UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Angle LLC
v. Case No. 22-cv-113-PB Opinion No. 2022 DNH 116 IQAir North America, Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
New Angle LLC and IQAir North America, Inc. are engaged in a
corporate quarrel involving dueling intellectual property and tortious
interference with economic relationships claims. They are fighting their
battle on two fronts: New Angle’s suit before me and another brought by
IQAir in the Central District of California. IQAir’s argument here is that this
court lacks personal jurisdiction to consider New Angle’s claims. If IQAir is
correct, the parties agree that I should transfer the case to the Central
District of California, where it is undisputed that the court has personal
jurisdiction. 1
1 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) permits a court to transfer rather than dismiss a case in
which the court lacks personal jurisdiction, if the case could have been brought in the transferee court and the “interest of justice” supports the transfer. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (recognizing that a court can transfer a case under § 1406(a) whether or not it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant). I. BACKGROUND
IQAir is a global manufacturer and distributor of air purification and
filtration products. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 8. It is incorporated and
headquartered in California. See Def.’s Mot., Doc. No. 5-1, 13. New Angle,
operating out of New Hampshire, manufactures aftermarket air filters for air
purifiers, humidifiers, and deodorizers, including those manufactured by
IQAir. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 6.
New Angle sued IQAir in New Hampshire Superior Court in March
2022. See Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1. IQAir then removed the case to
federal court and invoked the court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See
id. ¶ 5-7. New Angle’s core complaint is that IQAir filed baseless trademark
infringement claims against it with the online retailers Amazon and eBay,
who then delisted several New Angle products, yielding hundreds of
thousands of dollars in lost sales. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1 ¶ 23. Shortly after
New Angle filed its complaint, IQAir filed its own trademark infringement
action against New Angle in the Central District of California. See IQAir
Compl., Doc. No. 5-2.
IQAir is not registered to do business in New Hampshire, nor has it
owned any real property or maintained a bank account in the state. See
Hammes Decl., Doc. No. 5-3, ¶¶ 2-3, 5. In 2021, IQAir’s annual in-state sales
were slightly more than $200,000, or 0.41% of its national sales. See id. ¶ 4.
2 IQAir has moved to dismiss or transfer New Angle’s claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a defendant contests personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2),
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a basis for jurisdiction exists.
Nandjou v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 985 F.3d 135, 147 (1st Cir. 2021). Where, as
here, the court considers a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without holding an
evidentiary hearing, the court applies the prima facie standard. See id. Under
this standard, the plaintiff must “proffer evidence which, taken at face value,
suffices to show all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Baskin-Robbins
Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). In
conducting this analysis, I take the evidence offered by the plaintiff as true
and construe it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional
claim. Nandjou, 985 F.3d at 147–48. I can also consider facts offered by the
defendant when they are uncontradicted. A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc.,
812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016).
III. ANALYSIS
When assessing personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a federal court
“is the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.”
Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34 (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381,
1387 (1st Cir. 1995)). The court must determine whether an exercise of
3 jurisdiction is proper under both the forum’s long-arm statute and the
Constitution’s due process clause. C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food &
Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014). Because New Hampshire’s long-
arm statute is coextensive with the due process clause, I need only consider
whether exercising personal jurisdiction would satisfy due process. Phillips
Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 287 (1st Cir. 1999). 2
Due process requires that the defendant “have certain minimum
contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Plixer Int’l, Inc. v.
Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (cleaned up). When the plaintiff
asserts specific jurisdiction, due process requires that (1) her “claim directly
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-state activities”; (2) “the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state represent a purposeful availment of
the privilege of conducting activities in that state”; and (3) “the exercise of
jurisdiction is ultimately reasonable.” Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. The
Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018). IQAir disputes all three elements,
2 New Angle does not pursue a general jurisdiction theory of personal
jurisdiction, so I will only discuss whether the court has specific jurisdiction. See Mojtabai v. Mojtabai, 4 F.4th 77, 86 (1st Cir. 2021).
4 but I need only discuss the first two. See O’Neil v. Somatics, LLC, 2021 DNH
151, 2021 WL 4395115, at *5–6 (D.N.H. Sept. 24, 2021).
IQAir argues that New Angle cannot satisfy the relatedness
requirement because it has had no contacts with New Hampshire that have
any bearing on New Angle’s claims. New Angle responds by claiming that it
has sufficiently alleged relatedness because it has felt the effects of IQAir’s
tortious conduct in New Hampshire. But the in-state effects of out-of-state
conduct cannot, standing alone, satisfy the relatedness requirement. See
Vapotherm v.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Angle LLC
v. Case No. 22-cv-113-PB Opinion No. 2022 DNH 116 IQAir North America, Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
New Angle LLC and IQAir North America, Inc. are engaged in a
corporate quarrel involving dueling intellectual property and tortious
interference with economic relationships claims. They are fighting their
battle on two fronts: New Angle’s suit before me and another brought by
IQAir in the Central District of California. IQAir’s argument here is that this
court lacks personal jurisdiction to consider New Angle’s claims. If IQAir is
correct, the parties agree that I should transfer the case to the Central
District of California, where it is undisputed that the court has personal
jurisdiction. 1
1 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) permits a court to transfer rather than dismiss a case in
which the court lacks personal jurisdiction, if the case could have been brought in the transferee court and the “interest of justice” supports the transfer. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (recognizing that a court can transfer a case under § 1406(a) whether or not it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant). I. BACKGROUND
IQAir is a global manufacturer and distributor of air purification and
filtration products. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 8. It is incorporated and
headquartered in California. See Def.’s Mot., Doc. No. 5-1, 13. New Angle,
operating out of New Hampshire, manufactures aftermarket air filters for air
purifiers, humidifiers, and deodorizers, including those manufactured by
IQAir. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 6.
New Angle sued IQAir in New Hampshire Superior Court in March
2022. See Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1. IQAir then removed the case to
federal court and invoked the court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See
id. ¶ 5-7. New Angle’s core complaint is that IQAir filed baseless trademark
infringement claims against it with the online retailers Amazon and eBay,
who then delisted several New Angle products, yielding hundreds of
thousands of dollars in lost sales. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1 ¶ 23. Shortly after
New Angle filed its complaint, IQAir filed its own trademark infringement
action against New Angle in the Central District of California. See IQAir
Compl., Doc. No. 5-2.
IQAir is not registered to do business in New Hampshire, nor has it
owned any real property or maintained a bank account in the state. See
Hammes Decl., Doc. No. 5-3, ¶¶ 2-3, 5. In 2021, IQAir’s annual in-state sales
were slightly more than $200,000, or 0.41% of its national sales. See id. ¶ 4.
2 IQAir has moved to dismiss or transfer New Angle’s claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a defendant contests personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2),
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a basis for jurisdiction exists.
Nandjou v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 985 F.3d 135, 147 (1st Cir. 2021). Where, as
here, the court considers a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without holding an
evidentiary hearing, the court applies the prima facie standard. See id. Under
this standard, the plaintiff must “proffer evidence which, taken at face value,
suffices to show all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Baskin-Robbins
Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). In
conducting this analysis, I take the evidence offered by the plaintiff as true
and construe it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional
claim. Nandjou, 985 F.3d at 147–48. I can also consider facts offered by the
defendant when they are uncontradicted. A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc.,
812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016).
III. ANALYSIS
When assessing personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a federal court
“is the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.”
Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34 (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381,
1387 (1st Cir. 1995)). The court must determine whether an exercise of
3 jurisdiction is proper under both the forum’s long-arm statute and the
Constitution’s due process clause. C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food &
Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014). Because New Hampshire’s long-
arm statute is coextensive with the due process clause, I need only consider
whether exercising personal jurisdiction would satisfy due process. Phillips
Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 287 (1st Cir. 1999). 2
Due process requires that the defendant “have certain minimum
contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Plixer Int’l, Inc. v.
Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (cleaned up). When the plaintiff
asserts specific jurisdiction, due process requires that (1) her “claim directly
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-state activities”; (2) “the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state represent a purposeful availment of
the privilege of conducting activities in that state”; and (3) “the exercise of
jurisdiction is ultimately reasonable.” Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. The
Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018). IQAir disputes all three elements,
2 New Angle does not pursue a general jurisdiction theory of personal
jurisdiction, so I will only discuss whether the court has specific jurisdiction. See Mojtabai v. Mojtabai, 4 F.4th 77, 86 (1st Cir. 2021).
4 but I need only discuss the first two. See O’Neil v. Somatics, LLC, 2021 DNH
151, 2021 WL 4395115, at *5–6 (D.N.H. Sept. 24, 2021).
IQAir argues that New Angle cannot satisfy the relatedness
requirement because it has had no contacts with New Hampshire that have
any bearing on New Angle’s claims. New Angle responds by claiming that it
has sufficiently alleged relatedness because it has felt the effects of IQAir’s
tortious conduct in New Hampshire. But the in-state effects of out-of-state
conduct cannot, standing alone, satisfy the relatedness requirement. See
Vapotherm v. Santiago, 38 F.4th 252, 261 (1st Cir. 2022).
New Angle’s citation to Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009), does not assist it. The facts here are a far cry from the
“formidable array of [in-state] connections” that the plaintiff identified in
Astro-Med. See id. at 10. There, a California defendant hired a Rhode Island
plaintiff’s employee, allegedly violating non-competition and trade-secrets
clauses in the employee’s contract. See id. at 6–7. The defendant had “full
knowledge” of the contract’s Rhode Island forum-selection and choice-of-law
clause but hired the employee all the same. Id. at 12. The court stressed that
“the breach of contract — the actual injury — . . . occurred in” Rhode Island,
even though the employee was recruited out-of-state. See id. at 10. New
Angle cannot point to any similar facts in this case.
5 New Angle also mistakenly analogizes this case to an out-of-circuit
case, Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir.
2008). In Dudnikov, the plaintiffs planned to use eBay to auction off prints
located in Colorado that the defendants believed infringed their copyrights.
Id. at 1067. The defendants complained to eBay, who then canceled the
auction. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendants’ clear goal was to
cancel the plaintiffs’ Colorado-based auction. Id. at 1075. And since the
defendants’ “express aim” was to “halt a Colorado-based sale by a Colorado
resident,” Colorado had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 1075–76.
The Tenth Circuit has since explained that Dudnikov’s reasoning is limited to
cases when there is a “particular sale or transaction” in the forum state that
“was disrupted by [the defendant’s out-of-state] actions.” See C5 Med. Werks,
LLC v. CeramTec GMBH, 937 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 2019). Nothing like
that happened here. Accordingly, Dudnikov is a very different case that does
not affect my analysis.
Although failing to establish relatedness is fatal to New Angle’s
argument, IQAir is also entitled to dismissal because New Angle has not
satisfied the purposeful availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test. To
meet this requirement, “the defendant’s in-state contacts must represent a
purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and
6 making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts
foreseeable.” Astro-Med, 591 F.3d at 10. “The two key focal points of this
concept are voluntariness and foreseeability.” Id. The relevant “contacts must
be voluntary and not based on the unilateral actions of another party.” Id.
“And, the defendant’s contacts must be such that he could ‘reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.’” Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
New Angle argues that IQAir purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting business in New Hampshire because it sent a cease-and-desist
letter to New Angle in New Hampshire, engaged in pre-suit negotiations with
New Angle’s New Hampshire-based attorneys, and sent multiple claims to
New Angle through the company’s website domain registrar. I am
unpersuaded by New Angle’s argument. It may well be true that a pattern of
multiple cease-and-desist letters and extensive pre-suit negotiations directed
at the plaintiff in the forum state can suffice to support a finding of
purposeful availment in certain circumstances. See, e.g., PerDiemCo LLC,
997 F.3d 1147, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, however, New Angle alleges that
IQAir sent only a single cease-and-desist letter to its New Hampshire offices
and engaged in only a limited number of communications with its New
Hampshire attorneys. Wang Aff. Doc. No. 11-1 ¶¶ 22–23. Further, although
New Angle alleges that it threatened to sue IQAir in New Hampshire during
7 these negotiations, it does not suggest that IQAir ever agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of New Hampshire’s courts. Accordingly, this case is more similar
to other cases in which courts have refused to base a finding of personal
jurisdiction on the sending of a -and-desist letter. See, e.g., Kehm Oil
Company v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 301 (3rd Cir. 2008) (purposeful
availment); see also Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, 148 F.3d
1355, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“principles of fairness”); see Sabanek Assoc.,
Inc. v. Navarro, 1995 WL 869382 *3 (D.N.H. 1995); see also Nova Biomedical
Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190, 197 (1st Cir. 1980) (“The mailing of an
infringement notice standing alone has rarely been deemed sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional standard” (dictum)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum and Order, I determine
that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over IQAir. IQAir’s Motion to
Dismiss or Transfer (Doc. No. 5) is granted to the extent that the case shall
be transferred to the Central District of California.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge
September 22, 2022
cc: Counsel of Record