Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. the Ticket Exchange, Inc.

793 F. Supp. 976, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10020, 1992 WL 136629
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJune 5, 1992
DocketC91-745D
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 793 F. Supp. 976 (Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. the Ticket Exchange, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. the Ticket Exchange, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 976, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10020, 1992 WL 136629 (W.D. Wash. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

DIMMICK, District Judge.

The Court has before it the motion of plaintiff Northwest Airlines, Inc. for partial summary judgment and injunctive relief, and the motion of defendant, The Ticket Exchange, Inc., for summary judgment dismissal of all of plaintiffs claims. After full consideration of the facts and arguments presented, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to the extent of declaring defendant to be in violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), RCW 19.86.020 et seq. and granting injunctive relief pursuant to RCW 19.86.090. Further, the Court concludes that Northwest is entitled to compensation under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The remainder of plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s motion in its entirety are denied.

FACTS

Plaintiff Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Northwest”) brought this action against defendant The Ticket Exchange (“Exchange”) seeking damages and injunctive relief because of the Exchange’s brokering of Northwest’s frequent flyer certificates. These certificates are awarded to frequent flyers of Northwest as a bonus.

Northwest began a frequent flyer program entitled “WORLDPERKS” in 1986. The WORLDPERKS program rewards customers on the basis of numbers of miles flown. The WORLDPERKS rules permit the transfer of frequent flyer awards, but prohibit the sale or brokerage of the awards. Northwest’s Fly-Write tickets have a space for the original recipient’s signature, by which WORLDPERKS members certify that they have not and will not receive compensation for the ticket.

The Exchange admits its past purchase and sale of Northwest Fly-Write tickets and has expressed its intent to continue in this activity. The Exchange has advertised its willingness to purchase Fly-Write tickets. The Exchange has known since at least 1989 that it was the policy of Northwest that Fly-Write tickets were not to be sold and that the Fly-Write ticket contained the words “void if sold.” See Deposition of Pellham Jackson, at 78-115. It is admitted that if the original recipient did not sign the Fly-Write ticket then someone from the Exchange would do so. An Exchange agent also instructed ticket purchasers to state if questioned that the ticket was a gift. Deposition of Jackson, at 78.

Northwest submits an affidavit to the effect that the Exchange sold $185,774 worth of Fly-Write tickets between August 23, 1989 and July 30, 1991. Northwest asserts the value of these tickets as $360,-579 calculated on the basis of Northwest’s lowest regular fare.

The Exchange states that it was never notified by Northwest that it should not broker the Fly-Write tickets, despite the Exchange’s advertising that it would purchase such tickets. Northwest admits knowledge of brokering activities since the inception of the program. Brennan Deposition, at 63. The Exchange states that it believed that Northwest acquiesced in the brokerage of its tickets and benefitted from the sales in terms of increased good will. ■

Northwest does not have any specific facts as to persons who used a Fly-Write ticket brokered by the Exchange (or any other broker) who otherwise would have purchased a ticket from Northwest. Northwest agents, however, express their opinion that brokering distorts the economics of Northwest’s WORLDPERKS pro *978 gram and that Northwest is deprived of the revenue that goes to the Exchange which would otherwise be spent on a ticket purchased from Northwest.

Northwest’s complaint filed May 30,1991 asserts federal question jurisdiction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.); the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity); with pendent jurisdiction over state claims. Northwest’s claims are:

I. Fraud;
II. Conspiracy to commit fraud and abetting fraud;
III. RICO (section 1962(b) and section 1962(c));
IV. Washington Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86.020);
V. Tortious interference with contract;
VI. Interference with prospective economic advantage;
VII. Conversion; and
VIII. Lanham Act (trademark) violation.

Northwest’s motion for partial summary judgment seeks a finding of liability under Claims I, II, IV and V.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

The Exchange seeks summary judgment dismissal of all of plaintiff’s claims. Its motion is largely premised on the lack of evidence of actual damages to Northwest. 1 The Exchange also asserts the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel and laches.

The Court will discuss first the Exchange’s arguments for summary judgment dismissal of all of Northwest’s claims and incorporate within that discussion Northwest’s response on the damage issue.

The Exchange relies on Northwest’s lack of specific damage evidence to defeat all of Northwest’s claims,. relying on Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1990). That case similarly involved transfer of airline frequent flyer bonuses. There, the Ninth Circuit held that the reasonableness of Transworld’s tariffs required an evidentiary hearing; but that the policy against restraints on alienation of property would not defeat enforcement of frequent flyer awards as such awards are more properly characterized as contracts. These points are not at issue here. The Transworld court did reverse the district court’s issuance of an injunction and remanded for a determination of actual damages, noting four possible methods for determining damages: (1) displacement of legitimate frequent flyers; (2) displacement of passengers who would otherwise pay full fare; (3) increased use of frequent flyer bonuses because of their sales; (4) use of frequent flyer bonus tickets by passengers who would otherwise purchase a ticket from the airline. Id. at 691-92. The circuit court noted that the district court had relied on only the first two theories and cast doubt on the validity of the first. Analysis of the tort claims was premised on California law.

Northwest counters by asserting its so-called “stowaway” theory to establish fact of damages. The airline insists that it is under no obligation to provide transportation to a passenger without a valid ticket regardless of whether or not the plane is fully occupied.

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Bluebook (online)
793 F. Supp. 976, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10020, 1992 WL 136629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northwest-airlines-inc-v-the-ticket-exchange-inc-wawd-1992.