Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Company

246 P. 941, 139 Wash. 305, 48 A.L.R. 504, 1926 Wash. LEXIS 914
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJune 15, 1926
DocketNo. 19935. Department One.
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 246 P. 941 (Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Company, 246 P. 941, 139 Wash. 305, 48 A.L.R. 504, 1926 Wash. LEXIS 914 (Wash. 1926).

Opinion

Fullerton, J.

The respondent, Olympia Veneer Company, is a corporation organized under the laws of this state, and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling wood products, particularly veneer. The shares of its capital stock have a par value of $1,000 each. The appellant, Matie E. Nichols, is the owner of one of such shares, having acquired it as the heir of her husband, who was one of the original subscribers to the capital stock of the respondent.

The respondent, while organized under the general statutes relating to the formation of manufacturing *306 and business corporations (Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 3803 et seq.), has, by reason of its contracts with subscribers of its capital stock and the provisions of its by-laws, certain co-operative features. These are noticed in some detail in our cases of Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 135 Wash. 8, 236 Pac. 794, and State ex rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 244 Pac. 261, and need not be set out in full here. Those most pertinent to our present inquiry are: That each stockholder is entitled to employment by the corporation; that all stockholders employed, regardless of the nature of the work in which they may engage, shall receive an equal wage; and that each stockholder shall be entitled to one pro rata share of all profits arising from the business of the corporation.

The respondent was organized as a corporation in 1921. For the year 1922, none but stockholders were employed in its plant, and these received a wage of four dollars per day. For the year 1923, the wages of the stockholders were increased to five dollars per day, and certain non-stockholders were employed during that year at a wage of $4.40 per day. In 1924, the wages of the stockholders were increased to six dollars per day, and those of the non-stockholders reduced to four dollars per day. In 1925, the wages of the stockholders were fixed at eight dollars per day, the wages of the non-stockholders remaining as of the figure of the prior year. The appellant’s husband, prior to his death, worked at the plant as an employee of the respondent, and, of course, received the current wage. After his death, which occurred in December, 1922, it seems that, for a time being, the appellant, as the owner of his share of stock, was paid the difference between the current wage of a stockholder and the current wage of a non-stockholder.

*307 The corporation, prior to 1925, never declared a dividend, as such. In the beginning of the year 1924, ' however, the trustees “voted and allowed” to each individual stockholder, working at the plant between January 1 and October 1 of the year 1923, the sum of $175 per month, as additional compensation for the services rendered by the stockholder. The appellant, who was not such an employee, was not permitted to share in the allowance.

The present action was instituted in May, 1925. In her complaint, the appellant set up two causes of action. In the first, she alleged that the allowance made to the stockholders, as additional compensation for services rendered in 1923, was, in its substance and effect, a dividend, in which she was entitled to share, and that her pro rata share thereof was the sum of $1,500. In her second cause of action, as later amended, she alleged, in substance, that the wages paid the working stockholders since January 1, 1925, are grossly disproportionate to the value of the services rendered; that the actual value of such services did not exceed four dollars, and that the excess paid over that sum was, in effect, a division of the profits of the corporation, and that she is entitled to share in such division. Issue was taken on the allegations of the complaint, and, on a trial had before the court sitting without a jury, a judgment was entered in favor of the appellant on her first cause of action, and against her on the second. The appeal is from the adverse part of the judgment.

As a basis for its conclusion on the second cause of action, the court made the following findings of fact:

“I. That defendant corporation has ninety-two (92) stockholders working in the plant of defendant corporation, and that in addition thereto there are employed in the plant forty-six (46) non-stockholders. *308 And that the wages paid to the stockholders is the sum of Eight ($8.00) Dollars per day, and that the wages paid to non-stockholders working in the plant is the sum of Four ($4.00) Dollars per day.

“II. That defendant corporation is engaged in the manufacture of veneer panel at Olympia, Washington, owning its own site and machinery and transacting business totaling many thousands of dollars annually. That practically all^of the stockholders in said company have been with it since its inception and by their labor and close attention to business have developed the plant and business to its present condition. That said company was organized and is owned and • controlled by laboring men, and at all times has been and is officered, managed and operated by laboring ;nien, all of whom are requir'ed by the by-laws of the company and the subscription agreement heretofore mentioned, to be stockholders. That all of said stockholders, including the officers and managers, receive the same wage.

“III. That all the company’s business is transacted .by its stockholder's rather than by its Board of Trustees, except the ordinary routine business, and that the success of the company has been due in large measure to the judgment and attention to business of the stockholders, to an extent greater than is ordinarily the case in a corporation.

“IV; That by reason of the fact that the stockholders, have changed so little since the organization of the company, they have become skilled in their various respective positions and are familiar with the details of the business of the company. That many of the stockholders are skilled mechanics, and were experienced in mill work and logging industry prior to their connection with defendant corporation.

“V. That the positions of responsibility in the plant, the operation of all the more important machines, and the processes of manufacture calling for care and experience, are' almost altogether held by stockholders. That with the exception of two or three cases, the character of work performed by the non-stockholders is of minor importance and little, if any, responsibility.

*309 “VI. That the scale of wages paid to non-stockholders laboring in the plant, namely, Four Dollars ($4.00) per day, is a fair and reasonable scale of wages for the character of services performed by the non-stockholders. And that the scale of wages paid to stockholders, namely, Eight Dollars ($8.00) per day, is a fair and reasonable scale of wages for the char-actér of work and nature and value of the service rendered to the corporation by the stockholders., And that the amount paid to stockholder employees working in the plant is not grossly disproportionate to the amount paid to employees working in the plant who are not stockholders, taking into consideration the character of work and value of the services respectively rendered by them.

“VIII.

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Bluebook (online)
246 P. 941, 139 Wash. 305, 48 A.L.R. 504, 1926 Wash. LEXIS 914, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nichols-v-olympia-veneer-company-wash-1926.