Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. The Aurania

29 F. 98, 1886 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 27, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 29 F. 98 (Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. The Aurania) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. The Aurania, 29 F. 98, 1886 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).

Opinion

Brown, J.

Considering that Gedney’s channel across the bar is the principal, if not the only, thoroughfare for deep draught vessels in coming into and going out of the harbor of New York, it is a matter of surprise as w'ell as of regret that where tw'o vessels are going dowm the hay, and are approaching that fairway, the one by the Swash channel, and the other by the Main or Horseshoe channel, any doubt or uncertainty should oxist wdiich of them should keep out of the way of the other. It is still more to be regretted that any doubt should oxist, since onr adoption of the new international rules by the act of March 3, 1885, (23 St. at Large, 438,) whether the case is governed by those regulations, or by the rules previously existing and embodied in the Revised Statutes, (section 4233,) and by the local rules adopted by the supervising inspectors. And yet, at tho very threshold of this caso, I find a difficulty and embarrassment in determining which set of rules is applicable to vessels navigating in harbors within our coast waters that I have not boon able satisfactorily to solve.

The enacting clause of the act of March 3, 1885, provides “that tixe following ‘Revised International Rules and Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea’ shall he followed in tho navigation of all public and private vessels of the United States upon the high seas, and in all coast waters of the United States, except such as are otherwise provided for.” Then follow the twenty-seven articles of the new' regulations. The concluding section of tlio act is a repealing clause, declaring that “all law's and parts of laws inconsistent with the foregoing revised international rules and regulations for tho navigation of all public and private vessels of the United States upon the high seas, and in all coast waters of the United States, are hereby repealed, except as to the navigation of such vessels within the harbors, lakes, and inland waters of the United States.”

[102]*102Both these vessels were, indeed, English; but the British act subjects British ships to these same regulations, whether within British jurisdiction or not. Orders in Council, April 14, 1879, (4 Prob. Div. 243;) Orders in Council, August 11,1884, (9 Prob. Div. 247.) Article 25 of the new rules provides that “nothing in these rules shall interfere with the operation of a special rule, duly made by local authority, relative to the navigation of any harbor, river, or inland navigation.” If, therefore, by the exception in the repealing clause of the act of March 3,1885, the old rules are in force in the navigation of harbors situated within our coast waters, they would seem to cover foreign vessels while navigating within such a harbor whether in going out or in coming in. The new rules have made important changes. See 1 Abb. Nat. Dig. 664. Besides those there mentioned, article 14, in relation to sailing vessels, is wholly changed in phraseology, and would seem to reverse the obligation to keep out of the way as it formerly existed under rule 12, in certain situations. See The Commodore Jones, 25 Fed. Rep. 506. The changes in the new regulations are so numerous and important that, in my judgment, it would prove practically impossible for the two sets of rules to be applied successfully to vessels engaged in foreign commerce, and upon the same voyage, on passing the indefinite line where a “harbor” might be supposed to begin; and only misapprehension, confusion, and fatal consequences can be expected from any such attempt.

The exception as regards “lakes and inland waters of the United States” seems to be surplusage, for the reason that lakes and inland waters do not fall within the enacting clause of the statute, which applies only to “the high seas and coast waters.” This language may have been employed from superabundant caution, to indicate that the old rules were unchanged as respects the “lakes and inland waters.” The word “harbors” cannot.be construed in the same sense, a sociis, as meaning harbors only that are situated upon the lakes or inland waters, without taking from that word all effect whatsoever; since that meaning is already covered by the words “lakes and inland waters,” without the use of the word “harbor;” while, as it stands, the word “harbor” has an important significance, as a strict exception to the repealing clause immediately preceding.

On the other hand, inasmuch as the new rules are a revision of the old, and aim to supply several of their deficiencies; as they are designed to conform to the rules already adopted by the principal maritime nations of the world; and as they cover the whole ground of the former rules, and, in general, are plainly designed to supersede them; and as no object is apparent in retaining the old rules within the harbors.of the seaboard; and as strong reasons exist against the retention of two sets of rules, applicable to the same ocean Voyage,—it is difficult to suppose that it was the intention of congress, by this exception, to continue the old rules in force as respects ocean voyages terminating within the seaboar.d harbors. Moore v. American Trans. Co., 24 How. 1, 36; The Garden City, 26 Fed. Rep. [103]*103766, 773; U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486; U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92; Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 617; U. S. v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, 552; U. S. v. Auffmordt, 19 Fed. Rep. 897.

Upon this view of the possible intention of the exception as respects tlio use of the word “harbor,” if its effect were limited to trips confined to the harbor only, so as to give the word some effect,—■ that is, to navigation beginning and ending within the harbor,—the same practical difficulty would arise in another form, and the same liability to fatal confusion as between foreign bound vessels, and vessels navigating the harbor only; between which there is equal necessity for intelligible rules and a common understanding. I see no way out of these various difficulties that would not altogether nullify tli© effect of the word “harbor”'in the exception, by rendering it wholly superfluous, like the words “lakes-and inland navigation.” The subject should, receive, I think, further legislative consideration, and it is hoped that the difficulties referred to may bo remedied.

The place of collision being inside of the bar, and upon pilotage ground, may be said, in a general sense, to be within the “harbor” of New York; and yet being in the lower bay, and not in a part of the bay where vessels could either moor or safely lie at anchor, it is not within the meaning of the word “harbor” in its most strict and proper sense; namely, “a safe station for ships; a place of refuge, shelter, rest.” Worcest. Bid.

The fair inference from the pleadings and the testimony, moreover, is that the pilots and officers of each of the vessels regarded themselves and the other vessol as sailing under the new rules; and, this being the understanding of both, i shall treat the case, as respects the question of fault, according to the now rules, by which they both deemed themselves governed.

1. The first and principal question is whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the two steamers are to be regarded as crossing vessels, under tlio sixteenth article of the new rales; or whether the Aurania was an “overtaking” vessel, within the twentieth article.

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Bluebook (online)
29 F. 98, 1886 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oceanic-steam-nav-co-v-the-aurania-nysd-1886.