OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
This is a class action in which shareholders claim that a corporation paid discriminatory dividends. The shareholders prevailed in the superior court. They appeal, claiming that the damage award was too low, that the class was too narrowly defined, and that the court’s award of attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82 was too low. The corporation cross-appeals, asserting numerous defenses relating both to liability and damages. We affirm the superior court’s liability ruling, vacate the damage award, and remand for recalculation of damages and for consideration of whether an immediate lump sum payment of the judgment is appropriate.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Kake Tribal Corporation (Kake) is a village corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). Kake adopted a “Financial Security Plan” which was intended to confer financial benefits on some of Kake’s shareholders. The plan was open only to original Kake shareholders who retained the one hundred shares they were issued when the corporation was organized.
The plan consisted of two programs. Original shareholders of Kake who retained all one hundred of their original shares and were between twenty-one and sixty-nine years of age were entitled to participate in the basic program. Individuals who were seventy years of age or older, and met the same shareholding requirements, were entitled to enroll in the senior program.
Under the basic program, Kake purchased a life insurance policy for each program participant. Kake retained control of the policies, was named as the beneficiary, and retained the cash surrender values. Upon the death of a participant, the life insurance proceeds were placed in an account with an investment management firm. The funds in this account were used to pay program benefits, and for other corporate purposes.
Participants who enrolled in the basic program had the option of choosing either a living benefits program or a death benefits program. The death benefits program provided for an immediate payment upon the death of the participant of $1,800 in funeral expenses and monthly payments of $225 for sixteen years to beneficiaries designated by the participant. If a participant chose the living benefits option, the participant could elect to receive $100 per month for fifteen years beginning at age sixty-five, plus a $1,000 payment to the participant’s beneficiaries at the time of the participant’s death. Alternatively, the living benefits participant could elect to receive $4,000 per year, starting at age sixty-eight, for three years, plus a [1323]*1323$1,000 payment to the participant’s beneficiaries at death.
The senior program promised to pay each participant $100 per month for up to 180 months, plus $1,000 in funeral expenses at death. This program was devised because the shareholders who were seventy years of age or older were generally uninsurable.
Kake began to experience financial difficulty. After making twenty-three monthly payments to the elders — as the parties describe the participants in the senior program — the payments were suspended in 1982 due to lack of funds. On January 12, 1989, Kake paid each surviving elder $100 per month retroactive to October 1982 and each elder’s estate $100 for each month from October of 1982 until the time of the elder’s death. The corporation then discontinued the senior program.
Meanwhile, in 1985, Kake switched the insurers which were underwriting the basic program. This required that new insurance forms be filled out by program participants. Many shareholders failed to re-enroll with the new insurer.
The basic program was modified in 1989. Kake’s liability to pay death benefits from the account with the investment management firm was limited, and the living benefits program was terminated. On March 1, 1992, the basic program was terminated.
The plaintiffs filed suit on August 31,1990, alleging that the plan unfairly discriminated against them. Arlene Hanson and Victor Davis, Jr., are the widow and minor son of an original shareholder of Kake. When he died, fifty of his shares were transferred to Arlene and fifty passed to Victor. These shares were no longer considered to be original shares and, as a result, Arlene and Victor were not entitled to participate in the plan. Clifford Tagaban inherited twenty-five shares from his grandmother. He was also ineligible to participate in the plan.
In 1992 the plaintiffs amended their complaint, asserting class action claims. Kake moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Superior Court Judge Thomas M. Jahnke ruled that each payment to favored shareholders gave rise to a separate cause of action, subject to a separate limitations analysis; that the six-year statute expressed in AS 09.10.050 governed this case; that the statute barred claims accruing more than six years before the case was filed, that is claims accruing before August 31, 1984; and that claims held by minors were tolled pursuant to the tolling provisions of AS 09.10.140.
In the spring of 1993, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on remaining liability issues. At roughly the same time, by stipulation, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint which they claim expanded the class to include all shareholders who had been discriminated against, whether or not they participated in the plan.
The case was set for trial on June 28,1993. Just before trial, the trial judge, Walter L. Carpeneti, ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor on the summary judgment motions, holding “as a matter of law payments both to beneficiaries of shareholders and to shareholders directly under the challenged plan are distributions under state law, that the payments violate the rule of uniformity and that the defendant is therefore liable to plaintiffs.”
On June 25, 1993, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the class certification order to include all shares against which the plan had discriminated, not just those whose owners had been termed ineligible to participate in the plan. On the third day of trial Judge Carpeneti ruled on this motion, indicating that he would grant it, but only on the condition that the summary judgment order on liability be vacated, and that plaintiffs pay defendant’s attorney fees for lost trial and trial preparation time.
The plaintiffs declined to accept these conditions and trial proceeded on the issue of damages. Following trial, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the class certification order. The court again indicated that it would expand the class, but only on the condition that its order granting partial summary judgment on liability be set aside. A new trial would then be necessary. The class declined this condition and withdrew the motion for reconsideration.
[1324]*1324Following the trial, the court found that any shareholders who had participated in the plan, no matter how briefly, were excluded from any remedy. The court ruled that the remedy of shareholders holding less than one hundred shares would be calculated on a per share basis, while the remedy of shareholders who held more than one-hundred shares would be limited to one hundred shares. It found the plan to have cost Kake $1,996,000 or $47.30 for each participating share. The court awarded damages of $47.30 per share to the 11,152 shares which qualified for the remedy. Judgment for the class in the principal amount of $527,489.60 vras entered. Subsequently, Judge Jahnke awarded prejudgment interest of $438,178.38 and attorneys’ fees of $125,000.
Plaintiffs and Kake have appealed. Their claims on appeal will be identified in the discussion that follows.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Payments under the Plan Were Illegal
Kake claims that payments under the plan were not dividends. Instead, it argues that the plan was a social welfare program which is permissible under ANCSA. Kake, however, points to no provision which may be read as authorizing the plan.
It is true that a corporation may engage in charitable giving. AS 10.06.010(13) (a corporation has the power to “donate for the public welfare or charitable, scientific or educational purposes ... ”). The plan, however, was merely a method of distributing corporate assets to certain shareholders. No reasonable argument can be made that the plan was instead a series of charitable gifts. Indeed, the stated purpose of the plan was to provide financial security to the original shareholders of Kake. Distributions were to be made regardless of the need or financial status of the distributees.
Kake also argues that the senior program was authorized under amendments to ANCSA passed in 1988. These amendments did authorize the issuance, without consideration, of a special class of stock for shareholders who had attained the age of sixty-five. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1606(g)(2) (West Supp. 1996). However, creation of such stock requires a shareholder vote or an amendment to the articles of incorporation. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1629(b) (West Supp.1996). Kake never took these steps. Thus the senior program cannot be considered a valid exercise of the power granted by the 1988 ANCSA amendments.
Because no provision of ANCSA authorizes the plan, the payments in this ease were illegal. Subject to certain limited exceptions not relevant for present purposes, holders of village corporation stock have “all rights of a stockholder in a business corporation organized under the laws of the State.” The quoted language is drawn from section 7(h) of ANCSA (43 U.S.C.A. § 1606(h)(Z) (West Supp.1996)), which pertains to the stock of regional corporations. Section 8 of ANCSA (43 U.S.C.A. § 1607) makes section 7(h) applicable to village corporations. One of the rights of a shareholder of a business corporation is the right to enjoy equal rights, preferences, and privileges on his or her shares. Alaska Statute 10.06.305 provides that “[a]ll shares of a class shall have the same voting, conversion, and redemption rights and other rights, preferences, privileges, and restrictions.” The statute thus commands that every share shall have the right to “the same rights, preferences, and privileges” of whatever sort. Whether or not the payments at issue were “dividends” as the plaintiffs maintain, they unquestionably may be characterized as “preferences” or “privileges” based on stock ownership. It is evident, therefore, that the payments violated the rights of the excluded shareholders.
B. Statute of Limitations Issues
1. The Six-Year Statute Governs this Case
Kake claims that this suit is an action “upon a liability created by statute” and is therefore governed by the two-year statute of limitations expressed in AS 09.10.070. Plaintiffs argue that the six-year statute set forth in AS 09.10.050 controls because this action is contractual in nature and is one that was recognized at common law.
[1325]*1325We agree with the plaintiffs. The relationship between a corporation and its shareholders is primarily contractual. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 656, 4 L.Ed. 629, 664 (1819); State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wash.2d 368, 191 P.2d 689, 693 (1948). This court has previously held that actions against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty sound in contract and are governed by the six-year statute. Bibo v. Jeffrey’s Restaurant, 770 P.2d 290, 295-96 (Alaska 1989). It is our view that the holding in Bibo applies by analogy to this ease.
2.A Separate Cause of Action Accrued with Each Payment
Kake argues that the cause of action accrued on the effective date of the plan not, as Judge Jahnke ruled, that a separate cause of action accrued with each discriminatory payment. Citing Howarth v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486, 490-91 (Alaska 1975), Kake argues that it is not necessary for an injury to occur in order for a cause of action in contract to accrue. It contends that a cause of action accrues at the time when the plaintiffs could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that each discriminatory distribution gave rise to a new cause of action because each payment was a new wrong. They rely on, among other cases, Bibo, 770 P.2d at 294.
One of the claims in Bibo was that controlling shareholders of a corporation made excessive compensation payments to a bookkeeping service in which the controlling shareholders had a majority interest. Id. at 292. Bibo, the minority shareholder, claimed that these excessive payments were, in essence, discriminatory dividends. Id. We held that a separate cause of action accrued with each payment to the bookkeeping service. “Each excessive payment is a separate wrongful act.” Id. at 294.
It is our view that the Bibo precedent is applicable here. Acceptance of the rule advocated by Kake would permit a corporation to escape liability for a plan to pay illegal distributions by announcing the program and then awaiting the expiration of the period of limitations before actually paying the distributions. We see nothing to commend such a result.1
3.Payments Made before August SI, 198f Are Time Barred
In calculating damages, Judge Car-peneti did not distinguish between payments made more than six years before this suit was filed and payments made within the six-year period. Given our acceptance of Judge Jahnke’s ruling that each discriminatory payment was a separate wrongful act, it follows that no compensation may be awarded for payments which were made more than six years before the suit was filed. While continuing payments prevent the running of the statute of limitations, there can be no redress for the time-barred payments. See Oaksmith v. Brusich, 774 P.2d 191, 200 n. 10 (Alaska 1989).
4.The Minor Tolling Statute Was Applied Properly
The trial court ruled that the statute of limitations for the claims of minor stockholders was tolled by AS 09.10.140. This statute provides in relevant part:
(a) If a person entitled to bring an action ... is at the time the cause of action accrues ... under the age of majority ... the time of ... disability ... is not a part of the time limit for the commencement of the action.... [T]he period within which the action may be brought is not extended in any case longer than two years after the disability ceases.
Stock of ANCSA village corporations “that a minor is entitled to receive ... shall be held by a custodian.” AS 13.46.085(a). The custodianship is governed by the provisions of the Alaska Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, AS 13.46. See AS 13.46.085(d). Judge Jahnke ruled that the minor tolling statute [1326]*1326applies, even though shares of stocks are controlled by a custodian because legal title to the shares is held by the minor rather than the custodian.
Kake takes no issue with Judge Jahnke’s conclusion that legal title to ANCSA stock held for a minor is in the minor rather than in the custodian. Kake argues, however, that since a custodian has the power to sue and a minor does not, AS 09.10.140 does not apply. Kake argues:
[Alaska Statute] 09.10.140 tolls the statute of limitations “if a person who is entitled to bring an action ... is, at the time the cause of action accrues ... under the age of majority.” In this case the person who is entitled to bring the action at the time it arose is the custodian, who is not under the age of majority. Consequently, AS 09.10.140 does not, by its terms, toll the statute of limitations for stock held by custodians.
Kake also argues that the policy reasons underlying statutes of limitations, the encouragement of prompt prosecution of claims and avoiding injustices which may result as a consequence of delay, favor not applying the tolling statute where there is a competent custodian.
Kake’s argument focusing on the text of AS 09.10.140(a) lacks merit in our view. The “person” referred to in subsection (a) is the minor or other person under disability. The concept of entitlement to bring an action is most sensibly construed to mean entitlement, but for the person’s disability. So understood, the act applies to minors, even those with guardians. While it is true that a custodian may sue on behalf of a minor, who is in turn not legally able to sue, a similar state of affairs exists for injured minor children. Their parents may sue for them, and they are legally disabled from suing on their own behalf.2 Yet, in such cases, the tolling rule plainly applies. E.g., Fields v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 818 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1991).
There is weight to Kake’s policy argument. However, there are countervailing policy considerations. Custodians are ordinarily not professional representatives and they may not be alert to the need to take action on a minor’s behalf. It can be regarded as fundamentally unfair to a minor to saddle the minor with the consequences of a custodian’s neglect. We stated in Haakanson v. Wake-field Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1090-91 (Alaska 1979):
The legislature has found [by enacting AS 09.10.140] ... that certain circumstances outweigh the policies underlying these statutes of limitation....
This statute expresses the public policy that favors safeguarding the interests of minors....
We can think of no good reason why this expression of legislative policy should not apply to wrongful death actions.
As in Haakanson, we can think of no persuasive reason why the minor tolling rule should not apply to cases involving a minor’s property which is controlled by a custodian.3
C. The Superior Court Was Correct to Permit the Plaintiffs to Proceed urith a Direct Action
1. Permitting a Direct Action in this Case Is the Only Way to Provide an Adequate Remedy for the Share holders Who Were Excluded from the Financial Security Plan
If a direct action were not permitted in this case, the possible defendants in a [1327]*1327derivative action would be (1) the shareholders who received payments under the financial security plan, and (2) the corporation’s officers and directors. For the following reasons, it is unlikely that a derivative suit against either or both of these groups would be an adequate remedy for the plaintiffs.
First, the corporation may not be entitled to any damages from the shareholders who received payments under the financial security plan. Under AS 10.06.378, liability is imposed on shareholders who receive unlawful dividends only when they have accepted payments knowing that the distribution was in violation of certain legal limits. It is unlikely that the beneficiarles of the financial security plan knew that the payments violated the law. This suggests that the beneficiaries of the financial security plan would not be liable to the corporation.
Second, it is unlikely that any damages collected from the responsible directors and officers would approximate the sum of payments made under the plan.4
2. Courts Have Wide Discretion to Determine Whether a Complaint States a Derivative or a Primary Claim
Courts generally “have wide discretion in interpreting whether a complaint states a derivative or primary claim.” Charles R.P. Keating & Jim Perkowitz-Solheim, 12B Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5911 (perm. ed. rev.vol. 1993) (hereinafter Fletcher). Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the same allegations of fact in a complaint may support either a derivative or an individual cause of action. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964) (stating with regard to claim that proxy was false and misleading, “we believe that a right of action exists as to both derivative and direct causes.”).
It is possible to characterize the allegations in this case as stating a derivative claim. Courts have held that “when a wrong has been done to the corporation, the shareholder’s right to sue the directors or wrongdoers for redress is derivative and not primary.” 13 Fletcher, supra, § 5928. And, in a metaphysical sense, the illegal payments in this case can be said to have “harmed the corporation.”
There is also ample support for the proposition that these allegations state a direct claim against the corporation. Two points supporting this contention warrant emphasis. First:
A plaintiff alleges a special injury and may maintain an individual action if the shareholder complains of an injury distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or a wrong involving one of the shareholder’s contractual rights as a shareholder. Thus, where there is no question that plaintiffs are claiming an injury that was not suffered by all shareholders, but only by minority shareholders, that action is properly classified as representative rather than derivative.
13 Fletcher, supra, § 5908. In this ease, the plaintiffs do not allege that the corporation was harmed. Their claim is that the corporation by paying certain shareholders a discriminatory distribution harmed them. Another way of expressing this point is that the rule “that a shareholder cannot sue for injuries to his corporation ... [does not apply when] the shareholder suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders.” 13 Fletcher, supra, § 5911. In this case, the excluded shareholders clearly “suffered an injury separate and distinct from other shareholders.” The shareholders who received payments under the plan suffered no meaningful injury whatsoever.
Although it seems anomalous to say that a shareholder who has received illegal payments has suffered an injury, it is true that there are cases in which courts have required a derivative suit where fiduciaries of a corporation who were also shareholders received illegal payments.5 Such courts have [1328]*1328reasoned that all the shareholders of the corporation — even the fiduciaries who received illegal payments — were harmed by the diminution in value of their shares and that the “corporation” therefore was injured. A holding permitting the plaintiffs here to proceed through a direct action would not be inconsistent with these cases: In all such decisions of which we are aware, the defendant shareholders were also fiduciaries of the corporation. This difference is significant because, as already suggested, a corporation can recover from fiduciaries who misappropriate corporate assets. It may not be able to recover from rank and file shareholders. Consequently, where the recipients of the misappropriated funds are fiduciaries, a derivative action will adequately compensate the plaintiffs; where the recipients of misappropriated funds are rank and file shareholders, a derivative action will not adequately compensate the plaintiffs.
The second point supporting the contention that a direct action is appropriate here is that there are many reported cases concerning discriminatory distributions which proceeded as direct actions. See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y.1986); Asarco, Inc. v. Holmes A. Court, 611 F.Supp. 468 (D.N.J.1985); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.3d 93, 81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Erdman v. Yolles, 62 MiehApp. 594, 233 N.W.2d 667 (1975); Stoddard v. Shetucket Foundry Co., 34 Conn. 542 (1868). Although such cases usually involve close corporations, our research has not revealed a single case in which (1) a publicly-held corporation made a discriminatory distribution to a group of its rank and file shareholders, (2) the shareholders attempted to proceed through a direct action, and (3) the court held that the plaintiffs had to proceed through a derivative action.
Thus, on the facts at issue here, a court has sufficient discretion to permit this action to proceed as either a direct or a derivative suit. The crucial inquiry, therefore, is how the court should exercise its discretion.6
3. Although Its Decision to Permit the Plaintiffs to Proceed with a Direct Action Was Appropriate, the Superior Court Did Not Adequately Address Two Policy Concerns Raised by Its Order
The superior court’s decision (1) permitting the plaintiffs to proceed with a direct action, and (2) ordering Kake to pay damages immediately and in a single payment to the excluded shareholders, raises two policy concerns which the superior court did not adequately address. First, it is possible that an immediate lump sum payment to the excluded shareholders would be inconsistent with AS 10.06.358. That statute places certain limitations on the ability of a corporation to pay dividends. Second, it is conceivable that requiring Kake to pay damages immediately and in a lump sum would disrupt Kake’s operations or prevent Kake from pursuing a profitable business opportunity. The result would be that all Kake shareholders would be injured.
Although these concerns should be addressed by the superior court on remand, neither of the concerns warrants a conclusion [1329]*1329that the superior court erred in permitting a direct action. As discussed above, where discriminatory payments are made to a group of rank and file shareholders, barring the excluded' shareholders from proceeding through a direct action likely forecloses their only effective remedy. Under these circumstances, relegating the plaintiffs to a derivative suit seems unjustifiable if the two policy concerns can be adequately addressed in the context of a direct action.
They can be. On remand, the superior court should determine whether an immediate lump sum payment of the damages it orders will deplete Kake’s assets below the level which would be permissible under AS 10.06.358. If a lump sum payment would have such an effect, the superior court should fashion a payment schedule which ensures that Kake’s assets will not be depleted below the level permissible under AS 10.06.358. The superior court should also give Kake the opportunity to make a showing that its operations or investment opportunities would be impaired if it were compelled to pay immediately the entire amount of the judgment. If Kake can make such a showing, the superior court should fashion an appropriate payment schedule.
Finally, if the superior court concludes that an immediate lump sum payment of damages would be inappropriate for either of the reasons discussed above, the court should consider ordering Kake to suspend the payment of dividends to shareholders until Kake fully compensates the shareholders in the plaintiff class.
D. Measure of Damages
The trial court ruled that damages were to be determined by dividing the cost of the plan by the number of shares that were included in the plan, to arrive at the cost of the plan per share, then multiplying that cost by the number of shares held by the plaintiffs who were excluded from the plan. The court found that 42,200 shares participated in the plan, and the plan cost the corporation a total of $1,996,000. This resulted in a cost per share of $47.30. The trial court awarded each member of the plaintiff class $47.30 times the number of shares each held.
This approach is inconsistent with the nature of this case. If this were a derivative action, the remedy would-be based upon the harm done to the corporation. However, this is a direct action to recover damages for a discriminatory distribution and the measure of damages suffered by plaintiffs should be a payment that gives them parity with those who received payments under the plan. See Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139 Wash. 305, 246 P. 941 (1926).
Plaintiffs suggest, perhaps rhetorically, that a damage award could be made that would give plaintiffs parity with the highest distribution that any share received. This would amount to $542.16 per share. Plaintiffs arrive at the $542 figure by dividing the premiums that Kake paid for the shareholders with the most expensive policies, by the one hundred shares owned by those shareholders. This suggestion is faulty for two reasons. First, no shareholder actually received $542 per share. Second, the appropriate measure of damages is not the cost to the corporation, but the benefit to the shareholders. Although the premiums for the life insurance policies for several of the shareholders were in excess of $500 per share, these shareholders did not actually receive the policies, nor were their beneficiaries slated to receive the benefits defined in the policies. The policies were the method chosen by Kake to fund the payments promised under the plan. Kake retained control of the policies, retained the cash surrender value, and was the named beneficiary. Benefits paid upon the death of a shareholder were pooled into a managed account, controlled by Kake, and it was from this account that payments were made to the beneficiaries. No shareholder can actually be said to have received a life insurance policy under the program. The fact that some policies were very expensive while others were relatively cheap is irrelevant to plaintiffs’ remedy.
Plaintiffs argue, apart from the suggestion discussed above, that benefits of $121 per share were paid to a significant number of Kake shareholders and that plaintiffs’ damages should be calculated based on that benefit level. The $121 per share figure is based on the amount paid the elders. They re[1330]*1330ceived twenty-three monthly payments of $100 before 1982. They did not receive any payments for the next seven years, but were then given a lump sum of $9,800, or $98 per share.
We agree that the payments to the elders furnish an appropriate measure for the compensatory distribution due plaintiffs. However, because the twenty-three monthly payments were all made more than six years before plaintiffs filed this suit, recovery for discrimination based on these payments is barred by the statute of limitations, except for shares held by minors. The $9,800 payments were made within the year before the suit was filed. Therefore adult plaintiffs are entitled to $98 per share, and minor plaintiffs are entitled to $121 per share.
E. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Expand the Class
On March 10, 1993, the trial court certified the class consisting of “all those shareholders of Kake Tribal Corporation (1) who are not presently enrolled in the Kake Financial Security Plan, or (2) who have not been enrolled in the Plan at any time since 15 October 1980, or (3) who own [Kake] stock other than shares designated as ‘100 shares of original Class A Stock.’ ” In April 1993, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint which, they claim, expanded the class. As previously stated, supra p. 1323, immediately before trial plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the class certification order to “redefine the Class to include additional [Kake] shareholders who have been excluded from full participation in [Kake’s] corporate distri-buttons.” Judge Carpeneti indicated that he would grant the motion to expand the class, but only on conditions that plaintiffs would not accept. Plaintiffs’ post-trial motion for reconsideration had a similar ultimate result. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have unconditionally granted the motion to expand the plaintiff class.
The trial court acted within its discretion in conditioning expansion of the class in the manner that it did. The class proposed by plaintiffs would have broadened the scope of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs’ proposal would have inflated the class from only those shareholders who had never participated in the program to all shareholders except those who had received the maximum amount of benefits under the plan. As a practical matter, this would have included every shareholder who was not enrolled in the senior program.7
New defenses on liability applicable to the new class members were a possibility. The damages trial would be more complicated. Delay so that the notice and exclusion procedures mandated by Civil Rule 23(c) could be followed was inevitable. Trial time and trial preparation time would be lost. Under these circumstances the court could have simply denied the motion on untimeliness grounds. Conditioning the grant of the motion on reopening liability issues and paying costs for wasted time was also an appropriate resolution.8
F. Prejudgment Interest Must Be Recalculated
Kake argues that prejudgment interest should not reach back beyond the bar im[1331]*1331posed by the six-year statute of limitations, No effective response is made to this argument, and it is manifestly correct. The argument does not, however, apply to shares held by minors whose remedy is not barred by the six-year statute because of the minor tolling provision of AS 09.10.140.
Kake also argues that AS 09.30.070(b) governs a portion of this case. That section provides in relevant part:
[P]rejudgment interest accrues from the day process is served on the defendant or the day defendant received written notification that an injury has occurred and that a claim may be brought against the defendant for that injury, whichever is earlier.
This provision is applicable to causes of action which accrue after June 11, 1986. It therefore does not apply to payments made before that date.
Kake acknowledges that it received written notice from Mrs. Hanson of her claim and that of her son prior to June 11, 1986, but argues that it did not receive notice of a class claim until the amended complaint was filed on June 15, 1992. Therefore one issue is whether notice of an individual claim under subsection .070(b) will suffice to support the accrual of prejudgment interest on a class claim.
Plaintiffs argue that subsection .070(b) does not apply to contract claims, as it was adopted as part of tort reform legislation and uses the language of tort (“injury”) rather than contract.
The briefing on these questions is inadequate. Ordinarily, in such circumstances the proponent of the issue is deemed to have waived the issue. Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n. 3 (Alaska 1991) (“[Wjhere a point is given only cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be considered on appeal.”). However, in this case we do not believe that the waiver remedy would be appropriate because both parties are proponents of inadequately briefed points going to the award of prejudgment interest. Additionally, prejudgment interest must be entirely recalculated given our decision on the other issues in this case. Under these cir-eumstances, we believe that it is best that the question of the application of AS 09.30.070(b) be reconsidered by the trial court on remand,
G. Attorney's Fees
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82 was inadequate. As noted, the court awarded attorney’s fees of $125,000 to be paid by Kake to the class.9 In making the award the court did not follow the schedule set forth in Civil Rule 82(b)(1). It found that a variation was warranted because “Kake Tribal conducted a well-financed, deliberately excessively litigious defense.” On the other hand, the trial court found that plaintiffs’ counsel were inefficient and that the total amount of attorney’s fees reasonably incurred by them had they worked efficiently would have been $210,000. The court awarded more than half of this sum as a partial award of attorney’s fees in consideration of the factors listed in Civil Rule 82(b)(3).
Based on our review of the record we think that the superior court’s conclusion concerning the inefficiency of plaintiffs’ counsel is a reasonable one. Based on that conclusion and given the fact that the court’s award of attorney’s fees was greater than the amount that the class would have been entitled to under the schedule of Civil Rule 82(b)(1), we conclude that the award was not erroneous. On the other hand, on remand, it may be appropriate for the court to reconsider the award in light of the new judgment amount. The court is authorized to do so.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court concerning liability is affirmed. The award of damages and prejudgment interest is vacated. The award of attorney’s fees is affirmed, but the court may reconsider the award after damages are recalculated. This ease is remand[1332]*1332ed for farther proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
COMPTON, C. J., not participating.