cohen v. Ainsworth Pet Nutrition, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-05289-MCS-AS, 2020 WL 28 7250329, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2020). 1 Based on the foregoing, the Court dismisses counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and 2 IX of the SAC because they are predicated on Plaintiffs’ accord and satisfaction theory. 3 The Court dismisses these counts without leave to amend because it seems amendment 4 would be futile. This is Plaintiffs second attempt to amend their Complaint, and yet they 5 have failed to cure these deficiencies despite the Court’s prior Order clearly noting that 6 their FAC “does not allege any facts in support of” their accord and satisfaction defense. 7 (Doc. 57 at 11); Nieuwejaar v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. C15-1663JLR, 2016 WL 8 1436123, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2016), aff’d, 700 F. App’x 723 (9th Cir. 2017) 9 (denying leave to amend because plaintiffs’ amendment failed to cure the “identified 10 deficiency, which indicates to the court that further amendment would be futile”). “Where 11 the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add 12 the requisite particularity to its claims, the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend 13 is particularly broad.” Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC, 54 F.4th 1130, 1143 (9th 14 Cir. 2022) (citation modified). 15 2. Failure to Cease Communication 16 The remaining count II alleges Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) of the 17 FDCPA because they continued to communicate with Oliver after receiving written notice 18 that he refused to pay the debt. (Doc. 59 at 8.) 19 Section 1692c(c) states: If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to 20 pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further 21 communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except-- 22 (1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector’s further efforts are being 23 terminated; (2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke 24 specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or 25 creditor; or (3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or 26 creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy. 27 Plaintiffs allege that Oliver emailed LVNV that he refused to pay the debt. (Doc. 28 59 at 3.) This is confirmed by the email LVNV attached to its Motion, wherein Oliver 1 stated: “I am unwilling to pay this.” (Doc. 60-1 at 2.) Thus, LVNV had clear written notice 2 that Oliver refused to pay the debt, and thus was required to cease communications with 3 him “with respect to such debt.” § 1692c(c). Plaintiffs allege, however, that “[d]espite 4 Plaintiff’s clear refusal to pay, [LVNV] emailed again, violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).” 5 (Doc. 59 at 4.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege the settlement offer sent to LVNV stated, in 6 part, “[a]fter this payment I am unwilling to pay.” (Id.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege 7 LVNV cashed the settlement payment and “sent another communication.” (Id.) 8 LVNV argues these allegations are too conclusory to withstand Rule 8’s pleading 9 standard. (Doc. 60 at 15.) The Court disagrees. Once LVNV received written notice of 10 Oliver’s refusal to pay, § 1692c(c) required LVNV to “not communicate further with the 11 consumer with respect to such debt.” The plain language of this statute evidences 12 § 1692c(c)’s sweeping prohibition: While Congress appears to have intended the [FDCPA] to eliminate abusive 13 collection practices, the language of § 1692c(c) is broader: it not only states 14 that a debt collector may not make a demand for payment following a cease-communication letter, but also prohibits communication of any kind 15 other than those falling within the three exceptions. 16 Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Put 17 simply, “communications ‘with respect to’ a debt plainly include . . . those 18 communications conveying anything regarding the debt at issue.” Barbara Walden-Curry 19 v. MediCredit Inc., No. 25-CV-60919, 2026 WL 778089, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2026), 20 report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-60919-CIV, 2026 WL 778086 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21 6, 2026) (rejecting the argument that a communication that is only informational does not 22 plausibly violate § 1692c(c)). The FDCPA’s definitions support this reading. 15 U.S.C. 23 § 1692a(2) defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt 24 directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” Here, Plaintiffs allege Oliver 25 received an “email” and “another communication” from LVNV after it received his refusal 26 to pay. The Court would have to speculate that these emails were blank to side with 27 LVNV’s contention that these allegations are too conclusory. But doing so would 28 contradict the long-standing admonition to construe pro se pleadings liberally. Estelle v. 1 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Accordingly, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that LVNV 2 communicated information to Oliver regarding his debt after receiving his written refusal 3 to pay in violation of § 1692c(c). 4 The same is true for Credit Control. Plaintiffs allege that the settlement offer to 5 Credit Control included a statement: “After this payment I am unwilling to pay.” (Doc. 59 6 at 5.) After receiving the settlement payment, Plaintiffs allege Credit control “sent another 7 communication.” (Id.) Credit Control confirms that this communication to Oliver was 8 with respect to his debt by attaching the email to its Motion. That email thanked Oliver for 9 his “payment in the amount of $150.00 that was received on 12/23/2024,” and provided 10 the account balance on his debt. (Doc. 62-1 at 1.) Although Credit Control’s argument 11 that this communication was not in connection with the collection of a debt misunderstands 12 § 1692c(c)’s broader prohibition, it is equally unavailing. The email inconspicuously 13 states: “This communication from a debt collector is an attempt to collect a debt. Any 14 information obtained will be used for that purpose.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs plausibly 15 allege that Credit Control communicated information to Oliver regarding his debt after 16 receiving his written refusal to pay in violation of § 1692c(c). 17 Irrespective of the foregoing, the Court dismisses any claims advanced by Corina 18 Tolamaa against Defendants that they violated § 1692c(c) because the SAC does not allege 19 any facts suggesting Defendant’s communications were directed to her. Thus, Corina lacks 20 standing to bring count II. Because this is her only remaining count, the Court dismisses 21 Corina from the case. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 Accordingly, 24 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ 25 Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 60; 62). The Court grants Defendants’ request to dismiss with 26 prejudice Counts I, and III–IX of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 59). The 27 Court denies Defendants’ request to dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Second Amended 28 Complaint (Doc. 59). 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED striking Counts X—XII of Plaintiff's Second || Amended Complaint (Doc. 59) for exceeding the scope of the Court’s prior grant of leave 3 || to amendment. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration 5|| (Doc. 58). 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff Corina Tolamaa from the case 7\| for lack of standing. 8 Dated this 23rd day of June, 2026. 9 = . 10 SO ts ll A lonorable Susan M. Brnovich United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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