Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Lujan

872 F.2d 901, 1989 WL 34568
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 14, 1989
DocketNo. 88-3819
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 872 F.2d 901 (Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Lujan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Lujan, 872 F.2d 901, 1989 WL 34568 (9th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

The Northern Alaska Environmental Center, the Sierra Club, Alaska Chapter, and Denali Citizens Council (Appellants) appeal from the order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Interior and the National Park Service (NPS) on this claim for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the practice of the NPS of “approving plans of operations, methods of access, and transportation systems without determining whether the miner has a valid existing right to conduct mining operations.” Complaint, Count 3.1

We must decide whether Congress has imposed a duty upon the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the NPS (Secretary), to determine whether a discovery of valuable minerals has been made before approving a plan of operations for an un-patented mining claim on land within a national park. Because we conclude that none of the applicable statutes require the Secretary to conduct an on-site-field inspection and mineral examination to determine whether a valuable discovery has been made, we affirm.

I

We review an order granting summary judgment independently without deference to the district court’s conclusions. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir.1988). In determining whether any material fact is in dispute, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir.1986). In this matter both sides moved for a summary judgment.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are not in dispute. At the time this action was filed, the Secretary approved operation plans for unpatented mining claims within national park lands in Alaska without conducting on-site-field inspections and mineral examinations to determine whether a valuable discovery had been made.

II

Appellants assert that in enacting the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-5 (1982), Congress intended to restrict mining on national park land to valid patented and unpatented claims existing on the effective date of the statute. We agree.

ANILCA provides in pertinent part:

Subject to valid existing rights, and except as explicitly provided otherwise in the Act, the Federal lands within units of the National Park System established or expanded by or pursuant to this Act are hereby withdrawn from all forms of appropriation or disposal under the public land laws, including location, entry, and patent under the United States mining laws, disposition under the mineral leasing laws and from future selections by [904]*904the State of Alaska and native corporation.

16 U.S.C. § 410hh-5 (emphasis added).

Thus, since 1980, no one can enter national park land in Alaska for the purpose of locating minerals and filing a claim in order to engage in mining activities. Furthermore, a person possessing an unpatented claim2 cannot conduct mining activities without the Secretary’s prior approval. 36 C.F.R. § 9.9(a) (1988).

Appellants contend that under ANILCA the Secretary cannot approve a plan to operate on national park land that is subject to an unpatented mining claim without first determining whether it is valid. The parties disagree as to what the Secretary must do to verify the validity of a claim. We have previously described the steps necessary to establish the validity of a mining claim as follows:

First. The claimant must “locate” the claim. The procedures for locating a claim are prescribed by local custom or state law. See 30 U.S.C. § 28. These procedures usually require the claimant to (1) post some form of notice on the land; (2) mark the boundaries of the claim; (3) conduct preliminary excavation or discovery work on the claim; and (4) record a certificate in the local mining district office.
Second. The claimant must make a “discovery.” This requires the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit on the claim.

Dredge Corp. v. Conn, 733 F.2d 704, 705-706 (9th Cir.1984) (footnote and citation omitted).

Appellants assert that ANILCA requires that an on-site inspection be made by an expert to verify that a valuable mineral discovery has been made before the validity of an unpatented claim can be determined and mining operations can be approved by the Secretary. Contrary to Appellants’ contention, ANILCA does not prescribe to the Secretary the factors he should consider in exercising his discretion in determining the validity of a mining claim prior to approving a plan of operation. Appellants have not directed us to any language in ANILCA or its legislative history that demonstrates that Congress intended that a particular procedure be followed by the Secretary in conducting a validity examination. By its silence, Congress has left selection of the precise procedures employed in claim validity determination to the discretion of the Secretary.

Ill

Appellants claim that the Mining in the Parks Act (MPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1902 (1982) “contemplates that no mining will be approved unless the claim contains a valid discovery.” Appellants’ Opening Brief at 17. The quoted language is unsupported by citation to relevant statutory language or any court decision. We have examined the MPA. It does not impose a duty upon the Secretary to conduct a mineral examination to determine whether a valuable mineral discovery has been made by a claim. The MPA leaves it to the Secretary to determine the appropriate manner of determining whether an existing mineral right is valid.3 We are persuaded that [905]*905Congress has placed the question of the appropriate method of determining claim validity within the discretion of the Secretary.

IV

Appellants also insist that the failure of the Secretary to conduct a field inspection and a mineral examination to determine the value of a discovery prior to the approval of a plan of operation violates the Administrative Procedure Act because it is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).

We review agency action to determine if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To make this finding we “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”

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Related

Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Lujan
872 F.2d 901 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
872 F.2d 901, 1989 WL 34568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northern-alaska-environmental-center-v-lujan-ca9-1989.