OPINION
MATTHEWS, Chief Justice.
These appeals concern an investigative grand jury report which was subject to judicial review under Criminal Rule 6.1. The issue raised in O’Leary v. Superior Court, No. S-4105, is whether Criminal Rule 6.1 violates article I, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution. We answer that it does not.
The issue presented in In re Special Grand Jury, Nos. S-4131-34, 4159, is whether the superior court erred in ordering the entire report released. After oral argument in this case we ordered that only the “Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions” section of the report be immediately released. The names of the interested parties were deleted from that section. We have thus, implicitly, ruled that the superior court erred in ordering the entire report released. In this opinion we explain the reasons for our ruling. In addition, we order that much of the remainder of the report be released.
I. BACKGROUND
At the request of Alaska’s Attorney General, the grand jury for the third judicial district began an investigation into the conduct of the Anchorage School District, the Anchorage Police Department and the Anchorage District Attorney’s Office, relating to the investigation of a Bartlett High School teacher’s sexual relationships with students.
On March 5, 1990, the grand jury issued Part I of its report which identifies deficiencies in certain statutes and policies regarding the reporting and investigation of sexual misconduct with school children. It contains recommendations for statutory and policy changes. The grand jury also explained that it had prepared a second part of its report which addressed the actions of the school district, the police department and the district attorney’s office and of individuals employed by those organizations. Part II of the report was submitted to the superior court on March 15, 1990.
On March 19, 1990, the court issued an order finding that Part II meets the requirements of Criminal Rule 6.1(a)(1) and (2).1 The court also found the requirement of 6.1(b) that “the publication of the report will not improperly infringe upon the constitutional right of any person” was satisfied. However, it held that the procedures specified in 6.1(c) and (d) (judicial review if report adversely reflects on identifiable person) would be required since the report might reflect adversely on named or identifiable individuals.
In compliance with 6.1(c) and (d) the court identified individuals whose activities were discussed in Part II, and provided them with copies of the report. Under 6.1(c)(2) any person named or identifiable has an opportunity to request a hearing, and many of them did so. They are referred to collectively in this opinion as “interested parties.”
In the course of the 6.1 proceedings the court reconvened the grand jury in order to give it an opportunity to consider the written responses and testimony from certain interested parties.2 In response to this evidence the grand jury revised Part II of its original report and requested that it be [166]*166published. On August 7, 1990, the court issued a final order concluding that Part II of the report satisfied all requirements for release and ordered that it be published on August 21, 1990. The court also ordered, however, that publication would be stayed automatically if any interested party filed a notice of appeal before that time.3 The interested parties have appealed.
While the superior court was still conducting judicial review of Part II under Rule 6.1, appellant Kevin O’Leary, Chief of the Anchorage Police Department, filed an application for original relief in this court, claiming that Criminal Rule 6.1 was unconstitutional. The application was remanded to the superior court for decision. Two newspapers, the Anchorage Daily News and the Anchorage Times, intervened at the superior court level and made similar claims. The superior court structured the proceedings to maintain the confidentiality of Part II of the report. The grand jury and two prosecutors, Stephen Branchflower and Dwayne McConnell, also joined O’Leary in arguing that Criminal Rule 6.1 is unconstitutional. The interested parties opposed O’Leary’s application.
On August 1, 1990, the court issued an order ruling that “the applications of all parties to hold Criminal Rule 6.1 unconstitutional are denied.” From this order O’Leary has appealed. The newspapers, the prosecutors and the grand jury join in this appeal.
II. CRIMINAL RULE 6.1 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A.
Criminal Rule 6.1 provides a procedure for judicial review of grand jury reports before they are published. Under the rule, reports that may damage the reputation of a person are subject to review to determine whether (1) they concern the public safety and welfare, (2) they improperly infringe upon a constitutional right of any person, and (3) the factual findings they contain are supported by substantial evidence. In addition, interested parties may be afforded an opportunity to present evidence to the grand jury and to append an explanation to the report when it is published. The question presented is whether these procedures violate the anti-suspension clause of article I, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution. Article I, section 8 provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the armed forces in time of war or public danger. Indictment may be waived by the accused. In that case the prosecution shall be by information. The grand jury shall consist of at least twelve citizens, a majority of whom concurring may return an indictment. The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended.
The appellants’ arguments that Criminal Rule 6.1 violates the anti-suspension clause are generally conclusory in nature. O’Leary states that the anti-suspension clause “leaves no room for interpretation that results in any restraint or censorship on the grand jury investigatory and reporting functions”; that the grand jury is not a part of the judicial branch of government; and that it has “an unfettered power to investigate and make recommendations.” None of these conclusions are supported by case authority.
O’Leary’s contention that the grand jury is not a part of the judicial branch of government seems plainly wrong. Grand juries have traditionally been viewed as an arm of the court system.4 The proceedings of our Constitutional Convention demon[167]*167strate that the framers of the Alaska Constitution shared this understanding.5
O’Leary’s argument that the grand jury is not subject to “any restraint” and has “unfettered power” is also unsupported by authority. The argument, if correct, would mean that the grand jury could operate lawlessly, ignoring evidentiary privileges as well as the constitutional rights of those appearing before it. Such a position is supported by no case law of which we are aware. It is refuted by case law from the state of New York construing an analogous provision of the New York Constitution.
Seetion 6 of article I of the New York Constitution provides;
The power of grand juries to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of informations in connection with such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law.6 (Emphasis added.)
The New York courts have held nonetheless that the grand jury’s power to investigate is subject to various legal controls:
[Tjhose powers although extensive, are not unlimited. For example, [the grand [168]*168jury] may not violate a valid privilege, whether derived from the Constitution, statutes or the common law. Additionally, its powers to compel testimony and the production of evidence must “be exercised in accordance with the procedural and evidentiary rules laid down in the Criminal Procedural Law and other statutes.”
Stern v. Morgenthau, 62 N.Y.2d 331, 476 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812, 465 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1984) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Beach v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765, 465 N.E.2d 304 (1984) (grand jury may not subpoena TV reporter to obtain testimony as to reporter’s source because of statutory “shield law”).
In Beach, the New York Court of Appeals expressed and rejected an argument as broad as O’Leary’s concerning New York’s analogous constitutional provision:
[UJnder respondent’s argument, all statutory restrictions on a grand jury’s ability to investigate public officers would be invalid. Thus, the spousal, attorney-client, physician-patient, clergy, psychologist, and social worker privileges would all be ineffective. Similarly, a grand jury investigating corruption would be able to give complete immunity to private citizens who have engaged in bribery or extortion, regardless of a prosecutor’s desire to obtain waivers. Finally, to the extent that the normal rules of evidence are applicable to grand juries, a question might be raised as to their force when they operate to “impair” an investigation of a public officer.
Beach, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 772, 465 N.E.2d at 311 (footnote and citations omitted). The court noted that the New York Constitutional Convention was prompted to adopt its anti-suspension clause because “at a special session of the [Pennsylvania] Legislature a statute was adopted suspending the grand jury investigation into a public official, and depriving the grand jury of the power to act in the matter.” Beach, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771, 465 N.E.2d at 310.7 The New York court held that the objective of the anti-suspension clause was to prevent legislation which deprived the grand jury of authority to act.
Implied in the majority’s opinion in Beach and expressed in the concurring opinion of Judge Wachtler is the conclusion that had the reporter’s privilege been found to have been of constitutional magnitude under the state constitution the privilege would have even more clearly been entitled to recognition notwithstanding the anti-suspension clause.
New York’s anti-suspension language also does not prevent a court from editing an indictment if the goal is the protection of a constitutional right. In People v. Cirillo, 100 Misc.2d 527, 419 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1979), the defendant was charged in an indictment with three counts of perjury. He moved to amend the indictment seeking to strike the phrases “a narcotics violator” and “the narcotics violator” replacing each with his name. He asserted that the phrases were highly prejudicial and inflammatory and that their use in the indictment which was to be read to the petit jury “was in effect a flag that the said defendant was a criminal before even one scintilla of evidence was presented to the jury.” While recognizing that it had no statutory authority to amend an indictment on a defendant’s motion, the court, nonetheless, ruled that it inherently has this power.
The courts have exercised their power to set aside and quash indictments even in the absence of legislative grant when it appears to be founded upon a lack of evidence or involving illegal and incompetent testimony. This power is based upon the inherent right and duty of the courts to protect the citizen in those circumstances involving a substantial invasion of his constitutional rights.
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Every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the ad[169]*169ministration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.
Id., 419 N.Y.S.2d at 823-24 (citations omitted). Although the court did not specifically discuss the New York Constitution’s non-suspension language, it did state,
[TJhere is no law, constitutional or otherwise, proscribing the power of the court on its own motion to permit the defendant’s application, nor any interdiction against the striking of a portion of the indictment.
Id., 419 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
B.
Criminal Rule 6.1 is intended to guard against violations of the Alaska Constitution by a grand jury. Review to determine whether a report concerns the public safety or welfare8 recognizes that grand jury reports are limited by article I section 8 to “recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety.” The review under subsection (b)(2) to determine whether publication would improperly infringe on the constitutional right of any person is explicitly constitutionally based.
Reputation interests are entitled to a measure of protection under the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and of the Alaska Constitution.9 In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37, 91 S.Ct. 507, 509-10, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), the Supreme Court wrote:
[S]ome state and federal administrative procedures are summary by reason of necessity or history. Yet certainly where the State attaches “a badge of infamy” to the citizen, due process comes into play....
Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.
Similar statements have been made in the grand jury context: “The courts have recognized [that injury to one’s good name and reputation and impairment of one’s ability to obtain employment] are substantial and legally cognizable interests entitled to constitutional protection against official governmental action that debases them.” United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 797 (5th Cir.1975). In Briggs the issue was whether individuals named by the grand jury as co-conspirators who were not indicted suffered any injury protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The government had argued that “one’s interests are not adversely affected to any extent by being publicly branded as a felon so long as he is not named as a defendant,” and “if appellants have suffered injury it is at the hands of only the news media to whom they should repair for relief.” Id. at 799. The court rejected these arguments and held that the grand jury’s actions violated the fourteenth amendment. See also United States v. Chadwick, 556 F.2d 450, 450 (9th Cir.1977) (per curiam) (“charging appellant with the offense without making him a defendant was beyond the authority of the grand jury and a denial of due process”); Application of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 111 F.Supp. 858, 867 (S.D.N.Y.1953) (“[A] man should not be subject to a quasi-official accusation of misconduct which he cannot answer in an authoritative forum. The Grand Jury ... when it issues such reports, is imposing the punishment of public reprimand_”).
We have held that review of the eviden-tiary basis for government action is an essential part of due process.
The review of factual determinations becomes a review to find whether the administrative decision has passed beyond the lowest limit of the permitted zone of reasonableness to become capricious, arbitrary or confiscatory.
K & L Distribs. v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351, 358 (Alaska 1971).
[170]*170Although we suggested in K & L Distribs. that this was a lower standard of review than the substantial evidence standard, the difference, if any, seems more theoretical than real. Substantial evidence is evidence that, in light of the whole record, a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion at issue. Burgess Construction Co. v. Smallwood, 698 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Alaska 1985). Thus, evidence which passes the K & L Distribs. test, that which is above the “lowest limit of the permitted zone of reasonableness,” would seem to also pass the substantial evidence test.
Moreover, the language of the sentence containing the anti-suspension clause implies that there must be an evidentiary basis for the grand jury’s recommendations.
The section links the grand jury’s investigating and reporting powers. It does not empower the grand jury to make recommendations in the abstract or based upon speculation. The grand jury must base its recommendation upon the results of its investigation. If the investigation does not disclose evidence sufficient to support the conclusions and recommendations, the court should not publish the report.
Note, The Reportorial Power of the Alaska Grand Jury, 3 Alaska L.Rev. 295, 325-26 (1986).
Thus the requirement of Criminal Rule 6.1 that recommendations be based on substantial evidence elicited in the course of the grand jury’s investigation is based both on due process considerations and on the connection between the investigation and the recommendation made in article I, section 8 of our constitution.
C.
In our view, the anti-suspension clause does not prohibit reasonable procedural rules governing the issuance of grand jury reports.10 In 1955 and 1956 when the framers of the Alaska Constitution met, the power of grand juries to issue reports independent of indictments was a subject which was vigorously debated nationally.11 The majority view was that such reports were not permissible.12 The framers of the Alaska Constitution desired to unambiguously place Alaska among those states which recognized the grand jury’s power to recommend without indicting and to prevent this power from being abrogated. This is the manifest purpose of the anti-suspension clause.13 There is, however, nothing in the convention debates which suggests that the delegates intended the grand jury to operate in a legal vacuum when exercising its power to investigate and recommend.
Grand juries are an arm of the court system. As such, their operations are governed by the rules of administration, practice and procedure which the supreme court is constitutionally empowered to promulgate under article IV, section 15 of the Alaska Constitution.14 See Criminal Rule 6 (governing convening and discharge of grand juries and proceedings before grand juries). In 1988 we promulgated Criminal Rule 6.1 following recommendations by the judicial council and the standing committee on criminal rules. In mak[171]*171ing its recommendation, the council published a comprehensive and scholarly report, The Investigative Grand Jury in Alaska (1987), which reviewed the history of the grand jury and its investigative and reporting powers. The council study was requested by the Alaska State Senate in 1985.15 The council concluded that procedures like those contained in Criminal Rule 6.1 were needed to achieve a proper balance between the values inherent in the grand jury’s investigative and recommending function on the one hand and the constitutional rights of individuals on the other. The council concluded:
While safeguards are needed, the grand jury, as a citizens’ body, serves a valuable function in its investigative role. A proper balance between the grand jury’s reporting power and other constitutionally-protected rights of individuals can be achieved through the development of procedures that provide: (a) due process protections for individuals named or referred to in reports; (b) judicial review; and (c) guidelines for the publication and dissemination of reports.16
The council also stated:
Basic fairness and constitutional due process require that persons identified in grand jury reports be provided with certain protections not currently specified by Alaska law....
If the report reflects adversely on a person who is named in the report or whose identity can be determined in the report: [the council recommends] (1) that the report be supported by substantial evidence, (2) that it be related to the public welfare or safety, and (3) that it not infringe upon any protected rights or liberties of that person.
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No guidelines, statutes or case law presently exist in Alaska to provide standards for judicial review of grand jury reports. Other than the constitutional requirement that the report address some aspect of “the public welfare or safety”, judges have no additional guidance in reviewing the subject matter of reports or the circumstances under which a report should be issued.17
In promulgating Criminal Rule 6.1, we agreed with the council’s conclusion that rules governing the exercise of the grand jury’s investigative and reporting function were necessary in order to ensure fundamental fairness to those whose reputations might unjustifiably be injured by a grand jury report and to ensure that such reports are issued in compliance with constitutional requirements. In reaching this conclusion, we are by no means alone. All the commentators of whom we are aware who speak to the subject express the view that procedural limitations are desirable, or es[172]*172sential, to protect personal reputational interests.18 Moreover, the United States Congress,19 many of the state legislatures and state courts,20 federal courts, and the American Bar Association21 have expressed concern that individuals will be harmed if grand juries exercise unfettered reporting power.
The framers of our constitution were acutely concerned with the need to protect the rights of citizens. This need was the chief reason cited by the primary sponsor of the grand jury reporting power to support the need for the power.22 In the context of legislative and executive investigations, the delegates were sufficiently concerned about the possibility of damage to the reputation of individuals that special language was attached to the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution which guarantees to all persons “fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations.”23
The delegates hoped to avoid the excesses which they felt were characterized by the conduct of Senator Joseph McCarthy: “[H]e indulged in vilification, character assassination, and an intimation of guilt by association.”24 The delegates hoped that this clause would prompt the legislature to make rules of procedure to safeguard the reputational interest of individuals.25 The judiciary was excepted from this clause, but not because the delegates wanted the courts to have the power to treat individuals unfairly. Instead, the delegates believed that the concept of due process itself directly constrained the judiciary while it less clearly applied to legislative and executive investigations.26
It is not reasonably possible to believe that our constitutional framers who were so protective of personal reputational interests that they desired the legislature to make rules affording due process to those involved in legislative investigations also intended grand jury investigations to be free from due process constraints. In fact, as noted, the delegates believed that the due process clause already provided the same protection in the context of the judiciary, although grand juries were not specifically mentioned in this discussion.
Indictments issued by grand juries have traditionally been subject to various forms of judicial review. The anti-suspension language of our constitution was imported without discussion from the Missouri Constitution, which in turn is based on the New York Constitution.27 In those states the clause is, however, solely applicable to investigations resulting in indictments. Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 212 [173]*173N.Y.S.2d 33, 173 N.E.2d 21 (1961); Matter of Interim Report of the Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d 479 (Mo.1977). We are aware of no cases construing the anti-suspension clauses of the constitutions of either Missouri or New York which suggest that judicial review of an indictment amounts to a suspension of the grand jury’s power.28 Since the framers of the Alaska Constitution used language which did not bar judicial review in the context from which it was taken, it reasonably can be concluded that there was no intention to bar judicial review in the new context in which the phrase was used.
The courts of the state of Alaska have the constitutional duty to review actions by agencies of the state in order to ensure compliance with all provisions of the Alaska Constitution. Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d 351, 356 (Alaska 1982); K & L Distribs. v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351, 357-58 (Alaska 1971). This function applies not only to coordinate branches of government such as the legislature, Malone, supra, and the executive branch, K & L Distribs., supra, but to component parts of the judiciary such as lower courts, and the grand jury.29 It would be a radical deviation from this consistent line of authority to conclude that the anti-suspension clause means that this power does not exist with respect to grand jury reports. This would mean that only the grand jury can judge whether it has complied with the limitations imposed on its action by the constitution and whether it has violated the constitutionally protected rights of others. We see nothing in the language of the anti-suspension clause, in the debates of the Constitutional Convention, or in the relevant legal history which lends even slight credence to this view.
Appellants also alleged that Criminal Rule 6.1 violates the first amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section V of the Alaska Constitution, is an improper exercise of the court’s rule-making power, is contrary to the state’s public records acts, AS 09.25.100-.125, and serves to unconstitutionally expand the superior court’s jurisdiction. Upon consideration we find that all of these allegations lack merit. See Hammond v. Brown, 323 F.Supp. 326, 350 (N.D.Ohio 1971), aff'd 450 F.2d 480, 482 (6th Cir.1971) (per curiam); McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1162, 245 Cal.Rptr. 774, 786-88, 751 P.2d 1329, 1341-42 (1988) (en banc); People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 13 Cal.3d 430, 119 Cal.Rptr. 193, 200, 531 P.2d 761, 768 (1975).
III. RELEASE OF PORTIONS OF PART II OF THE GRAND JURY REPORT
As previously indicated, at the conclusion of oral argument this court ordered that all of Part II of the Grand Jury Report entitled “Findings and Recommendations and Conclusions" (hereafter Recommendations) be immediately released, deleting only the names of interested parties. We noted that the question whether more of the Grand Jury Report would be released remained under advisement and that an opinion would follow. We now explain our reasons for ordering the immediate release of the Recommendations.
First, because article I, section 8 explicitly grants authority to grand juries “to make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety” it is our view that the Recommendations are constitutionally authorized. The background text consisting of some 70 pages detailing the dispute [174]*174between the Anchorage School District, the Anchorage Police Department and the Anchorage District Attorney’s office does not stand on the same constitutional footing. We believe that such background material is implicitly covered by article I, section 8 only to the extent that it is necessary to make the grand jury’s Recommendations understandable. We find that the Recommendations are understandable without the background text, given Part I of the Grand Jury Report which has been previously published, and public information which has been widely disseminated concerning the underlying dispute. Thus there is no constitutional compulsion to release the background text.
Second, we ordered release of the Recommendations on the same day we heard oral argument. This was some two weeks before a municipal election in which the office of mayor and certain municipal assembly and school board seats were being contested. Because the grand jury Recommendations were generally critical of school district actions, while finding that the police and the district attorney’s office had acted appropriately, we believed that the Recommendations should be immediately released as they might have a bearing on the election. The Recommendations mentioned the names of certain interested parties who had argued that the report would adversely reflect on them. We ordered their names deleted as they were not essential to understanding the Recommendations.30 We did not order the interested parties’ names deleted because we necessarily agreed with their contentions that the report adversely reflected on them or was unsupported by substantial evidence.
We are now persuaded that the names of most of the interested parties mentioned in the Recommendations should be released. In the main, the Recommendations do not adversely reflect upon them in any serious or substantial way. Further, except as noted below, the grand jury’s characterization of the interested parties’ conduct meets the substantial evidence standard under Criminal Rule 6.1(c)(5).
Despite ordering the release of most of the names mentioned in the grand jury’s Recommendations, we note that grand jury procedures are not well designed to provide balanced fact finding.. Although the grand jury consists of unbiased citizens, the only attorney to appear before the grand jury is the prosecutor.31 The prosecutor generally decides what evidence will be presented to the grand jury and those under investigation have no notice or opportunity to be heard, no ability to call witnesses on their own behalf, no right to cross-examine witnesses, and no right to present their arguments. While under Criminal Rule 6.1 the trial judge may order the grand jury to consider evidence on behalf of an interested party, this order is made only after the grand jury has already at least tentatively committed itself to a report adversely reflecting on the party. Thus, it should be widely understood that grand jury reports may be extremely one-sided. They should not be given the same degree of credence as a trial court judgment.
In one respect the Recommendations reflect adversely on individuals in a manner unsupported by substantial evidence. Since the Recommendations have already been released, the only meaningful remedy at this point is to continue to withhold the names of the interested parties whose reputations would otherwise unjustly be damaged.
In four paragraphs beginning with sub-paragraph (b) on page 75 of the Recommendations, the grand jury states that school officials violated an “ethical if not a legal obligation ...” concluding that school officials report of their investigation to the state “could be interpreted as an attempt to gain statutory immunity ... ‘just in case’ a report was legally required.” Use of the term statutory immunity here is an [175]*175obvious misnomer. Statutory immunity is immunity from prosecution for a particular crime which is granted to a person so that he may be compelled to testify against another in a prosecution for the same or a related crime.32 An effort to obtain statutory immunity may imply that the person making the effort committed a crime. There is absolutely no evidence that any school officials involved in this case ever mentioned, or sought, statutory immunity. Thus, this aspect of the Recommendations does not satisfy the substantial evidence test.33
We turn now to the question whether any portion of the background text preceding the Recommendations should be released. Although release of this text is not constitutionally required, it is part of the Grand Jury Report and should be released under Criminal Rule 6.1 unless the provisions of that rule require that some or all of it remain confidential.
Most of the first 70 pages of Part II of the report relate the history of the investigation of the Bartlett High School teacher’s sexual relationships with high school students. We have reviewed this material and believe that it does not adversely reflect on the interested parties — as distinct from the Bartlett High School teacher — in any serious or substantial way. Moreover, the grand jury’s description of the interested parties’ conduct suggests that the substantial evidence standard of Criminal Rule 6.1(c)(5) would be satisfied in any ease.
However, there is an exception to this conclusion. The grand jury details information which had previously remained confidential concerning an investigation of allegations of sexual misconduct on the part of two other teachers. The names of these teachers are not mentioned but they are identifiable given other information in the report, and they are interested parties herein. These allegations were resolved in favor of the teachers and none of the parties before this court now claim that the allegations had merit. Nonetheless, the allegations are contained in the grand jury report “in order for the grand jury to fully understand the motives and actions of individuals involved in the [present controversy].”
While it may have been useful for the grand jury to review the prior investigation, no similar purpose is served by publication of its details. The grand jury’s discussion of the allegations against the teachers adds little or nothing to the comprehensibility of the Recommendations. Publication of the discussion would gravely harm the reputations of the teachers. We therefore order expunged from the Grand Jury Report all mention of this investigation for two reasons. First, the allegations against the teachers were unsubstantiated and thus were unsupported by substantial evidence. Second, publication of the allegations would improperly infringe the constitutionally protected reputational interests of the teachers. There is no countervailing constitutional end to be served by publication of the allegations since they are not necessary to an understanding of the Recommendations made by the grand jury.34
[176]*176For the above reasons, we order released Part II of the Grand Jury Report of March 15, 1990, with deletions as noted above.35 We also order that the final written responses of those interested parties who are still mentioned in the expunged report and who have preserved their right to file such responses be attached as an appendix.36
COMPTON, J., with whom BURKE, J., joins, dissenting.
RABINOWITZ, J., dissenting in part.