The opinion of the court was delivered by
Hughes, C. J.
We certified this case in order to examine an unpublished Appellate Division holding adverse to the plaintiff-appellant, hereafter “Sergeant Nicoletta” or “Nico-letta.” He had been discharged from his employment as a sergeant on the “Wanaque Reservoir Police Force.” He challenged the validity of that termination in an action commenced in the Chancery Division. There he alleged that he had been discharged without fair notice and hearing of the charges against him, in violation of his constitutional right to due process.1 By way of remedy he sought reinstatement to his position, the award of back pay for the period elapsed since his assertedly unlawful discharge, and such other relief as the court might deem “just and proper.”
After hearing on return of an order to show cause, the Chancery Division judge decided that the issue belonged, by [150]*150rule, in the Appellate Division. R. 2:2-3 (a) (2). He transferred it thereto for it to review the final decision and action of Nicoletta’s employer as a state administrative agency.
The Appellate Division first remanded the matter to such employer, the defendant-respondent North Jersey District Water Supply Commission (hereafter “Commission”),2 to amplify the record by furnishing transcripts of “hearings” and basic findings of fact associated with the discharge of Sergeant Nieoletta. That being done, and the appeal having been argued, the Appellate Division decided that the findings of the Commission “amply support [ed] the result reached, viz., the termination of * * * employment” and that it saw “no sound reason or justification for disturbing that result.” This in deference to the appellate restraint recommended in State v. Johnson, 42 N. J. 146, 162 (1964).
It is not suggested by the record here that Sergeant Nieoletta was an employee ousted from a fixed term or was other than an employee at will, unprotected by any statutory tenure, contractual commitment or collective negotiation agreement. Nor did he enjoy Civil Service tenure or other protection. See note 2, supra. In such circumstances, under the common law, the employer, even though a public employer, has the right to discharge such employee with or without cause. English v. College of Medicine and Dentistry, 73 N. J. 20, 23 (1977). Sergeant Nicoletta nevertheless [151]*151insists that the incidents of his dismissal and the very statute empowering it were such as to violate his constitutional rights and entitle him to the relief sought, a contention essentially ignored in the Appellate Division disposition.
While the factual and procedural background is somewhat tangled, with some facts in dispute, it is clear enough, in any aspect, to project sufficient ground for our decision. It was apparent that a violent physical altercation had taken place at police headquarters between Sergeant Ficoletta and a fellow officer, Patrolman Bussomanno. Ficoletta minimized his participation throughout, but Bussomanno and several other fellow policemen onlookers pictured Ficoletta as the aggressor in three separate physical attacks on Bussomanno, from which Ficoletta had to be restrained with force and with some difficulty. Shortly after the headquarters fight, Sergeant Ficoletta received a telegram advising him that he was suspended indefinitely without pay from his position. A few days later he received a letter inviting him to attend a meeting with the Commission toi “confer on complaints that ■ [he] did not follow requests of Chief George Destito [of the Wanaque Beservoir Police Force]He attended this meeting on April 10, 1974, with counsel, as did Busso-manno with his counsel, and met with some but not all of the Commission members, as well as the Commission counsel.
At this meeting ,the initial subject of interrogation by Commission counsel of Ficoletta and Bussomanno had to do with the fight between them. Their accounts differed widely in details unnecessary to discuss here. Ficoletta (as was Bussomanno) was afforded full opportunity, with the guidance of counsel, to present his version of the altercation. The inquiry then broadened to other alleged misdeeds and activities of Ficoletta such as his previous improper use of firearms, his filing of a belated and allegedly false report in derogation of Bussomanno (involving an unconnected incident) and questions concerning the references he had listed in his original employment application. Here again [152]*152there was no restriction on Nicoletta’s explanation, with advice of counsel, of his position on such matters.
None of these subjects, however, including the fight, had been identified in the letter (notice) which had summoned Sergeant Nicoletta to the conference. The .record bespeaks the broad scope of inquiry, at the initial conference and at a later “hearing,” leading to the Commission’s final action.
The Commission’s findings of fact were:
1. That on March 19, 1974 Sgt. Nicoletta without provocation initiated a violent altercation with Ptl. Russomanno in the presence of other members of the constabulary.
2. [T]hat Sgt. Nicoletta attempted to persuade Ptl. Saum not to report the assault upon Russomanno to higher authorities, in violation of his duties as a police officer.
3. That Sgt. Nicoletta deliberately withheld for two months a report of an alleged criminal episode, but entered a report attributing culpability to Ptl. Russomanno following the altercation, in an effort to discredit Russomanno without regard to his duties as a police officer.
4. That Sgt. Nicoletta engaged in conduct wholly inconsistent with his position and duties in the constabulary in that he had on several occasions engaged in repeated episodes of violent tempermental [sic] outbursts directed to other members of the force.
5. That Sgt. Nicoletta was incapable of maintaining discipline and morale among his subordinate officers due to his own behavior, including the abuse of brother officers.
The Eesol-ution of May 9, 1974, dismissing Nicoletta read:
WHEREAS, the Commission has conducted extensive examination into the subject of the qualifications of Nicholas Nicoletta to meet the requirements for employment as a Patrolman on the Police force of the N.J.D.W.S.C., including an examination of his conduct as a police officer and re-examination of his pre-employment qualifications, extensive hearings with regard to various acts and conduct and it appearing that there has been good cause shown, it is RESOLVED, that the employment of Nicholas Nicoletta be terminated as of March 27, 1974.
About a week after the first “hearing” some members of the Commission had another meeting (“hearing”), of which Sergeant Nicoletta was not specifically advised and which [153]*153he did not, of course, attend. However, he and counsel had been advised on April 10 that the Commission would be pursuing its investigation by interviewing other witnesses. He was invited by counsel for the Commission to suggest anyone else having knowledge of the facts, as follows:
* * * We expect to ask each of the people that were present in the headquarters or wherever this incident occurred to come and make a statement with regard to these incidences [sic], as well as the incidents involving the shotgun thing. Is there anyone else that you think this Commission should ask to appear here in order to fully explore all of the facts?
Ho request was made by Hicoletta or his counsel to be present at such interrogation. At that meeting, which occurred on April 16, Chief Destito and six other police officers gave their version of circumstances associated with the fight, and expressed other views as to Hicoletta’s stability as a police officer. Shortly thereafter the Commission adopted its Resolution terminating Sergeant Hicoletta’s employment.
The Commission minutes of May 9, 1974, disclose a further invitation to counsel to Hicoletta (who appeared with him at this final Commission meeting on the subject) to add any “material which he felt would be useful to the consideration of [the] matter.” At that final confrontation, a voluntary resignation of Hicoletta was offered and tentatively accepted by the Commission but was later, on the same day, withdrawn by Hicoletta. The Commission minutes disclose:
Counsel Teltser further informed [the Commission] that Mr. Hickey [Nicoletta’s counsel] requested the Commission to accept the resignation of Mr. Nicoletta to save him the embarrassment of a judgment which could be adverse. Counsel Teltser responded that based on his understanding, he predicted the Commission would accept Mr. Nicoletta’s resignation, and the Commission would not be inclined to penalize Mr. Nicoletta any more than would naturally occur by merely following the requirements of the Commission to follow normal procedure. * * *
Counsel Teltser stated after approval of the Commission for Mr. Nicoletta to present his letter of resignation, Mr. Hickey, in the [154]*154presence of Mr. Nicoletta, informed counsel Teltser they would prepare and return to the Commission within one hour a letter of resignation compatible with the Commission’s discussion. Counsel Teltser received a phone call from Mr. Hickey within the hour informing that Mr. Nicoletta had changed his mind and would not submit his resignation nor appear again at the Commission.
WAR SERGEANT NICOLETTA ENTITLED TO A HEARING?
We shall pass various procedural and other questions involved below, in order to examine the meritorious issue projected by the petition for certification, on the basis of which we agreed to review the case. That is to say: What due process or like right is owing to an employee such as Nicoletta, in the circumstances presented here, incident to the termination of his public employment?
We have seen that such termination need not be predicated on just cause, and accordingly no “property” interest is implicated, such as to invoke the due process shield. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). The “property” interest contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment may take many forms over and above the ownership of tangible property. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 86, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1997, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 573 (1972); see generally Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964). But in this context the key concept is “entitlement,” such as involved in statutory eligibility for welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970); tenure employment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U. S. 551, 76 S. Ct. 637, 100 L. Ed. 692 (1956); contractual right to employment, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952); a clearly implied promise of continued employment, Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 91 S. Ct. 1772, 29 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1971), or the like. The chief ingredient of this kind of “property” interest such as to quicken the right [155]*155to protection by procedural due process is a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561. As we have seen, the statute here subjects the duration of employment to the will of the employer and as against the exercise of such will, Nicoletta had no “entitlement” to employment. His status may be analogized to that of the respondent in Roth:
[T]he terms of the respondent’s appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it. In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment. [408 U. S. at 578, 92 S. Ct. at 2710, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)].
Nor does the present case involve an attempt to circumvent a constitutional right such as free speech, in which event there might be, as mentioned by Justice Stewart in Roth, “a different case.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972); Williams v. Civil Service Commission, 66 N. J. 152 (1974). But see, where there are multiple causes for dismissal, Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977).
A “property” interest aside however, it is asserted that the circumstances of Nicoletta’s dismissal involved a “liberty” interest on his part within the intendment of the Eourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, as it recalled in Roth, “has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process.” Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S. at 572, 92 S. Ct. at 2706, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 558. This “liberty” includes “not merely freedom from bodily [156]*156restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of * * * conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized * * * as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923).
The Both Court distinguished a case which might imperil these rights:
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different case. For “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437, 91 S. Ct. 507, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515, 519. * * * In such a ease, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials. In the present case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent’s interest in his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” is at stake.
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take, advantage of other employment opportunities. The State, for example, did not invoke any regulations to bar the respondent from all other public employment in state universities. Had it done so, this, again, would be a different case. For “[t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury * * Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath [341 U. S. 123, 185, 71 S. Ct. 624, 655, 95 L. Ed. 817, 861] (Jackson, J., concurring). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41, 36 S. Ct. 7, 10, 60 L. Ed. 131, 135. The Court has held, for example, that a State, in regulating eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot foreclose a range of opportunities “in a manner * * * that contravene^] * * * Due Process,” Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 238, 77 S. Ct. 752, 1 L. Ed. 2d 796, 801, 64 A. L. R. 2d 288, and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a full prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96, 103, 83 S. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 229, 2 A. L. R. 2d 1254. [157]*157[408 U. S. at 573-74, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59 (citations & footnote omitted)].
These concepts direct our attention again to Williams v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 66 N. J. 152, 156-57:
In this State a rule of the Civil Service Commission authorizes the Chief Examiner and Secretary of the Commission, with respect to any applicant who shall at any time theretofore “have been removed * * * from, the public service * * *” to do any of the following:
1. Reject the application of a person for admission to an examination ;
2. Refuse to test an applicant;
3. Refuse to place the name of a person on the employment list;
4. Refuse to certify the name of an eligible person; or
5. Remove from the employment list the name of an eligible person. [N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14]
Thus removal from the public service — as has occurred to this plaintiff — may indeed have imposed upon him a stigma or potential disability, seriously affecting his liberty to seek future employment in a position which falls within the domain of the civil service regulations.
We do'not consider here, for three reasons, the bearing on Nicoletta’s reputation of the strong charges of wrongdoing included in the Commission’s eventual findings of fact, supra, which were filed only in response to the remand direction of the Appellate Division. It cannot be overemphasized that Nicoletta’s employment was terminated -for “cause,” which went to the heart of the responsibilities of a law enforcement official. Thus, in this case, the disclosure of reasons occurred after the termination for cause and the accrual of constitutional injury.
In addition, as perceptively noted in the dissent of our colleague Justice Schreiber, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished between public and private disclosures or nondisclosures of reasons. It stated in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976), that:
In this cáse the asserted reasons for the City Manager’s decision were communicated orally to the petitioner in private and also were [158]*158stated in writing in answer to interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Since the former communication was not made public, it cannot properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner’s interest in his “good name, reputation, honesty, or integrity” was thereby impaired. And since the latter communication was made in the course of a judicial proceeding which did not commence until after petitioner had suffered the injury for which he seeks redress, it surely cannot provide retroactive support for his claim. A contrary evaluation of either explanation would penalize forthright and truthful communication between employer and employee in the former instance, and between litigants in the latter. [Id. at 348-49, 96 S. Ct. at 2079-80, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 692]3
Contrary to Bishop, where the original firing was allegedly for “no reason” or for reasons which were not disclosed or publicized but only came to light upon the insistence of the employee, in this case the revealment of reasons was elicited in the context of litigation instituted by the employee based on his legitimate assertion of constitutional injury stemming from the original firing for cause.
Third, we agree with Justice Schreiber that the Supreme Court in Bishop and Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976), appears to have receded from the dictum of Both concerning the stigmatie legal implications of a discharge for blameworthy cause. In Paul, the Court stated:
[159]*159While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the “stigma” which may result from defamation by the government in a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either “liberty” or “property” by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause. [Id. at 701, 96 S. Ct. at 1160-61, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 414],
It is unnecessary to probe and explore the scope of ambivalence in the treatment of this “reputation-stigma” factor by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Bishop v. Wood, supra; Paul v. Davis, supra; and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 91 S. Ct. 507, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1971). Nor need we determine the applicability of our State constitutional guarantee of due process, which has its source in N. J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 1; Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N. J. 1 (1977); Cunningham, v. Department of Civil Service, 69 N. J. 13 (1975); or, the firmly-established New Jersey “fairness and rightness” doctrine. State v. Deatore, 70 N. J. 100, 109-12 (1976); Donaldson v. Board of Educ., 65 N. J. 236, 242-43 (1974); Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N. J. 281, 294-96 (1971); Monks v. Parole Bd., 58 N. J. 238, 249-50 (1971); State v. Kunz, 55 N. J. 128, 144 (1969).
Por there is a much more narrow, yet palpable, ratio decidendi upon which to rest our decision, a ground conspicuously absent in Roth, Bishop and Paul. In the present ease, as in Williams, the removal of the employee from public employment per se exposed him to potential disqualification from further public employment. As indicated in Williams, supra, the source of this disablement is N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Chief Examiner and Secretary shall take the following actions for any cause listed in suhsection (b) of this Section or for any other good cause:
1. Reject the application of a person for admission to an examination ;
[160]*1602. Refuse to test an applicant;
3. Refuse to place the name of a person on the employment list;
4. Refuse to certify the name of an eligible person; or
5. Remove from the employment list the name of an eligible person.
' (b) Any of the following shall constitute good cause for such action by the Chief Examiner and Secretary against any prospective employee who:
* * * *
6. Has been removed or has resigned not in good standing or has resigned in lieu of removal from the public service, or whose record of employment, public or private, has been unsatisfactory for any reason which casts substantial doubt upon the person’s capacity to perform satisfactorily the duties of the position for which the application has been filed or the test held.
IN. J. A. G. 4:1-8.14],
No case, including Bishop and Paul, holds, or even suggests, that the foreclosure from future employment opportunities by operation of state law is less than a protectible liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental, preliminary point, reiterated recently by the Supreme Court in Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 9-12, 98 S. Ct. 1554, 1560-61, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39-40 (1978), is that the underlying substantive liberty or property interest is defined with reference to state law. In Williams, supra, Justice Mountain characterized the disabling consequences of termination from public service. He wrote:
Thus removal from the public service — as has occurred to this plaintiff — may indeed have imposed upon him a stigma or potential disability, seriously affecting his liberty to seek future employment in a position which falls within the domain of the civil service regulations. [66 N. J. at 157].
Since Nicoletta has been “removed” from the public service, the Chief Examiner and Secretary of Civil Service now has “good cause” to invoke all the sanctions of N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14 (a), including automatic disqualification from future state service.
[161]*161The essential impetus of Roth, Paul and Bishop buttresses the conclusion that such a concrete injury is a proteetible liberty interest. In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury * * ” 408 U. S. at 574, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 599. In Paul the Court quoted with approval— indeed, even accentuated — a passage from Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961):
“Finally, it is to be noted that this is not a case where government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 190-191, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 2d 216; Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 140-141, 71 S. Ct. 624, 95 L. Ed. 817. . . .” Id., at 898, 81 S. Ct. 1750, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230. (Emphasis supplied.) [Paul v. Davis, supra, 424 U. S. at 705-06, 96 S. Ct. at 1162, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 416],
This thought — that the impairment of future employability by operation of state law is a proteetible liberty interest — - flows logically from other passages in Paul. Eor example, Justice Behnquist, writing for the majority, quoted approvingly from Board of Regents v. Roth, supra:
“Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to tajee advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id., at 573, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548. [Paul v. Davis, supra, 424 U. S. at 709-10, 96 S. Ct. at 1164, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 419 (some emphasis in original)].
In view of these precedents, it is apparent that any eviscerating influences on the Both “reputation” theme in no way affect the continued vitality of the principal thrust of Williams, sppra, that is, its basic concern with the mentioned disabilities applicable ,to a person “removed * * * from the public service * * *” as Ficoletta has been. In such [162]*162ease it is clear that a Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” interest was implicated in the termination of his employment. It is readily dedueible that had such a future disqualification factor existed in the Bishop and Paul cases by operation of state law, and certainly in Both, those courts would have perceived and enforced due process rights on the part of the employee. In any case, the “liberty” interest which we have identified impels us now to an inquiry as to the nature of the “due process” or like right involved, and whether in connection with Ms ouster Nicoletta received the benefit of such right or anything reasonably equivalent to it.
ir.
DID SERGEANT NICOLETTA RECEIVE A HEARING COMPORTING WITH DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT8 f
In Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U. S. at 80, 92 S. Ct. at 1994, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 569, the Supreme Court, quoting from Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531, 534 (1864), asserted:
Dor more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.”
The first prerequisite then of due process is fair notice, Avant v. Clifford, 67 N. J. 496, 525 (1975), so that a response can be prepared and the respondent fairly heard. As stated by Judge Goldmann in Department of Law and Public Safety v. Miller, 115 N. J. Super. 122, 126 (App. Div. 1971) :
Adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare remains the key to proper administrative proceedings. * * * There can be no adequate preparation where the notice does not reasonably apprise the party of the charges, or where the issues litigated at the hearing differ substantially from those outlined in the notice. It offends elemental concepts of procedural due process to grant enforcement to a finding neither charged in the complaint nor litigated at the hearing.
[163]*163In Green v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377, 1390-91 (1959), the Supreme Court averred that:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
There is little if any contrariety of view as to the requirement of specific and informative notice of the substance of the issue to be heard and decided. And we need not labor the point that the letter to Nicoletta, failing to notify him of the real charge against him, that of instigating the fight, and failing also to advise him of any of the other matters to be investigated at the “hearing” was totally deficient as measured by due process notice requirements. That deficiency was such, in the narrow circumstances of this case, as to render both conferences (“hearings”) quite meaningless.
Nor need we pause here to discuss the impartiality of the hearing tribunal (in this ease several members of the Commission) except to note that such hearers, in order to be “neutral and detached,” need not be disassociated from the administrative process. Monitored by other safeguards which we shall mention, we sense no “hazard of arbitrary decision-making [which would] be held violative of due process.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 571, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2982, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 959-60 (1974). In Williams, supra, Justice Mountain, in a comparable case, saw minimal danger of injustice resulting from possible bias on the part of the emplojrer-hearer, and said “such injustice could be readily corrected by resort to the courts.” 66 N. J. at 160.
The phrase “some kind of hearing” used by the Supreme Court in Roth, supra, 408 U. S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S. Ct. at 2705, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 556, and by Justice White in Wolf v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U. S. at 557, 94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L. Ed. [164]*1642d at 952, was selected by Judge Henry J. Friendly as the title for his Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975). He outlined some of the important elements of a fair hearing including (1) an unbiased tribunal, (2) notice of the proposed action and grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the rights to call witnesses, to know the evidence against one, and to have decisions based only on the evidence presented, (5) counsel, (6) the making of a record and a statement of reasons, (7) public attendance and ,(8) judicial review. Id. at 1277-95. He noted that these factors are listed roughly in order of importance and that all of them may not be necessary in any given hearing; he added that “if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason .for diminishing or even eliminating another.” Id. at 1279.
We remember that at least one of these requisites— public attendance — has been rejected by our Court in a similar proceeding due to the confidentiality of police information and other factors noted by Justice Sullivan in Kelly v. Sterr, 62 N. J. 105, cert. den., 414 U. S. 822, 94 S. Ct. 122, 38 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1973). We specifically affirm this holding in application to the present case.
»[8] As to the hearing itself, fairness and not rigid formality should be the touchstone. “[FJormality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings,” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 119 (1971), the goal being to minimize the possibility of error or injustice, rectifiable in any ease by subsequent judicial ■review. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).
In examining the components of a fair hearing under due process norms, in a case such as the present one, we adopt the philosophy and manner of its implementation [165]*165stated by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). In that parole revocation ease, the Court held:
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. “ [Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 1236 (1961). * * * Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. [408 U. S. at 481, 92 S. Ct. at 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 494],
What is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding * * * will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the * * * behavior.
We now turn to the nature of the process that is due, bearing in mind that the interest of [the parties] will be furthered by an effective but informal hearing. [408 U. S. at 484-85, 92 S. Ct. at 2602, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 496],
*• * « *'
Our task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements of due process. They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations * * * ; (b) disclosure * * of evidence * * * ; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation) ; (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body * * * members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons [for acting]. [408 U. S. at 488-89, 92 S. Ct. at 2604, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 498-99].
The Morrissey Court emphasized that there was “no thought to equate this [procedural pattern] to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including let[166]*166ters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” 408 U. S. at 489, 92 S. Ct. at 2604, 33 L. Ed. 3d at 499. Yet fair precision, in the statement of judgment and the reasons therefor, was called for by Morrissey:
The hearing officer shall have the duty of making a summary, or digest, of what occurs at the hearing * * * and the substance o£ the documents or evidence given * ^ *. * * * As in Goldberg [Goldberg v. Kelly, supra], “the decision maker should state the reasons fox- his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on * * [408 U. S. at 487, 92 S. Ct. at 2603, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 498],
While it is probable that governmental exigencies in many circumstances would justify the limiting of formal and time-consuming cross-examination of witnesses by counsel, vis-a-vis informal questioning or pointing out of factual arguments (Wolff v. McDonnell, supra), there should generally be permitted the presence of the accused and a right on his part to present evidence, to be advised by counsel, if he chooses, to confront those accusing him and to expect a written statement by the fact-finder as to the findings from the evidence and the judgment based thereon.
These fundamentals are particularly necessary for effective judicial review, an important component of due process.
III.
THE REMEDY
Anent the remedy here sought, it is clear to us that by force of the statute, and the legislative intention to vest broad power in the Commission to terminate employment of an officer (N. J. 8. A. 58:5A-3), there is no residue of power in this Court to overrule the Commission’s decision on the merits (absent contamination by constitutional violation or like fault) no matter how abruptly it was made, such as by reinstating Nieoletta to his position. And considering his claim to award of back pay as a species of damages (uncon[167]*167nected with restoration to employment) on the basis of the interim deprivation of his constitutional right to procedural due process, here too we cannot grant such relief, at least in the absence of proof that such deprivation was maliciously intended or with “such disregard of * * * clearly established constitutional rights that [the] action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214, 225 (1975). We are not called upon here to determine whether, in the presence of such invidious factors, the converse would be true.
In view of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978), however, we should make an additional comment. There nominal damages, at least, were said to be justified in an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 where, in a pupil-school suspension case, procedural due process was withheld in violation of known and clearly established due process rights. Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U. S. at 251 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. at 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 252. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F. 2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 409 U. S. 1027, 93 S. Ct. 475, 34 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1972). We recognize that we are not dealing here with a § 1983 case, but even if we were, the basis for such a damage remedy would not exist. We are not aware of any precedent in New Jersey law (except Williams, supra, a conparatively recent decision) linking the termination of a public emplojonent which is terminable at will with the need for procedural due process in the form of notice and hearing. This according to the course of the common law restated by our Court as recently as in English, supra. The notice deficiency in Nicoletta’s due process right could hardly, therefore, be said to meet the scienter norms of Carey, supra. As the Supreme Court has held, executive officers are entitled to immunity where they act in good faith, as defined by the Court:
[168]*168“[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974).
Common-law tradition, recognized in our prior decisions, and strong public-policy reasons also lead to a construction of § 1983 extending a qualified good-faith immunity to school board members from liability for damages under that section. Although there have been differing emphases and formulations of the common-law immunity of public school officials in case of student expulsion or suspension, state courts have generally recognized that such officers should be protected from tort liability under state law for all good-faith, nonmalieious action taken to fulfill their official duties. [Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 318, 95 S. Ct. 992, 999, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214, 222-23 (1975)].
We note that such qualified immunity of a public body is concordant with New Jersey legislative policy as expressed in our Tort Claims Act:
59 :2-3. Discretionary activities
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity;
(b) A public entity is not liable for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature. * * *
We determine that for vindication of his constitutional “liberty” right, Sergeant Nieoletta is only entitled, if he wishes it, to a post-termination hearing not so much for the limited purpose described by Justice Mountain in Williams, supra • — ■ “to clear any damage to his reputation,” but rather to attempt to dislodge the specter of possible Civil Service debarment from further public employment. He would thus have opportunity to try to persuade the Commission, in its basic discretion nevertheless (N. J. S. A. [169]*16958:5A-2), to change its determination as to his ouster. As we have seen, it must not he supposed that this Court, in these circumstances, has authority to reinstate him to his position or award back pay. These decisions inhere in the Commission under the statute. Inasmuch as Nieoletta had no “property” interest that was taken from him and his dismissal, even without cause, was within the statutory province of the Commission, it is only the loss of his “liberty” interest which was implicated in the due process deficiency, and it is only the due process right related to that interest which can be restored to him by the power of this Court. As stated by the Supreme Court in Both, supra:
The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons. [408 U. S. at 573 n. 12, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59].
In the circumstances of this case, hearing in mind the Supreme Court’s softening of the effect of the Both “reputation-stigma” factor, this quoted expression could he read to substitute (for the thrust of such opportunity to “clear his name”) the expression “to contest the basis upon which his discharge and resulting potential employment disqualification would rest.”
Such was the sense of the Law Division holding in a comparable case, Campbell v. Atlantic Cty. Bd. of Freeholders, 145 N. J. Super. 316 (1976). A Board of Freeholders had terminated and thus “removed from the public service,” without prior notice or hearing, a non-tenured, “at will” employee (because of his indictment for a criminal offense, of which he was later acquitted). The Law Division identified a “liberty” interest right to procedural due process, as we do here. The sole remedy offered was described by that court:
An appropriate and adequate hearing as to the relevance of plaintiff’s discharge under N. J. A. O. 4:1-8.14 may be conducted before [170]*170this court. For that purpose * * the court retains jurisdiction. A full evidentiary hearing may be held, at plaintiff’s option, to establish the circumstances of his removal from the public service and their relevance to the application of N. J. A. G. 4:1-8.14. In all other respects plaintiff’s claims are rejected. [145 N. J. Super, at 330].
The Appellate Division only recently affirmed this decision, 158 N. J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 1978), particularly noting that “plaintiff still has available to- him, at his option, a full evidentiary hearing before the trial court” for the purposes outlined by that court.
We assume that these courts did not intend the term “full evidentiary hearing” to extend beyond that type described in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, which we have decided to be sufficient to accommodate the needs of government to operate efficiently, yet fully acquit the constitutional right under discussion.
Further, we believe and decide that such hearing should not, at least where the employer is in esse, be before the court but rather (in a non-civil service case) before the employer, as in Williams j supra. This for at least two principal reasons:
1. The post-termination hearing is designed to restore to the employee as nearly as possible the. procedural right of which he was deprived, a hearing, albeit a pre-termination hearing, before his employer.
2. The decision as to termination or, if the employer should reverse its decision at the hearing, to permit resumption of the employment, should be that of the employer and not of the court. This comports with the firmly established principle that issues within the bailiwick and expertise of an administrative agency should be adjudicated in the first instance by the agency, subject to judicial review. Cf. Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 76 N. J. 245 (1978) (judicial review of arbitrator’s award).
More practically, the courts of New Jersey under present circumstances are in no position to assume additional burdens where constitutional or other rights may be sufficiently [171]*171protected in another tribunal by adherence to fair procedural rules. Not only are the courts reeling under their present obligations .but face new ones, which should not be needlessly or gratuitously augmented.4
After the fair hearing, before his employer, to which Sergeant Nicoletta is entitled, the Commission is free to reaffirm or not its prior decision, in conformity with its statutory power. The hearing which we order is the only “just and proper” relief that can be afforded by this Court under its constitutional authority.
Reversed.