OPINION OF THE COURT
CIPARICK, J.
In 1959, plaintiff Maureen O’Connell and now-deceased John J. O’Connell were married in New York.1 Eight children were born of the marriage, all currently emancipated. In 1982, plaintiff moved out of the marital residence and commenced a New York divorce action based on cruel and inhuman treatment. After trial, Supreme Court dismissed the action for failure of proof and the Appellate Division affirmed (116 AD2d 823 [3d Dept 1986]). Thereafter, plaintiff and decedent continued to reside separately. The children lived with plaintiff, and decedent paid child support.
In 1993, plaintiff established residence in Vermont. Thereafter, in 1994, she commenced a divorce action in the Family Court of Vermont pursuant to Vermont’s no-fault divorce law, which permits divorce when “a married person has lived apart from his or her spouse for six consecutive months and the court finds that the resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable” (Vt Stat Ann, tit 15, § 551 [7]). Decedent was served with a complaint seeking divorce, and by letter answer opposed the [182]*182divorce. A final hearing was scheduled for December 21, 1994. Decedent received notice from the Vermont court, requesting that he appear at the hearing on the divorce and motion for property division. Decedent appeared pro se, although New York counsel accompanied him and was available in the courtroom.
During the hearing, plaintiffs counsel informed the Vermont court that plaintiff was seeking only a divorce. When the court inquired about property division, counsel explained that all of the parties’ marital assets were located in New York State and the Vermont court lacked jurisdiction to distribute the property. Neither the trial judge nor decedent contested plaintiffs statement. Decedent argued only that plaintiffs previous divorce action in New York barred her from maintaining a divorce action in Vermont. At the close of the hearing, the court rejected decedent’s argument and granted plaintiff a final judgment of divorce. It made no property distribution.
In 1995, plaintiff commenced this New York action against decedent seeking equitable distribution of the marital property, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (a), which authorizes New York courts to distribute marital property subsequent to a foreign judgment of divorce. Decedent moved for dismissal on the ground that the complaint was barred by res judicata. He argued that, because Vermont Family Court had personal jurisdiction over both parties, the court could have rendered a judgment directing equitable distribution of their marital assets. He contended that plaintiffs failure to seek equitable distribution in the Vermont divorce action barred her from seeking subsequent equitable distribution in Vermont and, therefore, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, New York was required to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
Supreme Court denied decedent’s motion and the Appellate Division affirmed (226 AD2d 950 [3d Dept 1996], Iv dismissed 88 NY2d 963 [1996]). Noting that Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (a) expressly permits parties to obtain equitable distribution following a foreign judgment of divorce, the Appellate Division concluded that the statute entitled plaintiff to proceed in this action. Additionally, the Court concluded that the Vermont divorce decree did not have res judicata effect in New York because the issue of equitable distribution was not resolved, addressed or litigated in the Vermont divorce proceeding, and it remitted the matter to Supreme Court for trial.
[183]*183Following a bench trial, Supreme Court awarded plaintiff a distributive award of $186,670, representing approximately half of the marital estate, and directed decedent to pay $5,000 toward plaintiffs counsel fees. The Appellate Division affirmed (290 AD2d 774 [3d Dept 2002]) and this Court granted defendant leave to appeal, bringing up for review the prior Appellate Division order that denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. We now reverse.
Domestic Relations Law § 236 permits a New York proceeding to obtain the distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce.2 Lower courts differ as to whether a bilateral sister state divorce decree—one in which the sister state could have, but did not, distribute marital property—precludes a subsequent New York proceeding to obtain equitable distribution pursuant to section 236 (B) (2) and (5) (a) (compare 226 AD2d 950 [3d Dept 1996], Iv dismissed 88 NY2d 963 [1996], with Erhart v Erhart, 226 AD2d 26 [4th Dept 1996]; see also Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:3, at 247-248). Er-hart held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the courts of this state to give the same effect to a properly obtained sister state divorce decree that the sister state would give the decree. Therefore, where a divorced spouse would be precluded from commencing a separate action for distribution of marital property within the sister state granting the divorce decree, New York must also preclude a subsequent action for equitable distribution of marital property (see Erhart, 226 AD2d at 31). This approach is consistent with the requirements of full faith and credit and our own application of res judicata in matrimonial actions.
While section 236 (B) (2) and (5) (a) are broadly worded to permit parties to obtain postdivorce equitable distribution fol[184]*184lowing a foreign divorce—with no mention of whether such a divorce results from either an ex parte or bilateral divorce proceeding—the statute should be interpreted to extend only as far as the Constitution permits. In accordance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a “judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced” (Underwriters Natl. Assur. Co. v North Carolina Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 455 US 691, 704 [1982], quoting Hampton v McConnel, 3 Wheat [16 US] 234, 235 [1818]; see also Vanderbilt v Vanderbilt, 354 US 416, 418 [1957]; Matter of Luna v Dobson, 97 NY2d 178, 183 [2001]). Thus, where a foreign divorce decree would serve as a bar to a subsequent action for equitable distribution brought in the courts of the decree-rendering state, the decree also has that effect in New York.
Giving a foreign divorce decree the same conclusive effect in New York as it would have in the decree-rendering state is consistent with our own application of res judicata in matrimonial actions (see Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284 [1988]). The decree-rendering state here being Vermont, we now turn to a review of its law.
Vermont Statutes Annotated, title 15, § 751 (a) provides that,
“[u]pon motion of either party to a [divorce] proceeding . . . the court shall settle the rights of the parties to their property, by including in its judgment provisions which equitably divide and assign the property. All property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court” (emphasis supplied).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION OF THE COURT
CIPARICK, J.
In 1959, plaintiff Maureen O’Connell and now-deceased John J. O’Connell were married in New York.1 Eight children were born of the marriage, all currently emancipated. In 1982, plaintiff moved out of the marital residence and commenced a New York divorce action based on cruel and inhuman treatment. After trial, Supreme Court dismissed the action for failure of proof and the Appellate Division affirmed (116 AD2d 823 [3d Dept 1986]). Thereafter, plaintiff and decedent continued to reside separately. The children lived with plaintiff, and decedent paid child support.
In 1993, plaintiff established residence in Vermont. Thereafter, in 1994, she commenced a divorce action in the Family Court of Vermont pursuant to Vermont’s no-fault divorce law, which permits divorce when “a married person has lived apart from his or her spouse for six consecutive months and the court finds that the resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable” (Vt Stat Ann, tit 15, § 551 [7]). Decedent was served with a complaint seeking divorce, and by letter answer opposed the [182]*182divorce. A final hearing was scheduled for December 21, 1994. Decedent received notice from the Vermont court, requesting that he appear at the hearing on the divorce and motion for property division. Decedent appeared pro se, although New York counsel accompanied him and was available in the courtroom.
During the hearing, plaintiffs counsel informed the Vermont court that plaintiff was seeking only a divorce. When the court inquired about property division, counsel explained that all of the parties’ marital assets were located in New York State and the Vermont court lacked jurisdiction to distribute the property. Neither the trial judge nor decedent contested plaintiffs statement. Decedent argued only that plaintiffs previous divorce action in New York barred her from maintaining a divorce action in Vermont. At the close of the hearing, the court rejected decedent’s argument and granted plaintiff a final judgment of divorce. It made no property distribution.
In 1995, plaintiff commenced this New York action against decedent seeking equitable distribution of the marital property, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (a), which authorizes New York courts to distribute marital property subsequent to a foreign judgment of divorce. Decedent moved for dismissal on the ground that the complaint was barred by res judicata. He argued that, because Vermont Family Court had personal jurisdiction over both parties, the court could have rendered a judgment directing equitable distribution of their marital assets. He contended that plaintiffs failure to seek equitable distribution in the Vermont divorce action barred her from seeking subsequent equitable distribution in Vermont and, therefore, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, New York was required to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
Supreme Court denied decedent’s motion and the Appellate Division affirmed (226 AD2d 950 [3d Dept 1996], Iv dismissed 88 NY2d 963 [1996]). Noting that Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (a) expressly permits parties to obtain equitable distribution following a foreign judgment of divorce, the Appellate Division concluded that the statute entitled plaintiff to proceed in this action. Additionally, the Court concluded that the Vermont divorce decree did not have res judicata effect in New York because the issue of equitable distribution was not resolved, addressed or litigated in the Vermont divorce proceeding, and it remitted the matter to Supreme Court for trial.
[183]*183Following a bench trial, Supreme Court awarded plaintiff a distributive award of $186,670, representing approximately half of the marital estate, and directed decedent to pay $5,000 toward plaintiffs counsel fees. The Appellate Division affirmed (290 AD2d 774 [3d Dept 2002]) and this Court granted defendant leave to appeal, bringing up for review the prior Appellate Division order that denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. We now reverse.
Domestic Relations Law § 236 permits a New York proceeding to obtain the distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce.2 Lower courts differ as to whether a bilateral sister state divorce decree—one in which the sister state could have, but did not, distribute marital property—precludes a subsequent New York proceeding to obtain equitable distribution pursuant to section 236 (B) (2) and (5) (a) (compare 226 AD2d 950 [3d Dept 1996], Iv dismissed 88 NY2d 963 [1996], with Erhart v Erhart, 226 AD2d 26 [4th Dept 1996]; see also Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:3, at 247-248). Er-hart held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the courts of this state to give the same effect to a properly obtained sister state divorce decree that the sister state would give the decree. Therefore, where a divorced spouse would be precluded from commencing a separate action for distribution of marital property within the sister state granting the divorce decree, New York must also preclude a subsequent action for equitable distribution of marital property (see Erhart, 226 AD2d at 31). This approach is consistent with the requirements of full faith and credit and our own application of res judicata in matrimonial actions.
While section 236 (B) (2) and (5) (a) are broadly worded to permit parties to obtain postdivorce equitable distribution fol[184]*184lowing a foreign divorce—with no mention of whether such a divorce results from either an ex parte or bilateral divorce proceeding—the statute should be interpreted to extend only as far as the Constitution permits. In accordance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a “judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced” (Underwriters Natl. Assur. Co. v North Carolina Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 455 US 691, 704 [1982], quoting Hampton v McConnel, 3 Wheat [16 US] 234, 235 [1818]; see also Vanderbilt v Vanderbilt, 354 US 416, 418 [1957]; Matter of Luna v Dobson, 97 NY2d 178, 183 [2001]). Thus, where a foreign divorce decree would serve as a bar to a subsequent action for equitable distribution brought in the courts of the decree-rendering state, the decree also has that effect in New York.
Giving a foreign divorce decree the same conclusive effect in New York as it would have in the decree-rendering state is consistent with our own application of res judicata in matrimonial actions (see Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284 [1988]). The decree-rendering state here being Vermont, we now turn to a review of its law.
Vermont Statutes Annotated, title 15, § 751 (a) provides that,
“[u]pon motion of either party to a [divorce] proceeding . . . the court shall settle the rights of the parties to their property, by including in its judgment provisions which equitably divide and assign the property. All property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court” (emphasis supplied).
Here, despite the erroneous statement of plaintiffs Vermont counsel, there is no question that the Vermont court had personal jurisdiction over both plaintiff and decedent and could have distributed the marital property, wherever situated. We reject plaintiffs contention and the dissent’s conclusion that decedent’s appearance was limited only to contesting the divorce and that the Vermont court had rendered itself powerless to decide the property issue (see dissenting op at 190).
In Vermont, as in New York, the common-law doctrine of res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the ‘parties, [185]*185subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical’ ” (Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v Stoneman, 159 Vt 53, 56, 615 A2d 141, 143 [1992]). This “doctrine covers claims that were actually litigated, as well as those which could have been litigated” in a previous action (Roddy v Roddy, 168 Vt 343, 347 n 2, 721 A2d 124, 127 n 2 [1998]).
Applying the principles of full faith and credit, plaintiff’s divorce action has the same conclusive effect in New York as it does in Vermont. We, therefore, hold that, notwithstanding Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) and (5) (a), this action is barred in New York. Public policy in New York and Vermont frowns upon forum shopping and the bifurcation of divorce and equitable distribution proceedings. In Boronow, this Court held that a party in a divorce action, who had a full and fair opportunity to contest title to the former marital home, was barred from raising the issue of title in a subsequent action (see 71 NY2d at 286). Applying a transactional analysis, we explained that, in a divorce action,
“questions pertaining to important ancillary issues like title to marital property are certainly intertwined and constitute issues which generally can be fairly and efficiently resolved with the core issue. The courts and the parties should ordinarily be able to plan for the resolution of all issues relating to the marriage relationship in the single action” (id. at 290).
The Vermont Supreme Court similarly has recognized a preference for a single action. As the court noted in Roddy v Roddy, “[n]o one is entitled to break a case down into a myriad of single issue actions to obtain the desired judgment. Judicial time schedules and fairness to one’s opponent prohibit this practice” (Roddy, 168 Vt at 347, 721 A2d at 127, quoting B & E Corp. v Bessery, 130 Vt 597, 601, 298 A2d 544, 546 [1972]).3 Thus, a party—who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate property issues in another state—would be precluded from litigating such issues in New York.
Finally, we do not agree with the dissent that the Vermont court “expressly declined to adjudicate the issue of equitable [186]*186distribution” (dissenting op at 186). There is no language severing issues of property distribution, and nothing in the court’s order to indicate an intention to do so. The dissent rests entirely on a colloquy with counsel (quoted at 187-188), when counsel erroneously advised that the court lacked jurisdiction to divide New York assets. The court responded “All right. Mr. O’Connell, is there anything that you wish to put to the Court at this time?” This in no way constitutes a severance. Indeed, in a 12-page transcript of the Vermont hearing, the court used the words “All right” eight times, clearly as a means of moving the parties along.
Nor can we, as a court of law, agree with the dissent’s closing observation that, if equitable distribution is denied, plaintiff will receive nothing from a long term marriage. In fact, we do not know the true equities here, and must be guided by the law and the parties’ arguments to us.4
Having determined that plaintiffs action for equitable distribution is barred, we need not address defendant’s remaining contentions as they are academic.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, the motion granted and the complaint dismissed with costs.