NY Life Ins. Co. v. Begashaw

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 20, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-02081
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE Case No. 2:22-cv-02081-KJM-JDP COMPANY, 12 FINDINGS AND Plaintiff, RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. THAT PLAINTIFF'S 14 MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT MICHAEL BEGASHAW; ENDALE AGAINST DEFENDANT MICHAEL 15 TESSEMA, BEGASHAW BE GRANTED 16 Defendants. ECF No. 24 17 18 Plaintiff New York Life Insurance Company brought this interpleader action pursuant to 19 28 U.S.C. § 1335 to determine the proper recipient of a death benefit that is due and payable 20 under a life insurance policy that plaintiff issued to the insured, Mariamawit Tessema, before her 21 death in 2021. ECF No. 1. The complaint names two of Tessema’s family members as 22 defendants: her son, Michael Begashaw, and her father, Endale Tessema (“Endale”).1 At issue is 23 plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against defendant Begashaw, who failed to file a response 24 after service of the complaint. See ECF Nos. 15 & 24. 25 On June 13, 2024, counsel for plaintiff and defendant Endale appeared for a status 26 1 To avoid confusion, I refer to Mariamawit Tessema as “Tessema” and Endale Tessema 27 as “Endale.” I also note that the complaint originally named the estate of Ms. Tessema as a defendant, and the district judge dismissed the estate from the action on February 5, 2024. See 28 ECF Nos. 1, 23, 31. 1 conference. ECF No. 39. I advised plaintiff’s counsel that the court lacked jurisdiction because 2 plaintiff had not deposited the death benefit with the court, a jurisdictional requirement for 3 statutory interpleader. Plaintiff subsequently deposited the fund. After reviewing the record, I 4 recommend granting the motion for default judgment against defendant Begashaw, as explained 5 below. 6 Background 7 Plaintiff issued a life insurance policy to Mariamawit Tessema that provided $35,000 as a 8 death benefit. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. Tessema designated her son, Michael Begashaw, as the sole 9 beneficiary. Id. ¶ 9; ECF No. 1-1. 10 On July 23, 2021, Tessema died as a result of multiple sharp force injuries, and the 11 policy’s death benefit became due and payable. ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; ECF No. 1-4. Plaintiff asserts 12 that Begashaw was arrested and charged with her murder. Because Begashaw was a minor at the 13 time of his arrest, he was housed at the Youth Detention Facility (“YDF”) in Sacramento and 14 remains incarcerated there.2 ECF No. 1 ¶ 15; ECF No. 24-1 ¶ 3. 15 Under California’s “slayer statute,” a named beneficiary of a life insurance policy “who 16 feloniously and intentionally kills . . . the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not 17 entitled to any benefit under the . . . policy, . . . and it becomes payable as though the killer had 18 predeceased the decedent.” Cal. Prob. Code § 252. Plaintiff asserts that, since Begashaw remains 19 in custody, “his involvement in [Tessema’s] death has not been ruled out.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. If 20 Begashaw is found to have intentionally killed his mother, he would be disqualified from 21 receiving the death benefit under the “slayer statute,” and plaintiff would be required to pay the 22 amount to another beneficiary in accordance with the policy’s terms. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 18-19. 23 The policy states that, if there is no beneficiary at the time of the insured’s death, “the 24 benefit will be payable to the insured’s estate, or at [plaintiff’s] option to the insured’s surviving 25 relative(s) in the following order of survival: spouse or domestic partner as defined by law, as 26 2 When filing the motion for default judgment on November 30, 2023, plaintiff’s counsel 27 stated in a supporting declaration that Begashaw was being held at the YDF pending his criminal trial for Ms. Tessema’s murder. ECF No. 24-1 ¶ 3. There is no indication in the docket that 28 Begashaw has been released from custody or was transferred to a different facility. 1 applicable; children equally; parents equally; or brothers and sisters equally.” ECF No. 1-5 at 2. 2 Plaintiff has determined that Tessema’s father, Endale, is her closest surviving relative in the 3 event that Begashaw is legally barred from receiving the death benefit. ECF No. 1 ¶ 3; ECF No. 4 24 at 4. 5 Faced with the uncertainty of Begashaw’s entitlement to the death benefit and to avoid 6 exposure to multiple liability, on November 16, 2022, plaintiff filed the complaint in interpleader 7 under 28 U.S.C. § 1335. ECF No. 1 ¶ 20. Plaintiff asserts that it cannot determine “factually or 8 legally” who is entitled to receive the death benefit. Id. The complaint seeks entry of judgment: 9 (1) requiring defendants to litigate their claims between themselves for the death benefit; 10 (2) permanently enjoining defendants from bringing any proceeding in any forum against plaintiff 11 involving the death benefit or the policy; (3) requiring that defendants or the court settle the 12 claims and determine which individual should receive the death benefit; and (4) discharging 13 plaintiff from all further liability to defendants relating to the policy or death benefit upon deposit 14 of the death benefit with the court. ECF No. 1 at 5-6. 15 On August 7, 2023, a senior deputy probation officer personally served Begashaw by 16 hand-delivering a copy of the complaint and summons.3 ECF No. 15; ECF No. 24-1 at ¶ 3. 17 Begashaw did not file a response to the complaint, and the deadline for doing so has long passed.4 18 Pursuant to plaintiff’s request, the Clerk of Court entered default on November 2, 2023. ECF 19

20 3 Plaintiff filed two motions to extend time to serve, which the district judge granted. ECF Nos. 9-13. In a joint status report, plaintiff explained that because Begashaw’s juvenile court 21 records are confidential, it was difficult to ascertain his location. ECF No. 18 at 3-4; see City of Eureka v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. App. 5th 755, 761, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 134 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2016) 22 (noting that California juvenile court records generally are confidential with certain exceptions). 23 Ultimately, plaintiff filed a petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court seeking disclosure of Begashaw’s juvenile case file pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code 24 § 827(a)(1)(Q). ECF No. 18 at 4. Begashaw’s attorney objected to the petition but eventually provided a service address at the YDF after negotiations with plaintiff’s counsel. Id. 25 4 The docket reflects that defendant Endale is a citizen of Ethiopia, and that he waived service on December 1, 2022. ECF Nos. 5, 17, 17-1. Endale submitted a letter addressed to the 26 court confirming his participation in this action, which the parties stipulated to construe as his 27 answer to the complaint. ECF Nos. 17, 17-1, 19, 22, 29. The district judge appointed counsel for Endale “for the limited purpose of representing defendant with respect to taking steps to receive 28 the death benefit relative to the Estate of Mariamawit Tessema.” ECF No. 25. 1 Nos. 20 & 21. Plaintiff then moved for default judgment against Begashaw. ECF No. 24. 2 Plaintiff asserts that the motion seeks equitable relief in the form of entry of judgment: 3 (1) discharging plaintiff from any and all liability to Begashaw regarding the policy and the death 4 benefit; (2) enjoining Begashaw from bringing any action or claim in any forum against plaintiff 5 that relates to the policy or death benefit; and (3) releasing all claims, rights, interests and actions 6 between Begashaw and plaintiff with respect to the policy or death benefit. Id.; ECF No. 24-2 at 7 2. 8 After plaintiff filed the motion for default judgment, the undersigned directed plaintiff to 9 deposit the death benefit with the court in accordance with Local Rule 150 and Federal Rule of 10 Civil Procedure 67. See ECF No. 32. The docket reflects that on August 12, 2024, plaintiff 11 deposited the death benefit, including interest, with the Clerk of Court in an interest-bearing 12 account.5 See docket entry on 08/12/2024 (receipt number 200008521 for $36,575.97); ECF Nos. 13 40, 41. 14 Legal Standard 15 Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. Under Rule 55(a), the court clerk 16 enters default when a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown 17 by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once the clerk enters default, a plaintiff may 18 apply to the district court for a default judgment under Rule 55(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 19 An initial entry of default by the court clerk, however, does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to 20 a court-ordered judgment. “[T]he general rule [is] that default judgments are ordinarily 21 disfavored.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). “Whenever 22 it is reasonably possible, cases should be decided upon their merits.” Pena v. Seguros La 23 Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Additionally, a court may 24 enter default judgment “against a minor or incompetent person only if represented by a general

25 5 Pursuant to the stipulation to deposit funds and for interpleader relief filed by counsel for plaintiff and Endale, the district judge ordered that upon the deposit of the death benefit: plaintiff 26 was discharged from any and all liability to Endale concerning the policy or death benefit; Endale 27 was permanently enjoined from bringing any action or claim in any forum involving plaintiff and relating to the policy or death benefit; and all claims or interests that Endale might otherwise have 28 held against plaintiff concerning the policy or death benefit were released. See ECF No. 41 at 2. 1 guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 2 The decision to grant or deny a default judgment is within the court’s discretion. See 3 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. When exercising this discretion, the court may consider the following 4 factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive 5 claim, (3) the sufficiency of the pleading, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the 6 possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable 7 neglect, and (7) the strong public policy favoring decisions on the merits. See id. at 1471-72. In 8 this context, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those 9 concerning the amount of damages. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 10 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 11 Discussion 12 A. Jurisdiction, Service, and Status of Defendant 13 Before determining whether the Eitel factors support entry of default judgment, the 14 undersigned first addresses the questions of jurisdiction and service of process. See In re Tuli, 15 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). As noted above, plaintiff’s complaint invokes statutory 16 interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335. District courts have original jurisdiction over statutory 17 interpleader actions if: (1) the amount in dispute exceeds $500; (2) there are two or more adverse 18 claimants of diverse citizenship; and (3) the plaintiff has deposited the money or property in 19 dispute into the registry of the court or posts an adequate bond. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1). The 20 jurisdictional requirements are met in this case: the death benefit is $35,000; the defendants are 21 diverse, as Begashaw is a citizen of California and Endale is a citizen of Ethiopia; and plaintiff 22 has deposited the insurance proceeds with the court. 23 The undersigned also finds that service of process was sufficient. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 24 § 2361, the nationwide service of process provision, “[i]n any civil action of interpleader or in the 25 nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all 26 claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in 27 any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the 28 interpleader action until further order of the court.” The proof of service shows that Begashaw 1 was personally served with a copy of the complaint and summons. ECF No. 15; S.E.C. v. Internet 2 Solutions for Business Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A signed return of service 3 constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service which can be overcome only by strong and 4 convincing evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 Neither does it appear that Begashaw’s status precludes entry of default judgment against 6 him. In connection with plaintiff’s request for entry of default under Rule 55(a), plaintiff’s 7 counsel submitted a declaration stating that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, Begashaw is 8 not legally incompetent; is not a minor, although he was a minor at the time of Tessema’s death; 9 and is not in active military service. ECF No. 20-1 ¶¶7-9; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 10 2. Eitel Factors 11 A. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 12 Considering the first Eitel factor, if default judgment is not entered against Begashaw, 13 plaintiff would suffer prejudice because it would be denied the principal benefits of an 14 interpleader action which are “to protect stakeholders from multiple liability” and to avoid “the 15 expense of multiple litigation.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bayona, 223 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 16 2000); see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Denying entry of default judgment would, in turn, deny 17 plaintiff the “certainty and finality that judgment in an interpleader is intended to provide.” 18 Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Est. of Ward, 2011 WL 5241257, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011). 19 This factor weighs in favor of granting plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 20 B. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint 21 The undersigned next considers the merits of plaintiff’s claims and the sufficiency of the 22 complaint. These factors are often treated as the most important and can be analyzed together, as 23 they ask whether the allegations in the complaint “are sufficient to state a claim on which the 24 [plaintiff] may recover.” See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); Fed. Nat. 25 Mortg. Ass’n v. George, 2015 WL 4127958, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2015); Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC 26 IT Educ. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 27 The requirements for an interpleader action have been met when there is “a single fund at 28 issue” and “there are adverse claimants to that fund.” Mack v. Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 1 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that 2 defendants have competing claims to the death benefit that could expose plaintiff to multiple 3 liabilities. Plaintiff has deposited the amount due under the policy with the court, and there is no 4 indication of bad faith on plaintiff’s part. Additionally, plaintiff asserts in the motion that it only 5 seeks equitable relief, including its discharge from any further liability to defendants in 6 connection with the policy and death benefit, and that “[t]he issue of who is entitled to receive the 7 Death Benefit is . . . to be advanced by the Defendants, and the Company takes no position on this 8 issue.” ECF No. 24 at 6. Accordingly, as plaintiff seeks protection from potentially conflicting 9 claims of the interpleader defendants, the undersigned finds that the second and third Eitel factors 10 weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 11 C. Sum of Money at Stake 12 The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake, does not weigh in favor or against the 13 entry of default judgment. This factor is neutral because plaintiff is not asserting an interest in the 14 death benefit and, instead, has deposited the funds with the court. See Transamerica Life Ins. Co. 15 v. Est. of Ward, 2011 WL 5241257, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011). 16 D. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 17 The fifth Eitel factor considers whether a dispute exists regarding material facts. Eitel, 18 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Because Begashaw is in default, all of plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual 19 allegations in the complaint are taken as true. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. 20 Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim in interpleader, and it appears that Begashaw is unlikely to 21 dispute those grounds. As discussed above, plaintiff is a disinterested party with no claim to the 22 insurance proceeds and has asked the court to adjudicate the disbursement of the death benefit in 23 accordance with the policy. See Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Est. of Diaz, 2024 WL 35453, at *4 24 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2024). This factor favors default judgment. 25 D. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect 26 The sixth Eitel factor considers whether the default was due to excusable neglect. Eitel, 27 782 F.2d at 1472. Begashaw was personally served on August 7, 2023, at the YDF. ECF No. 15. 28 The Clerk of Court entered default on November 2, 2023. ECF No. 21. Plaintiff moved for 1 default judgment on November 30, 2023. ECF No. 24. Although plaintiff has failed to defend 2 himself, the undersigned is aware that he has been incarcerated in a juvenile facility throughout 3 the pendency of this case. It is not apparent if his criminal prosecution is still ongoing, or if the 4 juvenile court made a determination as to his culpability. Under these circumstances, the 5 undersigned concludes that this factor is neutral. 6 E. Policy Disfavoring Default Judgment 7 The seventh Eitel factor concerns the policy that, whenever possible, cases should be tried 8 on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Numerous district courts have concluded, however, that 9 this policy, standing alone, is not dispositive, especially when a defendant fails to appear. See 10 Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 5241257 at *4 (listing cases). Accordingly, this factor does 11 not preclude the entry of default judgment. 12 While the factors weigh in favor of default judgment, the undersigned notes that plaintiff’s 13 proposed order on the motion for default judgment does not seek a determination concerning the 14 rightful beneficiary of the death benefit. See ECF No. 24-2. And under the circumstances of this 15 case, where the record lacks facts that conclusively establish that Begashaw is disqualified by 16 operation of law from receiving the death benefit, it appears that such a determination would be 17 premature. See Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Est. of Diaz, 2024 WL 35453, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 18 2024) (recommending that entry of default judgment against the interpleader defendant who, as 19 only a suspect in insured’s killing, was not legally disentitled to benefits, and finding “it would be 20 premature . . . to adjudicate the issue of who among the Interpleader Defendants is rightfully 21 entitled to the benefits under the Policies”). Even though Begashaw, after defaulting, is deemed 22 to have admitted the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, those facts only show that he 23 would be barred from receiving the death benefit if he is found to have intentionally killed 24 Tessema. At this time, there is no indication in the record that the juvenile court made such a 25 determination. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Ablaza, 2021 WL 4077980, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26 8, 2021) (denying motion for default judgment as premature because the complaint’s allegations 27 showed that the interpleader defendant “may be entitled to the policy proceeds in the future, 28 depending on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him”); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. 1 | v. Jace, 2016 WL 11747187, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (denying default judgment because 2 | the complaint’s allegations did not establish that the beneficiary was convicted of murdering the 3 | insured and thereby disentitled from receiving insurance benefits). 4 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that: 5 1. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, ECF No. 24, be granted and that default 6 | judgment be entered against defendant Begashaw. The entry of default judgment, however, shall 7 | not be construed as a determination of the rightful beneficiary to the death benefit. 8 2. Plaintiff be discharged from any and all liability to defendant Begashaw regarding 9 | the life insurance policy issued to Mariamawit Tessema and the death benefit under the policy. 10 3. Defendant Begashaw be permanently enjoined from bringing any action or 11 || proceeding in any forum against plaintiff relating to the life insurance policy issued to 12 | Mariamawit Tessema’s or the death benefit under the policy. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days of 15 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 16 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 17 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 18 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 19 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 20 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 21 | 1991). 22 73 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ( q Sty — Dated: _ August 20, 2024 Q_-——— 25 JEREMY D,. PETERSON 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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