Nucor Fastener Division v. United States

751 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1380, 34 C.I.T. 1380, 32 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2121, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 126
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedOctober 22, 2010
DocketSlip Op. 10-121; Court 09-00534
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 751 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Nucor Fastener Division v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Nucor Fastener Division v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1380, 34 C.I.T. 1380, 32 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2121, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 126 (cit 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

WALLACH, Judge.

I

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nucor Fastener Division (“Nu-cor” or “Plaintiff’) challenges the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or the “Department”) decision not to investigate an alleged subsidization by the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”) of the Chinese standard steel fastener industry through currency manipulation. Because Nucor’s challenge is unripe, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant United States (“Defendant”) and Defendanb-Intervenors XL Screw Corporation, The Hillman Group, Bossard North America, Inc., and Heads and Threads International, LLC (collectively, “Defendant-Intervenors”) are GRANT *1329 ED, and this action is dismissed in its entirety, but without prejudice.

II

BACKGROUND

A

Legal Overview

Before either antidumping or countervailing duties (“CVD”) can be imposed, Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) must each render affirmative determinations after conducting separate investigations. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673. “The central aim of the antidumping laws is to protect domestic industries from foreign manufactured goods that are sold injuriously in the United States at prices below the fair market value of those goods in their home market.” U.S. Steel v. United States, 637 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1204 (CIT 2009).

[CVDs] are imposed on foreign products that are imported, sold, or likely to be sold in the United States, where the foreign government is directly or indirectly subsidizing the manufacture, production, or export of that merchandise. The purpose of CVDs is to level the playing field in international trade by offsetting the unfair advantage that a foreign exporter receives through subsidies.

Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States, 31 CIT 1213, 1217-18, 502 F.Supp.2d 1334 (2007) (citations omitted).

In its antidumping and CVD investigations, Commerce respectively determines whether the subject imports are, or are “likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value,” 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1), and whether “the subject imports are in fact being subsidized,” Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1998). Commerce in its CVD investigation determines, inter alia, whether the alleged subsidy “is a specific subsidy, in law or in fact, to an enterprise or industry within the jurisdiction of the authority providing the subsidy.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D). “The specificity test was intended to function as a rule of reason and to avoid the imposition of [CVDs] in situations where, because of the widespread availability and use of a subsidy, the benefit of the subsidy is spread throughout an economy.” The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. 103-316 (1994), 1 at 222, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4242 (emphasis omitted).

ITC undertakes a related inquiry in investigating allegations of dumping or subsidization. Antidumping duties and CVDs can be imposed if ITC “determines that— (A) an industry in the United States — (i) is materially injured; or (ii) is threatened with material injury.” 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2). In its investigation, ITC “cumulatively assessfes] the volume and effects of imports of the subject merchandise” from countries that are subject *1330 to the review. Id. § 1677(7)(G). Whether petitioners allege dumping or subsidization, in its investigations ITC renders a preliminary determination, “based on the information available to it at the time of the determination, whether there is a reasonable indication” of injury or threat thereof. Id. §§ 1671b; 1673b. If ITC at this preliminary stage “makes a negative determination ... the investigation shall be terminated.” Id. § 1671b(a)(l); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.207(d) (“An investigation terminates automatically upon publication in the Federal Register of the ... Commission’s negative preliminary ... determination.”).

B

The Administrative Proceedings

In September 2009, Nucor filed anti-dumping and CVD petitions with Commerce and ITC concerning imports of certain standard steel fasteners from PRC and Taiwan. See Certain Standard Steel Fasteners From [PRC]: Initiation of [CVD] Investigation, 74 Fed.Reg. 54,543, 54,543 (October 22, 2009) (“Initiation Notice ”); Certain Standard Steel Fasteners From [PRC] and Taiwan: Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,537, 54,538 (October 22, 2009); Certain Standard Steel Fasteners From China and Taiwan, 74 Fed.Reg. 49,889, 49,890 (September 29, 2009) {“ITC Notice ”). ITC that month instituted a preliminary investigation “to determine whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury ... by reason of imports from China and/or Taiwan.” ITC Notice, 74 Fed.Reg. at 49,889.

In October 2009, Commerce “initiat[ed] a CVD investigation to determine whether manufacturers, producers, or exporters of standard steel fasteners in the PRC receive countervailable subsidies.” Initiation Notice, 74 Fed.Reg. at 54,545. The period of investigation was calendar year 2008. Id. at 54,543. Commerce included in its CVD investigation twenty-six specific programs that Nucor alleged to have provided countervailable subsidies. Id. at 54,-545-46. Commerce declined to investigate alleged currency manipulation, stating as follows:

[Nucor] alleges that the [government-maintained exchange rate effectively prevents the appreciation of the Chinese currency ([“RMB”]) against the U.S. dollar. Therefore, when producers/exporters in the PRC sell their dollars at official foreign exchange banks, as required by law, the producers receive more RMB than they otherwise would if the value of the RMB were set by market mechanisms.... [Nucor] has failed to sufficiently allege that the receipt of the excess RMB is contingent on export or export performance because receipt of the excess RMB is independent of the type of transaction or commercial activity for which dollars are converted or of the particular company or individuals converting the dollars. Therefore, we do not plan on investigating this program because [Nucor] has failed to properly allege the specificity element.

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751 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1380, 34 C.I.T. 1380, 32 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2121, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nucor-fastener-division-v-united-states-cit-2010.