North Coast Rivers Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 30, 2020·No. 1:16-cv-00307·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTH COAST RIVERS ALLIANCE, et al., No. 1:16-cv-00307-DAD-SKO Plaintiffs, ORDER RE STATUS OF PENDING

v. (Doc. Nos. 85, 90, 92) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al., Defendants,

WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT, et al., Intervenor-Defendants.

This case concerns approval by the United States Department of the Interior and its member

agency, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (collectively, Federal Defendants or Reclamation), of

six interim renewal contracts that authorized delivery of water from March 1, 2016, through February

28, 2018, from federal reclamation facilities to certain water districts served by the Federal Central

Valley Project (CVP) (2016–18 Interim Contracts). (Doc. No. 64, First Amended and Supplemental Complaint (FASC).) The 2016–18 Interim Contracts at issue in this case provided water service to Westlands Water District (Westlands), Santa Clara Valley Water District (Santa Clara), and Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (Pajaro) (collectively, Interim Contractors). See FASC at ¶ 2. The 2016–18 Interim Contracts are part of a long line of two-year interim contracts executed in recent years to provide CVP water to contractors with expired long-term water service contracts, pending the

anticipated execution of new long-term water service contracts after the completion of appropriate

environmental review. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA), Pub. L. No. 102-575,

106 Stat. 4600 (1992), §§ 3402, 3404.

Plaintiffs, a coalition of environmental organizations led by the North Coast Rivers Alliance,

allege in the FASC’s first claim for relief that Federal Defendants issued a deficient Revised

Environmental Assessment (EA) and associated Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) prior to

approval of the 2016–18 Interim Contracts, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., and Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706.

(FASC at ¶¶ 45–65.) Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief asserts that Reclamation violated NEPA by

failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the 2016–18 Interim Contracts. (Id. at

¶¶ 56–59.) The latter claim was dismissed on March 9, 2018. (Doc. No. 78.) Currently pending before

this court are cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits of certain aspects of the remaining

claims in this case.1 (Doc. Nos. 85, 90, 92.)

In late February 2019, the court requested input from the parties addressing the issue of

mootness. Doc. Nos. 99 & 101. The backdrop for the court’s mootness inquiry included the Ninth

Circuit’s ruling in Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Associations v. U.S. Department of the Interior,

655 F. App’x 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2016), in which that court held that challenges to interim contracts like

those at issue in this case are not moot, even though the relevant contract period has expired, because

“[t]he short duration and serial nature of Reclamation’s interim water contracts place plaintiffs’ claims

within the mootness exception for disputes capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id. However, on

March 12, 2019, in response to the court’s request for supplemental briefing, the United States revealed

that Reclamation “no longer intends to pursue the issuance of new long-term water service contracts to

Westlands under the authority of CVPIA § 3404. Rather, based on the authority and direction provided

1 As mentioned in previous orders and as Reclamation points out (see Doc. No. 102 at 2), plaintiffs do not address the adequacy of the Santa Clara and Pajaro contracts in their motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 85-1), which, given that the remaining APA claim in this case is to be decided on cross- motions for summary judgment, renders any such claim abandoned as to the Santa Clara and Pajaro in the 2016 Water Infrastructure Improvements of the Nation (WIIN) Act, Pub. L. 114-322, § 4011,

Reclamation intends to convert Westlands’ existing water service contracts into repayment contracts,”

which, according to Reclamation, will not be “subject to the requirements of NEPA.” (Doc. No. 100 at

¶¶ 3–4.) As of March 12, 2019, Reclamation indicated it could not be “certain when the WIIN Act

conversion of any of Westlands’ contracts might be completed, except that Reclamation would need to

complete any such conversion before the authority provided by the WIIN Act expires on December 16,

2021.” (Id. at ¶ 5 (citing WIIN Act, § 4013).)

On March 19, 2019, pointing out that it has a sua sponte obligation to determine whether a case

is moot, the court again requested additional information from Reclamation:

[Reclamation’s filing] raises more questions than it answers. The Court cannot tell whether Federal Defendants are being deliberately cryptic or whether the Court simply failed to make clear the underlying threshold jurisdictional question(s) that must be answered. This case already is technically moot because the 2016–18 Interim Contracts have expired. However, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 655 F. App’x 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2016), “[t]he short duration and serial nature of Reclamation’s interim water contracts place plaintiffs’ claims within the mootness exception for disputes capable of repetition yet evading review.” What the Court needs information on now is whether this mootness exception still applies to the contracts at issue in this case. Even though Federal Defendants do not appear to be encouraging the Court to revisit the matter, mootness is a jurisdictional issue the Court must nonetheless address sua sponte. Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002) (raising sua sponte mootness and the capable of repetition yet evading review exception because it is a question of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Ackley v. W. Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that the alleged wrong will not recur.”). “A mere speculative possibility of repetition is not sufficient. There must be a cognizable danger, a reasonable expectation, of recurrence for the repetition branch of the mootness exception to be satisfied.” Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136, 143 (9th Cir. 1977).

(Doc. No. 101 at 3 (emphasis in original).)

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North Coast Rivers Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

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