Newton v. Major Development 52 Corp

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 31, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-03469
StatusUnknown

This text of Newton v. Major Development 52 Corp (Newton v. Major Development 52 Corp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newton v. Major Development 52 Corp, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TINETA NEWTON Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-3469 (LLS) MAJOR DEVELOPMENT 52 CORP; ORDER TO AMEND STARK LAW PLLC; JUSTIN P. GROSSMAN, BADGE NO. 28; DAVID RAFOUA, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this application, which is styled as a “criminal complaint” for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. By order dated May 31, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND The following allegations are from Plaintiff Tineta Newton’s complaint. Stark Law PLLC, Major Development 52 Corp, and David Rafoua induced City Marshal Justin P.

Grossman to “invade” Plaintiff’s residence in Bronx County, New York, on April 10, 2019, and “unlawfully ransack[ ] and remove[ her] private property that was in the dwelling. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff contends that her property, including her cat, has been destroyed “without proper due process,” and she attaches a list of her property. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff asks that “arrest warrants be issued” for all defendants and that they be charged with violating federal criminal laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. DISCUSSION A. Criminal Charges A private citizen cannot prosecute a criminal action in federal court. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (private plaintiffs lack standing to seek the issuance of an arrest warrant); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks

a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Moreover, because federal prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). Plaintiff thus also cannot obtain an order directing a prosecutor to charge defendants. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims seeking to press criminal charges, and Plaintiff should not reassert these claims in any amended complaint that she may file in this action. B. Private Parties A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.

288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). “[A] private actor acts under color of state law when the private actor ‘is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). A complaint must allege facts showing that “the private entity and a state actor “acted in concert to commit an unconstitutional act” and that there is “such a close nexus” between the private actor and the state that underlying conduct “may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.” Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003). Defendants Stark Law PLLC, Major Development 52 Corp, and David Rafoua appear to be private parties, and Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing that they acted in concert with a

state actor to commit an unconstitutional act. Plaintiff therefore has not stated a claim against Defendants Stark Law PLLC, Major Development 52 Corp, or David Rafoua under § 1983. C. Due Process Claims The Court also liberally construes the complaint as asserting a claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. “The two threshold questions in any § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Where the government deprives a plaintiff of some interest pursuant to an established procedure, due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of hearing is provided before the individual is finally deprived of the property interest. Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). By contrast, a government employee’s random and unauthorized act does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1986).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
398 U.S. 144 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Mathews v. Eldridge
424 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Leeke v. Timmerman
454 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
455 U.S. 422 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Nnebe v. Daus
644 F.3d 147 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Sykes v. Bank of America
723 F.3d 399 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Tornheim v. Eason
363 F. Supp. 2d 674 (S.D. New York, 2005)
Green v. Bauvi
46 F.3d 189 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Stern v. Regency Towers, LLC
886 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D. New York, 2012)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Newton v. Major Development 52 Corp, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newton-v-major-development-52-corp-nysd-2019.