[122]*122OPINION
By the Court,
Manoukian, J.:
In July, 1974, the Washoe County Grand Jury commenced an investigation which focused upon a matter commonly referred to as the Conforte Land Transaction wherein northern Nevada brothel owner and appellant herein, Joseph Conforte, had purchased for development several hundred acres of ranch [123]*123land located in the City of Sparks. Conforte subsequently sold a portion of the property to the Washoe County Convention Authority for use as a golf course. Development of the golf course at county expense greatly enhanced the value of the property retained by appellant.
The scope of the investigation expanded measurably, ultimately involving members of both the then Reno and Sparks City Councils, Washoe County Commission, Washoe Convention Authority and various former public officials.
The grand jury publicly disseminated its report March 15, 1976 prior to review by the District Court. Among other things and in detail, it related that Conforte had established “substantial contacts” with a number of the public officials who were directly involved in the land transaction and other matters related thereto; that he contributed financially to their political campaigns and/or extended to them other “favors or gratuities;” that the courtesies had been extended to four of the five members of the Convention Authority who were concurrently members of the Reno and Sparks City Councils, and the Washoe County Commission, the governmental entities responsible for a substantial majority of all decisions affecting the public’s welfare in Washoe County.
The report further disclosed a 1962 felony-extortion conviction and 1963 federal felony-income tax evasion conviction from appellant’s criminal history; related his apparent affiliation with a number of ex-felons; referred to his ownership of the “Mustang” brothel in Storey County, and its effects on the inhabitants of adjoining Washoe County; mentioned that establishment’s claimed deleterious health effects on Washoe County; and even made reference to an alleged attempt by appellant to “establish close contacts with public officials in Libby, Montana” with an apparent intent on his part of “expanding business operations into that area.”
No presentments or indictments accompanied the report, and in our view, none was legally returnable, a conclusion expressly mentioned by the grand jury, in which we concur.
Appellant took exception to the report, contending that he was prominently and specifically identified in portions of it. Consequently, he petitioned the district court to expunge not only those portions referring to him, but the entire report, including portions referring to other individuals. We note that appellant lacks standing respecting the latter challenge.
The trial court expunged only a segment of the report which referred to Conforte’s refusal to testify before the grand jury [124]*124and his assertion of his Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege. Appellant, requesting further expungment, has appealed.
Appellant contends that the report accuses him of the crime of bribery.1 Appellant raises other issues for our consideration; however, we perceive only one of them as meriting discussion, namely, whether a district court must review a grand jury report prior to its release. A related issue requires us to inquire into the scope and extent of a grand jury’s reportorial authority. These issues are of considerable importance to the State’s grand jury reportorial process. We turn now to consider them.
In Nevada, unlike many other jurisdictions, the grand jury has investigatory authority over diversified local governmental agencies and activities. NRS 172.175; Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 P. 706 (1918). Specific legislative authorization for grand jury reports in Nevada was first enacted in 1943.2 Today, the pertinent statute is NRS 172.175 which in relevant part provides:
2. The grand jury may inquire into and report on any and all matters affecting the morals, health and general welfare of the inhabitants of the county, or any administrative division thereof, or of any township, incorporated city, irrigation district or town therein. [Emphasis added.]
The authority of a grand jury to investigate matters pertaining to the public welfare, morals, or safety of the community is restrained only by NRS 172.175(3), which provides:
3. No report issued pursuant to this section shall single out any person or persons which directly or by innuendo, imputation, or otherwise accuses such person or persons [125]*125of a wrongdoing which if true would constitute an indictable offense unless the report is accompanied by a presentment or indictment of such person or persons. At the time any grand jury is impaneled, the provisions of this subsection shall be included in the charge to such grand jury.
Respondent argues that there is no compelling justification to judicially restrain the efforts of the grand jury where the legislature has intentionally or inadvertently refrained. Compare Wood v. Hughes, 173 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1961); but see Re Investigation of South Mall Financing, 330 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. 1972), cf. People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 531 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1975). We disagree.
While the return of either a presentment or indictment is expressly required by statute to be made to the district court (NRS 172.115, 172.125), there is no such express mandate regarding a report on matters affecting the morals, health, and general welfare of the community. However, according to NRS 172.175(3), if this report in effect accuses an individual of an indictable offense, the report must be accompanied by an indictment or presentment, both of which must be filed with the court.
While it would appear quite obvious that a report pursuant to NRS 172.175 will be filed with the court as a matter of routine, the significance is the silence of the statute with respect to reports but not to presentments or indictments. This significance is magnified when the court is asked to impose a requirement of pre-release review.
It is, of course, our prerogative to interpret NRS 172.175 as allowing the district court the power to refuse to file reports which exceed the grand jury’s authority. See People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, supra.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[122]*122OPINION
By the Court,
Manoukian, J.:
In July, 1974, the Washoe County Grand Jury commenced an investigation which focused upon a matter commonly referred to as the Conforte Land Transaction wherein northern Nevada brothel owner and appellant herein, Joseph Conforte, had purchased for development several hundred acres of ranch [123]*123land located in the City of Sparks. Conforte subsequently sold a portion of the property to the Washoe County Convention Authority for use as a golf course. Development of the golf course at county expense greatly enhanced the value of the property retained by appellant.
The scope of the investigation expanded measurably, ultimately involving members of both the then Reno and Sparks City Councils, Washoe County Commission, Washoe Convention Authority and various former public officials.
The grand jury publicly disseminated its report March 15, 1976 prior to review by the District Court. Among other things and in detail, it related that Conforte had established “substantial contacts” with a number of the public officials who were directly involved in the land transaction and other matters related thereto; that he contributed financially to their political campaigns and/or extended to them other “favors or gratuities;” that the courtesies had been extended to four of the five members of the Convention Authority who were concurrently members of the Reno and Sparks City Councils, and the Washoe County Commission, the governmental entities responsible for a substantial majority of all decisions affecting the public’s welfare in Washoe County.
The report further disclosed a 1962 felony-extortion conviction and 1963 federal felony-income tax evasion conviction from appellant’s criminal history; related his apparent affiliation with a number of ex-felons; referred to his ownership of the “Mustang” brothel in Storey County, and its effects on the inhabitants of adjoining Washoe County; mentioned that establishment’s claimed deleterious health effects on Washoe County; and even made reference to an alleged attempt by appellant to “establish close contacts with public officials in Libby, Montana” with an apparent intent on his part of “expanding business operations into that area.”
No presentments or indictments accompanied the report, and in our view, none was legally returnable, a conclusion expressly mentioned by the grand jury, in which we concur.
Appellant took exception to the report, contending that he was prominently and specifically identified in portions of it. Consequently, he petitioned the district court to expunge not only those portions referring to him, but the entire report, including portions referring to other individuals. We note that appellant lacks standing respecting the latter challenge.
The trial court expunged only a segment of the report which referred to Conforte’s refusal to testify before the grand jury [124]*124and his assertion of his Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege. Appellant, requesting further expungment, has appealed.
Appellant contends that the report accuses him of the crime of bribery.1 Appellant raises other issues for our consideration; however, we perceive only one of them as meriting discussion, namely, whether a district court must review a grand jury report prior to its release. A related issue requires us to inquire into the scope and extent of a grand jury’s reportorial authority. These issues are of considerable importance to the State’s grand jury reportorial process. We turn now to consider them.
In Nevada, unlike many other jurisdictions, the grand jury has investigatory authority over diversified local governmental agencies and activities. NRS 172.175; Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 P. 706 (1918). Specific legislative authorization for grand jury reports in Nevada was first enacted in 1943.2 Today, the pertinent statute is NRS 172.175 which in relevant part provides:
2. The grand jury may inquire into and report on any and all matters affecting the morals, health and general welfare of the inhabitants of the county, or any administrative division thereof, or of any township, incorporated city, irrigation district or town therein. [Emphasis added.]
The authority of a grand jury to investigate matters pertaining to the public welfare, morals, or safety of the community is restrained only by NRS 172.175(3), which provides:
3. No report issued pursuant to this section shall single out any person or persons which directly or by innuendo, imputation, or otherwise accuses such person or persons [125]*125of a wrongdoing which if true would constitute an indictable offense unless the report is accompanied by a presentment or indictment of such person or persons. At the time any grand jury is impaneled, the provisions of this subsection shall be included in the charge to such grand jury.
Respondent argues that there is no compelling justification to judicially restrain the efforts of the grand jury where the legislature has intentionally or inadvertently refrained. Compare Wood v. Hughes, 173 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1961); but see Re Investigation of South Mall Financing, 330 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. 1972), cf. People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 531 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1975). We disagree.
While the return of either a presentment or indictment is expressly required by statute to be made to the district court (NRS 172.115, 172.125), there is no such express mandate regarding a report on matters affecting the morals, health, and general welfare of the community. However, according to NRS 172.175(3), if this report in effect accuses an individual of an indictable offense, the report must be accompanied by an indictment or presentment, both of which must be filed with the court.
While it would appear quite obvious that a report pursuant to NRS 172.175 will be filed with the court as a matter of routine, the significance is the silence of the statute with respect to reports but not to presentments or indictments. This significance is magnified when the court is asked to impose a requirement of pre-release review.
It is, of course, our prerogative to interpret NRS 172.175 as allowing the district court the power to refuse to file reports which exceed the grand jury’s authority. See People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, supra. There, the district attorney sought a writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from reviewing the grand jury report prior to filing.
In a sharply split decision, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court had the power of limited review to insure that the grand jury not exceed its authority.
As in so many other instances, we face here competing values; the value of the protection of the public through the unrestricted power of the grand jury to probe and expose the operations of government, as opposed to the value of the protection of the individual from unlawful and unauthorized conduct of that tribunal. Although we recognize the advantage of a wider range in the grand jury’s investigatory authority, we do not accept the [126]*126extreme position that such authority is absolute or that its sweep is so extensive that under any and all circumstances its proposed reports may be publicized. Id., at 769.
Although no Nevada statute expressly permits even limited judicial review, we elect to follow the lead of the California Supreme Court. To us, judicial review to determine the excess of established legal limits is implicit in legislation defining the grand jury’s subject matter jurisdiction, is confirmed in the common law (see In re Presentment of Camden County Grand Jury, 89 A.2d 416 (N.J. 1952); State v. Wurdeman, 187 S.W. 257 (Mo. 1916), see generally Kuh, The Grand Jury “Presentment”: Foul Blow or Fair Play? 55 Colum. L.Rev. 1103, 1132 (1955)), and, here, is mandated by the trial court’s own instructions given during the body’s organizational meeting in 1974.3
Grand juries have traditionally been within the control of the courts, In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Central States, 225 F.Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1964); In re Ormsby Grand Jury, 74 Nev. 80, 322 P.2d 1099 (1958); and the trial judge should exercise his powers when appropriate. United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895. Moreover, our constitutional and statutory scheme contemplate reasonable judicial control of our grand juries. Thus, the court presides at the impanellment of the grand jury (Art. 6, § 5, Nev. [127]*127Const.; NRS 6.110-140), receives presentments and indictments (Art. 6, § 5, Nev. Const.; NRS 172.255, 172.285), determines when a grand jury shall be impanelled (NRS 6.110, 6.130), charges the grand jury as to its authorities and responsibilities (NRS 172.095), and determines when a grand jury is to be discharged, recessed (NRS 6.145), or a juror excused (NRS 172.275). Accordingly, we hold the district court has the limited power to review reports of grand juries within its jurisdiction prior to publication.
This limitation will not unduly interfere with the grand jury’s reportorial authority, since the trial judge simply will be reviewing the proposed report to determine whether the jury, one of it appendages, has acted not just irresponsibly, but unlawfully. Of course, the judiciary will refrain from interfering unduly with the grand jury during the investigatory stage of its work, whether the investigation is reportorial or inquisitorial or both in nature.4 Compare United States v. United States District Court, 238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981. Thus the judgmental independence of the grand jury will continue, with the district court having “no authority either to impose its own views on the grand jury or to suppress a report simply because it considers it ill-advised, insufficiently documented or even libelous.” People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, supra, at 766. Trial court prefiling review is consistent with the concept of judicial economy, since it will avert post-filing expungment proceedings or, at least minimize the scope and extent of such proceedings.
Appellant’s argument is that, without some restriction by the courts on the content of a grand jury report, individuals cannot adequately defend themselves. As a matter of fairness, it seems sufficient that appellant in this case was given an opportunity to testify and present evidence for consideration by the grand jury. The report presumptively was made in the public interest. Here, as Mr. Conforte was inextricably involved with public officials and matters of significant public concern, such involvement was appropriately directed to the community’s attention. Appellant was not accused of any crime or publicly condemned without indictment. Appeal of William Gregory, 77 Nev. 290, 362 P.2d 447 (1961). The report was in part an exposé relating to the purchase of land by Conforte and his attempt to sell a portion of it to a local governmental agency while profiting on the remainder of the property. The report evidenced that some [128]*128local governmental officials favoring the purchase from Con-forte were regularly entertained without charge at Conforte’s Mustang brothel. Compare In Re Presentment By Camden County Grand Jury, 169 A.2d 465 (1961). The report generally thus detailed factual matters and is not properly subject to expungment. In re Ormsby Grand Jury, supra. If a grand jury has gone beyond its express authority, expungment is the proper remedy. Appeal of Gregory, supra; Clemmons v. State, 141 So.2d 749 (Fla.App. 1962). Here, the report was generally issued in the legitimate community interest, and Conforte, with one exception, has not demonstrated that justice requires further expungement.
Touching once again on the scope and extent of grand jury reportorial authority, In re Ormsby Grand Jury, supra, at 85, 322 P.2d at 1102, held:
There are limits to its reportorial power, however. Such power to report upon public affairs must be distinguished from the power to accuse of public offense, which by statute is accomplished by indictment or presentment. The grand jury has no power, where the law is silent, to declare certain acts to be public offenses through the fixing of standards in accordance with its ethical or moral views.
The legislative grant to grand juries of the authority to investigate and report “on any and all matters affecting the morals, health and general welfare of the inhabitants of the county” was not an unchecked opportunity by which a grand jury could make adverse findings, conclusions and recommendations concerning acts, omissions or practices, which although not expressly forbidden by law, were immoral and therefore subject to censure. Moreover, the proper territorial scope of any grand jury investigation is limited to the county in which it is impaneled. NRS 172.175(2). Accordingly, we find that the grand jury exceeded its statutory authority relative to its reference to appellant’s purported Libby, Montana activities. However, notwithstanding the fact that the district court was not afforded the opportunity to preview the instant report, the grand jury generally acted within its province.
We hold that the district court properly denied expungement of the remaining portions of the grand jury report, with the exception of the reference to the Libby, Montana matter, and as to that portion, we remand for modification by the district court of its findings, conclusion and judgment and for expungement of page 29, lines 17-28; page 30, lines 1-4.
[129]*129Appellant’s claim that the reporting statute is vague and overbroad, that he was denied equal protection, that the secrecy provisions of the Nevada Revised Statutes were violated, and that the reportorial functions of the grand jury violate the separation of powers doctrine are all without merit.
Affirmed as modified with instructions.
Mowbray, C. J., and Fondi, D. J.,5 concur.