Ney v. Ney

917 A.2d 863
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 7, 2007
StatusPublished
Cited by46 cases

This text of 917 A.2d 863 (Ney v. Ney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ney v. Ney, 917 A.2d 863 (Pa. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION BY

MUSMANNO, J.:

¶ 1 Joseph Ney (“Father”) appeals from the Orders entered by the trial court in this child support/spousal support case. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 The trial court summarized the history of this case as follows:

The parties, [Kristina Ney (“Mother”) ] and [Father] were married in November 2000 and separated sometime prior to July 22, 2004. They are the parents of one daughter, currently four years of age. At the time of separation, [Mother] had primary physical custody of their child. On July 22, 2004, [Wife] filed a complaint seeking child and spousal support from [Husband]. (No. 1729 DR 2004) Following an office conference, this court issued a child and spousal support order from which [Wife] sought de novo review. Upon the parties’ request, the de novo hearing was delayed pending custody hearings. On December 21, 2004, [the trial court] issued a custody order granting [F]ather the majority of physical custody. (No. 2285 CV 2004) As a result, on December 27, 2004, [Father] filed a complaint seeking child support from [Mother]. (No. 45 DR 2005) In light of the custody change and [Father’s] child support complaint, the parties agreed that the action be remanded for another conference hearing. Following the second office conference, [the trial court] issued three recommended child and spousal support orders with varying effective dates reflecting the change in custody and changes in [Father’s] actual income. In determining the amount of child and spousal support due, the conference officer determined that [Father’s] actual net monthly income was $4,224.26 for the period from July 22, 2004 through December 21, 2004; $3,202.79 from December 22, 2004 through April 3, 2005, and $2,909.98 from April 4, 2005 forward. Both parties requested de novo review.
The sole issue addressed at the October 7, 2005 de novo hearing was [Father’s] income/earning capacity. [Fa[865]*865ther], currently 39 years old, has been employed in the trucking industry for twenty years including the last ten years with the trucking firm[,] Estes Express Lines. From 2001 until April 4, 2005, he was the terminal manager at the firm’s Kutztown office. In 2004, he earned approximately $68,000 gross, or $4,224.26 net per month as determined by the conference officer under the Support Guidelines. [Father] testified that on February 15, 2005, “out of the clear blue,” he was told by his immediate supervisory Mr. Griesty that he was being demoted and transferred to the York terminal as a fill-in supervisor as of April 4, 2005. [Father] received a letter the next day informing him that his salary would be reduced by $9,196 per year and that he would no longer be eligible for up to $16,000 in yearly bonuses (which he traditionally received), as well as employer-provided weekly gas tank fill ups, a total loss of over $25,000 in gross yearly income. [Father] testified that he was informed that “higher ups” in the company considered him no longer qualified to be manager after [Father] had informed them he could not be available on-call 24/7 due to having primary physical custody of his daughter.
[Mother] noted that at the December 21, 2004 custody hearing, [Father] had represented to the court that his employer would have no problem adjusting his hours as needed (in light of his custody request). [Father’s] testimony from the custody hearing was that as of May 2004, he no longer had to put in long hours at his job because he could make many of the necessary managerial decisions from his cell phone. He also testified in the custody hearing that both Mr. Griest and Mr. Griest’s boss “would have no problem adjusting my hours to whatever I need them to be.”
[Father] countered that while Mr. Gri-est told [Father] he would work with him, the decision to demote [Father] came from Mr. Griest’s bosses and that the issue was out of Mr. Griest’s control. [Father] did admit that in the almost eight months since he was informed of his demotion on February 15, 2005, through the date of the de novo hearing on October, 2005, he had sent out only one job application, though he claimed that he was actively looking for jobs.
At the conclusion of the de novo hearing, [the trial court] held that [Father] should be held to his 2004 income/earning capacity of $4,224.26 net per month for all time periods and directed that the Domestic Relations Section prepare appropriate orders. Accordingly, on February 14, 2006, [the trial court] issued two orders, one under each docket number, reflecting the recalculation of the parties’ support obligation using [Father’s] net monthly earning capacity....

Trial Court Opinion 5/11/06, at 1-3 (citations omitted). Father thereafter filed the instant timely appeal.

¶ 3 Father presents the following claims for our review:

[1.] Did the trial court err as a matter of law in presenting and considering hearsay evidence, sua sponte, of jobs allegedly] available to [Father] on a website on the internet in its assessment of his income and/or income potential for child support and spousal support/[alimony pendente lite] purposes?
[2.] Did the trial court err as a matter of law in assessing [Father] for child support and spousal support/[alimony pendente lite] purposes, at the higher income of his former job, rather than the lower income of his current job, when his employer had transferred him [866]*866and reduced his salary through no fault or involvement of [Father]?

Brief of Appellant at 5 (issues renumbered for purposes of this Memorandum).

¶ 4 In Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630 (2003), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the following standard of review in child support matters:

In our appellate review of child support matters, we use an abuse of discretion standard. A support order will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court failed to consider properly the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions for Support ... or abused its discretion in applying these Rules. An abuse of discretion is “not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused. This is a limited role and, absent a clear abuse of discretion, the appellate court will defer to the order of the trial court. A finding of abuse is not lightly made but only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

Id at 634 (quotations and citations omitted).

¶5 In this case, Father sought a modification of his child support obligation based upon a reduction in his actual earnings. “Where a party voluntarily accepts a lower paying job, there generally will be no effect on the support obligation.” Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16 — 2(d)(1). “[T]o modify a support obligation based upon the reduced income, a petitioner must first establish that the voluntary change in employment which resulted in a reduction of income was not made for the purpose of avoiding a child support obligation and secondly, that a reduction in support is warranted based on petitioner’s efforts to mitigate any income loss.” Grimes v. Grimes, 408 Pa.Super.

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Bluebook (online)
917 A.2d 863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ney-v-ney-pasuperct-2007.