Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Bulen

315 F. Supp. 2d 821, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, 2004 WL 896207
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedApril 26, 2004
DocketCIV.A. 3:03-2281
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 315 F. Supp. 2d 821 (Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Bulen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Bulen, 315 F. Supp. 2d 821, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, 2004 WL 896207 (S.D.W. Va. 2004).

Opinion

ORDER

GOODWIN, District Judge.

Pending before the court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporaxy Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction [Docket 37]. I pi-eviously granted the plaintiffs’ motion in part and issued a temporary restraining order on April 6, 2004 [Docket 39]. A hearing to consider further injunctive relief was held on April 12, 2004. I renewed the temporary restraining order on April 15, 2004 [Docket 50]. On April 19, 2004, the parties submitted supplemental briefs addressing issues raised at the April 12 hearing [Docket 54, 57, 60]. The hearing on the motion resumed on April 22, 2004.

The plaintiffs have supported their motion with several arguments, each of which raises serious questions going to the merits of this case. The plaintiffs have argued, for example, that the coal refuse that the Green Valley Coal Company (Green Valley) proposes to discharge into the waters of the United States should be regulated pursuant to Section 402 of the Clean Water Act (the Act) rather than Section 404; that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) cannot issue authorizations to an applicant that has not first obtained state water quality certification for a project; that Nationwide Permit (NWP) 21 is arbitrary and capricious because it imposes no limit on the filling of perennial streams; and that NWP 21 is arbitrary and capricious because it allows mitigation to be used to offset environmental impacts that are more than minimal. Each of these arguments is entitled to and will receive my full consideration. I decline to issue a broad ruling in this case, however, until all parties have had an opportunity to brief the issues in response to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and/or Summary Judgment On All of Their Claims [Docket 43]. Today, for the reasons stated below, I GRANT the motion for a preliminary injunction on the narrow ground that the plaintiffs have established a strong likelihood of proving that Green Valley’s “Revision 5” is an illegally segmented project.

I. Background

The Corps is currently reviewing Green Valley’s proposal to dispose of coal refuse, which is known as Incidental Boundary Revision (IBR) 9, under Section 404(a) of the Act. Section 404(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue individual permits for the “discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” The individual review process under Section 404(a) involves, inter alia, “site-specific documentation and analysis, opportunity for public hearing, public in *823 terest review, and a formal determination.” United States’ Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction (United States Memorandum) [Docket 49] (citing 33 C.F.R. § 322.3, 33 G.F.R. Parts 323, 325).

While awaiting approval of IBR 9 under the individual review process of Section 404(a), Green Valley applied for approval of a smaller project, known as Revision 5, under NWP 21. On March 25, 2004, the Corps approved the plan for Revision 5, authorizing Green Valley “to place fill material into 431 linear feet (0.044 acre) of an unnamed tributary” of Blue Branch, a tributary of Hominy Creek, near the community of Carl, in Nicholas County, West Virginia. Administrative Record (AR), Vol. I, Tab A, section C. The entire area of land within Revision 5 is also within the proposed boundaries of IBR 9.

NWP 21 was issued pursuant to Section 404(e) of the Act, which authorizes the Secretary, acting through the Corps, to issue general permits involving discharges of dredged or fill material, NWP 21 authorizes “[d]iseharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the U.S. associated with surface coal mining and reclamation operations ...” 67 Fed.Reg.2038, 2081. General permits, as authorized by the Corps pursuant to Section 404(e), are subject to certain “General Conditions.” General Condition 19 describes factors that a Corps District Engineer (DE) will consider “when determining the acceptability of appropriate and practicable mitigation necessary to offset adverse effects on the aquatic environment that are more than minimal.” 67 Fed.Reg.2020, 2092. In other words, the current regulatory scheme permits the Corps to authorize a project under a general permit, even when the project will have greater than minimal effects on the aquatic environment, so long as the permittee takes adequate steps to mitigate those effects. When NWP 21 was reissued on January 15, 2002, the Corps “proposed to add clarification to NWP 21 that the Corps will require mitigation when evaluating surface mining activities in accordance with General Condition 19.” 1

On April 5, 2004, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, in part asking the court to order the Corps to suspend or revoke its authorization to Green Valley. 2 The parties have stipulated to OVEC’s standing to bring an action against the Corps based on the Corps’ approval of Green Valley’s Revision 5. April 12 Hearing Tr. at 8. OVEC also sought to prevent the Corps from authorizing the filling of more than 300 feet of any perennial stream in this District pursuant to NWP 21. I denied without prejudice that aspect of OVEC’s motion. April 6, 2004 Order [Docket 39],

II. Standard of Review

A district court undertakes a “balance-of-hardship” test when considering a party’s motion for injunctive relief. Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.1977). The court considers the following four fac *824 tors: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the requested relief is granted, (3) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (4) the public interest.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir.1991). The court’s comparison of the likelihood of harm to each party is its most important consideration. Id. The balancing of harms determines the degree to which a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir.1997). If the balance of harms “tips decidedly in favor of the plaintiff, a preliminary injunction will be granted if the plaintiff has raised .questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.” Direx Israel, 952 F.2d at 812 (internal quotations omitted). As the balance of harms tips away from the plaintiff, the plaintiff must make a stronger showing of probable success on the merits. Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
315 F. Supp. 2d 821, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, 2004 WL 896207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ohio-valley-environmental-coalition-v-bulen-wvsd-2004.