NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust v. Acis Capital Management, L.P.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 9, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-04384
StatusUnknown

This text of NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust v. Acis Capital Management, L.P. (NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust v. Acis Capital Management, L.P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust v. Acis Capital Management, L.P., (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: _________________ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED: 8/9/2022 ------------------------------------------------------------------------X - : : NEXPOINT DIVERSIFIED REAL ESTATE TRUST : : 1:21-cv-04384-GHW Plaintiff, : : MEMORANDUM OPINION -against- : AND ORDER : ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., U.S. BANK, : N.A., JOSHUA N. TERRY, BRIGADE CAPITAL : MANAGEMENT, L.P., : : Defendants. : : ----------------------------------------------------------------------- X GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge: I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Nexpoint Diversified Real Estate Trust (“Nexpoint”) is a closed-end retail fund that holds notes issued by a portfolio of collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) that is managed by defendant Acis Capital Management, L.P. (“Acis”). Plaintiff asserts that Acis, Defendant Brigade Capital Management L.P. (“Brigade”), Defendant Joshua N. Terry, and Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”) mismanaged the CLOs and led the CLOs to lose value, causing Plaintiff monetary losses. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings claims under the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (the “IAA”), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa et seq., and also brings claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion, and negligence under state law. Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that the agreement governing the investment relationship between the parties was made illegally or requires illegal performance, Plaintiff’s IAA claims are dismissed. Moreover, because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that defendant U.S. Bank breached any fiduciary duties, and because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims, which are brought pursuant to state law, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. II. BACKGOUND

a. Factual Background1

1. The Acis CLOs

A CLO is a type of structured financial transaction that pools debt instruments issued by corporations. Dkt. No. 42 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 10–18. The pooled loans are funneled into a trust entity commonly referred to as a “special purpose vehicle” (“SPV”) that raises funds through equity investment and by issuing notes to third-party investors. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. Cash flow from the CLOs is paid out to noteholders and, subsequently, to equity holders. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Acis serves as the portfolio manager for the CLOs at issue in this case (the “Acis CLOs”). Id. ¶ 37. Mr. Terry is the president, owner, and primary advisor of Acis. Id. As portfolio manager, Acis’s role is to identify and purchase CLO assets and to monitor the CLO assets to ensure that they meet various requirements. Id. ¶ 20. Acis’s responsibilities as portfolio manager are set forth in portfolio management agreements (the “PMAs”). Id. ¶ 21. As compensation for its role as the portfolio manager, Acis receives a percentage of the “assets under management,” which is determined by reference to the face value of the CLO assets. Id. ¶ 27. Intervenor Highland Capital Management L.P. (“Highland”) originally served as the sub- advisor to the Acis CLOs. Id. ¶ 40. However, during a 2018 consolidated bankruptcy proceeding in the United State Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Acis appointed Brigade as a sub-adviser and shared-services provider to Acis for all but one of the Acis CLOs. Id. ¶¶ 47, 53.

1 The following facts are drawn from the second amended complaint. Dkt. No. 42 (“SAC”). The Court “accept[s] all facts alleged in the [amended] complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). After the bankruptcy, Highland remained the advisor for one CLO, Acis CLO-7. Id. ¶ 53. As sub-advisor, Brigade took on certain delegated advisory tasks. Id. ¶¶ 22, 49. Plaintiff asserts that those tasks included advisory services as well as back- and middle-office functions including accounting, payments, operations, technology, and finance. Id. ¶ 48. Brigade was also charged with assisting in the negotiation and execution of documents necessary to acquire or dispose of assets under the PMAs. Id. ¶ 49.

U.S. Bank serves as the indenture trustee of the Acis CLOs. Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiff alleges that indenture trustees can use a variety of tests available to monitor the “security and soundness of CLO assets”, including the weighted average rating factor (“WARF”), which demonstrates the credit quality of the CLO’s entire portfolio, and the weighted average life (“WAL”), which demonstrates the average maturity of the debt instruments in the CLO. Id. ¶¶ 33–35.2 CLOTypically, the portfolio manager, advisor, and trustee are parties to an indenture, an agreement that further sets forth their responsibilities to the CLOs. Id. ¶ 19. 2. The Alleged Mismanagement

Between 2014 and 2016, Plaintiff became a noteholder in Acis CLO 2015-6 LLC and Acis CLO 2015-6 Ltd. (together, “ACIS-6”). Id. ¶ 38. ACIS-6 is governed by an indenture between Acis and U.S. Bank. Dkt. No. 82-2 (the “Indenture”). Plaintiff came to hold equity in Acis-6 valued at approximately $7.5 million. SAC ¶ 38. Plaintiff asserts that, beginning on February 15, 2019, Acis, Brigade, U.S. Bank, and Mr. Terry “caused the Acis CLOs . . . to incur astronomic, unprecedented expenses, which were well outside the Acis CLOs’ historical expense patterns.” Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff

2. As alleged in the second amended complaint, “WARF is calculated by taking the credit rating of each debt instrument in the CLO, determining the percentage of the CLO portfolio that each instrument constitutes, and aggregating those to a factor of the portfolio’s notional balance.” Id. ¶ 34. “The better the WARF, the lower the risk to a CLO’s investors.” Id. “Calculating the WAL,” by contrast, “yields the average number of years for which each dollar of unpaid principal on an investment remains outstanding.” Id. ¶ 35. “This metric is important because, in general, investors want to be paid back sooner rather than later,” and “[l]onger payouts typically mean greater exposure to risk because of unforeseen circumstances.” Id. Thus, “the shorter the maturity dates, the better the WAL—and, accordingly, the lower the risk to a CLO’s investors.” Id. asserts that under Mr. Terry’s management, Acis “replaced shorter-term debt with longer term loans,” which resulted in “increased risk,” “decreased residual principal value,” and “longer, artificially induced periods for interest accrual.” Id. ¶¶ 67–68. That mismanagement is alleged to have included Acis’s purchase of loans that did not maintain or improve the credit quality of the Acis CLOs’ portfolio, leading the CLO to register a failing WAL score in violation of the standards set forth in the PMA, id. ¶¶ 78–84; Acis’s purchase of loans that were “substandard,” id. ¶¶ 95–100;

and making purchases at a time when market conditions were poor, id. ¶¶ 101–08. Plaintiff asserts that these actions violated various provisions of the PMA and Indenture, and led to significant financial losses. Plaintiff asserts that Brigade had “far reaching . . . involvement” in managing the CLOs’ portfolios, and that Terry “direct[ed] and control[led]” Acis’s conduct. Id. ¶ 51. Further, Plaintiff asserts that U.S. Bank permitted the mismanagement by the other defendants, including by allowing the other defendants to take steps to circumvent various collateral quality requirements, and by permitting purchases that contributed to Acis-6’s failing WAL scores. Id. ¶¶ 124–27. b. Procedural History

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NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust v. Acis Capital Management, L.P., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nexpoint-diversified-real-estate-trust-v-acis-capital-management-lp-nysd-2022.