Newcomb v. Humansville R-IV School District

908 S.W.2d 821, 1995 Mo. App. LEXIS 1574, 1995 WL 555665
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 19, 1995
Docket20017
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 908 S.W.2d 821 (Newcomb v. Humansville R-IV School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newcomb v. Humansville R-IV School District, 908 S.W.2d 821, 1995 Mo. App. LEXIS 1574, 1995 WL 555665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

SHRUM, Chief Judge.

This case arises under the Teacher Tenure Act, §§ 168.102-.130, RSMo 1994 (the Act). 1

Mary Newcomb was a permanent teacher as defined by § 168.104(4), holding an indefinite contract 2 with Humansville R-IV School District (District). 3 District sought to terminate its contract with Newcomb on the ground of “[i]ncompetency [or] inefficiency ... in line of duty.” § 168.114.1(3). After a hearing, as provided for by § 168.118, District’s Board of Education (Board) terminated Newcomb’s contract based upon its finding of her continued incompetency and inefficiency during the curative period. § 168.116.2.

Newcomb appealed to the Circuit Court of Polk County. That court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered it to reinstate Newcomb. District appeals from that judgment.

Because she was the party aggrieved by the Board’s decision, Newcomb filed “the appellant’s brief and reply brief’ as required by Rule 84.05(e). 4 Newcomb presents four points to support her contention that the Board erred and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed: (I) Board’s decision to terminate Newcomb’s contract is based on findings that are not supported by competent and substantial evidence; (II) District’s warning letter lacked the detail and specificity required by the Act; (III) District did not, during the postwarning period, “meet and confer” with Newcomb about her alleged teaching deficiencies as mandated by the Act; and (IV) Board did not afford New-comb a fair and impartial hearing free of actual bias and prejudice.

We disagree and reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to reinstate the decision of the Board.

The essential facts are as follows:

Newcomb was a teacher for seventeen years and employed by the District for fifteen years. Generally, she taught elementary classes, although she taught junior high in 1991-92. In 1993-94, she taught District’s only third grade class. District’s principal, Sandy Wessel (Wessel), evaluated New-comb’s teaching performance during both the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years.

In a letter dated March 18, 1994, New-comb was notified by District’s superintendent that charges of incompetency, inefficiency, and insubordination might be filed against her if the causes set forth in the letter were not corrected within thirty days of the letter. 5 On May 17, 1994, District’s superintendent filed charges of incompetency and inefficiency. 6 A notice of hearing was filed with the charges as prescribed by § 168.116.3. Newcomb timely requested a hearing before the Board. A full hearing was conducted in which Newcomb was repre *824 sented by counsel and afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present all evidence that she deemed applicable. Following the hearing, the Board entered its decision, which was supported by extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. By a unanimous vote, the Board terminated New-comb’s teaching contract. Newcomb then presented the matter to the Circuit Court of Polk County for review. The trial court entered its judgment reversing Board’s decision and ordered reinstatement of Newcomb as a permanent teacher and the payment of past benefits and compensation. This appeal followed.

In Newcomb’s first point, she contends that in terminating her contract the Board acted “contrary to law, in that the overwhelming weight of the evidence failed to establish that ... Newcomb was incompetent or inefficient and the Board’s decision to terminate her employment was without sufficient evidentiary support.” Because New-comb’s argument in support of Point I appears to have three parts, we discuss each separately.

One theory of error in Newcomb’s first point, as we comprehend it, is that the Board ascribed a wrong definition or legal standard to the terms “ineompetency” and “inefficiency” in reaching its decision. In developing this argument, Newcomb recognizes that the Act does not define the terms incompetency or inefficiency. She also concedes that several cases have judicially defined the scope of these terms to mean the inability “ ‘to perform ... professional teaching duties in a manner acceptable to the Board.’ ” Artherton v. Board of Education of the School District of St. Joseph, 744 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo.A.pp.1988) (quoting Birdwell v. Hazelwood School District, 352 F.Supp. 613, 626[22] (E.D.Mo.1972), aff'd 491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir.1974)). For more recent applications of the Artherton definition of incompetency, see Johnson v. Francis Howell R-3 Board of Education, 868 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Mo.App.1994), and Beck v. James, 793 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Mo.App.1990).

Nevertheless, Newcomb argues that the foregoing cases do not state the legal standard that should be applied in her case. She avers that during the 1993-94 school year, District created “the conditions which [rendered her unable] to perform her professional teaching duties,” and thus “led to the warning letter, and ... charges.” To support this assertion, Newcomb points to evidence that the third grade class assigned to her for 1993-94 had thirty-two students (composed of twenty-six boys and six girls), ranging in age from eight to nine years, and of the thirty-two pupils at least seven were “special needs” children. Additionally, she refers to evidence that school administrators were frequently in her room observing and that on several occasions a video camera was set up in her classroom.

Without further elaboration and without pointing to other evidence to support her claim, Newcomb concludes “[t]here were many disruptions intentionally caused by the administration. All of these factors led to a status of disorder.” With that as her premise, Newcomb suggests that “the definition of incompetency adopted by the Court in Arth-erton is not necessarily controlling when, as here, the ability to perform the teacher’s professional teaching duties during the one year in question was dictated by conditions not within control of the teacher.”

We are not persuaded that District “created conditions” that led to the “status of disorder” in Newcomb’s class or that it intentionally ■ caused disruptions in her classroom. District assigned Newcomb to teach the third grade class in accordance with her choice. Before District made classroom assignments for the 1993-94 year, Wessel asked New-comb what class she could be most effective with and have the best chance to improve. Newcomb chose the third grade, saying she had taught that grade level for many years.

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Bluebook (online)
908 S.W.2d 821, 1995 Mo. App. LEXIS 1574, 1995 WL 555665, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newcomb-v-humansville-r-iv-school-district-moctapp-1995.