Nicholas A. Iacobucci, D/B/A Talk of the Town v. City of Newport, Kentucky

785 F.2d 1354

Opinions

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of two ordinances of the City of Newport, Kentucky. Ordinance 0-82-85 prohibits nude or nearly nude dancing in establishments selling liquor by the drink, and provides for both criminal and civil sanctions. The second ordinance, 0-82-56, requires certain employees of such establishments to register with the Newport police department, to be fingerprinted, photographed, and to procure an identification card. The appellants are managing agents of retail liquor establishments which provide live entertainment including nude and nearly nude dancing. They claim that the ordinances deprive them of their constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and seek a declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinances.

The fingerprinting ordinance, 0-82-56, provides in pertinent part:

1. Any person employed in any capacity in any establishment or place of business, except as hereinafter provided, where liquor or beer is sold or dispensed by the drink as defined in both the Kentucky Revised Statutes and the Newport City Ordinances, shall register in a book of registration to be kept by the Newport Police Department, and is hereby required to be fingerprinted or photographed by the Police Department of the City of Newport within five (5) days from the time of his or her employment. No such person shall fail to register, be fingerprinted or photographed.

2. No employer, whether a person, firm or corporation, shall allow any person to remain in such employment longer than five (5) days unless within such five (5) day period, the employee shall have registered and shall have been fingerprinted and photographed.

3. The registrants are required to have in their possession the identification cards issued by the Newport Police Department on their persons during their hours of employment in establishments selling or dispensing liquor or beer by the drink.¹

Later sections exempt persons whose “primary function is the service of food.” The penalty for violation of this ordinance is a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than five hundred dollars, which can be assessed against both the employee and employer.

The proprietors in this case claim that the fingerprinting ordinance infringes upon their rights under the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. They contend that their right of privacy and right of association are specifically threatened by this enactment, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). We do not believe that any fundamental constitutional rights are implicated by this ordinance. Because the ordinance bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, we view it as a proper exercise of the City’s police power. People v. Stuller, 10 Cal.App.3d 582, 89 Cal.Rptr. 158 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977, 91 S.Ct. 1205, 28 L.Ed.2d 327 (1971); Sibert v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 169 Cal.App.2d 563, 337 P.2d 882 (1959); Friedman v. Valentine, 177 Misc. 437, 30 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup.Ct.1941), aff'd, 266 A.D. 561, 42 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1943).

Newport’s fingerprinting ordinance does not contain a statement of its purpose. The district judge discussed Newport’s “tarnished image” and concluded that correcting this image constituted a rational basis for the ordinance. The City asserts that the ordinance would facilitate enforcement of various state laws regulating retail liquor establishments. While a specific statement of the purpose of the ordinance should have been included in its text, fingerprints and photographs of those serving alcohol will clearly further compliance with the Kentucky statute prohibiting minors and convicted felons² from serving alcohol in any retail establishment, K.R.S. § 244.-090. Newport’s notorious crime problems intensify the necessity of such compliance; a remand for a statement to this effect is therefore not required. See, e.g., Friedman v. Valentine, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 894 (“That an unsupervised cabaret offers a tempting field for abuses and crimes is almost axiomatic.”)

Courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of similar ordinances as valid implementations of the police power. In People v. Stuller, 10 Cal.App.3d 582, 89 Cal.Rptr. 158 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977, 91 S.Ct. 1205, 28 L.Ed.2d 327 (1971), a bartender’s fingerprints taken pursuant to a virtually identical ordinance were admitted as evidence in his trial for rape. In rejecting the defendant’s claim that the ordinance authorized an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy, the Stuller court noted the minimal nature of the intrusion involved in registration and fingerprinting, and listed the numerous non-criminal situations in which fingerprints are required. 89 Cal.Rptr. at 166-67.

A New York Police Commission regulation requiring the registration and fingerprinting of all cabaret employees was upheld in Friedman v. Valentine, 177 Misc. 437, 30 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup.Ct.1941), aff'd, 266 A.D. 561, 42 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1943). The court held that the regulation was justified by conditions in the cabaret industry, stating “[n]o one can seriously argue against the conclusion that persons employed in cabarets and by their concessionnaires have especially favorable opportunities to victimize patrons of such establishments.” 30 N.Y.S.2d at 895. Friedman was reaffirmed in Simone v. Kennedy, 26 Misc.2d 748, 212 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1961), in which the court approved the police department’s practice of charging fees for the identification cards required by the ordinance.

The Friedman reasoning helped pave the way for a federal case on fingerprinting requirements, Thom v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 306 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y.1969), aff'd sub nom. Miller v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905, 90 S.Ct. 1696, 26 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970). Thom upheld the constitutionality of a New York state statute requiring fingerprinting of all employees of member firms of national security exchanges registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and all employees of affiliated cleaning corporations. The court rejected the plaintiff’s privacy argument, observing that fingerprinting “is only a means of verifying the required information as to the existence or nonexistence of a prior criminal record ... [t]he actual inconvenience is minor; the claimed indignity, nonexistent; detention, there is none; nor unlawful search; nor unlawful seizure.” Id. at 1009. See also id. at 1007 n. 17 (citing federal and state eases upholding fingerprinting requirements); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 1397-98, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (recognizing the minimal intrusiveness of the fingerprinting process).

The Durham, North Carolina City Council adopted a similar, but more extensive, ordinance regulating massage parlors. The ordinance requires all applicants for licenses for massage businesses to be fingerprinted and photographed, and to submit to medical examinations. The constitutionality of this ordinance was upheld in Brown v. Brannon, 399 F.Supp. 133, 138-39 (M.D.N.C.1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir.1976). The Brown court concluded that the ordinance was rationally related to a valid state interest: “[T]he photographing and fingerprinting obviously serve to aid police and administrative personnel in identifying and investigating potential applicants for a license____ The records also would aid in the efforts of North Carolina relating to offenses against public morality and decency.” Id. at 139.

Fingerprints are required by states and cities in many noncriminal situations, most often in connection with applications for licenses or permits. See, e.g., Ky., Sup. Ct.R. 2.020(2) (requiring fingerprints of applicants for the bar); Louisville, Ky., Code §§ 73.22, 112.15(2) (requiring photographs and fingerprints of applicants for licenses for numerous occupations, including auctioneers, fortune tellers, and collecting agencies); Louisville, Ky., Code § 114.-049(A)-(D) (requiring fingerprinting of all applicants for retail liquor licenses and authorizing the Director of Safety to require fingerprinting of all “stockholders, agents, or employees of a licensed corporation” if he has reasonable grounds to believe the person has a prior criminal record.)

Newport’s fingerprinting ordinance serves corresponding goals. Because no fundamental right is threatened by the ordinance, it will be upheld if it is reasonable, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). We believe that the ordinance legitimately furthers Kentucky’s objective of screening employees of retail liquor establishments, and advances the city’s goal of eliminating crime. Cf. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541, 556-57 (5th Cir.1982) (upholding city ordinance requiring religious solicitors to comply with registration and financial disclosure requirements, and to carry identification cards); Hamilton v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm’n., 117 N.J.Super. 345, 284 A.2d 564 (1971) (upholding Real Estate Commission regulation requiring all applicants for salesman, broker-salesman, or broker’s licenses to be fingerprinted); Playboy Club of New York, Inc. v. O’Connell, 18 A.D.2d 339, 239 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 503, 248 N.Y.S.2d 226, 197 N.E.2d 662 (1964) (upholding regulation of department of licenses that female cabaret employees are prohibited from mingling with patrons). Compare Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826, 834 (1st Cir.1972) (ordinance requiring newspaper vendors to obtain a license and to wear a badge held unconstitutional because printed materials distributed anonymously “have played an important role in the progress of mankind”.); Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir.1970) (same). Wulp and Strasser involved undisputed first amendment concerns; no comparable governmental interest is threatened by this ordinance.

Judicial authority is therefore in agreement that requiring fingerprints of employees of retail liquor establishments bears a rational relationship to the legitimate goal of crime prevention. The operators of the Newport establishments present essentially the same arguments rejected in these earlier cases. Whatever the outer limits of the right to privacy, clearly it cannot be extended to apply to a procedure the Supreme Court regards as only minimally intrusive. Enhanced protection has been held to apply only to such fundamental decisions as contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and family living arrangements, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). Fingerprints and photographs have not been held to merit the samq level of constitutional concern.

We also reject the proprietors’ argument that the fingerprinting ordinance interferes with their freedom to pursue the occupation of their choice. Although government may not unreasonably interfere with a citizen’s pursuit of his occupation, Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 327-28 (6th Cir.1983), this fingerprinting ordinance places no categorical restrictions on those who may be employed in retail liquor establishments. Compliance with the ordinance is not a sufficiently serious impediment to the pursuit of employment in a retail liquor establishment to merit constitutional protection. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 48 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976) (invalidating a civil service rule barring all non-citizens from employment in the federal civil service system). We therefore reject the proprietors’ claim, and affirm the lower court’s ruling as to ordinance 0-82-56.³

The challenge to Newport’s nude dancing ordinance raises many different and complex legal issues. After reviewing the arguments presented in the parties’ briefs and at oral argument, this Court determined that the district court and the parties had proceeded on the basis that the case involved a conflict between the twenty-first amendment and other constitutional rights and therefore failed to discuss the questions of delegation, preemption, or the application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981) to the facts of this case. The parties were therefore directed to file supplemental briefs on these issues.

Newport’s nude dancing ordinance is almost identical to the New York State statute held constitutional in Bellanca. The district court stated that the nude dancing ordinance is constitutional because it “is squarely within the doctrine of Bellanca.” Because we do not agree that the doctrine of Bellanca applies in this case, we need not address the question of delegation of twenty-first amendment authority from the state to the city.

The rationale of the Bellanca decision is that, “[t]he State’s power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs.” Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 717, 101 S.Ct. at 2601. Given the express statutory authorization for cities to conduct popular elections on the question of local prohibition, see K.R.S. §§ 242.010-242.990, as required by the Kentucky Constitution,⁴ it is very doubtful that a city in Kentucky may by ordinance “ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely.” Therefore, even assuming that Kentucky has, in some metaphysical sense, delegated its twenty-first amendment power to the City of Newport, the ordinance does not fall within the Bellanca doctrine. A city cannot exercise in part a power it does not hold in full, and the citizens of the city have not chosen to exercise the power granted to them by K.R.S. §§ 242.010-242.990 and § 61 of the Kentucky Constitution.

Because we believe that Bellanca’s rationale does not apply to the facts of the instant case, we do not reach the state law question of delegation of authority from the state to the city. This determination does not, however, dispose of the matter, because the city may still justify the ordinance as an appropriate exercise of its police power. In Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 944 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859, 103 S.Ct. 132, 74 L.Ed.2d 113 (1982), the Eleventh Circuit observed:

We initially note that the Supreme Court in New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981), upheld a similar state statute on the basis of authority conferred under the Twenty-first Amendment. Bellanca does not, however, resolve the issue before us because Cocoa Beach, a municipality lacking any delegated regulatory authority under the Twenty-first Amendment, is required to justify the ordinance solely as a legitimate exercise of its police power.

See also Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854-55 (11th Cir.1985) (“Because Florida has not delegated its regulatory authority to municipalities, however, Pensacola must justify its ordinance under the stricter standard typically used to review an infringement on a protected liberty interest justified solely under the government’s police power.”).

While the exact amount of proof necessary to satisfy this “stricter standard” is an issue properly left to the discretion of the district court, we note that no substantive evidence concerning the government’s justifications for the ordinance was presented below. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that “[wjhere such fundamental interests as free speech are at issue ... we require more than simply an articulation of some legitimate interest that the city could have had.” Krueger, 759 F.2d at 855. Specifically, no evidence was presented relating the crime rate in bars in which topless dancing occurs to the crime rate in bars lacking such entertainment. The preamble to the ordinance, standing alone, is insufficient evidence of the motivating factors in its passage. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 69-73, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2183-2185, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); City of Miami Springs v. J.J.T., Inc., 437 So.2d 200, 204 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983).

Of course, a municipality may not exercise its police power when local authority over the subject has been preempted by the state’s exercise of its superior power to regulate the alcoholic beverage industry. See, e.g., City of Bowling Green v. Gasoline Marketers, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Ky.1976); City of Newport v. Tye, 335 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky.1960); Commonwealth ex. rel. City of Hazard v. Day, 287 Ky. 176, 152 S.W.2d 597 (1941); Die Burg, Inc. v. Underhill, 465 F.Supp. 1176, 1178 (M.D.Fla.1979). We express no view as to the resolution of this difficult issue, which was not raised below, but merely note that it must be addressed if the lower court, after hearing all the evidence, determines that the ordinance is an appropriate exercise of the city’s police power.

Another issue which would arise upon such a determination is the susceptibility of the language “or simulation thereof” to an attack on vagueness grounds. Like the preemption issue, the vagueness challenge need not be addressed until a ruling on the City’s police power authority is made by the court below. Clearly, however, the Bellanca decision is not dispositive on the issue, because a vagueness claim was not raised before the Supreme Court in that case.

We hold further that the ordinance does not constitute an impermissible prior restraint upon either present or future restricted expression. The appellants’ argument that their zoning status would be altered if their occupational licenses were revoked does not constitute a reason to invalidate the ordinance as a prior restraint. In this case, prescreening discretion is not vested in any administrative body, as in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), and the dangers of censorship are not present. A comparison of the dangers involved in systems of prior and subsequent restraint is contained in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C.Cir.1979):

An administrative censorship scheme provides less protection for expression than a system of subsequent punishment because it permits sanctions to be imposed for failure to obtain the censor’s approval, regardless of the nature of the expression. Expression may be punished in a censorship scheme upon proof of one fact — the failure to obtain prior approval. A would-be speaker thus cannot ignore the censor, for later he will be unable to defend his expression on the ground that it posed no danger and therefore the censor could not have suppressed it consistent with the First Amendment____

In contrast, under a system of subsequent punishment, the state must show in each case that the particular expression which the state seeks to punish did in fact pose an immediate threat to an interest which the state has a right to protect. Id. at 184 n. 15 (citations omitted).

In summary, we hold only that the district court’s determination that Newport’s ordinance “falls squarely within the doctrine of Bellanca,” cannot stand. We remand for a determination of the city’s authority under the police power, and, if necessary, analysis of the preemption and vagueness issues. We affirm as to the fingerprinting ordinance.

APPENDIX

Footnotes

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ORDINANCE NO. 0-82-85

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, PROHIBITING NUDE OR NEARLY NUDE ACTIVITIES IN ESTABLISHMENTS WITH A RETAIL DRINK LIQUOR LICENSE AND/OR RETAIL CEREAL MALT BEVERAGE LIQUOR LICENSE, AND PROVIDING FOR PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, INCLUDING THE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF THE SAID RETAIL LIQUOR DRINK LICENSE AND/OR RETAIL CEREAL MALT BEVERAGE LIQUOR LICENSE AND THE REVOCATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT’S OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE.

WHEREAS, numerous business establishments with a retail drink liquor license and/or retail cereal malt beverage liquor license from the City of Newport, Kentucky, provide adult entertainment for its patrons, such as nude or nearly nude dancing; and

WHEREAS, the City Commission of the City of Newport, Kentucky, determines such conduct or activities as injurious to the citizens of the City of Newport, Kentucky; and

WHEREAS, .the City Commission of the City of Newport, Kentucky, believes that this Ordinance is necessary:

1. To protect property values;

2. To prevent blight and the deterioration of the City’s neighborhoods;

3. To promote a climate conducive to a return of residences and businesses to the City’s neighborhoods;

4. To enhance the quality of life within the City;

5. To presume [sic] and stabilize the City’s neighborhoods; and

6. To decrease the incidence of crime, disorderly conduct and juvenile delinquency, now Therefore,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY:

SECTION I

DEFINITIONS:

A. “Business Establishments” — Shall mean a business within the City of Newport, Kentucky, where liquor, beer and/or wine is sold for consumption on the premises pursuant to a retail drink liquor license and/or retail cereal malt beverage liquor license that has been issued by the City of Newport, Kentucky.

B. “Liquor Administrator” — Shall mean the duly appointed Alcoholic Beverage Con trol Administrator of the City of Newport, Kentucky.

C. “Licensee” — Shall mean any person to whom a retail drink liquor license or a retail cereal malt beverage liquor license has been issued by the City of Newport, Kentucky, including the officers and agents of the licensee.

D. “License” — Shall mean a retail drink liquor license or a retail cereal malt be-verge liquor license issued by the City of Newport, Kentucky.

E. “Occupation License” — Shall mean the occupational license issued for the business establishment pursuant to the City of Newport, Kentucky’s Occupational License Ordinance.

F. “Person” — Shall mean a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental authority.

G. “Premises” — Shall mean the land and building in and upon which any business establishment regulated by alcoholic beverage statutes is carried on.

H. “Retail Licensee” — Shall mean any licensee including its officer and agents, who sells at retail any alcoholic beverage for the sale of which an occupational license is required.

SECTION II

It shall be unlawful for and a person is guilty of performing nude or nearly nude activity when that person appears on a business establishment’s premises in such a manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of the pubic area, anus, vulva or genitals, or any simulation thereof, or when any female appears on a business establishment’s premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view portion of the breast referred to as the areola, nipple, or simulation thereof.

SECTION III

A license or retail licensee is guilty of permitting nude or nearly nude activity when having control of the business establishment’s premises which it knows or has reasonable cause to know, is being used by any person to appear on the premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view portions of the public area, anus, vulva or genitals, or any simulation thereof; or used by any female to appear on the premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of the breast referred to as the areola, nipple, or any simulation thereof, it permits such activity or fails to make reasonable and timely effort to halt or abate such activity or use.

SECTION IV

A. Performing nude or nearly nude activities as set forth in Section II or permitting such activities as set forth in Section III is a Violation and punishment shall be fixed as se.t forth in the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

B. The second violation of Section II or Section III above within a twelve month period shall constitute a Class B Misdemeanor with punishment as set forth in the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

C. Three or more violations of Section II or Section III within a twelve month period shall constitute a Class A Misdemeanor with punishment as set forth in the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

SECTION V

A. In the event that a violation of Section II and/or III of this Ordinance occurs, the City of Newport Liquor Administrator shall forthwith conduct a hearing pursuant to KRS 243.520 (in conjunction with 241.160 and 241.190), to determine whether the liquor license, at whose business establishment the activity prohibited by this Ordinance occurred, shall have his/her or its license suspended or revoked.

B. In the event three or more violations of Section II and/or III above occur at a business establishment within a twelve month period, the Liquor Administrator, after a hearing, shall revoke the said retail drink license or retail cereal malt beverage liquor license or both.

SECTION VI

A. In the event that a violation of Section II or II above occurs, the City Manager shall prefer charges against the retail license pursuant to the Newport Code of Ordinances, sections 26-45 et seq. and after notice, a hearing etc. held by the Board of Commissioners, the occupational license shall either be revoked or suspended.

B. In the event that three or more violations of Section II or III above occur at a business establishment within a twelve month period, after notice and hearing etc. pursuant to the Newport Code of Ordinances sections 26-45 et seq., the Board of Commissioners shall revoke the occupational license of the retail licensee.

SECTION VII

If any provision of this ordinance, or the application thereof, is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or other applications of this Ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or applications, and to this end, the provisions of the Ordinance are declared to be severable.

SECTION VIII

This Ordinance shall be in full force and effect on October 1, 1982.

PUBLISHED: In Full in the Campbell County Recorder, the 13 day of September, 1982.

COMMISSIONERS ORDINANCE NO. 0-82-56

AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR THE REGISTRATION, PHOTOGRAPHING AND FINGER PRINTING OF ALL EMPLOYEES OF ESTABLISHMENTS THAT SELL LIQUOR OR BEER BY THE DRINK WITHIN THE CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY:

SECTION I

REGISTRATION, PHOTOGRAPHING AND FINGER PRINTING OF EMPLOYEES

1. Any person employed in any capacity in any establishment or place of business, except as hereinafter provided, where liquor or beer is sold or dispensed by the drink as defined in both the Kentucky Revised Statutes in the Newport City Ordinance, shall register in a book of registration to be kept by the Newport Police Department, and is hereby required to be finger printed and photographed by the Police Department of the City of Newport within five (5) days from the time of his or her employment. No such person shall fail to register, be finger printed and photographed.

2. No employer, whether a person, firm or corporation, shall allow any person to remain in such employment longer than five (5) days unless within such five (5) day period, the employee shall have registered and shall have been finger printed and photographed.

3. The registrants are required to have in their possession the identification cards issued by the Newport Police Department on their persons during their hours of employment in establishments selling or dispensing liquor or beer by the drink.

4. The City of Newport shall require a payment of Ten ($10.00) Dollars of each person registered, which charge shall be sufficient to cover the cost involved in the procedure, including the cost of the identification card furnished to the registrants.

5. In those businesses having a liquor or beer by the drink license where another business is the principal user of the location, including but not limited to restaurants and hotels, only those persons who are directly engaged in that portion of that business which sell liquor or beer by the drink are subject to this section.

6. This registration procedure shall not apply to waiters and waitresses which [sic] primary function is the service of food.

7. Any establishment having a liquor or beer by the drink license that employs a contract cleaning service or other maintenance service to work in their establishment after closing hours, shall require those persons so employed by the contractor to wear an I.D. card while working in that portion of the establishment that is directly involved in the sale of liquor or beer by the drink. This special I.D. shall only list the persons [sic] name, address, and date of birth.

8. Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violating this section shall be fined not less than Twenty-five ($25.00) Dollars, no more than Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars in the discretion of the Campbell District Court.

SECTION II

Any section or part of a section or any provision of this Ordinance which is declared by a Court of appropriate jurisdiction, for any reason, to be invalid, such decision shall not effect or invalidate the remainder of this Ordinance.

SECTION III

This Ordinance shall be signed by the Mayor, attested by the City Clerk, recorded, published, and effective at the time of publication.

PUBLISHED: In full in the Campbell County Recorder, the 10th day of June, 1982.

1

. The complete text of both Ordinance 0-82-56 and 0-82-85 is contained in the attached Appendix.

2

. As the result of a 1978 amendment, section 244.090(l)(a) prohibits a liquor licensee from employing any person who "has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or offense directly or indirectly attributable to the use of intoxicating liquors, within the last two (2) years.” Additionally, minors, aliens, and those who have violated liquor laws are not eligible for employment. K.R.S. § 244.090(l)(b)-(d).

3

. Newport’s fingerprinting ordinance is supplementary to the State’s regulatory scheme, and thus is within the City's regulatory power. City of Bowling Green v. Gasoline Marketers, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Ky.1976).

4

. Section 61 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:

Provision to be made for local option on sale of liquor — Time of elections. — The General Assembly shall, by general law, provide a means whereby the sense of the people of any county, city, town, district or precint may be taken, as to whether or not spirituous, vinous or malt liquors shall be sold, bartered or loaned therein, or the sale thereof regulated. But nothing herein shall be construed to interfere with or to repeal any law in force relating to the sale or gift of such liquors. All elections on this question may be held on a day other than the regular election days.

Ordinances appear as filed by the parties in the joint Appendix submitted on appeal.