Mr. Justice NELSON
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.
The suit was brought by' the plaintiffs in the court below against the defendants, a company incorporated under the laws of New York, and owners of the steam propeller M. B. Spaulding.
The goods in question were put on board of the propeller at Buffalo, on the 80th October, 1856, for transportatior. to Detroit, and on the next day they took fire, and vessel and goods were entirely consumed, without any default or negligence of the master or crew, or any knowledge-of the-defendants, their officers or agents. The propeller was of more than twenty tons burden, and was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and engaged in navigation and commerce, as a-[35]*35common carrier, between ports and places in different States upon the lakes, and navigable waters connecting the same.
The defendants relied, in their defence, upon the -act of Congress, passed March 3d, 1851, entitled “an act to limit the liability of ship owners, and for other purposes.”
The 1st section provides-that no owner of any ship or vessel shall be liable to answer for any loss or damage which may happen to any goods or merchandise which shall be shipped on board any such ship or vessel, by reason of any fire happening on board the same, unless such fire is caused by design or neglect of such owner, with a proviso that the parties may 'make such contract between themselves on the subject as they please.
The 2d section provides against any liability of the owner of the vessel, in case of precious metals, &c., unless notice and entry on the bill of landing.
The 3d section provides against liability of the owner, in cases of embezzlement or loss, &e., by the master, officers, &c., of any property shipped on board, or for any loss by collision, &c., without the privity or knowledge of the owner, exceeding the value of his interest in the ship and freight.
The 4th section provides for an apportionment of . the proceeds, in case of the sale of the. vessel, among the several freighters or owners of the goods, if these and the freight should not be sufficient to.pay each loss.
The 6th section saves the remedy against the master and hands, in case of embezzlement or loss, or for any negligence or malversation by these persons.
.The 7th section, after- providing a penalty -for shipping oil of vitriol, and such dangerous materials, without notice to the master, is as follows: “ This act shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel, of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation.”
It is insisted, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the navigation of Lake Erie, and also of all the other lakes in connection therewith, is within the exception to this act, as falling within the words “inland navigation.” The question thus raised is [36]*36not. without difficulty, as we have no clear or cei’tain guide to lead us to the true meaning attached to these words by Congress. Looking at them in a very general sense, and without much regard to the reasons or policy of the law, it may, with some .plausibility, be urged, as has been on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the phrase “inland navigation” was used as contradistinguished from navigation upon the ocean; and that all vessels navigating waters within headlands, and after they have passed out of the ocean, come within the designation. But a construction thus broad can hardly be maintained, for it would be unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended to apply one rule of responsibility to the owner in respect to the same vessel upon the ocean, and another upon the bays or rivers, in the course of the same voyage. Besides the absence of any good reason for such a distinction as to the rule of responsibility, it would have seriously embarrassed all parties engaged in commerce of this description in respect tc their securities against accidents, and losses by means of insurance, bills of lading, charter-parties, &c.
The connection in which this term “inland navigation” is used in the act, we think, may throw some light upon the intent of the law-makers.
It is declared, that the act shall not apply to the owner of any canal-boat, bargé, or lighter, or to any vessel.of any description used in rivers or inland navigation. It will be seen, that certain craft is excepted from the act eo nomine, and then a class of vessels without any designation, other than by a reference to the waters or locality in which used. But the character of the craft enumerated may well serve to indicate to some extent, and with some reason, the class of vessels in the mind of the law-makers, which are designated by the place where employed. This class may well be regarded ejusdem generis, and thus aid us in interpreting the true meaning of the words of the act, namely, vessels “ used in rivers or inland navigation.”
Many of the provisions of this act were taken from the 53 Geo. 3, e. 159, as also the exception to the enacting clause. The excepk'on in the English act is as follows: that, nothing [37]*37in this act shall extend to the owner of any “lighter, barge, boat, or vessel of any description whatsoever, used solely in rivers or inland navigation.”
The language of this exception is more specific than that used in ours; but the meaning intended to be conveyed, we think substantially the same. The words in ours are, “any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation.” This word used means, in the connection found, employed, and doubtless, in the mind of Congress, was intended to refer to vessels solely employed in rivers or inland navigation. It was this species of navigation — that is, on rivers and inland — which was intended to be withdrawn from the limitation of the liability of the owner; and the addition .of the term “inland navigation,” as an alternative to rivers, was doubtless designed, speaking in a general sense, to embrace all internal-waters, either connected with river's, but which did not, in a geographical or popular sense, fall under that name, or which might not be connected with rivers, but fell within the reason or policy of the exception, such as bays, inlets, straits, &c. Vessels, whatever may be their class or description, solely employed upon these waters, are usually employed in the trade and traffic of the localities, carried on chiefly by persons residing upon their borders, and connected with the local business, and without the formalities and precautions observed in regular commercial pursuits, with a view to guard against accidents and losses, such as insurance, bills of lading, &c. It was fit and proper, therefore, in this .description of trade and traffic, that the common-law liabilities of the carrier should rémaiir unaltered.
But the business upon the great lakes lying upon our Northern frontiers, carried on between the States, and with the foreign nation with which they are connected, (and this is the only business which Congress can regulate, or with which we are dealing,) is of a very different character. They form a boundary between this foreign country and the United States for a distance of some twelve hundred miles, and are of an average width of at least one hundred miles; and this, without including Lake Michigan, of itself three hundred and fifty [38]
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Mr. Justice NELSON
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.
The suit was brought by' the plaintiffs in the court below against the defendants, a company incorporated under the laws of New York, and owners of the steam propeller M. B. Spaulding.
The goods in question were put on board of the propeller at Buffalo, on the 80th October, 1856, for transportatior. to Detroit, and on the next day they took fire, and vessel and goods were entirely consumed, without any default or negligence of the master or crew, or any knowledge-of the-defendants, their officers or agents. The propeller was of more than twenty tons burden, and was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and engaged in navigation and commerce, as a-[35]*35common carrier, between ports and places in different States upon the lakes, and navigable waters connecting the same.
The defendants relied, in their defence, upon the -act of Congress, passed March 3d, 1851, entitled “an act to limit the liability of ship owners, and for other purposes.”
The 1st section provides-that no owner of any ship or vessel shall be liable to answer for any loss or damage which may happen to any goods or merchandise which shall be shipped on board any such ship or vessel, by reason of any fire happening on board the same, unless such fire is caused by design or neglect of such owner, with a proviso that the parties may 'make such contract between themselves on the subject as they please.
The 2d section provides against any liability of the owner of the vessel, in case of precious metals, &c., unless notice and entry on the bill of landing.
The 3d section provides against liability of the owner, in cases of embezzlement or loss, &e., by the master, officers, &c., of any property shipped on board, or for any loss by collision, &c., without the privity or knowledge of the owner, exceeding the value of his interest in the ship and freight.
The 4th section provides for an apportionment of . the proceeds, in case of the sale of the. vessel, among the several freighters or owners of the goods, if these and the freight should not be sufficient to.pay each loss.
The 6th section saves the remedy against the master and hands, in case of embezzlement or loss, or for any negligence or malversation by these persons.
.The 7th section, after- providing a penalty -for shipping oil of vitriol, and such dangerous materials, without notice to the master, is as follows: “ This act shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel, of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation.”
It is insisted, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the navigation of Lake Erie, and also of all the other lakes in connection therewith, is within the exception to this act, as falling within the words “inland navigation.” The question thus raised is [36]*36not. without difficulty, as we have no clear or cei’tain guide to lead us to the true meaning attached to these words by Congress. Looking at them in a very general sense, and without much regard to the reasons or policy of the law, it may, with some .plausibility, be urged, as has been on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the phrase “inland navigation” was used as contradistinguished from navigation upon the ocean; and that all vessels navigating waters within headlands, and after they have passed out of the ocean, come within the designation. But a construction thus broad can hardly be maintained, for it would be unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended to apply one rule of responsibility to the owner in respect to the same vessel upon the ocean, and another upon the bays or rivers, in the course of the same voyage. Besides the absence of any good reason for such a distinction as to the rule of responsibility, it would have seriously embarrassed all parties engaged in commerce of this description in respect tc their securities against accidents, and losses by means of insurance, bills of lading, charter-parties, &c.
The connection in which this term “inland navigation” is used in the act, we think, may throw some light upon the intent of the law-makers.
It is declared, that the act shall not apply to the owner of any canal-boat, bargé, or lighter, or to any vessel.of any description used in rivers or inland navigation. It will be seen, that certain craft is excepted from the act eo nomine, and then a class of vessels without any designation, other than by a reference to the waters or locality in which used. But the character of the craft enumerated may well serve to indicate to some extent, and with some reason, the class of vessels in the mind of the law-makers, which are designated by the place where employed. This class may well be regarded ejusdem generis, and thus aid us in interpreting the true meaning of the words of the act, namely, vessels “ used in rivers or inland navigation.”
Many of the provisions of this act were taken from the 53 Geo. 3, e. 159, as also the exception to the enacting clause. The excepk'on in the English act is as follows: that, nothing [37]*37in this act shall extend to the owner of any “lighter, barge, boat, or vessel of any description whatsoever, used solely in rivers or inland navigation.”
The language of this exception is more specific than that used in ours; but the meaning intended to be conveyed, we think substantially the same. The words in ours are, “any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation.” This word used means, in the connection found, employed, and doubtless, in the mind of Congress, was intended to refer to vessels solely employed in rivers or inland navigation. It was this species of navigation — that is, on rivers and inland — which was intended to be withdrawn from the limitation of the liability of the owner; and the addition .of the term “inland navigation,” as an alternative to rivers, was doubtless designed, speaking in a general sense, to embrace all internal-waters, either connected with river's, but which did not, in a geographical or popular sense, fall under that name, or which might not be connected with rivers, but fell within the reason or policy of the exception, such as bays, inlets, straits, &c. Vessels, whatever may be their class or description, solely employed upon these waters, are usually employed in the trade and traffic of the localities, carried on chiefly by persons residing upon their borders, and connected with the local business, and without the formalities and precautions observed in regular commercial pursuits, with a view to guard against accidents and losses, such as insurance, bills of lading, &c. It was fit and proper, therefore, in this .description of trade and traffic, that the common-law liabilities of the carrier should rémaiir unaltered.
But the business upon the great lakes lying upon our Northern frontiers, carried on between the States, and with the foreign nation with which they are connected, (and this is the only business which Congress can regulate, or with which we are dealing,) is of a very different character. They form a boundary between this foreign country and the United States for a distance of some twelve hundred miles, and are of an average width of at least one hundred miles; and this, without including Lake Michigan, of itself three hundred and fifty [38]*38miles in length, and ninety in breadth, which lies wholly within the United States. The aggregate length of these lakes is over fifteen hundred miles, and the area covered by their waters is said to be some ninety thousand square miles. The commerce upon them corresponds with their magnitude.
According to the best official statistics, the value of the property annually, the subject of this commerce, exceeds $600,000,000, employing more than sixteen hundred vessels, with an aggregate tonnage exceeding.four hundred thousand tons. These vessels are duly licensed for the'foreign trade, as well as for that carried on coastwise. This commerce, from its magnitude, and the well-known perils incident to the lake navigation, deserves to be placed on the footing of commerce on the ocean; and, we think, in view of it, Congress could not have classed it with the business upon rivers, or inland navigation, in the sense in -which we understand these terms.
These lakes are usually designated' by public men and jurists, when speaking of them, as great inland waters, inland seas, or great lakes; and, if Congress intended to have excluded them from the limitation of the liabilities of owners, it would have been most natural and reasonable, and, indeed, almost a matter of course, to have referred to them by a more specific designation.
The decision in tlio case of the Lexington, which was burned upon Long Island Sound, led to this act of 1851. That case was decided in 1848, subjecting the carrier in case of a loss by fire. (6 How., 344.)
The Sound is but one hundred and ten miles in length, and from two to twenty in breadth.
The waters of these lakes, in the aggregate, exceed those of the Baltic, the Caspian, or the Black sea, and approach in magnitude those of the Mediterranean. They exceed those of the Red sea, the North sea or German ocean, the sea of Marmora, and of Azoff. And, like the lakes, all of these seas, With the exception of the North sea, are tideless. The ■marine disasters upon these lakes, in consequence of the few. natural harbors for the shelter of vessels, and the consequent losses of life and property, are immense. According to the [39]*39report of. a committee in the House, of Representatives in 1856, the destruction of property upon Lake Michigan in the year 1855 exceeded $1,000,000. The appalling destruction of life in the loss of the Erie upon Lake Erie, and of the Superior and Lady Elgin upon Michigan, are still fresh in the recollections of the country. The policy and justice of the limitation of the liability of the owners, under this act of 1851, are as applicable to this navigation as to that of the ocean. The act was designed, to promote the building of ships, and to encourage persons engaged in the business of navigation, and to place that of this country upon a'footing with England-and on the continent of Europe. The act not only exempts the owner from the casualty of fire, but limits his liability in cases of embezzlement or loss of goods on board by the master, ofiicers, &c., and also for loss or damage from collisions, and, - indeed, for any loss or damage occurring without the privity of the owner, to an amount not exceeding the value of the vessel and freight.
It has been suggested that our construction of the act may embrace within the limitation of the liability of the owners Western lakes lying within a State, such as the Cayuga, Seneca, and the like. But the answer is, that commerce upon these lakes, and all others similarly situated, is not within the regulation of Congress. The act can apply to vessels only which are engaged in foreign commerce, and commerce between the States. The purely internal commerce and navigation of a State is exclusively under State regulation. .
We think the court below was right, and that the judgment should be affirmed.