Com. v. Williams, K., Jr.

2025 Pa. Super. 137

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 1, 2025
• Docket: 182 MDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-S42010-24 2025 PA Super 137

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KAREEM MOHAMMED WILLIAMS JR. : : Appellant : No. 182 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002933-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: JULY 1, 2025

Kareem Mohammed Williams, Jr., appeals from the judgment of

sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, after the

court found him guilty of possessing a firearm without a license1 following a

stipulated bench trial. After review, we affirm.2

____________________________________________

1 (a) Offense defined.--

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A § 6106(a)(1).

2 Because the Supreme Court of the United States has declined to take up the

question before us, see Jacobson v. Worth, --- S. Ct. ----, 2025 WL 1151242 (U.S. filed Apr. 21, 2025) (denying petition for writ of certiorari), we see it as particularly pressing to provide clarity on the issue under Pennsylvania law. J-S42010-24

At a bench trial held on January 3, 2024, the parties stipulated to the

following relevant facts:

1. Defendant is Kareem Williams, Jr., DOB: 12/05/2003[,] and was nineteen (19) years old on April 18, 2023.

2. On April 18, 2023, [O]fficer Tomas O’Brien of the Spring Garden Township Police Department initiated a traffic stop on a grey Ford Sedan bearing PA registration MCK8575 in the 1000 block of Boundary Avenue in York County. []

3. [Williams] was the front passenger in said vehicle and Officer O’Brien noticed that Williams was carrying a fanny/sling[- ]type pack on his person.

4. During the traffic stop, Officer [Samantha] Cumor asked [Williams] to get out of [the] vehicle and noticed [Williams’] fanny/sling[-]type pack on the front passenger floor of the vehicle.

5. Officer Cumor asked [Williams] what was in his fanny/sling[- ]type pack and [Williams] stated his pack contained a firearm.

6. [Williams] did not have a concealed carry permit and could not legally obtain a concealed carry permit as he was under twenty-one (21) years of age.

7. The firearm found in [Williams’] possession [] on April 18, 2023, was a Springfield XDS 9mm with serial number HG906743. Said firearm is functional and capable of discharging the type of ammunition for which it was manufactured.

8. The firearm was loaded with eight (8) rounds of 9mm ammunition in the magazine and one round in the chamber. []

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, Stipulations of Fact for Bench Trial, 1/5/24.

Prior to trial, on September 12, 2023, Williams filed an omnibus pretrial

motion arguing, inter alia, that the court should dismiss the charge for carrying

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a firearm without a license because 18 Pa.C.S.A §§ 6106 and 61093 violate

the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as applied to Williams’ conduct.

See Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 9/12/23, at ¶¶ 40, 69. The court, relying on

Commonwealth v. Jamison, et. al., Docket No. CP-67-CR-4208-2022 (York

Ct. Com. Pls., en banc, Oct. 31, 2023), an en banc decision by the Court of

Common Pleas of York County addressing similar challenges to 18 Pa.C.S.A §

6105,4 denied Williams’ omnibus pretrial motion. See N.T. Omnibus Pretrial

Motion Hearing, 11/9/23, at 3; see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/24, at 2.

Based on the above-recited stipulations, the court found Williams guilty

of one count of carrying a firearm without a license and sentenced him to two-

and-a-half to five years’ incarceration and the costs of prosecution, with 260

days’ credit for time served.5 See Order, 1/3/24. Williams filed a timely

appeal.

3 Pennsylvania’s licensing statute provides that “[a]n individual who is 21 years of age or older may apply to a sheriff for a license to carry a firearm concealed on or about his person or in a vehicle within this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6109(b).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A § 6105 is Pennsylvania’s “persons not to possess” statute, which

delineates what prior convictions bar an individual from, inter alia, possessing a firearm.

5 The court expressly found Williams not guilty of the second charged offense

of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), 35 P.S. § 780- 113(a)(31)(i). See N.T. Nonjury Trial, 1/3/24, at 3. Accordingly, while Williams raised an issue relating to the drug offense on appeal, it is moot.

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The trial court and Williams have both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Williams raises the following claims on appeal:

1. The trial court erred when it denied [Williams’ m]otion to [d]ismiss:

a. The trial court heard no evidence and took no argument on [Williams’] motion, instead relying on [an] unrelated Court of Common Pleas en banc decision[ addressing] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105, which [was] not relevant to [Williams’] case and to which [Williams] was not a party; [and]

b. The Commonwealth presented no evidence or argument to sustain its burden of historical analogues for 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106 and § 6109 under the test set forth in [New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.] v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 [] (2022);

2. Sections 6106 and 6109 of the Crimes Code violate [Williams’] rights under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution:

a. There is no historical tradition under the Bruen test of prohibiting 18[-]20-year-olds from carrying a firearm in public with or without a license, as required by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6109;

b. There is no historical tradition under the Bruen test of prohibiting the possession of a firearm in a vehicle without a license, as required by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106; [and]

c. Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution on these issues.

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5 (reordered for ease of review; unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

In Williams’ first claim, he raises two sub-issues challenging the denial

of his motion to dismiss, which we address separately. First, he argues that

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the court erred by not taking evidence or hearing argument on the Bruen

claim raised in his omnibus pretrial motion, but, instead, relying on Jamison.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 16–17.

Williams’ claim fails as Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 577

permits a trial court to rule on such a motion based on the filing alone. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 577. Specifically, Rule 577 states the following:

(A) Following the filing of a motion,

(1) if the judge determines an answer is necessary, the court may order a written answer, or it may order an oral response at the time of a hearing or argument on a motion. []

(2) if the judge determines the motion requires a hearing or argument, the court or the court administrator shall schedule the date and time for the hearing or argument. []

Pa.R.Crim.P. 577(A)(1), (2). The rule’s language makes clear that a trial court

may decide whether a hearing or additional evidence is necessary to rule upon

a motion. See Commonwealth v. Cernick, 272 A.3d 476, at *2 n.3 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (Table)6 (“Rule 577(A)(2) confers general discretion to a trial

court to determine whether a hearing is required upon the filing of any

motion.”). Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling on Williams’ motion,

and he is afforded no relief on this claim.

Williams next contends that the trial court erred in relying on an

“unrelated” en banc Court of Common Pleas of York County decision.

6See Pa.R.A.P. 126(a)-(b) (unpublished, non-precedential opinions of this Court, filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).

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Appellant’s Brief at 16. Williams asserts that this was error because the en

banc decision dealt with a different section of the criminal code than the one

he was charged with—section 6105 instead of section 6106—and because a

trial court may not consider evidence outside of the record in making its

determination. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17, citing Ney v. Ney, 917 A.2d

863 (Pa. Super. 2007). Williams’ claim is belied by the record.

In its opinion, the trial court relies only in part on Jamison: “namely[,]

the jurisdictional points and decision with respect to whether Pennsylvania law

affords greater protection than federal law for firearms licensure remain

directly applicable to this case.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/24, at 2.; see also

Jamison, at 8–9 (“There is not a single case to support the argument that

the Pennsylvania Constitution offers greater protection with respect to

firearms ownership and possession than the Second Amendment.”). It also

relied on Bruen, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States

considering a Second Amendment challenge, discussed further infra. Id.

Furthermore, while Williams relies on Ney to claim that a trial court may not

rely on evidence outside of the record, Ney dealt with a judge who relied upon

his own internet job search in making a ruling—a far cry from a judge citing

to an en banc decision by the court it sits on as persuasive legal reasoning.

See Ney, 917 A.2d at 868. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in relying,

in part, on Jamison, and Williams is entitled to no relief.

Williams’ next claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

dismiss because the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden under the

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Bruen test. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. Williams’ position is that it was “the

Commonwealth’s burden to show the challenged statute is consistent with

traditional firearm regulations.” Id.

This claim is unavailing because Williams waived this argument by failing

to properly preserve it. “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). At the

hearing on Williams’ omnibus pretrial motion, when the trial court denied his

motion, he did not raise an objection on the basis that the Commonwealth had

not met its burden. See N.T. Omnibus Pretrial Motion Hearing, 11/9/23, at

3;7 see also Interest of N.B., 260 A.3d 236, 243 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Failure

to timely object to a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that

issue.”) (citation omitted).

In his second argument, Williams raises three sub-issues, which we

address separately. First, Williams argues that sections 6106 and 6109 are

unconstitutional as applied to him under the Federal and Pennsylvania

Constitutions. See Appellant’s Brief, at 21, 40. Williams’ Second Amendment

challenge asserts that his conduct—carrying a firearm in a vehicle—was akin

to carrying a gun for self-defense outside the home and, therefore, according ____________________________________________

7 Even if Williams had not waived this issue, his claim would still be without

merit. As discussed supra, Rule 577 permits trial court judges to rule on motions based on the moving party’s filing alone. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 577. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Williams’ motion to dismiss without briefing from the Commonwealth because, while it had discretion to seek a response from the Commonwealth, it was not required to do so and was permitted by rule to deny Williams’ motion without further briefing. See Cernick, supra.

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to Bruen, is “protected conduct under the Second Amendment.” Id. at 18.

Williams argues that, because his conduct is protected under the Second

Amendment, under Bruen, it becomes the Commonwealth’s burden to “show

the challenged statute is consistent with traditional firearm regulations[.]” Id.

He claims that doing so would require the Commonwealth to “affirmatively

prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits

the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id.

Regarding section 6109, Williams points to the decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Lara v. Evanchick,8 91 F.4th

122 (3rd Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom., Lara v.

Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), in

support of his claim that “there is no basis to find that 18-to-20-year-olds are

not part of [‘]the people[’] in the Second Amendment.”9 Appellant’s Brief, at

38–40. In this section of his brief, Williams primarily summarizes the

8 We refer to this case as Lara v. Evanchick, as Williams did, to avoid confusion with Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025) (“Lara”), a different opinion from the same litigation.

9 The appellee in Evanchick, the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari from that ruling. The writ was granted, the judgment vacated, and the case was remanded to the Third Circuit for further consideration in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 690 (2024). Thereafter, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in Lara that it did in Evanchick. That said, neither case is binding on this Court. See Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 782 (Pa. Super. 2002) (providing federal court decisions other than those of United States Supreme Court not binding on this Court).

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government’s argument in Evanchick and the Third Circuit’s reasons for

rejecting those arguments. See id.

The Commonwealth’s response to Williams primarily rests on its

argument that, because 18-to-20-year-olds were treated as “infants,” i.e.,

minors or non-adults, with limited political and civil rights at the time of the

founding, it is not against our nation’s history and tradition of firearm

regulation to curtail their access to firearms now. See Commonwealth’s Brief,

at 21-27. The Commonwealth points to the fact that, at the time of the

founding, minors did not have the ability to go to court to seek vindication of

their rights and had a legal status similar “to that of married women under

the doctrine of coverture under common law.”10 See id. at 22. When the

Second Amendment was ratified, minors aged 18 to 20 could not vote or serve

on juries, enter into most contracts, or collect debts owed to them except

through a legal guardian. See id. at 22–23, citing Megan Walsh and Saul

Cornell, Age Restrictions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1791-1868,

108 MNLR 3049, 3056-57 (June 7, 2024). Further, the Commonwealth notes

that when minors attended college, the school acted in loco parentis and often

prohibited guns on and even off campus. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 23.

10 “[T]he husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every[]thing[.]” 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 441.

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The Commonwealth dedicates a significant portion of its brief to

attempting to rebut Williams’ argument regarding 18-to-20-year-olds being

mandated to serve in state militias at the time of the founding. See id. at

24-26. One component of the Commonwealth’s argument is the distinction

between a “right” and an “obligation.” See id. at 25. To illustrate, while

citizens today have “a duty to participate in jury service,” they do not have “a

right to be chosen to serve on a jury.” See id., citing Walsh and Cornell,

supra, at 3077. It follows, according to the Commonwealth, that it is error

to assume that because an 18-year-old in 1792 could have been legally

obliged to serve in a militia and bear arms as a part of that service, he had a

corresponding right to bear arms outside of and independent from that

obligatory service. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 25. The Commonwealth

also posits that minors required to serve in a militia were not expected to arm

themselves for service; instead, it was commonly understood that their

parents, guardians, or the local government or state would provide them with

arms. See id. at 25-26. Therefore, according to the Commonwealth, a

“regulation that limits licenses to carry concealed [weapons] . . . is consistent

with this nation’s historical tradition.” See id. at 26.

A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question

of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary. See Commonwealth v. Farmer, 329 A.3d 449, 451 (Pa. Super.

2024). Wiliams, as the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute,

carries the “high burden” of demonstrating it “clearly, palpably, and plainly”

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violates the Second Amendment. See Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 333

A.3d 417, 426 (Pa. Super. 2025), citing Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d

179, 185 (Pa. 2009).

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has only once taken up a challenge

to a firearm regulation under the Bruen test. See Barris v. Stroud

Township, 310 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2024). Barris was decided before the Supreme

Court of the United States announced its decision in United States v.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), wherein it expanded upon its decision in Bruen

and attempted to clarify how lower courts are to apply the Bruen test.11 See

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690–702. We will, therefore, attempt to synthesize the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Barris with Rahimi’s updated

guidance on applying Bruen.

11 Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s concurrence in Rahimi acknowledged the

difficulty lower courts had applying Bruen, stating:

The message that lower courts are sending now in Second Amendment cases could not be clearer. They say there is little method to Bruen’s madness. It isn’t just that Bruen’s history- and-tradition test is burdensome (though that is no small thing to courts with heavier caseloads and fewer resources than we have). The more worrisome concern is that lower courts appear to be diverging in both approach and outcome as they struggle to conduct the inquiry Bruen requires of them. Scholars report that lower courts applying Bruen’s approach have been unable to produce “consistent, principled results,” and, in fact, they “have come to conflicting conclusions on virtually every consequential Second Amendment issue to come before them[.]” Given this, it appears indisputable that, after Bruen, “confusion plagu[es] the lower courts.”

See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 742–43 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

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The United States Supreme Court has reiterated that “the right to keep

and bear arms is among the ‘fundamental rights necessary to our system of

ordered liberty.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690, citing McDonald v. Chicago,

561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010). “Like most rights, though, the right secured by

the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690, citing

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (internal

quotations omitted). When a statute is challenged under the Second

Amendment, Bruen’s standard is as follows:

When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.”

Barris, 310 A.3d at 203, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.

Analyzing a Second Amendment challenge entails considering “whether

the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin [the

Nation’s] regulatory tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, citing Bruen, 597

U.S. at 26–31. It is the Commonwealth’s burden to show that the regulation

“is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 689, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. We must then

determine whether the Commonwealth has proven that the regulation is

“relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit,

apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern

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circumstances.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29

(internal quotations omitted).

One method we can employ to determine whether historic and modern

regulations are “relevantly similar” is by looking at the “how and why” behind

the regulations, i.e., whether the regulations “impose a comparable burden

on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably

justified[.]” Barris, 310 A.3d at 185–86, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29;

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (“Why and how the regulation burdens the right are

central to this inquiry.”). The analysis does not require a “historical twin” or

“dead ringer[;]” instead, the Commonwealth can point to “well-established

and representative historical analogue[s]” to show that the regulation is

sufficiently analogous. Barris, 310 A.3d at 186, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at

30.

Furthermore, the High Court’s Second Amendment precedents do not

render our jurisprudence “trapped in amber.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. Just

as the Second Amendment’s protection “extends, prima facie, to all

instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in

existence[ at the founding,]” so too does it permit “more than just those

regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691–92,

quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. That said, while we do not need a “historical

twin” to deem a regulation constitutional, we “must be careful not to read a

principle at such a level of generality that it waters down the right.” Rahimi,

602 U.S. at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring).

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In Evanchick, the appellee provided evidence that, at the time of the

founding,12 individuals younger than 21 were “infants” in the eyes of the law

and thus not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. See

Evanchick, 91 F.4th at 131–32. The United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit rejected those arguments because it held that: (1) it did not

need to examine the first step of the Bruen analysis—figuring out whether

the appellant is part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment—

through the retrospective “historical analogue” test of the second step; (2)

the fact that those under 21 years of age lacked certain legal rights at the

time of the Second Amendment’s ratification did not, ipso facto, mean that

they were not under the umbrella of “the people;” and (3) because 18-to-20-

year-olds were among the people protected by other constitutional rights, it

would follow that they are within the ambit of “the people” protected by the

Second Amendment. See id. Additionally, the Third Circuit juxtaposed what

it characterized as a “conspicuously sparse record of state regulations on 18-

to-20-year-olds at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification” with the

Second Militia Act of 1792, which “required all able-bodied men to enroll in

the militia and to arm themselves upon turning 18.” See id. at 136, citing

Second Militia Act of 1792 § 1, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).

12 We use “the founding” and “founding-era” interchangeably to refer generally

to the period of time prior to and shortly after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in 1789 and the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 109 (referring to “founding-era texts from between 1760 and 1799) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

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In Rahimi, the United States Supreme Court considered a Bruen

challenge to 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8), a law that, inter alia, prohibited

individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a

firearm.13 See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 684, 692. While the High Court was not

presented with “a founding-era or Reconstruction-era law that specifically

disarmed domestic abusers,” it nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of the

law in an as-applied challenge based upon surety laws14 and restrictions on

“going armed.”15 See id. at 702; see also id. at 704 (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring). These laws provided a historical tradition of disarming individuals

who “pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another.” Id. The High

Court reasoned that “[t]aken together, the surety and going[-]armed laws

confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear

13 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) made it unlawful to possess a firearm for a person

who was subject to a court order including a finding that “such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child.” See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8)(c)(i).

14 Described by the High Court as a “form of ‘preventive justice,’” surety laws

authorized magistrates to require an individual suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond. If the individual were to fail to post a bond or posted the bond and thereafter broke the peace, they risked being jailed or forfeiting the bond. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 695–97, quoting 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 251 (1787). Founding-era surety laws also targeted the misuse of firearms, requiring individuals who went armed to post bonds. See id. at 696.

15 These laws prohibited “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual

weapons, [to] terrify[] the good people of the land.” Id. at 697, citing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 148–149 (1769).

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threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be

disarmed.” Id. at 698.

Here, we conclude that section 6109 is consistent with the nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.16 To begin, under the Bruen

analysis,17 we have little trouble in saying that Williams’ conduct, carrying a

firearm in a vehicle, is protected by the Second Amendment. See Bruen, 597

U.S. at 32 (reasoning text of Second Amendment encompasses public carrying

of firearms).

Turning to the second step, it becomes the Commonwealth’s burden to

“justify its [regulation] by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Barris, 310 A.3d at 208, citing ____________________________________________

16 Our review took us outside the scope of the historical regulations cited to

by the Commonwealth in its brief. However, it “is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by the lower court itself.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 520 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022).

17 In Barris, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up the “preliminary matter[]” of determining whether the petitioner is part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. See Barris, 310 A.3d at 204. The Bruen opinion spent little time on this issue and provided no test to conduct, nor elements or factors to consider, while the Rahimi majority opinion makes no mention of it. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31–32 (“It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.”); see Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690–702 (omitting preliminary step of determining whether petitioner was a part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment). Here, we will not rule on this issue because we lack proper guidance, from either the Supreme Court of the United States or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on how to conduct the inquiry, and because it is immaterial to our ultimate decision.

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Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. The Commonwealth has presented evidence of a

historical tradition of individuals aged 18-to-21 being prohibited from

possessing firearms. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18-27.

Since before the founding, our nation’s state legislatures have

categorically disarmed groups judged too dangerous to be able to safely or

responsibly bear arms. As summarized by then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett,

“founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed groups whom they judged

to be a threat to the public safety.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 458 (7th

Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting). In the pre-founding era, Catholics were

disarmed for refusing to swear allegiance to the sovereign or independent

states, while in the founding-era, slaves and Native Americans were similarly

prohibited from possessing firearms because they were perceived as

“immediate threats to public safety and stability[.]” See id. at 457-58

(citations omitted).

In the 19th century, as guns became more dangerous and accessible,

legislatures enacted a variety of prohibitions of the sale and/or the possession

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of guns by, inter alia, “tramps” or “vagrants,”18 persons of unsound mind,19

and intoxicated persons.20 At least 29 jurisdictions limited the sale of firearms

to, or the possession of firearms by, individuals below a set age.21 ____________________________________________

18 See Act of Mar. 27, 1879, ch. 59, § 4, 1879 Conn. Pub. Acts 394; Act of

Mar. 27, 1879, ch. 155, § 8, 16 Del. Laws 225 (1879); Act of May 3, 1890, ch. 43, § 4, 1890 Iowa Acts 69; Act of Apr. 24, 1880, ch. 257, § 4, 1880 Mass. Acts 232; Miss. Rev. Code ch. 77, § 2964 (1880); Act of Aug. 1, 1878, ch. 38, § 2, 1878 N.H. Laws 170; Act of May 5, 1880, ch. 176, § 4, 1880 N.Y. Laws, Vol. 2, at 297; Act of Mar. 12, 1879, ch. 198, § 2, 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws 355; Act of June 12, 1879, § 2, 1879 Ohio Laws 192; Act of Apr. 30, 1879, § 2, 1879 Pa. Laws 34; Act of Apr. 9, 1880, ch. 806, § 3, 1880 R.I. Acts & Resolves 110; Act of Nov. 26, 1878, No. 14, § 3, 1878 Vt. Acts & Resolves 30; Act of Mar. 4, 1879, ch. 188, § 4, 1879 Wis. Sess. Laws 274.

19 See Act of Feb. 4, 1881, ch. 3285, No. 67, § 1, 1881 Fla. Laws 87; Act of

Mar. 5, 1883, ch. 105, § 1, 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159; Act of Feb. 17, 1899, ch. 1, § 52, 1899 N.C. Pub. Laws 20-21.

20 See Act of Feb. 23, 1867, ch. 12, § 1, 1867 Kan. Sess. Laws 25; Act of Feb.

28, 1878, ch. 46, § 2, 1878 Miss. Laws 175; 1 Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, Art. II, § 1274, at 224 (1879); Act of Apr. 3, 1883, ch. 329, § 3, 1883 Wis. Sess. Laws, Vol. 1, at 290.

21 See Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 159, § 5, 27 Stat. 117 (D.C.); Act of Feb. 2,

1856, No. 26, § 1, 1856 Ala. Acts 17; Act of Apr. 8, 1881, ch. 548, § 1, 16 Del. Laws 716 (1881); Act of Feb. 4, 1881, ch. 3285, No. 67, § 1, 1881 Fla. Laws 87; Act of Feb. 17, 1876, No. 128, § 1, 1876 Ga. Laws 112; Act of Apr. 16, 1881, §2, 1881 Ill. Laws 73; Act of Feb. 27, 1875, ch. 40, § 1, 1875 Ind. Laws 59; Act of Mar. 29, 1884, ch. 78, § 1, 1884 Iowa Acts 86; Act of Mar. 5, 1883, ch. 105, § 1, 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159; Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 29, Art. 29, § 1, at 359 (Edward I. Bullock & William Johnson eds., 1873); Act of July 1, 1890, No. 46, § 1, 1890 La. Acts 39; Act of May 3, 1882, ch. 424, § 2, 1882 Md. Laws 656; Act of June 2, 1883, No. 138, § 1, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 144; Act of Feb. 28, 1878, ch. 46, § 2, 1878 Miss. Laws 175; 1 Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, Art. II, § 1274, at 224 (1879); Act of Mar. 2, 1885, ch. 51, § 1, 1885 Nev. Stat. 51; Act of Feb. 10, 1882, ch. 4, §§ 1-2, 1882 N.J. Acts 13-14; Act of May 10, 1883, § 1, ch. 375, 1883 N.Y. Laws 556; Act of Mar. 6, 1893, ch. 514, § 1, 1893 N.C. Pub. Laws 468; Act of Mar. 25, 1880, § 1, 1880 Ohio (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Aside from legislative prohibitions on certain groups purchasing and/or

possessing firearms, the founding-era treatment of 18-to-20-year-olds as

minors is likewise weighty evidence of a historical tradition. The founding

“generation shared the view that minors lacked the reason and judgment

necessary to be trusted with legal rights[,]” and that, accordingly, “infants

were subject to the ‘power’ of their parents until they reached age 21.” See

National Rifle Association v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1117 (11th Cir. 2025),

citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 452-53

(1871). Among the legal rights minors lacked at the time of the founding

were the right to enter into contracts or sue without joining their guardian.

See Lara, 125 F.4th at 449 (Restrepo, J., dissenting). Further, when

founding-era youths went off to college, universities, standing in loco parentis,

often prohibited students from carrying firearms both on and off campus. See

id. at 450–51 (discussing founding-era weapons bans at Yale University,

University of Georgia, University of North Carolina, and University of Virginia).

This understanding of the legal status of minors at the founding and the

restrictions on bearing arms to which they were subject lends itself to the

Laws 79-80; Act of June 10, 1881, § 1, 1881 Pa. Laws 111-112; Act of Apr. 13, 1883, ch. 374, § 1, 1883 R.I. Acts & Resolves 157; Act of Feb. 26, 1856, ch. 81, § 2, 1856 Tenn. Acts 92; Act of 1897, ch. 155, § 1, 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 221; Act of Nov. 16, 1896, No. 111, § 1, 1896 Vt. Acts & Resolves 83; Act of Nov. 26, 1883, § 1, 1883 Laws of the Territory of Wash. 67; Act of Mar. 29, 1882, ch. 135, § 1, 1882 W. Va. Acts 421; Act of Apr. 3, 1883, ch. 329, § 2, 1883 Wis. Sess. Laws, Vol. 1, at 290; Act of Mar. 14, 1890, ch. 73, § 97, 1890 Wyo. Territory Sess. Laws 140.

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conclusion that our nation has a historical tradition of restricting the rights of

those aged 18 to 20.

Williams’ argument against section 6109’s constitutionality relies on

Evanchick and the Second Militia Act of 1792, § 1.22 However, this Court is

not bound by the Third Circuit’s decisions. See Werner, 799 A.2d at 782

(providing federal court decisions other than those of United States Supreme

Court not binding on this Court). Therefore, the outcome in Evanchick,

wherein a panel of the Third Circuit held section 6109 unconstitutional, is not

determinative in this case.

As for the Second Militia Act, Williams conflates a legal obligation or duty

imposed on a citizen with a legal right. The Second Militia Act required all

“free[,] able-bodied[,] white male citizen[s] . . . who [are] or shall be of age

of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years . . . be enrolled in the

22 The Act provides, in relevant part:

That every citizen, so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein, to contain not less than twenty four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball; or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch, and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear so armed, accoutred[,] and provided, when called out to exercise or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.

Second Militia Act of 1792, § 1.

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militia . . . [and] provide himself with a good musket or firelock . . . or with a

good rifle[.]” Second Militia Act of 1792. Williams claims that this requirement

shows that “18-20[-]year[-]olds were expect[ed] to supply (i.e., possess)

their own arms and transport (i.e., carry) them when called to muster for

militia duty.” Appellant’s Brief, at 40. However, as discussed above, an

obligation is not the same thing as a right—an individual’s duty to do

something does not mean they have a corresponding, unassailable right to do

that thing.

Additional context regarding the manner in which states effectuated the

Second Militia Act’s requirement that individuals provide their own arms

further erodes support for Williams’ conclusion. Given the limitations on the

legal status of individuals under the age of 21, discussed supra, states

enacted laws to address minors’ inability to procure the required firearms for

their service. These laws took various forms: Pennsylvania and Delaware

exempted minors entirely from the requirement to provide their own firearms;

seven states required parents to acquire firearms for their sons’ militia

service; and twelve states made parents legally liable if their minor children

did not appear for service with the requisite firearms. See Bondi, 133 F.4th

at 1119–20 (listing statutes). “By 1826, at least 21 of the 24 states admitted

to the Union—representing roughly 89 percent of the population—had enacted

laws that placed the onus on parents to provide minors with firearms for militia

service.” See id. at 1120 (citation omitted). These supplemental laws are

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indicative of a founding-era assumption that minors were restricted in their

access to firearms.

Going even further, in the latter-half of the nineteenth century, twenty

jurisdictions passed laws restricting firearm access for minors. See id. at

1121 (listing statutes). Fifteen jurisdictions “prohibited selling, loaning, or

giving dangerous weapons, including pistols,” to individuals younger than 21.

Id. Separately, Kansas went as far as prohibiting individuals younger than 21

from possessing pistols and “other dangerous weapon[s,]” and Nevada

prohibited them from “wear[ing] or carry[ing] . . . dangerous or deadly

weapons[,]” such as pistols. See id. (citations omitted).

Based upon this history of both common law and statutory restrictions

on access to firearms by minors, among other groups, from the pre-founding-

era through the latter half of the 19th-century, we find that a national

historical tradition exists of restricting firearm access to individuals deemed

unable to responsibly bear arms, particularly 18-to-20-year-olds. The “how”

and “why” of these laws and section 6109 are likewise analogous. The

restrictions burden the right to access and possess firearms (the “how”)

because the defined group—here, 18-to-20-year-olds—has been judged too

dangerous to allow such access (the “why”).23 Therefore, it follows that

section 6109 is constitutional under the standard set out in Bruen.

23 Moreover, as to the “why,” Pennsylvania’s legislature faces “unprecedented

societal concerns [and] dramatic technological changes” that historians agree (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Turning to section 6106, Williams alleges the Commonwealth cannot

meet its burden “because there are no historical analogues to a licensing

scheme like [s]ection 6106[,]” i.e., prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in a

vehicle. Appellee’s Brief, at 20. Williams points out that, prior to 1931, “few

laws in the Commonwealth [] prohibited the carrying of firearms in general,

nor did those laws require obtaining a license to do so.” Id. at 30. Further,

he claims that laws prior to 1931 “set no prohibition[s] or licensing

requirements for carrying in the available forms of transportation at the time,

such as wagons, carriages, railroad cars, and on horseback.” Id.

The Commonwealth notes at the outset of its argument regarding

section 6109 that most of its citations apply to the concealed carrying of

weapons, which it avers are apt because “these laws are directly analogous to

licensing the carrying of firearms in vehicles: carrying a firearm in a vehicle

allows for many of the same advantages as carrying it concealed on one’s

person, and presents many of the same dangers, and thus can be licensed

accordingly.”24 See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18 n.4. We agree. ____________________________________________

the founding-generation legislatures were not burdened by, and, therefore, the analysis requires “a more nuanced approach” when drawing analogies. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27; see also Lara, 130 F.4th at 72 (Krause, J., dissenting) (contrasting present-day interpersonal gun violence with lack thereof in founding era).

24 Aside from its argument on the merits, the Commonwealth also claims that

Williams has waived a facial challenge against section 6106 by not raising it before the trial court. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11-12. However, (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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While Williams makes a compelling case that our historical tradition is

rather quiet on the question of carrying firearms in “the available forms of

transportation in the 19th century,” Appellant’s Brief, at 31, we do not need a

regulation of that sort to find section 6106 constitutional. See Bruen, 597

U.S. at 3 (stating courts need not find “dead ringer” to hold law constitutional).

This reasoning follows a “use it or lose it view of legislative authority”—it

assumes that late-18th and early-19th century legislatures constitutionally

could not have legislated in this fashion merely because they did not. See

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739–40 (Barrett, J., concurring) (internal quotation

omitted). This rationale, however, is “flawed” and forces upon present day-

legislatures “a law trapped in amber.” Id. Such an approach would turn any

Second Amendment analysis into a “historical inquiry so exacting as to be

useless, a too-sensitive alarm that sounds whenever a regulation did not exist

in an essentially identical form at the founding.” Id. at 702–03 (Sotomayor,

J., concurring).

Instead, this Court need only, and does, consider section 6106

“relevantly similar” to the many “public-carry restrictions [which]

proliferate[d]” after the ratification of the Second Amendment in 1791. See ____________________________________________

Williams’ claim is an as-applied challenge. See Appellant’s Brief, at 21 (“The instant challenge is that [s]ection 6106 is unconstitutional as applied to [] Williams under the Second Amendment.”); see also Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 9/12/23 (“[Appellant] respectfully requests that this Honorable Court . . . find that [section] 6106 . . . is unconstitutional as applied to him[.]”). Because Williams brings an as-applied challenge and not a facial challenge, the Commonwealth’s waiver argument is meritless.

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Bruen, 597 U.S. at 50. Carrying a weapon concealed on one’s person versus

storing it in the glovebox or center console is, to this Court, a distinction

without a difference. If anything, the additional number of spaces in which to

store a firearm within a vehicle, the variety of firearms that can be carried

within a vehicle as opposed to concealed on one’s person, and the portability

provided by modern vehicles all weigh in favor of section 6106 applying with

greater force to possession within a vehicle than possession on one’s person.25

Therefore, as section 6106 can then be viewed through the same lens as a

standard licensing scheme for concealed carry, Bruen is controlling, and

section 6106’s prohibition on unlicensed individuals possessing a firearm in a

vehicle is similarly constitutional. See id. at 80 (“[T]he 43 states that employ

objective[,] shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns for self-

25 The criminal law concept of “constructive possession” is a helpful example

here. Relevant sections of Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act prohibit “possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance[,]” see 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and the “possession with intent to use[] drug paraphernalia[.]” See id. at § 780-113(a)(32). There are numerous Pennsylvania cases upholding convictions under these or similar sections wherein the convicted individual “constructively possessed” the illegal substance within their vehicle, i.e., had it in their car with them, though not directly on their person, and exercised “conscious dominion” over it. See Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, 177 A.3d 253, 258 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa. Super. 2019) (sustaining conviction under section 780-113(a)(30) for possession with intent to deliver under theory of constructive possession wherein defendant had narcotics in vehicle); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 326 A.2d 554, 556 (Pa. Super. 1974) (upholding conviction for possession of narcotics in vehicle under theory of constructive possession). Therefore, akin to Pennsylvania’s criminal controlled substance law jurisprudence, we consider the possession of a firearm in a vehicle, as opposed to on one’s person, nearly indistinguishable.

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defense may continue to do so.”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he majority of the 19th-century courts to

consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons

were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”).

Williams’ last argument, that Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution, is also

unavailing. This Court has at least twice had the recent opportunity to take

up the question of whether the Pennsylvania Constitution’s arms-bearing

provision provides greater protection than its federal counterpart. In both

instances, this Court has declined to hold that it does. See Commonwealth

v. Mead, 326 A.3d 1006, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[Pennsylvania’s] courts

have repeatedly treated Article I, Section 21 as not providing any greater

restriction on government firearm regulations than the Second

Amendment.”); Commonwealth v. Nieves-Crespo, 321 A.3d 965, *13 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (Table) (finding arms-bearing provisions of Pennsylvania and

United States Constitutions “offer the same protection”).

Based on the foregoing, we hold that, as applied to Williams, sections

6106 and 6109 are constitutional and do not impermissibly infringe upon his

right to bear arms under either the United States or Pennsylvania

Constitutions.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/01/2025

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