SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Racine County, A. Don Zwickey, Reserve Judge. This court took jurisdiction of the appeal upon certification by the court of appeals. Sec. (Rule) 809.61, Stats. 1985-86.
The court of appeals certified the following question which is one of first impression for this court: "When an insurance policy contains a provision which accords uninsured motorist (UM) coverage to a passenger in an insured’s vehicle and also contains a reducing clause which states that any payment under the UM coverage will reduce any recovery for the same damages under the liability coverage, is the passenger permitted to stack the UM and liability coverages or does the reducing clause effectively preclude such action?”
The circuit court enforced the reducing clause whose validity is at issue in this case. The circuit court permitted the insurance company to reduce the amount it owed to the plaintiff under the liability portion of its policy ($50,000) by the amount which it paid the plaintiff prior to trial under the uninsured motorist portion of its policy ($15,000). Accordingly, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $35,000. We conclude that [586]*586the reducing clause is void and unenforceable because it contravenes sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats. 1979,1 and we reverse this portion of the circuit court’s judgment and remand the cause to the circuit court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $50,000.
The circuit court denied plaintiffs claims for prejudgment interest and double costs. This issue is before this court on appeal, and we affirm this portion of the judgment.
r-H
For purposes of this appeal, the facts are not in dispute. This appeal arises out of an automobile [587]*587accident on June 21, 1980, in which Kim Nicholson, the plaintiff, was seriously injured. The plaintiff was a passenger in the car driven by Sandra Garcia; the car ran a stop sign and was struck broadside by a car driven by Alexander Chartier, an uninsured motorist.
The car Ms. Garcia was driving was owned by her father and was insured by Home Insurance Companies, Inc. The policy provided liability coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per accident, and, as required by sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats. 1979, provided uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident.
After the injury Home Insurance offered to pay the plaintiff $50,000, its liability coverage limits, but only in exchange for a release by the plaintiff from all further claims she might have against Home Insurance and Ms. Garcia. The plaintiff was willing to accept $50,000 in settlement of her liability claim against Home Insurance but not in settlement of her liability claim against Ms. Garcia. Home Insurance continued to demand a full release both of itself and its insured in return for payment of $50,000. The plaintiff then commenced this action on May 18,1983, against Ms. Garcia, Mr. Chartier and Home Insurance.2
After the plaintiff commenced this action, Home Insurance furnished plaintiffs counsel with a complete copy of the Home Insurance policy. At that time, the plaintiff discovered the policy’s uninsured motorist provision which the plaintiff believed to be applicable to her claim against Mr. Chartier, an uninsured motorist. Home Insurance settled the plaintiffs claim [588]*588to its uninsured motorist coverage by paying the plaintiff $15,000 and reserving the issue of reduction as a "policy defense” for court resolution.
The reducing provision appears in the uninsured motorist section of the Garcia policy (Part C) under the heading "Limit of Liability.” The policy provides, inter alia, as follows:
"Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage [uninsured motorist] shall be reduced by all sums: 1. Paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes all sums paid under Part A [liability coverage];
"Any payment under this coverage [uninsured motorist] will reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover for the same damages under Part A [liability coverage].”
The jury absolved Mr. Chartier of any negligence, found Ms. Garcia 100% negligent, and determined damages at $591,465.00. The circuit court stayed all proceedings against Ms. Garcia until such time as her pending bankruptcy claim was resolved. The circuit court entered judgment against Home Insurance for $35,000, which sum represents the full limit of the liability coverage, $50,000, .minus the $15,000 Home Insurance had paid the plaintiff prior to trial under the uninsured motorist coverage. The circuit court stated that the $35,000 constituted a full and complete discharge and satisfaction of all of the duties and obligations of Home Insurance to the plaintiff under the Home Insurance policy.
Both parties agree that the jury’s finding that Mr. Chartier was not negligent has no bearing on this appeal. The parties agree that had Home Insurance [589]*589not paid the $15,000 prior to trial, the jury finding that Mr. Chartier was not negligent would have negated any claim the plaintiff might have had against Home Insurance under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policy. The parties also agree that because Home Insurance settled the claim under the uninsured motorist coverage before the question of Mr. Chartier’s negligence was resolved, Home Insurance cannot seek to recoup that payment on the ground that Mr. Chartier was ultimately found not to be negligent.
h-4
The first question presented in this case is whether the court will enforce the reducing clause of the Home Insurance policy which allows Home Insurance to reduce the $50,000 the plaintiff is entitled to recover under the liability provisions of the policy by the $15,000 the plaintiff has received under the uninsured motorist provision of the same policy.
The plaintiff first asserts that the reducing clause does not apply in this case. The reducing clause states that any payment under the uninsured motorist coverage will "reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover for the same damages" under the liability coverage. (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff argues that the same damages language of the reducing clause prohibits her recovering twice for the same bodily injury and is not applicable to this case where, because of the policy limits, the plaintiff will not be compensated fully for her bodily injury. In other words, the plaintiff urges that because her damages exceed the maximum combined coverage (recovery) under the uninsured motorist and the liability provi[590]*590sions, there is no risk that payment under both will allow the plaintiff to recover twice for the same damages. The plaintiff asserts that if her total damages were only $50,000 then the damages compensated under the uninsured motorist coverage would be the "same” as those compensated under the liability coverage and the reducing clause would come into effect.
We conclude that the plaintiffs reading of the reducing provision is strained and unpersuasive. The Home Insurance policy has two related provisions, which we quoted earlier, concerning reduction of payments: any payment made under the liability provision reduces any payment under the uninsured motorist provision; any payment made under the uninsured motorist provision reduces payment "for the same damages” under the liability coverage. Only the second provision uses the term "same damages.” If we adopted the plaintiffs reading of the policy, the two reducing provisions would produce different results depending on whether Home Insurance first made payment under the uninsured motorist or under the liability provision. We conclude that a more reasonable reading of the reducing provisions of the policy is that each provision complements the other, assuring that any amount paid for bodily injury under one part of the policy would reduce the amount payable for bodily injury under the other part of the policy.
The plaintiffs second argument is that where, as in this case, the damages are in excess of the combined total of the separate liability and uninsured motorist coverages in a single policy, a reducing clause such as [591]*591the one in the instant case violates the legislative mandate expressed in sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats. 1979, and therefore is unenforceable. Upon examination of sec. 632.32(4)(a), we find the plaintiffs argument persuasive.
The text of the uninsured motorist statute, sec. 632.32(4)(a), requires the policy in this case to include uninsured motorist coverage. Sec. 632.32(4)(a) provides:
"Every policy of insurance issued subject to the section that insures with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death ... shall contain ... provisions ...;
(a) Uninsured motorist. 1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, in limits or at least $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident ...
Sec. 632.32(4)(a) is silent about reducing clauses; it neither authorizes nor prohibits them. The uninsured motorist statute mandates that certain motor vehicle insurance policies provide uninsured motorist protection. This court has said that "[t]he purpose of uninsured motorists coverage is to compensate an insured who is the victim of an uninsured motorist’s negligence to the same extent as if the uninsured motorist were insured.” Vidmar v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 2d 360, 370, 312 N.W.2d 129 (1981), overruled on other grounds Welch v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 172, 179, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985). See also Radlein v. Industrial Fire [592]*592& Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 624-25, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984). Uninsured motorist coverage essentially substitutes for insurance that the tortfeasor should have had.
If Mr. Chartier, the uninsured motorist, had carried liability insurance coverage in the same amount as the uninsured motorist coverage, the plaintiff would have recovered $65,000 — $15,000 from Mr. Chartier’s insurance company under its liability coverage and $50,000 from Home Insurance under its liability coverage.3 Because Mr. Chartier was uninsured, however, the plaintiff will recover a total of only $50,000 if the reducing clause is enforced. Instead of placing the injured party in the same position that she would have been in had the uninsured motorist been insured, the uninsured motorist provision in combination with the reducing clause puts Home Insurance in the same position that it would have been in had the uninsured motorist carried insurance. Insurance companies are required to put uninsured motorist provisions in their automobile insurance policies for the protection of an injured party, not for their own protection. If the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to be achieved, the plaintiff must be entitled to the proceeds of the uninsured motorist coverage without reductions that would not have been available had the uninsured motorist been insured.
The plaintiff argues that the effect of the two reducing provisions in this case is to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage to zero: the plaintiff recovers the maximum of $50,000 under the liability coverage; she recovers nothing under the uninsured [593]*593motorist coverage. The plaintiff asserts that such a result is contrary to the clear text of the statute and the legislature’s objective to ensure through the statute that the policy provide $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage. We agree with the plaintiff.
Home Insurance urges that the two reducing provisions do not negate the uninsured motorist coverage. It reasons that the uninsured motorist coverage is in full force and effect in this case with the plaintiff recovering $15,000 under the uninsured motorist provision and recovering $35,000 under the liability provision. In effect, Home Insurance urges that under the Garcia policy $50,000 is Home Insurance’s maximum limit for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident, that $35,000 is the amount of liability coverage under the circumstances of this case, and that no statute prohibits the insurance company from issuing liability insurance in the amount of $35,000.
Home Insurance’s argument elevates form over substance, ignoring the legislative intent underlying the uninsured motorist statute. Home Insurance’s argument amounts to a plea to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly. Although Home Insurance cannot directly eliminate or reduce the statutorily mandated $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage, it does so indirectly in this case by reducing the liability coverage whenever money is paid out for uninsured motorist coverage. Unable to withhold uninsured motorist coverage, Home Insurance instead gives such coverage with one hand and takes it away with the other. The reducing clause effectively eliminates uninsured motorist coverage whenever the insurance company’s liability coverage applies, as happened in this case. Home Insurance’s denial of coverage under [594]*594uninsured motorist coverage — even in this indirect way — violates sec. 632.32(4)(a) which clearly and unambiguously mandates uninsured motorist coverage.
We hold that the reducing provision violates sec. 632.32(4)(a). This holding is mandated by the text of sec. 632.32(4)(a), which requires the policy to include uninsured motorist coverage, and the public policy underlying sec. 632.32(4)(a), which puts the injured party in the same position as if the uninsured tortfea-sor had been insured.
Home Insurance would challenge this holding as contravening Leatherman v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 190 N.W.2d 904 (1971), Scherr v. Drobac, 53 Wis. 2d 308, 193 N.W.2d 14 (1972), and Nelson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974). Home Insurance argues that these cases held that reducing clauses — different from the one in the instant case but involving uninsured motorist coverage — did not violate public policy or the statute. As we shall explain, these cases do not dispose of the issue presented in this case.
The Leatherman court gave effect to a reducing clause that reduced any amount payable to the injured party under the uninsured motorist policy by all sums paid the injured party by an insured tortfea-sor who was jointly liable with the uninsured motorist tortfeasor. As we explained in Nelson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., supra, 63 Wis. 2d at 567, the Leatherman court concluded it was permissible for an uninsured motorist policy to guarantee payment to the injured party only to the extent that all other sources had not yielded the recovery to which the plaintiff is entitled under the uninsured motorist coverage. The Leatherman court expressly declined to [595]*595hold that uninsured motorist coverage guarantees recovery equivalent to that which would have been had if the uninsured motorist had been minimally insured. Subsequently the Nelson court said that while Leatherman did not squarely present the issue of the validity of the reducing clause, Leatherman did impliedly uphold its validity and "stated the argument that [whether] such a clause was invalid was more properly addressed to the legislature.” Id. at 568. When the Leatherman insurance policy was written, however, no Wisconsin statute required the insurance company to write uninsured motorist coverage.
The Leatherman fact situation was presented to the court again in the Scherr case. By the time the Scherr policy was written, the legislature had adopted sec. 204.30(5), Stats. 1967, the precursor of sec. 632.32(4)(a). The 1967 statute required the insurance company to offer uninsured motorist coverage but gave the insured the right to reject the coverage. The injured party in Scherr argued that the reducing clause violated the 1967 statute. The Scherr court, without analysis of the 1967 statute, simply concluded that "we do not think that the provisions of sec. 204.30(5)(a), change the outcome [of the Leatherman case]. All this new statute does, is require that the coverage be offered.” Scherr, 53 Wis. 2d at 310-311.
The third case upholding a reducing clause was Nelson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., supra 63 Wis. 2d at 568-69. In that case the injured party was driving a friend’s car which was struck by an uninsured motorist. The injured party could recover from two uninsured motorist provisions: that in the friend’s car policy and that in her own car policy. One of the uninsured motorist coverages had a reducing clause. The Nelson court upheld the reducing clause, adher[596]*596ing to the Leatherman and Scherr decisions. The Nelson court added that the 1967 uninsured motorist statute was silent on the subject of reducing clauses, and the court was not willing to invalidate reducing clauses on the basis of public policy considerations not mandated in a legislative enactment. The Nelson court expressly stated that it did not construe the 1973 amendment, which this opinion discusses below, "or intimate any interpretation.” Id. at 569.4
In each of the three cases, despite the fact that the injured party had not been fully compensated for injuries, this court upheld reducing clauses which allowed an insurance carrier to refuse payment under its uninsured motorist coverage once the injured party had received the amount available under the uninsured motorist’s provision from any other source. In essence, the court interpreted the uninsured motorist statute to require only that the injured party receive the statutory minimum of uninsured motorist coverage from some source, not that the uninsured motorist coverage guaranteed recovery equivalent to that which the injured party would have received if the uninsured motorist had been minimally insured. As we noted previously, the Leatherman court expressly declined to adopt the latter view.
We do not find this trilogy of cases applicable to this case. After Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson were decided, the statute governing uninsured motorist coverage was amended.
[597]*597The facts in Leatherman arose before there was any statute at all regulating uninsured motorist coverage. By the time of Scherr and Nelson, the legislature had passed the 1967 uninsured motorist statute. Sec. 204.30(5)(a), Stats. 1967. That statute, however, differs substantially from the uninsured motorist statute that governs this case.
Since 1967 the uninsured motorist statute has been amended in several significant ways. First, in 1971, the legislature made uninsured motorist coverage mandatory. Ch. 28, Laws of 1971; sec. 204.30(5)(a), Stats. 1971. Then, in 1973, the legislature specifically addressed for the first time the issue of reducing clauses. It amended sec. 204.30(5)(a) and expressly prohibited reducing clauses which would render the insured’s coverage less than if the uninsured motorist had been insured to the same limits as those mandated by the statute. The 1973 amendment added the following language to the uninsured motorist statute:
"... The uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage limits provided in an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance as required in this subsection shall not be reduced by the terms thereof to provide the insured with less protection than would be afforded him if he were injured by a motorist insured under an automobile liability policy of insurance containing the limits provided in this subsection.” Ch. 72, Laws of 1973.
The 1973 amendment clearly declares that the legislative purpose of the uninsured motorist coverage was to place the insured in the same position as if the uninsured motorist had been insured. Legislative Council Note, 1973, sec. 204.30, Stats. 1973. The premise upon which Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson [598]*598were based is directly contrary to the declared purpose of the 1973 amendment.
This court never had an opportunity to determine the effect of the 1971 or 1973 amendment on the Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson cases. The Legislative Council specifically noted, however, that the 1973 amendment was a response to the Leatherman decision. The Council Note to sec. 204.30, Stats. 1973 states:
"This bill clarifies the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage to place the insured in the same position he would have been if the uninsured motorist were insured. It is the result of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Leatherman v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 644.
"In Leatherman the court upheld the validity of policy provisions relating to uninsured motorist coverage. The court agreed with the insurer’s position that these provisions required the insurer to pay the amount the insured was legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile, but reduced this amount by payments recovered from anyone jointly or severally liable for the accident even if the payments did not cover any portion of the uninsured motorist’s share of the liability.
"At the time of the [Leatherman] accident, Wisconsin had no statute relating to the uninsured motorist coverage. In 1965, Wis. Stat. s. 204.30 (5) was enacted, requiring uninsured motorist coverage as part of automobile liability policies, unless rejected by the insured. In 1971 the coverage became mandatory as part of all automobile liability policies. This bill would make certain that the [599]*599reduction in coverage permitted in Leatherman would not occur under the amended statute.”
The 1973 statute was again amended in 1975 as part of a major revision of the insurance laws. The legislature deleted the above quoted language which had been added to the statute in 1973. The 1975 statute (sec. 204.30) was recodified as sec. 632.32(3)(a) — which was later renumbered to the present sec. 632.32(4)(a). Ch. 375, Laws of 1975. The legislative council committee comments of 1975 and 1979 to sec. 632.32(4)(a) make clear that the 1975 revision deleting the 1973 language was not intended to change the meaning of the 1973 statute. The 1973 Committee Comment states: "In sub. (3)(a) [later (4)(a)] the final sentence of s. 204.30(5)(a) is omitted [because i]t does not seem to add anything.” Committee Comment — 1975 to sec. 632.32, Wis. Stats. Ann. (1980). The 1979 Committee Comment states that "Subsection (4) continues former sub. (3) ... with major editorial changes but without intended change of meaning....” Committee Comment — 1979 to sec. 632.32, Wis. Stats. Ann. (1980).
We conclude from this legislative history that although the present statute does not include the language added by the 1973 legislature, the legislative intent was that sec. 632.32(4)(a) be interpreted as if the 1973 language was a part of it. We therefore conclude that the Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson cases, which dealt with insurance policies written before the 1971 and 1973 amendments, are not relevant to interpreting the present statute.
Home Insurance calls our attention to Mullen v. Coolong, 132 Wis. 2d 440, 393 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. [600]*6001986), in which the court of appeals concluded that the 1975 repeal of the 1973 language meant a return to the Leatherman and Scherr decisions. The court of appeals said, "Had the supreme court felt that the spirit or intent of sec. 204.30(5)(a), Stats. (1967), required the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage, the result in Scherr would have been different_If the Leatherman outcome could occur under the unamended sec. 204.30(5) (1967), as the supreme court held in Scherr, it could also occur under the parallel provisions of sec. 632.32(4)(a)l., from which the anti-Leatherman language has been deleted.” Mullen v. Coolong, supra, 132 Wis. 2d at 448-52.
We disagree with and overrule the court of appeals Mullen decision for two principal reasons. First, the court of appeals erroneously concluded that the legislature intended the 1975 amendment to mean a return to the Leatherman decision. The expressed purpose of the 1975 amendment was to continue in effect the 1973 amendment which overturned the Leatherman decision.
Second, the court of appeals failed to analyze the Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson cases carefully. The court of appeals failed to consider that the Leather-man case (which predated the uninsured motorist statute) and the Scherr and Nelson cases (both of which predated compulsory uninsured motorist coverage) rejected the concept that uninsured motorist coverage guaranteed recovery equivalent to that which the injuring party would receive had the uninsured motorist been minimally insured. Nelson, 63 Wis. 2d at 567. This court’s recent decisions under the present uninsured motorist statute make it clear [601]*601that the legislative policy behind the present statute, which is substantially similar to the 1971 statute, is to afford persons injured by an uninsured motorist the same protection the person would have had under an insured motorist. Vidmar v. American Family Mut. Auto Ins. Co., supra, 104 Wis. 2d at 370; Radlein, supra, 117 Wis. 2d at 624-25. Because the legislature has rejected the premise underlying Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson, these three cases are not valid interpretations of the present law.
Before we move on to the next issue, the court must consider one other case, namely, Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984). Although the parties and the court of appeals were aware of and cite the Radlein case (on different points), neither the parties nor the court of appeals in its certification rely on Radlein as disposi-tive of the question certified in the case at bar. We discuss Radlein, although it is not directly on point, because there is language in the Radlein opinion that some may view as tangentially related to this case, even if the parties in this case and the court of appeals do not.
In Radlein the injured party was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist (the driver of the car in which she was a passenger) and an "insured” motorist (Milwaukee county, which operated the bus involved in the accident). In a settlement agreement she apparently recovered a sum from Milwaukee county and $6,000 under the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage in her husband’s policy.
After the settlement, she sued the uninsured motorist carrier claiming bad faith for not paying her the full $15,000 under the uninsured motorist coverage when her injuries exceeded the total amount she [602]*602had recovered for all parties. The insurance carrier asserted that the suit was frivolous.
The Radlein court concluded that because the injured party had never established the uninsured motorist’s negligence, she had not shown that she was legally entitled to the full proceeds of the uninsured motorist coverage. Consequently, the insurance company’s refusal to pay the full amount under uninsured motorist coverage cannot constitute bad faith, and the suit was frivolous. As far as the holding of the case goes, the Radlein decision has no bearing on this case.
In the course of reaching its decision, however, the Radlein court discussed several factors present at the time of the settlement agreement which would have made it reasonable for the insurance company and the injured party to settle for $6,000. Among those factors was the assertion that under the rule established in the Leatherman, Scherr and Nelson cases, even if drivers of the car and bus had been found negligent, the injured party would not have been entitled to the full $15,000 uninsured coverage should she recover in excess of the uninsured motorist policy limit from Milwaukee county. In other words, the court asserted that a reducing clause could be given effect under circumstances similar to but not the same as those in this case.
We agree with the parties in this case and the court of appeals in viewing the Radlein discussion of the reducing clause as cursory, as incidental to the holding and, therefore, as dictum which is not useful in deciding the issue presented in this case.
The plaintiffs final argument in support of her contention that the reducing clause is invalid is that where, as in this case, the damages exceed the combined total of the separate coverages for liability [603]*603and uninsured motorist within a single policy, the reducing clause is unenforceable because it violates the legislative mandate expressed in sec. 631.43(1), Stats. 1979,5 relating to "other insurance” provisions. Home Insurance argues that the reducing clause in this case, in contrast to the reducing clauses in several other cases involving multiple policies, does not fall within the proscription of sec. 631.43(1) because (1) this case does not involve "two ... policies” within the meaning of the statute and (2) the legislature’s use of the term "indemnify” signifies that it meant the statute to apply only to indemnity provisions, not to liability provisions. We need not reach this issue in view of our holding that the Home Insurance policy reducing clause violates sec. 632.32, Stats. 1979.6
[604]*604In summary, we conclude that the reciprocal reducing clauses in the Home Insurance policy are an attempt to subvert the insurer’s obligation under the statute to provide uninsured motorist coverage so that the injured party is guaranteed recovery as if the uninsured tortfeasor was minimally insured. If the legislative objective in requiring uninsured motorist coverage is to be fulfilled, the injured party must be entitled to the proceeds of uninsured motorist coverage free from any reductions contingent solely on the fact that a negligent uninsured motorist was a tortfea-sor. In this case, if the uninsured motorist, Mr. Chartier, had been insured, the plaintiff would have received $15,000 from Mr. Chartier’s insurer and $50,000 from Home Insurance. Home Insurance’s reducing clause, which limits the plaintiffs recovery to $50,000 instead of $65,000, clearly places the plaintiff in a worse position than if Mr. Chartier had been insured.
An insurance policy may expand but not reduce the coverage required by the uninsured motorist [605]*605statute. Any policy provisions effectively reducing the coverage required by the statute are void. We therefore hold that the clause in the Home Insurance policy that seeks to reduce payments made under its liability policy by any amounts paid out under its uninsured motorist coverage is void under sec. 632.32(4)(a) and is therefore unenforceable.
III.
The plaintiff argues that if Home Insurance is held liable for the full $50,000, she is entitled to double costs under sec. 807.01(3) and pre-judgment interest on $50,000 by virtue of sec. 807.01(4). The circuit court implicitly rejected plaintiffs position. We affirm the circuit court.
Sec. 807.01(3) provides that a plaintiff shall recover double the amount of taxable costs if the defendant does not accept plaintiffs offer of settlement and the plaintiff subsequently recovers a more favorable judgment. Sec. 807.01(3) requires the plaintiff to serve "upon the defendant a written offer of settlement for the sum, or property, or to the effect therein specified with costs” within the time specified, namely, "after issue is joined but at least 20 days before trial.” Sec. 807.01(3), Stats. 1979. Plaintiff asserts that her letter dated September 20, 1983, satisfied sec. 807.01(3). We shall examine this letter in our discussion of plaintiffs claim under sec. 807.01(4).
Sec. 807.01(4), Stats. 1979, provides for pre-judgment interest at the annual rate of 12% on the amount recovered from the date of the offer of settlement until the amount is paid under the following conditions:
[606]*606"// there is an offer of settlement by a party under this section which is not accepted and the party recovers a judgment which is greater than or equal to the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the party is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% on the amount recovered from the date of the offer of settlement until the amount is paid. Interest under this section is in lieu of interest computed under ss. 814.04(4) and 815.05(8).” (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff asserts that the offer of settlement for $50,000 which she made in September 1980, before she filed this action, satisfies sec. 807.01(4), entitling her to pre-judgment interest from September 1980. We conclude that the plaintiffs interpretation of sec. 807.01(4) is erroneous.
The operative language of sec. 807.01(4) clearly indicates that an offer of settlement under sec. 807.01(4) must be made under sec. 807.01. The only reference in sec. 807.01 to an offer of settlement by a plaintiff appears in sec. 807.01(3). Looking at 807.01 as a whole and sec. 807.01(3) specifically, we conclude that to be entitled to the 12% statutory interest under sec. 807.01(4), the plaintiff must have made an offer of settlement within the meaning of sec. 807.01(3). Sec. 807.01(3) makes it clear that the plaintiffs offer of settlement must be in writing and must be made "[a]fter issue is joined but at least 20 days before the trial.” In addition, the offer for settlement must state that it is "for the sum, or property or to the effect therein specified, with costs.” Sec. 807.01(3). We therefore conclude that the September 1980 letter [607]*607which was sent before the action was commenced does not constitute an offer under sec. 807.01(4).
Plaintiffs complaint was filed on May 18, 1983 and the issue was joined soon thereafter. The only written communication by the plaintiff to Home Insurance which the plaintiff asserts meets the three requirements set forth in sec. 807.01(4) is her letter dated September 20, 1983. The plaintiff sent this letter after issue was joined and at least 20 days before the trial. The letter is captioned "Formal Demand for Uninsured Motorist Benefits” and states that it is a "formal demand ... to unconditionally pay forthwith its limit of uninsured motorist coverage ... in the amount of $15,000.” The letter refers to a February 23,1983, letter which preceded the filing of the action, demanding the maximum liability limit of $50,000 for liability coverage. The plaintiff asserts that a copy of the February 23 letter accompanied the September 20 letter. The plaintiff reads the two letters together as one offer for settlement of both the $50,000 liability coverage and the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage plus costs. Home Insurance disagrees.
We have reviewed these two letters and the extensive correspondence between the parties after the September 20, 1983, letter. We conclude that the September 20,1983, letter does not qualify as an offer of settlement for $50,000 plus costs for the purposes of sec. 807.01(3) and (4). The September 20 letter is entitled "Separate, Formal Demand for Uninsured Motorist Benefits” and does in fact demand $15,000 from Home Insurance in payment of the uninsured motorist benefits. The letter merely makes reference to the February 28, 1983, letter. The September 20 letter describes the February letter as one in which [608]*608the plaintiff "formally demanded the maximum liability limit of $50,000 for liability coverage.” The letter does not state that a copy of the February 28 letter was enclosed. Furthermore there is nothing in the September 20 letter which renews the plaintiffs demand for $50,000. Because the original demand for $50,000 was made before issue was joined and there was no subsequent renewal of that offer after issue was joined, we conclude that there was no offer of settlement for $50,000 satisfying the requirements of sec. 807.01. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to pre-judgment interest or double costs under the statute.
In the alternative, the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to pre-judgment interest under the common law. Home Insurance, however, claims that this issue is controlled by Johnson v. Pearson Agri-Systems, Inc., 119 Wis. 2d 766, 350 N.W.2d 127 (1984), in which this court rejected a claim for pre-judgment interest in a personal injury action on the grounds that damages must be liquidated or liquidable in order for prejudgment interest to be awarded. Id. at 771. With minor modifications, this has been the established rule in Wisconsin since 1899. See Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 79 N.W. 327 (1899).
Both the plaintiff and the amicus, Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, are asking us to treat the plaintiffs case as a claim against Home Insurance for its maximum potential liability under its policy rather than as a typical personal injury claim for the plaintiffs total damages. The argument is that the former is a liquidated amount or a determinable or liquidable amount because Home Insurance has a reasonable basis for knowing in advance how much its [609]*609maximum exposure would be. The amicus argues that this court should adopt a standard that requires an insurance company to pay interest on its policy limit when a verdict exceeds that limit or, alternatively, where it was reasonably likely that the damages would exceed the policy limits. This, they argue, would give insurance companies the incentive to pay valid claims promptly and would compensate plaintiffs for the use of the money to which they were entitled from the time of the accident.
This is a case in which Home Insurance’s ultimate liability for the plaintiffs personal injuries was clearly limited by the terms of its policy. In addition, as the jury determined, the plaintiffs damages were far in excess of the policy limits (whether policy limits are $50,000 or $65,000). Since before Laycock, this court has acknowledged the existence of an equitable argument for requiring a defendant to pay for the use of money or property, which the plaintiff recovers in a damage award between the time of the accident and the time of trial.
In Johnson, this court considered the equitable arguments. In a divided vote the court refused to accept the equitable argument, reasoning that the subject is best left to the legislature. We decline at this time to modify the Johnson rule to draw the distinctions which the plaintiff and the amicus urge.
On appeal the plaintiff has raised for the first time the issue of post-verdict interest against Home Insurance on the entire $591,000 verdict. This claim rests on a provision in Part A of Home Insurance’s policy which provides that Home Insurance will pay, in addition to its limit of liability, all "defense costs” beyond the policy limits. The plaintiff did not raise [610]*610this claim in any of the earlier proceedings and Home Insurance has not responded to this claim on appeal. We are unwilling to consider this issue which was raised for the first time on appeal. If the issue can be raised at all, and we do not decide whether it can be, it must be raised at the circuit court on remand.
In conclusion, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the plaintiffs claims for pre-judgment interest and double costs and remand this case to the circuit court with directions to modify the judgment to be in the sum of $50,000 plus costs in lieu of the sum of $35,000 plus costs consistent with this opinion.
For the reasons set forth, that part of the judgment awarding the plaintiff $35,000 is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court to enter judgment in the sum of $50,000. That part of the judgment denying double costs and pre-verdict interest is affirmed.
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with directions.