North Construction Co. v. Mayo

432 F. Supp. 725, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14655
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedDecember 23, 1975
DocketG-75-560 CA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 432 F. Supp. 725 (North Construction Co. v. Mayo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
North Construction Co. v. Mayo, 432 F. Supp. 725, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14655 (W.D. Mich. 1975).

Opinion

OPINION ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MILES, District Judge.

This case is presently before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The plaintiff, North Construction Co. seeks to overturn a determination by the Environmental Protection Agency that it was not entitled to be awarded a contract for the construction of a secondary sewage treatment plant, and to enjoin the award of the contract to another bidder. The project planned to be located in Albion, Michigan was undertaken by the Calhoun County Board of Public Works and financed in large measure (75%) by a grant from the Environmental Protection Agency, pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Amendments of 1972, specifically 33 U.S.C. § 1282.

The bid proposal for the project consisted of three parts: a single lump sum for a number of items; unit price bids for 19 items of work; and unit prices for three contingent items which had no effect on the total of the bid. Plaintiff tendered a bid, which was revealed to be the lowest of those submitted. At the same time it was *727 discovered that plaintiff had not submitted unit prices for a number of the items of the bid proposal. Thereafter, North promptly prepared the complete submission, certifying the same to the Board of Public Works within 25 hours of the bid opening. The Board of Public Works determined that these omissions rendered the North bid unresponsive on August 4, 1975, and awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder, Associated Mechanical Services. The City Council of Albion concurred on August 6, 1975. Thereupon, North filed a protest with the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the provisions of 40 CPR 35.-939(a) contending that this was only an inadvertent oversight without substantial effect upon the bid. The parties then followed the procedure set forth in the E.P.A. regulations, which culminated in the administrative ruling at issue here.

After a meeting between the parties, the Director of the Board of Public Works forwarded to North a statement explaining why the bid was considered to be unresponsive. This was followed by the submission of a letter from the project consulting engineers and a legal opinion from the County Prosecutor, both of the effect that North’s bid was neither complete nor responsive.

On September 19, 1975, North filed a Request for Review as provided for in 40 CFR 35.939(b), along with a brief and other documents. Submissions by the other parties followed, and on November 13, 1975, the Regional Administrator upheld the Board’s decision to reject North Construction’s “bid.” This suit followed initiated on November 24,1975 by way of a request for a Temporary Restraining Order. On that date, a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause were issued restraining defendants from consummating this contract, and setting a date for a hearing. In preparation for the hearing, briefing was received from all parties, along with a motion to intervene by Associated Mechanical Services, the successful, although not the lowest bidder.

On the appointed hearing date, there being no objection, and the Court having determined that the addition of Associated Mechanical Services would not delay or prejudice the rights of the parties already in the case, the motion to intervene by Associated was granted. The Court then heard oral argument on the instant motion and continued from the bench the current restraining order, pending its ruling on the motion.

Plaintiff’s case rests upon the allegation that the E.P.A. violated its own regulations in its ruling thereby depriving plaintiff of its constitutional due process rights, and providing this Court the power under the Administrative Procedure Act to review and overturn the Regional Administrator. Defendants argue that the failure to submit unit prices rendered the bid a nullity, that this defect was indeed substantial and that all the defendants were fully justified in rejecting it.

In assessing this request for injunctive relief, we are obligated to keep in mind that while the grant of a preliminary injunction rests in the Court’s sound judicial discretion, injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should be rendered with great caution. Corning Glass Works v. Lady Cornella, Inc., 305 F.Supp. 1229 (E.D.Mich. 1969). 7 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 65.04(1).

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly set forth the criteria to be applied in an application for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff must show (1) that his case has the higher probability of success on the merits; (2) that his damages are irreparable; (3) that the balance of injury favors grant of the injunction; and (4) that injunctive relief is in the best interest of the public. Garlock Inc. v. United Seal, Inc., 404 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1968); Cincinnati Electronics Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1975), 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948. Applying these guidelines to the instant case, plaintiff’s first task is to convince the Court of the likelihood that the Regional Administrator’s ruling will not stand the scrutiny of full judicial review. The case law instructs that in reviewing this type of administrative de *728 termination, the standard is that of “arbitrary, capricious ... or otherwise not in accordance with the law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Cincinnati Electronics Corp., supra, Keco Industries v. Laird, 318 F.Supp. 1361 (D. D.C. 1970).

This standard has been held to mean that:

“A court has no warrant to set aside agency action as arbitrary or capricious when those words mean no more than that the judges would have handled the matter differently had they been agency members. Judicial intervention must, instead, be rested upon a demonstration that the agency action has transgressed the statutory boundaries.”

Calcutta East Coast of India and East Pakistan/USA Conference v. Federal Maritime Commission, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 399 F.2d 994, 997 (1968), quoted in M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 455 F.2d 1289, 1299 (1971).

' Quoting from a number of points in the E.P.A. ruling, North’s central contention is that the Regional Administrator utilized an improper burden of proof, in violation of the Agency’s regulations. E.P.A. regulations spell out the general policies governing the award of contracts under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, along with many of the details of the award process:

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432 F. Supp. 725, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/north-construction-co-v-mayo-miwd-1975.