Brachtenbach, J.
— Plaintiffs sued the State of Washington, acting through its Department of Natural Resources (DNR), for damages sustained as a result of a fire which escaped from DNR land. The fire became known as the Barker Mountain fire. Barker Mountain, east of Tonasket, is bordered on the south by a state highway and on the north by the Siwash Creek Valley. A portion of this land is owned by the State. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 122-23 (Apr. 15, 1987).
In the early morning hours of a Wednesday, a lightning storm started numerous fires in northeastern Washington, including the Barker Mountain fire. DNR describes what became the Barker Mountain fire as a "small lightning strike fire." Brief of Appellant, at 7.
The initial fire was but a quarter mile off a paved highway, in terrain described as "gentle." It was initially no larger than a campfire. By about 6 a.m. on that Wednesday DNR had received a telephone report of a fire on the south [280]*280side of Barker Mountain. DNR dispatched some fire fighters on Wednesday afternoon, but by Wednesday evening these forces were withdrawn. The fire escaped from DNR property on Thursday afternoon and subsequently, plaintiffs' properties to the north of the initial fire lines on Barker Mountain were damaged. On these days DNR was fighting not only the Barker Mountain fire but other major and minor fires.
These facts are only relevant as a background for the legal issues. This is so because the jury, in answers to special interrogatories, found (1) the fire which damaged plaintiffs' property started on DNR land, (2) DNR was negligent, and (3) negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. In addition, DNR stipulated that "plaintiffs relied upon the DNR to furnish them with fire protection." Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 95-96 (Apr. 13, 1987). DNR does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the specific findings of negligence, nor does DNR assign error to any instructions given nor to the failure to give any proposed instructions. We necessarily assume, because it is now beyond challenge, that there was sufficient evidence that DNR was negligent in allowing the escape of fire from its land. Further, we also make the critical assumption that the jury was properly instructed on the duties which DNR had and which it breached. In its briefs DNR recounts much detail about fighting these fires. All of the fire fighting difficulties faced by DNR and all of the demands placed upon its resources were before the jury. Since DNR raises no challenge to the admissibility of any evidence, no challenge to the sufficiency thereof, no challenge to the amount of damages nor any challenge to the legal correctness of instructions (which are not a part of the record), the trial proceedings are conclusive.
DNR's sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The essence of DNR's position is that the public duty doctrine prevents liability from attaching to its negligence. It admits that it has statutory fire fighting [281]*281duties and common law and statutory duties as a landowner. However, DNR contends that its fire fighting duties are only to the public, and these plaintiffs are owed no duty in particular. DNR argues that its duties as a landowner are "subsumed" (its phrase) into its fire fighting duties when it fights more than one fire in the same area.
We hold that DNR had a duty to these plaintiffs and its landowner duties are not "subsumed."
The legal issues presented are very narrow indeed. Particularly enlightening is DNR's own narrowing of its escape route by these statements:
There is no dispute that Natural Resources has a duty to provide fire protection from uncontrolled fires on forest land, or which threaten forest land. RCW 76.04.015 and .750.
Brief of Appellant, at 41.
We do not dispute that Natural Resources would be liable under RCW 76.04.730 for the escape of a fire from its land under normal circumstances.
Brief of Appellant, at 54.
Private landowners in Washington have a common law duty to exercise reasonable care in preventing fire from spreading to lands of neighboring owners. A similar duty is imposed by statute, e.g., RCW 76.04.730.
(Citations omitted.) Brief of Appellant, at 53-54. We note, as discussed hereafter, DNR is within the statutory definition of "landowner."
There is no dispute that Natural Resources owes a duty of fire protection to those forest landowners who pay the forest protection and fire suppression assessments. State ex rel. Showalter v. Goodyear, 30 Wn.2d 834, 194 P.2d 389 (1948); State ex rel. Sherman v. Pape, 103 Wash. 319, 323, 174 Pac. 468 (1918).
Clerk's Papers, at 34.
We start our analysis of DNR's arguments with the premise that DNR, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, is liable for its tortious conduct as would be a private person or corporation. RCW 4.92.090. Given this all-encompassing waiver of sovereign immunity, we have said: " [defendants are governmental entities, but [282]*282in only rare instances does this preclude liability." Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 781, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).
We first identify the various statutory and common law duties of defendant DNR. Next we examine to whom each of these duties is owed; if a duty is owed by DNR solely to the public in general, the public duty doctrine will operate to foreclose a negligence claim by plaintiffs; if, on the other hand, DNR owes any particular duty to the plaintiffs, separate from the general public, the plaintiffs may bring a claim under one of the exceptions to the public duty doctrine. Hartley, at 781.
Initially, we consider DNR's potential liability as a landowner which negligently allowed a fire to escape from its land. Parenthetically we note that the fact that the initial small fire was caused by lightning is of no consequence:
. . . there may be negligence [by the landowner] ... in his failure to use due diligence in preventing the spread of a fire originating upon his own land though it so originate [d] without any act or fault of his own.
Sandberg v. Cavanaugh Timber Co., 95 Wash. 556, 558,164 P. 200 (1917).
The statutes governing landowner liability are found in RCW 76.04. The present contents of that chapter were recodified in 1986, after this fire, but DNR specifically adopts the recodified statutes as controlling.1
The obvious question is whether DNR is within the ambit of the statutes creating landowner duties. Clearly it is. RCW 76.04 specifically defines "owner of forest land," "landowner," or "owner" to include the owner of any public or private forest land. RCW 76.04.005. Further, even DNR must pay fire protection assessments for its land. RCW 76.04.610 provides that every nonfederal public body is liable for such assessment. Thus, the Legislature's express inclusion of DNR within the landowner category indicates [283]*283that the sections governing landowner liability apply to DNR.
An owner of forest land has a positive duty to provide adequate protection against the spread of fire thereon or therefrom. RCW 76.04.600.
The standard of care required of a landowner in preventing the spread of fire is set by RCW 76.04.730:
It is unlawful for any person to negligently allow fire originating on the person's own property to spread to the property of another.
By definition in the statute, RCW 76.04.005, DNR is a landowner, and has a duty as a landowner to provide adequate protection against the spread of fire from its land. By the unchallenged jury's answers, DNR has breached RCW 76.04.600 and .730.
As to a common law duty upon a landowner to use due care in preventing the spread of fire, DNR admits that such common law duty exists in Washington. Jordan v. Spokane, P.&S. Ry., 109 Wash. 476, 480-81, 186 P. 875 (1920); Sandberg v. Cavanaugh Timber Co., 95 Wash. 556, 558-62, 164 P. 200 (1917).
Where the federal government allegedly acted negligently in its capacity of landowner and fire fighter, the Ninth Circuit recognized
it is the law of Washington . . . that a land occupier has an affirmative obligation to use care to confine any fire on his premises, regardless of its origin, in favor of all persons off his premises who are subjected thereby to an unreasonable risk of damage due to escape of the fire.
Arnhold v. United States, 284 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1960) (vacating 166 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Wash. 1958)), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 876 (1961).
That court further noted that the federal government, by agreement,
had undertaken to protect all non-United States owned land in the region from fire and to take "immediate vigorous action" to control all fires breaking out in the protected area.
This agreement . . . would be the basis of an affirmative obligation of the United States to use care ... if there were no [284]*284other basis of liability on its part in its capacity as land occupier.
(Citations omitted.) Arnhold, at 328. See also 166 F. Supp. at 380, 386 (although its determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence establishing negligence was contrary to that of the Ninth Circuit, the District Court reached the same conclusions as to landowner and fire fighting duties under Washington law).
We have concluded that DNR had statutory and common law duties as a landowner. It is liable for its established negligence unless the public duty doctrine precludes liability. As noted above, it is only in "rare instances" that the total waiver of sovereign immunity by RCW 4.92.090 is not applicable.
DNR argues that this is one of those "rare instances" because its duties as a fire fighter are protected by the public duty doctrine. DNR can escape its liability as a landowner only if (1) the public duty doctrine is applicable here and (2) its landowner duty is "subsumed" into its claimed public duty.
We conclude that the public duty doctrine is not applicable here so DNR is liable for its negligence as to these plaintiffs. We emphasize the narrowness of this holding because of the peculiar state of this record and the unique dual, specific duties statutorily placed on DNR.
Our recent case of Bailey v. Forks, 108 Wn.2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987) summarized the principles of the public duty doctrine. As Bailey, at 265, and cases therein cited, point out, the fundamental inquiry is whether the governmental unit owed a duty to this particular plaintiff as contrasted to a duty owed to the public in general.
One of the situations in which the court has found an actionable duty is where a legislative enactment evidences an intent to identify a particular and circumscribed class of persons. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 676-77, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978).
[285]*285We hold that the statutory scheme here involved does identify a particular and circumscribed class of persons, including these plaintiffs, to whom multiple duties were owed by DNR.
Perhaps it would be wise and prudent to separate clearly the duties of DNR as a landowner and as a fire fighter. The Legislature has not done so, and in fact, has intermixed these duties. As delineated above RCW 76.04 places specific duties upon forest landowners regarding fire protection and suppression. RCW 76.04.600, .730. After placing these original duties upon the landowner and including DNR within the landowner category, the Legislature then mandates that DNR shall provide adequate protection if the landowner does not. If a fire starts and proper action is not taken to prevent its spread, DNR is ordered by statute to summarily suppress it. RCW 76.04.600, .610, .750.
Thus, DNR not only has a mandatory duty to suppress fires, RCW 76.04.610, .750, it has a concomitant duty as a landowner, RCW 76.04.600, .730. The Legislature itself has imposed upon DNR this peculiar set of duties by specifically defining "forest landowner," "owner of forest land," "landowner," or "owner" to include DNR. RCW 76.04-.005(9).
In addition to the above statutory scheme, we find specific intent to protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons. The statute under which DNR admits liability "under normal circumstances" identifies the protected class. By its terms the statute is designed to protect adjacent landowners because its purpose is to prevent the "spread [of fire] to the property of another." RCW 76.04-.730.
There is still more telling evidence of legislative intent to benefit adjoining landowners because if they do not provide the required fire protection, forest landowners are assessed by DNR to pay therefor, and then, by statute, DNR "shall provide such protection". RCW 76.04.610(1). Thus, the [286]*286very class of persons, forest landowners, who have the original obligation to provide fire protection are charged a special assessment to pay for that protection if they fail to provide it and DNR, in their place, provides such protection.
There is still more which illustrates how this whole scheme is aimed at the protection of forest landowners, not just the public in general. For instance, there is, by statute, a different assessment per acre for forest land east of the Cascade Mountains than for land west of the summit. There is even a differential based on the size of the parcel of forest land. RCW 76.04.610(1).
These plaintiffs paid their assessments. DNR stipulated that these plaintiffs relied upon DNR for fire protection. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 95-96 (Apr. 13, 1987).
This case is not the first judicial pronouncement upon the relationship of the special fire protection assessments to the landowner who paid them. In State ex rel. Sherman v. Pape, 103 Wash. 319, 321-22, 174 P. 468 (1918), the issue was whether the forest fire protection assessment had to be paid into the state general fund, subject to appropriation, or whether the assessment funds were trust funds not belonging in the general fund. The court held that the assessments were a trust fund. The court specifically categorized the assessments and their disbursement for fire protection to be "made for and on behalf of the private forest landowners, for their special benefit as well as incidentally for the general benefit on the whole public." (Italics ours.) Sherman, at 324. A general benefit to the public does not preclude an intent to provide protection to a specific class. Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wn.2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975).
Finally, we note that the Legislature has authorized DNR to enter upon any lands, public or private, to carry out its duties under RCW 76.04 and other statutes. Such entry shall not be a trespass, per the statute, but nothing in that statute "shall limit or diminish any liability which would otherwise exist as a result of the acts or omissions" of DNR. [287]*287RCW 76.01.060. This pronouncement by the Legislature indicates an assumption that DNR is potentially liable for its negligent conduct under the statute.
DNR concedes that it has a duty, and therefore liability for breach of that duty, under RCW 76.04.730; it states "[w]e do not dispute that Natural Resources would be liable under RCW 76.04.730 for the escape of a fire from its lands under normal circumstances." Brief of Appellant, at 54. Obviously DNR believes that more than one fire is the less than normal circumstance which precludes liability, for DNR states: "[w]e do not contest that the State could be liable in a single fire situation." Brief of Appellant, at 58.
DNR then goes on to argue that when it responds to numerous fires (more than one by its own standard) in the same area (how large an area we are not told) then it has no liability because its landowner duty is "subsumed" into its public duty to prevent and suppress forest fires. Brief of Appellant, at 54-55.
This distinction defies logic. To repeat, DNR's analysis is that it would be liable to these plaintiffs if it were negligent (as it was) in failing to prevent the spread of a single fire from its lands to the plaintiffs' lands. However, because there was more than one fire, DNR argues it is not liable.
There is nothing in the statutes to lend the slightest support to DNR's novel theory. Indeed, DNR cites no precedent, either direct or by analogy, which has even considered its on-again/off-again theory of liability/no liability, much less adopted it.
Despite the lack of precedent, we have examined carefully the reasons advanced by DNR for adoption of its theory, always bearing in mind, however, that DNR admits it would be liable if it were fighting only a single fire. DNR advances three policy reasons why it should escape liability for its negligence.
First, DNR argues if it is liable here, then it would attach higher priority to fighting fire on its own lands. We are not persuaded by this make-weight argument, nor was the trial court. The trial court precisely and logically rejected the [288]*288defendant's argument. The court's analysis, as follows, is compelling:
DNR's conduct should be governed by whether it was negligent in allocating resources and the manner in which it responded to the fire the same as any other private landowner and not necessarily whether or not the fire started on its property or elsewhere then spread across its property.
Liability would flow from its negligent suppression of or failure to suppress a fire starting on or spreading onto its land then to that of another versus a fire that did not start or spread onto property.
In other words, if a fire of higher priority in terms of life, property and timber or other value started on private property and DNR committed to it and then a fire started on DNR's property and DNR could not respond effectively to it and fighting both fires exceeded its ability to adequately suppress both fires, DNR could not be said to be negligent as a landowner if unable to stop the fire that occurred on DNR property.
Oral Decision of the Court, at 13 (June 12, 1987).
In other words, defendant's potential liability is not absolute; its liability depends upon the circumstances. Here there was extensive evidence of all the problems facing the defendant in fighting multiple fires. But the evidence of defendant's negligence, under these facts, was so great that defendant does not even challenge the jury's conclusion that it was in fact negligent.
The defendant's second policy reason why it should escape liability for its negligence is that it would be unfair to subject it to "after-the-fact, courtroom scrutiny of emergency firefighting decisions.11 Brief of Appellant, at 56-57. Needless to say, defendant cites no legal authority to support its position for this argument. Moreover, the same argument could be made for any professional defendant or product manufacturer defendant, or, indeed, for the ordinary driver whose driving is examined after the fact by a jury.
Defendant's argument must fail when one recognizes that it chose not to challenge the evidence supporting the jury's finding of negligence, and that it chose not to challenge the instructions under which the jury found that negligence. [289]*289Thus, defendant tacitly admits the soundness and fairness of the jury's scrutiny of its emergency fire fighting decisions.
The conclusion is inescapable that defendant was negligent, admits it was negligent, and can only escape its judgment liability by this court holding it immune. The Legislature has abolished defendant's sovereign immunity, RCW 4.92.090, yet it is immunity which defendant seeks.
The third policy argument advanced by defendant for its claim of immunity is that its duty as a landowner was "subsumed into its public duty as a matter of fact." Brief of Appellant, at 57. Defendant argues that it was acting in its governmental capacity in fighting these fires. Brief of Appellant, at 55. RCW 4.92.090 renders meaningless that distinction. This argument highlights the uncontrovertible fact that what defendant actually wants is for this court to resurrect sovereign immunity.
DNR's argument confuses the public duty doctrine, which negates the existence of a duty to a particular plaintiff, with sovereign immunity, which admits the existence of a duty and a tort for its breach, but denies liability because of immunity. J&B Dev. Co. v. King Cy., 100 Wn.2d 299, 669 P.2d 468, 41 A.L.R.4th 86 (1983), overruled on other grounds in Taylor v. Stevens Cy., 111 Wn.2d 159, 168, 759 P.2d 447 (1988). In other words, defendant is presenting the public duty doctrine as a defense to liability, not to negate the existence of a duty. Sovereign immunity is a defense to liability, but the public duty doctrine is not.
In summary, we hold that DNR is liable as a landowner under Washington's statutory and common law and that the public duty doctrine does not negate the jury's unchallenged finding that it was negligent.
The judgment is affirmed.
Callow, C.J., Utter, Dolliver, Andersen, Durham, and Smith, JJ., and Pearson, J. Pro Tern., concur.